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Mixed-Effects Modeling and Non-Reductive Explanation
(4975 words)
Abstract: This essay considers a mixed-effects modeling practice and its 
implications for the philosophical debate surrounding reductive explanation. 
Mixed-effects modeling is a species of the multilevel modeling practice, where a 
single model incorporates simultaneously two (or even more) levels of 
explanatory variables to explain a phenomenon of interest. I argue that this 
practice makes the position of explanatory reductionism held by many 
philosophers untenable, because it violates two central tenets of explanatory 
reductionism: single level preference and lower-level obsession.
1
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1. Introduction
Explanatory reductionism is the position which holds that, given a relatively 
higher-level phenomenon (or state, event, process, etc.), it can be reductively 
explained by a relatively lower-level feature (Kaiser 2015, 97; see also Sarkar 
1998; Weber 2005; Rosenberg 2006; Waters 2008).1 Though philosophers tend to 
have slightly different conceptions of the position, two central tenets of the 
position can still be extracted:2 
Single level preference: a phenomenon of interest can be fully explained by
invoking features that reside at a single, well-defined level of analysis (e.g., 
molecular level in biology).
1 According to Sarkar (1998), explanatory reduction is an epistemological thesis 
which is distinguished from constitutive (ontological) and theory reductionism 
theses. Kaiser further distinguishes two sub-types of explanatory reduction: (a) “a 
relation between a higher-level explanation and a lower-level explanation of the 
same phenomenon” (2015, 97); (b) individual explanations, i.e., given a relatively
higher-level phenomenon, it can be reductively explained by a relatively lower-
level feature (Ibid., 97). This essay will focus on the second sub-type. Besides, 
when referring to levels I mean either hierarchical organization such as 
universities, faculties, departments etc., or functional organization such as organs,
tissues, cells etc. When referring to scales I mean spatial or temporal scaling 
where levels are not so clearly delimited.
2 Similar summary of the position can be found in Sober (1999).
2
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Lower-level obsession: lower-level features always provide the most 
significant and detailed explanation of the phenomenon in question, so a 
lower-level explanation is always better than a higher-level explanation.
Philosophers sometimes express these two tenets explicitly in their work. For 
example, Alex Rosenberg holds that “[…] there is a full and complete explanation
of every biological fact, state, event, process, trend, or generalization, and that this
explanation will cite only the interaction of macromolecules to provide this 
explanation” (Rosenberg 2006, 12). Marcel Weber expresses a similar idea in his 
explanatory hegemony thesis, according to which it’s always some lower-level 
physicochemical laws (or principles) that ultimately do the explanatory work in 
experimental biology (Weber 2005, 18-50). John Bickle attempts to motivate a 
‘ruthless’ reduction of psychological phenomena (e.g., memory) to the molecular 
level (Bickle 2003).
However, many philosophers have questioned the plausibility of the position 
on the basis of scientific practice (Hull 1972; Craver 2007; Bechtel 2010; 
Brigandt 2010; Hüttemann and Love 2011; Kaiser 2015). To counter that 
position, some authors have pointed to the relevance of an important practice that 
has not received sufficient attention before: multiscale or multilevel modeling or 
sometimes called integrative modeling approach, where a set of distinct models 
ranging over multiple levels or scales—including the macro-phenomenon 
level/scale—are involved in explaining a (often complex) phenomenon of interest 
3
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(Mitchell 2003, 2009; Craver 2007; Brigandt 2010, 2013a, 2013b; Knuuttila 
2011; Batterman 2013; Green 2013; O’ Malley et al. 2014; Green and Batterman 
2017). Often these models work together by providing diverse constraints on the 
potential space of representation (Knuuttila and Loettgers 2010; Knuuttila 2011; 
Green 2013).
This multilevel modeling surely casts some doubt on explanatory 
reductionism, for it seems unclear what reductively explains what—all those facts
in the set of models ranging over different levels/scales are involved in doing 
some explanatory work. However, there is a species of multilevel modeling that 
has slipped away from most philosophers’ sights: mixed-effects modeling (MEM 
hereafter)—also called multilevel regression modeling, hierarchical linear 
modeling, etc.—in which a single model incorporating simultaneously two (or 
even more) levels of variables is used to explain a phenomenon. For a mixed-
effects model to explain, features of the so-called reducing and reduced levels 
must be simultaneously incorporated into the model, that is, they must go hand in 
hand. 
MEM deserves special attention because it sheds new light on the 
reductionism-antireductionism debate by showing that (a) a mixed-effects model 
violating the two central tenets of explanatory reductionism can provide 
successful explanation, and (b) a single mixed-effects model without integrating 
with other epistemic means can also provide such successful explanation. 
Therefore, MEM first further challenges the explanatory reductionist position, and
4
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second offers a novel perspective bolstering the multilevel/multiscale integrative 
approach discussed by many philosophers.
The essay proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the challenges faced by the
traditional single-level modeling approach, and examines the reasons why the 
MEM approach is preferable in dealing with these challenges. Section 3 describes
a MEM practice using a concrete model. Section 4 elaborates on the implications 
of MEM for the explanatory reductionism debate. Finally, Section 5 considers 
potential objections to my viewpoint.
2. Challenges to Reductive Explanatory Strategies 
In many fields (e.g., biological, social and behavioral sciences) scientists find that 
the data collected show an intrinsically hierarchical or nested feature. Consider a 
simple example: we might be interested in examining relationships between 
students’ achievement at school (A hereafter) and the time they invest in studying 
(T).3 In conducting such a research, we might collect data from different classes 
(say 5 classes in total), with each class providing the same number of samples 
(say 10 students in each class). The data collected among classes might be taken 
for granted to be independent. Then we may use certain traditional statistical 
techniques such as ordinary least-squares (OLS) to analyze the data and build a 
linear relationship between A and T. 
3 For scientific studies of this kind, see Schagen (1990), Wang and Hsieh (2012), 
and Maxwell et al. (2017).
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However, this single-level reductive analysis can lead to misleading results, 
because it ignores the possibility that students within a class may be more similar 
to each other in important aspects than students from different classes. In other 
words, each group (class) may have its own features relevant to the relationship 
between A and T that the other groups lack. Hence, the data collected from the 
students are in fact not independent, i.e., the subjects are not randomly sampled, 
because the individuals (students) are clustered within groups (classes). In 
technical terms, we say our analysis may fall prey to the atomistic fallacy where 
we base our analysis solely on the individual level—i.e., we reduce all the group-
level features to the individuals. Therefore, traditional OLS techniques such as 
multiple regression cannot be employed in this context, because the case under 
consideration violates a fundamental assumption of these techniques: the 
independence of observations (Nezlek 2008, 843).
Conversely, we may face the same problem the other way around if we fail to 
consider the inherently nested nature of the data. Consider the student-
achievement-at-school case again. We may observe that in classes where the time 
of study invested by students is very high, the achievements of the students are 
also very high. Given such an observation, we may reason that students who 
invest a lot of time in studying would be more likely to get higher achievements at
school. However, this inference commits the ecological fallacy, because it 
attributes the relationship observed at the group-level to the individual-level 
(Freedman 1999). The individuals may exhibit within-group differences that the 
single group-level analysis fails to capture. In technical terms, this inference flaws
6
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because it reduces the variability in achievement at the individual-level to a 
group-level variable, and the subsequent analysis is solely based on group’s mean 
achievement results (Heck and Thomas 2015, 3). Again, traditional statistical 
techniques such as multiple regression cannot be employed in this context.
In sum, a single-level modeling approach that disrespects the multilevel data 
structure can commit either an atomistic or an ecological fallacy. Confronted with
these problems, one response is to ‘tailor’ the traditional statistical techniques by, 
e.g., adding an effect variable to the model which indicates the grouping of the 
individuals. However, many have argued that this approach is unpromising 
because it may give rise to enormous new problems (Luke 2004; Nezlek 2008; 
Heck and Thomas 2015). Alternatively, scientists have developed a new 
framework that takes the multilevel data structure into full consideration, i.e., the 
MEM approach, to which we now turn.
3. Case Study: A Mixed-Effects Model 
Depending on different conceptual and methodological roots we have two broad 
categories of MEM approaches: the multilevel regression approach and the 
structural equation modeling approach. The former usually focuses on direct 
effects of predictor variables on (typically) a single dependent variable, while the 
latter usually involves latent variables defined by observed indicators (for details 
see Heck and Thomas 2015). For the purpose of this essay’s arguments, I will 
concentrate on the first kind.
7
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Consider the student-achievement-at-school example again. Since students are
typically clustered in different classes, a student’s achievement at school may be 
both influenced by her own features (e.g., time invested in studying) and her 
class’s features (e.g., size of the class). Hence here comes two levels of analysis: 
the individual-level (level-1) and the group-level (level-2), and individuals (
i=1, 2 ,…,N ) are clustered in level-2 groups ( j=1,2 ,…,n).4 Now suppose that 
students’ achievements at school are represented as scores they get in the exam. 
The effect of time invested in studying on scores can be described as follows:
Y ij=β0 j+β1 j X ij+εij                                                               (1)
where Y ij refers to the score of individual i in the jth group,  β0 j is a level-1 
intercept representing the mean of scores for the jth group, β1 j a level-1 slope 
(i.e., different effects of study time on scores) for the predictor variable X ij, and 
the residual component (i.e., an error term) ε ij the deviation of individual i’s score 
from the level-2 mean in the jth group. Equation (1) looks like a multiple 
regression model; however, the subscript j reveals that there is a group-level 
incorporated in the model. It can also be seen from this equation that both the 
intercept β0 j and slope β1 j can vary across the level-2 units, that is, different 
groups can have different intercepts and slopes. 
4 Note that, for instructive purposes, our case involves only two levels; however, 
the MEM approach can in principle be extended to many more levels.
8
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The most remarkable thing of MEM is that we treat both the intercept and 
slope at level-1 as dependent variables (i.e., outcomes) of level-2 predictor 
variables. So here we write the following equations expressing the relationships 
between the level-1 parameters and level-2 predictors:
β0 j=γ 00+γ01W j+u0 j                                                               (2)
and
β1 j=γ10+γ11W j+u1 j                                                                (3)
where β0 j refers to the level-1 intercept in level-2 unit j, γ00 denotes the mean 
value of the level-1 intercept, controlling for the level-2 predictor W j, γ01 the 
slope for the level-2 variable W j, and u0 j the error (i.e., the random variability) for
unit j. Also, β1 j refers to the level-1 slope in level-2 unit j, γ10 the mean value of 
the level-1 slope controlling for the level-2 predictor W j, γ11 the effect of the 
level-2 predictor W j, and u1 j the error for unit j. 
Equations (2) and (3) have specific meanings and purposes. They express how
the level-1 parameters, i.e., intercept or slope, are functions of level-2 predictors 
and variability. They aim to explain variations in the randomly varying intercepts 
or slopes by adding one (or more) group-level predictor to the model. These 
expressions are based on the idea that the group-level characteristics such as 
group size may impact the strength of the within-group effect of study time on 
9
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scores. This kind of effect is called a cross-level interaction for it involves the 
impact of variables at one level of a data hierarchy on relationships at another 
level. We will discuss this in detail in the next section. 
Now we combine equations (1), (2) and (3) by substituting the level-2 parts of
the model into the level-1 equation. We finally obtain the following equation:
Y ij=[ γ00+γ 10 X ij+γ01W j+γ11 X ij W j ]+[u1 j X ij+u0 j+εij ]        (4)
This equation can be simply understood that Y ij is made up of two components: 
the fixed-effect part expressed by the first four terms and the random-effect part 
expressed by the last three terms. Note that the term γ11 X ij W j denotes a cross-
level interaction between level-1 and level-2 variables, which is defined as the 
impact of a level-2 variable on the relationship between a level-1 predictor and 
the outcome Y ij. We have 7 parameters to estimate in (4), they are four fixed 
effects: intercept, within-group predictor, between-group predictor and cross-level
interaction, two random effects: the randomly varying intercept and slope, and a 
level-1 residual. 
Now a mixed-effects model has been built, and the next step is to estimate the 
parameters of the model. However, we will skip this step and turn to explore the 
philosophical implications of the modeling practice relevant to the explanatory 
reductionism debate.
4. Implications for the Explanatory Reductionism Debate 
10
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Looking closely into the MEM practice, we find that a couple of important 
philosophical implications for the explanatory reductionism debate can be drawn.
4.1. All levels are indispensable 
The first, and most obvious, feature of MEM is that it routinely involves many 
levels of analysis in a single model, and all these levels are indispensable to the 
model in the sense that no level can be reduced to or replaced by the other levels. 
These levels consist of both the so-called reducing level in the reductionist’s 
terminology, typically a lower-level that attempts to reduce another level, and the 
reduced level, typically a higher-level to be reduced by the reducing level. In our 
student-achievement-at-school case, for example, a reductionist may state that the 
group-level will be regarded as the reduced level whereas the student-level as the 
reducing level. 
The indispensability of each level in the model can be understood in two 
related ways. First, due to the nested nature of data, only when we incorporate 
different levels of analyses to the model can we avoid either the atomistic or 
ecological fallacy discussed in Section 2. As discussed in the student-
achievement-at-school example where students are clustered in different classes 
(in the manner that students from the same class may be more similar to each 
other in important aspects than students from different classes), reducing all the 
analyses to the level of individual students can simply miss the important 
11
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information associated with group-level features and thus lead to misleading 
results. Although it’s true that the problem might be partially mitigated by 
tailoring traditional single-level analytical techniques such as multiple regression, 
it’s also true that this somewhat ad hoc maneuver can simply bring about various 
new vexing and recalcitrant issues (Luke 2004; Nezlek 2008; Heck and Thomas 
2015).
Second, the problem can also be viewed from the perspective of identifying 
explanatory variables. In building a mixed-effects model, the main consideration 
is often to find a couple of variables that may play the role of explaining the 
pattern or phenomenon observed in the data. Here a modeler must be clear about 
how to assign explanatory variables, for instance, she must consider if there are 
different levels of analyses and, if so, which explanatory variables should be 
assigned to what levels, and so on. These considerations may come before her 
model building because of background knowledge, which paves the way for her 
to develop a conceptual framework for investigating the problem of interest. 
However, without such a clear and rigorous consideration of identifying and 
assigning multilevel explanatory variables, an analysis can flaw simply because it 
confounds variables at different levels. 
Respecting the multilevel nature of explanatory variables has another 
advantage: “Through examining the variation in outcomes that exists at different 
levels of the data hierarchy, we can develop more refined theories about how 
explanatory variables at each level contribute to variation in outcomes” (Heck and
Thomas 2015, 33). In other words, in respecting the multilevel nature of 
12
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explanatory variables, we get a clear idea of how, and to what degrees, 
explanatory variables at different levels contribute to variation in outcomes. If 
these variables do contribute to variation in outcomes, as it always happens in 
MEM, then the situation suggests an image of explanatory indispensability: all the
explanatory variables at different levels are indispensable to explaining the pattern
or phenomenon of interest.
Given these considerations, therefore, one implication for the explanatory 
reductionism debate becomes clear: it isn’t always the case that, given a relatively
higher-level phenomenon it can be reductively explained by a relatively lower-
level feature. Rather, in cases where the data show a nested structure or, put 
differently, the phenomenon suggests multilevel explanatory variables, we 
routinely combine the higher-level with the lower-level in a single (explanatory) 
model. As a result, one fundamental tenet of explanatory reductionism is violated:
single level preference.
4.2. Interactions between levels
Another crucial feature of multilevel modeling is its emphasis on a cross-level 
interaction, which is defined as
“The potential effects variables at one level of a data hierarchy have on 
relationships at another level […]. Hence, the presence of a cross-level 
interaction implies that the magnitude of a relationship observed within 
13
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groups is dependent on contextual or organizational features defined by 
higher-level units”. (Heck and Thomas 2015, 42-43)
Remember that there is a term γ11 X ijW j in our mixed-effects model discussed in 
Section 3, which indicates the cross-level interaction between the group-level and 
the individual-level. More specifically, this term can be best construed as the 
impact of a group-level variable, e.g., group size, upon the individual-level 
relationship between a predictor, e.g., study time, and the outcome, e.g., students’ 
scores. 
The cross-level interaction points to the plain fact that an organization or a 
system can somehow influence its members or components by constraining how 
they behave within the organization or system. This doesn’t necessarily imply 
top-down causation (Section 5.3 will turn back to this point). Within the context 
of scientific explanation, however, it does imply that it isn’t simply that 
characteristics at different levels separately contribute to variation in outcomes, 
but rather that they interact in producing variation in outcomes. In other words, 
the pattern or phenomenon to be explained can be understood as generated by the 
interaction between explanatory variables at different levels. Therefore, to 
properly explain the phenomenon of interest, we need not only have a clear idea 
of how to assign explanatory variables to different levels but also an unequivocal 
conception of whether these explanatory variables may interact. 
Different models can be built depending on different considerations of the 
cross-level interaction. To see this, consider the student-achievement-at-school 
14
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example again. In some experiment setting we may assume that there was no 
cross-level interaction between group-level characteristics and the individual-
level relationship (between study time and scores). In such a situation, we kept the
effect of individual study time on scores the same across different classes, i.e., we 
kept the slope constant across classes. In the meanwhile, we treated another 
group-level variable (i.e., intercept) as varying across classes, i.e., different 
classes have different average scores. So, this is a case where we have a clear idea
of how to assign explanatory variables but no consideration of the cross-level 
interaction. Nonetheless, in a different experiment setting we may assume that 
there existed cross-level interaction, and hence the effect of individual study time 
on scores can no longer be kept constant across different classes. At the same 
time, we treated another group-level variable (i.e., intercept) as varying across 
classes. Hence, this is a case where we have both a clear idea of how to assign 
explanatory variables and a consideration of the cross-level interaction. 
Corresponding to these two different scenarios, two different mixed-effects 
models can be built, as shown below:
15
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Figure 1. Two different models showing varying intercepts or varying 
intercepts and slopes, respectively. Three lines represent three classes. This 
figure is adapted from Luke (2004, 12).
Given such a cross-level interaction, therefore, the explanatory reductionist 
position has been further challenged. This is because any reductive explanation 
that privileges one level of analysis—usually the lower-level—over the others 
falls short of capturing this kind of interaction between levels. If they fail to do so,
then they are missing important terms relevant to explaining the phenomenon of 
interest. As a consequence, a mixed-effects model involving interactions between 
levels simultaneously violates the two fundamental pillars of explanatory 
reductionism: first, it violates single level preference because it involves 
multilevel explanatory variables in explaining phenomena, and second, it violates 
lower-level obsession because it privileges no levels—all levels are interactively 
engaged in producing outcomes. 
16
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5. Potential Objections 
This section considers two potential objections.
5.1. In-principle argument
One argument that resurfaces all the time in the reductionism-versus-
antireductionism debate is the in-principle argument, the core of which is that 
even if reductive explanations in a field of study are not available for the time 
being, it doesn’t follow that we won’t obtain them someday (e.g., Sober 1999; 
Rosenberg 2006). Therefore, according to some reductionists, the gap between 
current-science and future-science is simply a matter of time, for advancement in 
techniques, experimentation and data collecting can surely fill in the gap. 
However, I think the argument flaws. To begin with, advancement in 
techniques, experimentation and data collecting isn’t always followed by 
reductive explanations. For example, in our MEM discussed in Section 3, even if 
the data about the individual-level is available and sufficiently detailed, it isn’t the
case that we explain the phenomenon of interest in terms of the data from the 
individual-level alone. Consider another example: in dealing with problems 
associated with complex systems in systems biology, even though large-scale 
experimentation (e.g., via computational simulation) can be conducted and high 
throughput data arranging over multiple scales/levels can be collected, a bottom-
up reductive approach must be integrated with a top-down perspective so as to 
17
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produce useful explanations or predictions (Green 2013; Green and Batterman 
2017; Gross and Green 2017). 
Nevertheless, reductionists may reply that the situations presented above only 
constitute an in-practice impediment, for it doesn’t undermine the possibility that 
lower-level reductive explanations, typically provided by some form of ‘final 
science’, will be available someday. Let us dwell on the notion of possibility a bit 
longer. The possibility here may be construed as a logical possibility (Green and 
Batterman 2017, 21; see also Batterman 2017). Nonetheless, if it’s merely 
logically possible that there will be some final science providing only reductive 
explanations, then nothing can exclude another logical possibility that there will 
be some ‘mixed-science’ providing only multilevel explanations. After all, how 
can we decide which logical possibility is more possible (or logically more 
possible)? I doubt that logic alone could provide anything useful in justifying 
which possibility is more possible, and that appealing to logical possibility could 
offer anything insightful in helping us understand how science proceeds. As 
Batterman puts, “Appeals to the possibility of in principle derivations rarely, if 
ever, come with even the slightest suggestion about how the derivations are 
supposed to go” (2017, 12; author’s emphasis). 
Another interpretation of possibility may be associated with real possibilities, 
referring to the actual cases of reductive explanations happening in science. 
Unfortunately, I don’t think the real scenario in science speaks for the reductionist
under this interpretation. Though it’s impossible to calculate the absolute cases of 
non-reductive explanations occurring in science, a cursive look at scientific 
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practice can tell that a large portion of scientific explanations proceeds in a non-
reductive fashion, as suggested by multilevel modeling (Batterman 2013; Green 
2013; O’ Malley et al. 2014; Green and Batterman 2017; Mitchell and 
Gronenborn 2017). Moreover, even in areas such as physics which was regarded 
as a paradigm for the reductionist stance, progressive explanatory reduction 
doesn’t always happen (Green and Batterman 2017; Batterman 2017). 
In sum, we have shown that the in-principle argument fails for it neither offers
help in understanding how science proceeds if it’s construed as implying a logical
possibility, nor goes in tune with scientific practice if it’s construed as implying 
real possibilities.
5.2. Top-down causation 
In Section 3 we have shown that there is a cross-level interaction taking the form 
that higher-level features may impact lower-level features. A worry arises: Does 
this imply top-down causation? 
My answer to this question is twofold. First, it’s clear that this short essay 
isn’t aimed to engage in the philosophical debate about whether, and in what 
sense, there exists top-down causation (see Craver and Bechtel 2007; Kaiser 
2015; Bechtel 2017). Second, what we can do now is to show that the cross-level 
interaction is a clear and well-defined concept in multilevel modeling. It 
unambiguously means the constraints on the lower-level processes exerted by the 
higher-level parameters (Green and Batterman 2017). In our multilevel modeling 
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discussed in Section 3, we have shown that group-level features may impact some
individual-level features through the way that each group possesses its own 
feature relevant to explaining the differences at the individual-level across groups.
This idea is incorporated into the mixed-effects model by assigning some 
explanatory variables to the group-level and a cross-level interaction term to the 
model.
The idea of cross-level-interaction-as-constraint is widely accepted in 
multilevel modeling broadly construed, where constraint is usually expressed in 
the form of initial and/or boundary conditions. For example, in modeling cardiac 
rhythms, due to “the influences of initial and boundary conditions on the solutions
of the differential equations used to represent the lower level process” (Noble 
2012, 55; Cf. Green and Batterman 2017, 32), a model cannot simply narrowly 
focus on the level of proteins and DNA but must also consider the levels of cell 
and tissue working as constraints. The same story happens in cancer research, 
where scientists are advocating the idea that tumor development can be better 
understood if we consider the varying constraints exerted by tissue (Nelson and 
Bissel 2006; Shawky and Davidson 2015; Cf. Green and Batterman 2017, 32).
6. conclusion
This essay has shown that no-reductive explanations involving many levels 
predominate in areas where the systems under consideration exhibit a hierarchical
structure. These explanations violate the fundamental pillars of explanatory 
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reductionism: single level preference and lower-level obsession. Traditional 
single-level reductive approaches fall short of capturing systems of this kind 
because they face the challenges of committing either the atomistic or ecological 
fallacy. 
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The Universe Never Had a Chance
C. D. McCoy∗†
1 March 2018
Abstract
Demarest asserts that we have good evidence for the existence and nature of an initial
chance event for the universe. I claim that we have no such evidence and no knowledge
of its supposed nature. Against relevant comparison classes her initial chance account
is no better, and in some ways worse, than its alternatives.
Word Count: 4712
1 Introduction
Although cosmology, the study of the universe’s evolution, has largely become a province
of physics, philosophical speculation concerning cosmogony, the study of the origin of the
universe, continues up to the present. Certainly, many believe that science has settled this
too by way of the well-known and well-confirmed big bang model of the universe.
According to the big bang account the universe began in a extremely hot, dense state,
composed of all the different manifestations of energy that we know. Indeed, time itself
began with the big bang. Yet, properly speaking, the universe’s past singularity is not some
event in spacetime according to the general theory of relativity. In cosmological models this
hot dense state called the big bang is generally understood instead as just a very early stage
of the universe’s evolution, i.e. properly a part of cosmology and not cosmogony. While we
may be highly confident that the entire big bang story is correct back to a very early time,
our confidence should at some point decrease as we near the supposed ”first moment”. Thus
there remains world enough and time to engage in traditional philosophical and scientific
speculations about cosmogony and cosmology alike. Were there previous stages to the
universe? What brought the universe into existence? What was the character of this initial
happening (should it in fact exist)?
The ubiquity of probabilities in modern physical theories, e.g. quantum mechanics and
statistical mechanics, has led some to wonder as well how chance should fit into our
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cosmogonical worldview. In this vein, Demarest (2016) argues that the probabilities of all
events in a(n ostensibly) deterministic universe can be derived from an initial chance event
and, what’s more, that “we have good evidence of its existence and nature.” In this paper I
aim to dispute these latter claims. I argue that we do not have any evidence at all of an
initial chance event in a big bang universe as described above, much less of its nature. What
we rather have in Demarest’s account is just a particular way of interpreting probabilistic
theories, where all probabilities are taken to derive from ontic chances pertaining to the
particular genesis of the relevant physical system, e.g. the universe as a whole. I claim that
this interpretation, while coherent, should be disfavored in cosmology—we should rather
say that the universe never had a chance.1 Along the way I will make several clarifying
remarks concerning the relation of chance and determinism, cosmological probabilities, and
alternative interpretations of statistical and quantum mechanics.
2 Chance and Determinism in Physical Theory
By the world metaphysicians usually mean something like “the maximally inclusive entity
whose parts are all the things that exist.” Of course terminology varies. This particular
rendering comes from Schaffer (2010, 33), who instead chooses to call this entity the
cosmos. Cosmologists do not usually call their object of study the cosmos; more commonly
they say that they study the universe. In Cosmology: The Science of the Universe, Harrison
explicitly notes the philosophical and historical dimensions of the world taken in its
broadest sense, designating this world as a whole the Universe. Cosmology, according to
Harrison, is the study of universes, by which he means particular models of the Universe
(Harrison, 2000, Ch. 1). Cosmological models are the particular concern of physical
cosmologists; they are physical models of the Universe, which describe especially its
large-scale structure and the evolution thereof.
In what follows I employ these terminologies in the following way. By the world I
designate the locus of (principally) metaphysical questions concerning the Universe. Is the
world deterministic? Is it chancy? By the universe I designate the locus of principally
physical questions concerning the Universe. How did the big bang universe begin? How
will it end? These are questions to which the big bang model should provide an answer.
I do not mean, of course, to introduce an admittedly arbitrary distinction between
science and metaphysics by differentiating universes and worlds. Indeed, when one asks
whether the world is deterministic, many metaphysicians of science would look first to
models of the Universe to help decide the question. Wu¨thrich for example remarks,
matter-of-factly, that “this metaphysical question deflates into the question of whether our
best physical theories entail that the world is deterministic or indeterministic” (Wu¨thrich,
2011, 366).
1There are several senses, in fact, in which this claim is true. Cosmology suggests that the inevitable fate
of the universe is to become ever more sparse and empty through the accelerated expansion of space under the
influence of dark energy.
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Indeed, many discussions of determinism adopt the approach mentioned by Wu¨thrich.
Let determinism denote the thesis that the world is deterministic. Then, following for
example (Lewis, 1983, 360), a world is deterministic if and only if the laws of that world
are deterministic. To determine whether the laws of the universe are deterministic, we must
look to our theories of which those laws are part and ask whether those laws taken together
should be considered deterministic. It is by no means a straightforward matter to decide
whether a given physical theory is deterministic of course. Even the classic example of
deterministic physics, Newtonian mechanics, admits many counterexamples against its
putative determinism (Earman, 1986; Norton, 2008). General relativity as well seemingly
permits indeterministic phenomena in the form of causal pathologies (closed timelike
curves) (Earman, 1995) and, if the hole argument is to be believed, is hopelessly rife with
indeterminism (Earman and Norton, 1987).
Although classical theories like classical mechanics and general relativity are
nevertheless debatably deterministic, surely probabilistic theories like quantum mechanics
are properly characterized as indeterministic (at least so long as the probabilities involved
are objective features of the world). Yet various interpretations of probabilistic theories seek
to avoid indeterminism even here, where it seems unassailable, by characterizing
probabilities as merely epistemic or subjective, or else by presenting them as fully
deterministic theories (as in the Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics).
Philosophers have raised serious concerns, however, over how one can truly understand
probabilities in deterministic theories, an issue that has been termed the “paradox of
deterministic probabilities” (Loewer, 2001; Winsberg, 2008; Lyon, 2011) in statistical
mechanics, since objective probabilities seem to entail indeterminism necessarily.
The most well-known and successful reconciliation of chance and determinism in the
context of statistical mechanics is defended by Loewer (2001). It is seldom recognized by
interpreters, however, that there is no reconciliation in the sense of simultaneous
compatibility between chance and determinism. The world cannot both be chancy and
deterministic as a matter of metaphysical fact. As Lewis writes, “to the question of how
chance can be reconciled with determinism, or to the question of how disparate chances can
be reconciled with one another, my answer is: it can’t be done (Lewis, 1986, 118). This is
because chance entails indeterminism, the contrary of determinism. Thus, insofar as the
probabilities of statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics are objective, these theories
are indeterministic theories. Loewer’s account actually shows us how deterministic laws
can co-exist with indeterministic laws within a theory. The source of all probabilities in
statistical mechanics, according to Loewer, is in an initial chance distribution over
microscopic states of affairs. After the initial time these states of affairs evolve
deterministically. Note that although for almost all times evolution is deterministic, it is not
so at all times. There is an initial chance event, which is where the indeterminism of the
theory appears. A deterministic theory is, recall, a theory whose laws are deterministic, not
a theory whose laws are mostly deterministic or operate deterministically for almost all
times.
Loewer’s account is also presented in terms of Humean chances, so he does not believe
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these chances and laws actually exist. According to the modern Humean, they merely are
the result of the best systematizations of the occurrent facts, in keeping with Lewis’s “best
systems account” of laws and chances. Demarest, however, offers a small tweak to
Loewer’s Humean account by invoking a “robustly metaphysical account of chance”
(Demarest, 2016, 256). She claims that such chances are compatible with determinism, and
indeed they are when, as said, compatibility is understood to pertain to the co-existence of
indeterministic and deterministic laws in a single theory—which, however, do not operate
at the same time.2
Demarest’s central claims are that this initial chance event exists and that we have good
evidence for it. I dispute these claims in the remainder of the paper.
To begin, it is not so clear what exactly Demarest takes the evidence for the initial
chance event to be. She does contrast the evidential position of her view with the Humean
view of Loewer, claiming that, “for the Humean, the statistical patterns in the world are not
evidence of an initial chance event” (Demarest, 2016, 261)—presumably this is so because
Humeans reject the metaphysics of chance for the usual Humean reasons. One might
suppose, then, that she believes that statistical patterns in the world are evidence of an initial
chance event for all those who do not share the Humeans ontological worries. Let us accept,
for the moment then, that statistical patterns may be some evidence for the existence of
chances, for it is difficult to see what other evidence there might be for an initial chance
event. In that case, on what grounds might we say that statistical patterns are good evidence
for initial chances? I consider a series of three salient contrast classes.
First, do statistical patterns in data provide good evidence for indeterministic (i.e.
chancy) theories rather than deterministic theories? It would seem that the answer is: not
necessarily. (Werndl, 2009), for example, argues for the observational equivalence of
indeterministic theories and deterministic theories. If one could contrive a fully
deterministic theory that reproduces the same statistical patterns of the relevant phenomena
observed in nature, then it would seem that such patterns provide no better evidence for the
indeterministic theory than the deterministic one. However, since the theories under
discussion, statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics, are generally characterized as
indeterministic, let us flag but set aside the possibility of fully deterministic alternatives to
them.
So, second, do statistical patterns provide good evidence for initial chances rather than
non-initial chances? It would seem that the answer is firmly: no. There is a variety of ways
one could implement chances into a probabilistic theory like statistical mechanics. All one
must do, as Loewer shows us by example, is neatly separate when the indeterministic laws
are operative and when the deterministic laws are operative. Loewer chooses to locate all
the indeterminism in one place—the initial time—but one could equally locate it at another
time, at many times, or even all times. Statistical mechanics does not wear its interpretation
on its sleeve, just as quantum mechanics does not decide between solutions of the
measurement problem, whether initial chances as in Bohmian mechanics or collapse
2Still, it is worth emphasizing that her claim that her account applies to deterministic worlds is false, for
chancy worlds are not deterministic.
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dynamics as in GRW (discrete time collapses) or CSL (continuous collapses). Unless there
are evidential reasons to favor one implementation of indeteterministic probabilities over
the others, there is not good evidence for an initial chance event. Certainly statistical
patterns in nature will not do so.
Third, do statistical patterns provide good evidence for “robustly metaphysics” chances
rather than Humean chances? It seems as if this might Demarest’s intended contrast class,
since much of the discussion in the paper concerns the Humean account. I will have
something to say about the relative merits of Demarest’s non-Humean account and
Loewer’s Humean account at the end of the next section. In any case though, it does not
seem as if statistical patterns decide the matter in Demarest’s mind, for she repeatedly
demurs in the face of Humean responses to the considerations she raises, claiming only to
offer an alternative “for philosophers who are antecedently sympathetic to governing laws
of nature or powerful properties” (Demarest, 2016, 261-2). She finds it “plausible to think
of the universe as having an initial state and as producing subsequent states in accordance
with the laws of nature (some of which may be chancy)” (Demarest, 2016, 261). Such
metaphysical intuitions are not grounded on observations of statistical patterns. Statistical
patterns do not have any evidential bearing on the metaphysical dispute between the
Humean and non-Humean.
Therefore, based on my canvassing of relevant alternatives, I conclude that we in fact do
not have good evidence for an initial chance event, where evidence is interpreted in terms of
statistical patterns (or in any usual sense of the term “evidence”). At best we have a
motivation to attend to indeterministic theories when our evidence displays statistical
patterns. It is another matter entirely to decide how to implement probabilities in that theory.
That said, Demarest’s reasoning could be interpreted at points as invoking explanatory
considerations as justification for the initial chance interpretation. Insofar as one considers
“what justifies” as constituting evidence, perhaps these explanatory considerations should
be counted as evidence.3 Nevertheless, it does not look, on the face of it, like we have good
evidence for an initial chance event still. Repeating the three cases considered before:
deterministic and chancy theories can both serviceably explain statistical evidence;
alternative implementations of chance in interpretations of indeterministic theories explain
statistical evidence equally well; Humean and non-Humean metaphysics each render a story
for how statistical patterns come about (merely subjective intuitions notwithstanding).
Without explicit explanatory reasons to prefer one of these alternatives to the other, reasons
lacking in Demarest’s argument, good evidence (in this wider sense) for an initial chance
event remains elusive.
3There are obvious dangers with going to far in this direction. Suppose that the Supreme Being explains
all. Then it would appear that we have very good evidence of Its existence, which is obviously absurd.
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3 Chance and Determinism in Systems of the World
In the previous section I gave reasons to doubt Demarest’s claims about an initial chance
event and our evidence for it. I disputed especially that we have evidence for it and did so
by comparing it to alternatives of three different kinds. In the first case I characterized the
issue (in part) as a matter of theory choice, namely of choosing between an indeterministic
and deterministic theory. In the second case I characterized the issue as a matter of theory
interpretation, namely of interpreting between different ways of implementing probability
in a theory that does not decide one way or another on how this must be done. In the third
case I characterized the issue as a matter of metaphysics, namely of deciding between the
ontological status of chances.
In this section I consider more broadly whether there are any reasons to favor
Demarest’s interpretation, in particular in the sense of the just given second characterization
of the issue. The question is whether the world should be thought to have an initial chance
event, when one might consider that it is chancy in various other ways, e.g. its laws of
evolution themselves are always probabilistically indeterministic.
First of all, it is worth mentioning that from the point of view given by the
contemporary standard model of cosmology this question is moot. The so-called ΛCDM
model, a development of the older standard big bang model, is a model of the general
theory of relativity, a theory which makes use of no probabilities at all in its basic
description of gravitating systems (including the universe). In this different sense it is also
true that the universe never had a chance.
Demarest is not particularly interested in cosmology or the universes of general
relativity however. She is concerned with probabilistic theories like classical statistical
mechanics and quantum mechanics as applied to the world at large. We should, that is,
imagine a statistical mechanical universe or a quantum mechanical universe (never minding
that no concrete such model exists in physics that describes our universe) as a conceptual
possibility when asking metaphysical questions about the world. Given the different ways
of implementing probabilities in such a universe, we should ask whether one way is
preferable to the others.
I should point out that this is not Demarest’s question, for she explicitly restricts
attention to “deterministically evolving worlds”. Of course these worlds are not actually
deterministic so long as the probabilities involved are chances. Nevertheless, unaffected by
that fact is one of her central points: “that positing just one initial chance event can justify
the usefulness and explain the ubiquity of nontrivial probabilities to epistemic agents like
us, even if there are no longer any chance events in our world”(Demarest, 2016, 249). I say:
so can a lot of other ways of conceiving chance in these theories. It is therefore necessary to
compare them if we are to take Demarest’s (and Loewer’s) account seriously.
For present purposes, I am happy to agree with Demarest that the initial chance account
can indeed justify and explain nontrivial probabilities used to describe subsystems of the
universe.4 But is it a good explanation? Is it worth believing?
4Notwithstanding pressure to move in this “global” direction in statistical mechanics (Callender, 2011)
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The initial chance account invites the oft-invoked (in cosmology) picture of the (blind
and unskilled) Creator throwing a dart (Wald, 2006, 396) or pointing a pin (Penrose, 1989,
442) at the set of possible universes, thereby picking out the initial conditions of the
universe. That such pictures are intended as pejorative jabs at dubious metaphysics is plain.
A mere picture is hardly an objection, of course, so what is it that seems problematic about
initial chances for the universe? Could it not be the best cosmogonical story of our universe,
that is, that a matter of chance determined its actualization out of a vast range of
possibilities that could have been actualized had only their sisal been struck?
Intuition suggests that this just is not a serious, satisfying story for how the world could
be. The probabilities of events in the actual world would derive ultimately from the
probabilities for the actualization of our world. But why should we not just assume that the
world started in the state that it did, with probability one or with certainty? Presumably the
response of the initial chance advocate is that in that case we would lose the justification
and explanation of subsystem probabilities. Yet is there anything to lose, if this
metaphysical explanation is epistemically untrustworthy? How can we come to know these
ultimate probabilities of other worlds? Is the metaphysical story sufficiently complete even?
How could the probabilities of other worlds matter for what happens in our world?
I am willing to grant that these questions do have some answer, for what strikes me as a
more serious difficulty is the following. Insofar as they are objective and justified, the
probabilities agents like us use for specific events in subsystems of the world must be
epistemic probabilities. On Demarest’s (and Loewer’s) account all such epistemic
probabilities derive from initial epistemic probabilities for different initial conditions of the
world. How is it that these probabilities obtain their needed objectivity and justification, and
hence explanatory power? According to Demarest it is because they accord with the actual
chances. However, what has one achieved by invoking “actual chances” at this stage?
Although these chances do not merely have a virtus dormitiva per se, “just so” stories like
this surely make the explanatory credentials of chances suspect. Does one dare invoke a
transcendental argument or thump the realist table to defend their objectivity?
If we were somehow forced to adopt the initial chance explanation of epistemic
probabilities, then we might swallow whatever dubious metaphysics attendant to it. If there
were reasonable alternatives, however, should we not prefer them? And indeed there are
other interpretive options available. Locating the chances at another time (or even “outside
the universe”) constitutes one set of possibilities, but they obviously suffer from the same
awkwardness as the initial chance account. Another is based on the idea that chancy
behavior occurs at discrete time intervals. One finds this idea in the orthodox Copenhagen
and other collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics for example. One might be uneasy
with the invocation of chancy behavior at potentially ill-defined times in such
interpretations, and even with their postulation of two dynamical laws of nature, a
deterministic one and an indeterministic one (although it is a feature of the initial chance
account as well). However one at least avoids a commitment to chance figuring into
(and quantum mechanics) in order to justify and explain probabilities in subsystems of the universe, serious
reservations about whether doing so is itself justified are advanced by, inter alia, Earman (2006).
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cosmogenesis and also the questionable leap to objectivity in agential probabilities, since
chances in these interpretations are physical processes that happen within the universe,
whether as part of the general evolution of the universe or tied to the evolution of individual
systems.
Another possibility is suggested by continuing this line of thought, i.e. of spreading
chanciness out further in time. Instead of chancy behavior at discrete intervals, why not
suppose that it occurs continuously? In quantum mechanics this idea is implemented in
some interpretations, such as continuous spontaneous localization, and in statistical
mechanics there are various stochastic dynamics approaches. Advantages of this idea are
that one has a single law of evolution, an indeterministic one, and, again, one does not make
chanciness a matter of cosmogenesis. What disadvantage? To some that it makes the world
rife with indeterminism. Yet who is afraid of indeterminism? It surely does not mean
anything goes, nor does it threaten the possibility of knowledge of the world (although there
are limits to what we can know). Besides, by accepting quantum mechanics (or even
statistical mechanics) we have already let indeterminism in the door in physics.
When we look at the interpretations available for a world governed by probabilistic laws,
in every case the alternatives to the initial chances view therefore appear preferable. Indeed,
it would seem that only one who demands that the world be as deterministic as possible
could favor the initial chances view, but it is hard to see what motivation there could be for
that demand. I therefore conclude, in a final sense, that the universe never had a chance.
That said, I emphasize that this judgment applies only to the case where we treat the
universe as a statistical mechanical system or quantum mechanical system. In other words,
the world is the universe, our world-metaphysics is our universe-metaphysics. The
considerations leading to this conclusion change shape somewhat when we confine the
application of our theories to systems describable by those theories. The initial chance
account is far less dubious when attached to individual statistical mechanical systems and
not automatically to the universe at large. Indeed, it could well be that the initial conditions
of similar systems are best treated as randomly distributed, for here we do have empirical
evidence that this interpretation can be used to explain—unlike with the universe, where we
have but one system.
There is, as noted, sometimes pressure to globalize our theories, especially in the case of
statistical mechanics. If we ask what accounts for the randomness in initial conditions of a
particular class of systems, it is natural to look at larger systems that contain them. If we
find that these systems have random initial conditions, then we continue to expand our
scope, ultimately reaching the “maximally inclusive entity whose parts are all the things
that exist.” This globalization of statistical mechanics is the kernel of the so-called
imperialism of (Albert, 2000) and Loewer. If we are right to feel this pressure to interpret
the world at large in the same terms as individual physical systems, then there is
concomitant pressure to hold the same interpretive of chance in both cases. I have argued,
however, that the intuitive considerations vary somewhat, at least with respect to the initial
chance account. Is this reason to disfavor it in the case of individual systems? Or is our
confidence in its applicability for individual systems sufficient to overcome any hesitation at
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accepting it for the universe? My inclination is to answer “yes” and “no”, but I offer no
grounds for the preference here. I do believe that metaphysicians of science should care
about considerations like this, however, having to do with the relation of subsystem and
universe, for often enough what seems right in one context is questionable in the other.
I close this section with a brief comment on the relation of Loewer’s and Demarest’s
accounts. As I argued above, empirical evidence and explanatory considerations do not
favor one over the other, since they account for empirical evidence in essentially the same
way. The central difference is whether chances are understood as reducible to other facts,
hence not part of the fundamental ontology of the world, or as “robustly metaphysical”, in
which case they are. The problems Demarest mentions for the Humean view—past events
may have nontrivial chances, the chance of an event depends on what one knows, worlds
with identical frequencies cannot have different chances, etc.—are surely not problems
when viewed properly through the Humean lens. However, whereas the problem I raise for
the initial chance view, concerning the explanatory credentials and justification for the posit
of initial chances, threatens Demarest’s account, it will not worry the Humean of Loewer’s
stripe, for these initial chances do not exist for the Humean. Humean chances do not
produce or generate any actual states of affairs. Of course one may raise the usual
complaint against the Humean, that there is a circularity in the Humean account involving
descriptions explaining themselves, and others besides. I do not care to enter into this
debate here of course. I only wish to point out that my argument about how chance can fit
into a cosmogonical worldview appears to give some reason to favor the Humean account in
this particular context.
4 Conclusion
In this paper I considered whether we should think that the world had one chance, as
claimed by Demarest. First I considered her claim that we have good evidence that an initial
chance event occurred by contrasting it with relevant classes of alternatives. I argued that
evidence neither favors a chancy theory over a chanceless theory, nor initial chances over
other implementations of chances, nor metaphysically robust chances over Humean
chances. I concluded, therefore, that we do not have good evidence to adopt the initial
chance account.
I then considered whether there were other reasons to favor or disfavor the initial chance
account. I argued that the dubious nature of worldly chances provides a strong impulse to
look for other accounts that do not make chance a matter of cosmogenesis. The other
implementations did not suffer from this defect, so I suggested that from a cosmogonical
perspective they should be preferred. But the relation of the universe and its subsystems
makes a demand to have a consistent interpretation. As the initial chance account looks
favorable on the subsystem level (to many) and not on the universe’s level (as I argued),
there remains a significant metaphysical tension to be resolved.
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Abstract 
We argue that mechanistic models elaborated by machine learning cannot be explanatory 
by discussing the relation between mechanistic models, explanation and the notion of 
intelligibility of models. We show that the ability of biologists to understand the model 
that they work with (i.e. intelligibility) severely constrains their capacity of turning the 
model into an explanatory model. The more a mechanistic model is complex (i.e. it 
includes an increasing number of components), the less explanatory it will be. Since 
machine learning increases its performances when more components are added, then it 
generates models which are not intelligible, and hence not explanatory. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Due to its data-intensive turn, molecular biology is increasingly making use of machine 
learning (ML) methodologies. ML is the study of generalizable extraction of patterns 
from data sets starting from a problem. A problem here is defined as a given set of input 
variables, a set of outputs which have to be calculated, and a sample (previously input-
output pairs already observed). ML calculates a quantitative relation between inputs and 
outputs in terms of a predictive model by learning from an already structured set of input-
output pairs. ML is expected to increase its performances when the complexity of data 
sets increase, where complexity refers to the number of input variables and the number of 
samples. Due to this capacity to handle complexity, practitioners think that ML is 
potentially able to deal with biological systems at the macromolecular level, which are 
notoriously complex. The development of ML has been proven useful not just for the 
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complexity of biological systems per se, but also because biologists now are able to 
generate an astonishingly amount of data. However, we claim that the ability of ML to 
deal with complex systems and big data comes at a price; the more ML can model 
complex data sets, the less biologists will be able to explain phenomena in a mechanistic 
sense.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we discuss mechanistic 
models in biology, and we emphasize a surprising connection between explanation and 
model complexity. By adapting de Regt’s notion of pragmatic understanding (2017) in 
the present context, we claim that if a how-possibly mechanistic model can become 
explanatory, then it must be intelligible to the modeler (Section 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4). 
Intelligibility is the ability to perform precise and successful material manipulations on 
the basis of the information provided by the model about its components. The results of 
these manipulations are fundamental to recompose the causal structure of a mechanism 
out of a list of causally relevant entities. Like a recipe, the model must provide 
instructions to ‘build’ the phenomenon, and causal organization is fundamental in this 
respect. If a model is opaque to these organizational aspects, then no mechanistic 
explanations can be elaborated. By drawing on studies in cognitive psychology, we show 
that the more the number of components in a model increases (the more the model is 
complex), the less the model is intelligible, and hence the less an explanation can be 
elaborated.  
Next, we briefly introduce ML (Section 3). As an example of ML application to 
biology, we analyze an algorithm called PARADIGM (Vaske et al 2010), which is used 
in biomedicine to predict clinical outcomes from molecular data (Section 3.1). This 
algorithm predicts the activities of genetic pathways from multiple genome-scale 
measurements on a single patient by integrating information on pathways from different 
databases. By discussing the technical aspects of this algorithm, we will show how the 
algorithm generates models which are more accurate as the number of variables included 
in the model increases. By variables, here we mean biological entities included in the 
model and the interactions between them, since those entities are modeled by variables in 
PARADIGM.  
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In Section 4 we will put together the results of Section 2 and 3. While performing 
complex localizations more accurately, we argue that an algorithm like PARADIGM 
makes mechanistic models so complex (in terms of the number of model components) 
that no explanation can be constructed. In other words, ML applied to molecular biology 
undermines biologists’ explanatory abilities. 
 
2. COMPLEXITY AND EXPLANATIONS IN BIOLOGY  
 
The use of machine learning has important consequences for the explanatory dimension 
of molecular biology. Algorithms like PARADIGM, while providing increasingly 
accurate localizations, challenge the explanatory abilities of molecular biologists, 
especially if we assume the account of explanation of the so-called mechanistic 
philosophy (Craver and Darden 2013; Craver 2007; Glennan 2017). In order to see how, 
we need to introduce the notion of mechanistic explanation, and its connection with the 
notion of intelligibility (de Regt 2017). 
 
2.1 Mechanistic explanations 
Molecular biology’s aim is to explain how phenomena are produced and/or maintained 
by the organization instantiated by macromolecules. Such explanations take the form of 
mechanistic descriptions of these dynamics. As Glennan (2017) succinctly emphasizes, 
mechanistic models (often in the form of diagrams complemented by linguistic 
descriptions) are vehicles for mechanistic explanations. Such explanations show how a 
phenomenon is produced/maintained and constituted by a mechanism – mechanistic 
models explain by explaining how. As Glennan and others have noticed, a mechanistic 
description of a phenomenon looks like what in historical narrative is called causal 
narrative, in the sense that it “describes sequences of events (which will typically be 
entities acting and interacting), and shows how their arrangement in space and time 
brought about some outcome” (Glennan 2017, p 83). The main idea is that we take a set 
of entities and activities to be causally relevant to a phenomenon, and we explain the 
phenomenon by showing how a sequence of events involving the interactions of the 
selected entities produces and/or maintains the explanandum. In epistemic terms, it is a 
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matter of showing a chain of inferences that holds between the components of a model 
(e.g. biological entities). Consider for instance the phenomenon of restriction in certain 
bacteria and archaea (Figure 1). This phenomenon has been explained in terms of certain 
entities (e.g. restriction and modification enzymes) and activities (e.g. methylation). 
Anytime a bacteriophage invades one of these bacteria or archaea (from now on host 
cells), host cells stimulate the production of two types of enzymes, i.e. a restriction 
enzyme and a modification enzyme. The restriction enzyme is designed to recognize and 
cut specific DNA sequences. Such sequences, for reasons we will not expose here
2
, are to 
be found in the invading phages and/or viruses. Hence, the restriction enzyme destroys 
the invading entities by cutting their DNA. However, the restriction enzyme is not able to 
distinguish between the invading DNA and the DNA of the host cell. Here the 
modification enzyme helps, by methylating the DNA of the host cell at specific 
sequences (the same that the restriction enzyme cuts), thereby preventing the restriction 
enzyme to destroy the DNA of the host cell. The explanation of the phenomenon of 
restriction is in terms of a narrative explaining how certain entities and processes 
contribute to the production of the phenomenon under investigation. The inferences take 
place by thinking about the characteristics of the entities involved, and how the whole 
functioning of the system can be recomposed from entities themselves. 
 
																																																								
2
 See for instance (Ratti 2018) 
Seattle, WA; 1-4 November 2018 -41-
Ratti & López-Rubio – Mechanistic Models and the Explanatory Limits of 
Machine Learning 
5 
 
 
2.2. Complexity of mechanistic models 
Despite the voluminous literature on mechanistic explanation, there is a connection 
between models, in fieri explanations and the modeler that has not been properly 
characterized. In particular, mechanistic models should be intelligible to modelers in 
order to be turned into complete explanations. Craver noticed something like that when 
he states that his ideal of completeness of a mechanistic description (in terms of 
molecular details) should not be taken literary, but completeness always refer to the 
particular explanatory context one is considering. The reason why literary completeness 
is unattainable is because complete models will be of no use and completely obscure to 
modelers; “such descriptions would include so many potential factors that they would be 
unwieldy for the purpose of prediction and control and utterly unilluminating to human 
beings” (2006, p 360, emphasis added).  
We rephrase Craver’s intuitions by saying that how-possibly models cannot be 
turned into adequate explanations if they are too complex. We define complexity as a 
function of the number of entities and activities (i.e. components of the model) that have 
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to be coordinated in an organizational structure in the sense specified by mechanistic 
philosophers. This means that no agent can organize the entities and/or activities 
localized by highly complex models in a narration that rightly depicts the organizational 
structure of the explanandum. Therefore, very complex models which are very good in 
localization cannot be easily turned into explanations. Let us show why complex models 
cannot be turned into explanatory models in the mechanistic context. 
 
2.3 Intelligibility of mechanistic models 
The idea that agents cannot turn highly complex mechanistic models into explanations 
can be made more precise by appealing to the notion of intelligibility (de Regt 2017). 
By following the framework of models as mediators (Morgan and Morrison 
1999), de Regt argues that models are the way theories are applied to reality. Similar to 
Giere (2010), de Regt thinks that theories provide principles which are then articulated in 
the form of models to explain phenomena; “[t]he function of a model is to represent the 
target system in such a way that the theory can be applied to it” (2017, p 34). He assumes 
a broad meaning of explanation, in the sense that explanations are arguments, namely 
attempts to “answer the question of why a particular phenomenon occurs or a situation 
obtains (…) by presenting a systematic line of reasoning that connects it with other 
accepted items of knowledge” (2017, p 25). Ça va sans dire, arguments of the sort are not 
limited to linguistic items
3
. On this basis, de Regt’s main thesis is that a condition sine 
qua non to elaborate an explanation is that the theory from which it is derived must be 
intelligible.  
 In de Regt’s view, the intelligibility of a theory (for scientists) is “[t]he value that 
scientists attribute to the cluster of virtues (…) that facilitate the use of the theory for the 
construction of models” (p 593). This is because an important aspect of obtaining 
explanations is to derive models from theories, and to do that a scientist must use the 
theories. Therefore, if a theory possesses certain characteristics that make it easier to be 
used by a scientist, then the same scientist will be in principle more successful in deriving 
explanatory models. In (2015) de Regt extends this idea also to models in the sense that 
“understanding consists in being able to use and manipulate the model in order to make 
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inferences about the system, to predict and control its behavior” (2015, p 3791). If for 
some reasons models and theories are not intelligible (to us), then we will not be able to 
develop an explanation, because we would not know how to use models or theories to 
elaborate one. 
This idea of intelligibility of models and its tight connection with scientific 
explanation, can be straightforwardly extended to mechanistic models. Intelligibility of 
mechanistic models is defined by the way we successfully use them to explain 
phenomena. But how do we use models (mechanistic models in particular), and for what? 
Please keep in mind that whatever we do with mechanistic models, it is with explanatory 
aims in mind. Anything from predicting, manipulating, abstracting, etc is because we 
want an explanation. This is a view shared both by mechanistic philosophers but by de 
Regt as well, whose analysis of intelligibility is in explanatory terms. 
First, highly abstract models can be used to build more specific models, as in the 
case of schema (Machamer et al 2000; Levy 2014). A schema is “a truncated abstract 
description of a mechanism that can be filled with descriptions of known component 
parts and activities” (Machamer et al 2000, p 16). For instance, consider the model of 
transcription. This model can be highly abstract where ‘gene’ stands for any gene, and 
‘transcription factor’ stands for any transcription factor. However, we can instantiate such 
a schema in a particular experimental context by specifying which gene and which 
transcription factors are involved. The idea is that biologists, depending on the specific 
context they are operating, can instantiate experiments to find out which particular gene 
or transcription factor is involved in producing a phenomenon at a given time.  
Next, mechanistic models can be used in the context of the build-it test (Craver 
and Darden 2013) with confirmatory goals in mind. Since mechanistic explanations may 
be understood as recipes for construction, and since recipes provide instructions to use a 
set of ingredients and instruments to produce something (e.g. a cake), then mechanistic 
models provide instructions to build a phenomenon or instructions to modify it in 
controlled ways because, after all, they tell us about the internal division of labor between 
entities causally relevant to producing or maintaining phenomena. This is in essence the 
build-it test as a confirmation tool; by modifying an experimental system on the basis of 
the ‘instructions’ provided by the model that allegedly explains such a phenomenon, we 
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get hints as to how the model is explanatory. If the hypothesized modifications produce 
in the ‘real-world’ the consequences we have predicted on the basis of the model, then 
the explanatory adequacy of the model is corroborated. The more the modifications 
suggested are precise, the more explanatory the model will be
4
. A first lesson we can 
draw is that if a mechanistic model is explanatory, then it is also intelligible, because it is 
included in the features of being explanatory mechanistically the fact that we can use the 
model to perform a build-it test. 
The build-it test is also useful as a tool to develop explanations. Consider again 
the case of restriction in bacteria and a how-possibly model of this phenomenon based on 
a few observations. Let’s say that we have noticed that when phages or viruses are unable 
to grow in specific bacteria, such bacteria also produce two types of enzymes. We know 
that the enzymes, the invading phages/viruses and restriction are correlated. The basic 
model will be as follows; anytime a phage or a virus invade a bacterium, these enzymes 
are produced, and hence the immune system of the bacterium must be related to these 
enzymes. We start then to instantiate experiments on the basis of this simple model. Such 
a model suggests that these enzymes must do something to the invading entities, but that 
somehow modify the host cell as well. Therefore, the build-it test would consist in a set 
of experiments to stimulate and/or inhibit these entities to develop our ideas about the 
nature of their causal relevance and their internal division of labor. In fieri mechanistic 
models suggest a range of instructions to ‘build’ or ‘maintain’ phenomena. These 
instructions are used to instantiate experiments to refine the model and make it 
explanatory. This is an example of what Bechtel and Richardson would call complex 
localization (2010, Chapter 6), and it is complex because the strategy used to explain the 
behavior of a system (immune system of host cells) is heavily constrained by empirical 
results of lower-levels. The how-possibly model affords a series of actions leading to a 
case of complex localization, when “constraints are imposed, whether empirical or 
theoretical, they can serve simultaneously to vindicate the initial localization and to 
develop it into a full-blooded mechanistic explanation” (Bechtel and Richardson 2010, p 
125). Therefore, if a how-possibly model can be turned into an explanatory model, then it 
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is intelligible, because the way we turn it into an explanatory model is by instantiating 
build-it tests. 
A mechanistic model is therefore intelligible either when (a) it is a schema and we 
can instantiate such a model in specific contexts, or (b) when it affords a series of built-it 
test which are used either to corroborate its explanatory adequacy, or to make it 
explanatory. About (b), it should be noted that if we consider a mechanistic model as a 
narrative, then the model will be composed of a series of steps which influence each other 
in various ways. Being able to use a model means being able to anticipate what would 
happen to other steps if I modify one step in particular. This is not a yes/no thing. The 
model of restriction-modification systems is highly intelligible, because I know that if I 
prevent the production of modification enzymes I simultaneously realize that the 
restriction enzyme will destroy the DNA of the host cell. However, more detailed models 
will be less intelligible, because it would be difficult to simultaneously anticipate what 
would happen at each step by modifying a step in particular. 
 
2.4 Recomposing mechanisms and intelligibility 
In the mechanistic literature, the process of developing an explanatory model out of a 
catalogue of entities that are likely to be causally relevant to a phenomenon is called 
recomposition of a mechanism and it usually happens after a series of localization steps. 
To recompose a mechanism, a modeler must be able to identify causally relevant 
entities and their internal division of labor. The idea is not just to ‘divide up’ a given 
phenomenon in tasks, but also a given task in subtasks interacting in the overall 
phenomenon, as it happens in complex localization (Bechtel and Richardson 2010). In the 
simplest case, researchers assume linear interactions between tasks, but there may be also 
non-linear or more complex type of interactions. 
 These reasoning strategies are usually implemented by thinking about these 
dynamics with the aid of diagrams. Diagrammatic representations usually involve boxes 
standing for entities (such as genes, proteins, etc) and arrows standing for processes of 
various sorts (phosphorylation, methylation, binding, releasing, etc). Therefore, biologists 
recompose mechanisms as mechanistic explanations by thinking about these diagrams, 
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and they instantiate experiments (i.e. built-it test) exactly on the basis of such 
diagrammatic reasoning. 
 Cognitive psychology and studies of scientific cognition have extensively 
investigated the processes of diagrammatic reasoning (Hegarty 2000; 2004; Nersessian 
2008). Moreover, empirical studies have emphasized the role of diagrams in learning and 
reasoning in molecular biology (Kindfield 1998; Trujillo 2015). In these studies, 
diagrammatic reasoning is understood as a “task that involves inferring the behavior of a 
mechanical system from a visual-spatial representation” (Hegarty 2000, p 194). Hegarty 
refers to this process as mental animation, while Nersessian (2008) thinks about this as an 
instantiation of mental modelling. This is analogous to thinking about mechanistic models 
as narratives, namely being able to infer how a course of events, decomposed into steps, 
may change if we change one step in particular. Mental animation is a process of 
complex visual-spatial inference. Limits and capabilities of humans in such tasks depend 
on the cognitive architecture of human mind
5
. What Hegarty has found is that mental 
animation is piecemeal, in the sense that human mind does not animate the components 
of a diagram in parallel, but rather infer the motion of components one by one. This 
strategy has a straightforward consequence; in order to proceed with animating 
components, we should store intermediate results of inferences drawn on previous 
components. Due to the limitations of working memory (WM), people usually store such 
information on external displays. Hegarty has provided evidence that diagrammatic 
reasoning is bounded to WM abilities. The more we proceed in inferring animation on 
later components, the more the inferences on earlier components degrade (see for 
instance Figure 2); “as more components of the system are ‘read into’ spatial working 
memory, the activation of all items is degraded, so that when later components are in, 
there is not enough activation of the later components to infer their motion” (Hegarty 
2000, p 201).  
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The actual limit of our cognitive architecture on this respect may be debated, and it is an 
empirical issue. The important point is that no matter our external displays, for very large 
systems (such as Figure 3) it is very unlikely that human cognition will be able to process 
all information about elements interactivity. This is because by animating components 
one-by-one, even if we use sophisticated instruments such computer simulations, still 
inferences on earlier components will degrade. This means that build-it tests will be very 
ineffective, if not impossible. In terms of narratives, recipes and mechanistic models, this 
means that for large mechanistic diagrams with many model components, no human 
would be able to anticipate the consequences of modifying a step in the model for all the 
other steps of the model, even if a computer simulation shows that the phenomenon can 
be possibly produced by the complex model. The computer simulation may highlight 
certain aspects (as Bechtel in 2016 notes), but the model is not intelligible in the sense 
required by mechanistic philosophy. If the model is not intelligible in this way, then it 
cannot be possibly turned into an explanation. 
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 The results of Hegarty’s research suggest that when mechanistic models are 
concerned, strategies of localization are effective (in terms of explanatory potential) only 
when a limited number of model components are actually identified. The number may 
increase if we use computer simulations. However, for very large amounts of model 
components (such as Figure 3) recomposition is just impossible for humans, because 
inferences on the role of components in the causal division of labor of a phenomenon will 
degrade to make place for inferences about other components. This of course holds only 
if we have explanatory aims in mind. 
 To summarize, in section 2 we have made three claims: 
1. If a how-possibly model can be turned into an explanation, then it is intelligible 
2. If a model is not intelligible, then it cannot become explanatory  
3. Complex models are a class of non-intelligible models 
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3. MACHINE LEARNING AND LOCALIZATIONS 
Machine learning (ML) is a subfield of computer science which studies the design of 
computing machinery that improves its performance as it learns from its environment. A 
ML algorithm extracts knowledge from the input data, so that it can give better solutions 
to the problem that it is meant to solve. This learning process usually involves the 
automatic construction and refinement of a model of the incoming data. In ML 
terminology, a model is an information structure which is stored in the computer memory 
and manipulated by the algorithm.  
As mentioned before, the concept of ‘problem’ in ML has a specific meaning 
which is different from other fields of science. A ML problem is defined by a set of input 
variables, a set of output variables, and a collection of samples which are input-output 
pairs. Solving a problem here means finding a quantitative relation between inputs and 
outputs in the form of a predictive model, in the sense that the algorithm will be used to 
produce a certain output given the presence of a specific input.  
 
3.1 The PARADIGM algorithm 
ML has been applied in the molecular sciences in many ways (Libbrecht and Noble 
2015). Especially in cancer research
6
, computer scientists have created and trained a great 
deal of algorithms in order to identify entities that are likely to be involved in the 
development of tumors, how they interact, to predict phenotypes, to recognize crucial 
sequences, etc (see for instance Leung et al 2016). 
As a topical example of ML applied to biology, we introduce an algorithm called 
PARADIGM (Vaske et al 2010). This algorithm is used to infer how genetic changes in a 
patient influence or disrupt important genetic pathways underlying cancer progression. 
This is important because there is empirical evidence that “when patients harbor genomic 
alterations or aberrant expression in different genes, these genes often participate in a 
common pathway” (Vaske et al 2010, p i237). Because pathways are so large and 
biologists cannot hold in their mind the entities participating in them, PARADIGM 
integrate several genomic datasets – including datasets about interactions between genes 
and phenotypic consequences – to infer molecular pathways altered in patients; it predicts 
																																																								
6
 See for instance The Cancer Genome Atlas at https://cancergenome.nih.gov 
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whether a patient will have specific pathways disrupted given his/her genetic mutations. 
 The algorithm is based on a simplified model of the cell. Each biological pathway 
is modeled by a graph. Each graph contains a set of nodes, such that each node represents 
a cell entity, like a mRNA, a gene or a complex. A node can be only in three states (i.e. 
activated, normal or deactivated). The connections among nodes are called factors, and 
they represent the influence of some entities on other entities. It must be noticed that the 
model does not represent why or how these influences are exerted. Only the sign of the 
influence, i.e. positive or negative, is specified. 
The model specifies how the expected state of an entity must be estimated. The 
entities which are connected by positive or negative factors to the entity at hand cast 
votes which are computed by multiplying +1 or –1 by the states of those entities, 
respectively. In addition to this, there are 'maximum' and 'minimum' connections to cast 
votes which are the maximum or the minimum of the states of the connected entities, 
respectively. Overall, the expected state of an entity is computed as the result of 
combining several votes obtained from the entities which are connected to it. Such a 
voting procedure can be associated to localizations (i.e. whether a node is activated or 
not), but hardly to biological explanations. 
The states of the entities can be hidden, i.e. they can not be directly measured on 
the patients, or observable. The states of the hidden variables must be estimated by a 
probabilistic inference algorithm, which takes into account the states of the observed 
variables and the factors to estimate the most likely values of the hidden variables. Here it 
must be pointed out that this algorithm does not yield any explanation about the 
computed estimation. Moreover, it could be the case that the estimated values are not the 
most likely ones, since the algorithm does not guarantee that it finds the globally 
optimum solution. 
The size of the model is determined by the number of entities and factors that the 
scientist wishes to insert. A larger model provides a perspective of the cell processes 
which contains more elements, and it might yield better predictions. This means that the 
more components the model has, the better the algorithm will perform. In biological 
terms, the larger the model, the more precise complex localizations the algorithm will 
identify, in particular by pointing more precisely towards pathways that are likely to be 
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disrupted in the patient with more information about the state of gene activities, 
complexes and cellular processes. Importantly, PARADIGM does not infer new genetic 
interactions, but it just helps identifying those known interaction in a new data set. It is 
completely supervised, in the sense that “[w]hile it infers hidden quantities (…), it makes 
no attempt to infer new interactions not already present in an NCI [National Cancer 
institute database] pathway” (Vaske et al 2010, p i244). 
 
4 COMPLEX MODELS AND MECHANISTIC EXPLANATIONS  
Before unwinding our conclusions, let me recall the results of Section 2 very briefly: 
1. If a how-possibly model can be turned into an explanation, then it is intelligible
7
. 
2. If a model is not intelligible, then it cannot become explanatory  
3. Complex model (in the sense explained in 2.2) are not intelligible  
 
What does this have to do with PARADIGM? It is important to emphasize what we have 
pointed out in Section 3.1, namely that an algorithm like PARADIGM is more efficient 
when working with more components. If we think about models generated by algorithms 
such as PARADIGM in mechanistic terms, this means that the algorithm provides more 
precise complex localizations, because more entities that are likely to be causally relevant 
to a phenomenon are identified, and the information about the probability of a pathway 
being disrupted in a patient will be more precise. However, the models will be more 
complex, and they will be decreasingly intelligible. This is because the final model will 
count an elevated number of components, and recomposing these components into a full-
fledged mechanistic explanation of how a tumor is behaving will be cognitively very 
difficult; the inferences about the behavior of components are not run in parallel, but one 
by one, and once we proceed in inferring the behavior of a component on the basis of the 
behavior of another component, other inferences will degrade, as Hegarty’s studies have 
shown. In the ideal situation, PARADIGM will generate unintelligible models: 
																																																								
7
 Remember: A mechanistic model x is intelligible to a modeler y if y can use the information 
about the components of x to instantiate so-called ‘build-it test’. Such tests are performed on how-
possibly models to turn them into explanatory models by obtaining information on how to 
recompose a phenomenon (i.e. by showing how a list of biological entities are organized to 
produce a phenomenon).  
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4. Algorithms such as PARADIGM generate models which are not intelligible 
because such models are too complex 
5. Because of 2, 3 and 4, complex models generated out of algorithms like 
PARADIGM cannot become explanations 
 
This means that when we use algorithms such as PARADIGM to cope with the 
complexity of biological systems, we successfully handle big data sets, but such a 
mastery comes at a price. Using ML in molecular biology means providing more detailed 
localizations, but we also lose explanatory power, because no modeler will be able to 
recompose the mechanism out of a long list of entities. 
 This implies that, in the mechanistic epistemic horizon, the central role assigned 
to explanations should be reconsidered when contemporary molecular biosciences are 
concerned. As Bechtel has also emphasized in the context of computational models in 
mechanistic research (2016), such tools are useful to show whether some entities are 
likely to be involved in a particular phenomenon or suggest alternative hypotheses about 
the relation between certain entities. However, providing fully-fledged mechanistic 
explanations is another thing. It is the same with algorithms of ML; we identify more 
entities likely to be involved in a mechanism, we may even find out that entities involved 
in specific process may be connected with entities involved in other processes (via for 
instance Gene Ontology enrichments), but we cannot recompose a mechanism out of a 
list of hundreds of entities. In fact, we come to value different epistemic values, and 
explanatory power is not one of them. This somehow implies also a shift in the way 
scientific articles are organized; if in ‘traditional’ molecular biology evidence converges 
towards the characterization of a single mechanism, in data-intensive biology we make a 
list of entities that can be involved in a phenomenon, but we do not necessarily connect 
those entities mechanistically (Alberts 2012). Another strategy (Krogan et al 2015) – 
though motivated more by biologically rather than cognitive reasons – is to abstract from 
macromolecular entities and consider only aggregates of them in the form of networks; 
whether establishing network topology is providing a mechanistic explanation remains an 
open question. 
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The Roles of Possibility and Mechanism in 
Narrative Explanation 
 
 
Abstract 
 
There is a fairly longstanding distinction between what are called the ideographic as opposed to 
nomothetic sciences. The nomothetic sciences, such as physics, offer explanations in terms of the 
laws and regular operations of nature. The ideographic sciences, such as natural history (or, more 
controversially, evolutionary biology), cast explanations in terms of narratives. This paper offers 
an account of what is involved in offering an explanatory narrative in the historical (ideographic) 
sciences. I argue that narrative explanations involve two chief components: a possibility space 
and an explanatory causal mechanism. The presence of a possibility space is a consequence of 
the fact that the presently available evidence underdetermines the true historical sequence from 
an epistemic perspective. But the addition of an explanatory causal mechanism gives us a reason 
to favor one causal history over another; that is, causal mechanisms enhance our epistemic 
position in the face of widespread underdetermination. This is in contrast to some recent work 
that has argued against the use of mechanisms in some narrative contexts. Indeed, I argue that an 
adequate causal mechanism is always involved in narrative explanation, or else we do not have 
an explanation at all. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The historical sciences (geology, paleontology, evolutionary biology, etc.)1 are usually thought 
to deploy different explanatory strategies than the non-historical sciences (Turner 2007; Turner 
2013). Whereas physics, say, seeks explanations given in terms of general laws and the like, the 
historical sciences seek to explain in terms of narratives. In this paper I will argue for a version 
of narrative explanation involving two chief components: possibility spaces and causal 
mechanisms. It has recently been argued that complex historical narratives (to be defined later) 
can’t support explanations involving causal mechanisms (Currie 2014). I argue that this is 
mistaken. I’ll go over some recent work on the history of abiogenesis research to support this 
contention. 
 The argument presented in this paper will defend two primary claims: (1) the conceptual 
structure of narrative explanations nearly always involves a space of alternative possibilities. 
This can be for either epistemic or ontological reasons. From and epistemic perspective 
possibility spaces are necessary on account of our position relative to the available evidence. 
That is, the available evidence radically underdetermines any particular causal history, and on 
the basis of that fact many possible histories appear compatible with what we know (see Gordon 
and Olson 1994, p. 15). Construed ontologically, a set of historical facts might involve a high 
degree of objective contingency—it might be the case that things really could have gone a 
number of different ways. For the purposes of this paper I remain silent with respect to this 
ontological aspect and defend the importance of possibility spaces for largely epistemic reasons. 
(2) Adequate causal mechanisms enhance our epistemic position relative to alternative causal 
                                                        
1
 I note that the idea of evolutionary biology as a properly “historical science” is a controversial 
one. See Ereshefsky (1992) for some strong arguments against the idea of evolutionary biology 
as having a distinctively ‘historical’ flavor. 
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histories. Causal mechanisms put us in a position to better assess the plausibility of a given 
history within our possibility space, and in this way enhance the epistemic power of a 
purportedly explanatory historical narrative. This can involve either the actual discovery of such 
mechanisms, or raw theoretical innovation. Citing an adequate causal mechanism may not 
discriminate between possibilities in decisive fashion. Rampant underdetermination seems to 
rule out such a possibility (see Turner 2007). But an adequate mechanism does make a given 
explanation more explanatory than its competitors, and so part of the task is to see how this 
notion of mechanistic adequacy can be cashed out in such a way as to make this notion of 
explanatoriness epistemically significant and not simply ad hoc. 
 
2. The Role of Possibility Spaces 
In the introduction I said that I would defend two major claims: (1) the conceptual structure of 
narrative explanation nearly always involves a space of alternative possibilities, and (2) adequate 
causal mechanisms enhance our epistemic position relative to alternative causal histories. This 
section will address the first claim by giving a more detailed account of the conceptual structure 
of narrative explanations and why the role of possibility spaces is so central to them. 
 When confronted with a natural historical problem (e.g. accounting for the processes 
involved in the formation of atoll reefs, say (see Ghiselin 1969)) it is my claim that what we are 
confronted with is, in fact, a space of possible histories. That is, when the historical scientist 
attempts to answer the question, “What geological process accounts for the formation of atoll 
reefs?” she understands—perhaps implicitly—that there are a number of ways things might have 
gone: she sees many possible histories. This space of possible histories essentially generates a 
contrasting set of possible explanations, each possible history corresponding roughly to one 
PSA 2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -58-
 4 
hypothetical solution to the problem.2 Obviously there’s just one causal history that actually 
obtained, but the evidential situation is such that this history is not uniquely fixed from an 
epistemic perspective (see Roth 2017). The historical scientist’s explanatory task then consists in 
finding the best approximation of the true causal history. 
 A nice example of this sort of reasoning process can be glimpsed in the debates over 
speciation processes among evolutionary biologists and paleobiologists. Stephen J. Gould and 
Niles Eldredge (1972) developed the theory of punctuated equilibria to account for the pattern of 
speciation witnessed in the fossil record. The idea of punctuated equilibria, in brief, holds that 
evolutionary change occurs in sudden bursts (on geological timescales, anyway), followed by 
long periods of relative evolutionary stasis. The going theory of evolutionary change at the time 
held to phyletic gradualism—the idea that the pace of evolution is slow and relatively uniform 
(see Turner 2011). Each of these alternatives is broadly consistent with the available fossil 
evidence. Phyletic gradualism takes the view that the evolutionary process is gradual, and that 
the fossil record is very patchy. The putatively patchy character of the fossil record means that 
we shouldn’t expect to be able to use it as a tool for faithfully reading off patterns of speciation 
in the actual history of life. The theory of punctuated equilibria has it that the fossil record is 
relatively faithful to evolutionary history, meaning that the fossil record does have some 
explanatory import with respect to uncovering important evolutionary patterns (like speciation). 
The evidence in the fossil record can support either interpretation. 
 Consider another example, this time from geology. 19th century geologists were 
confronted with a fascinating geological puzzle involving what were called ‘erratic blocks’. 
                                                        
2
 I’m certainly not claiming that the historical scientist is in a position to generate or realize all 
possible histories, as the number of such alternatives is plausibly infinite. But certainly it’s 
possible to generate quite a few, and it seems that in fact we usually do. 
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These hulking slabs of (usually) granite are found miles away from any related rocks, and so the 
obvious question to be answered is, “How did such a large piece of granite come to be deposited 
here?” In 1820s Europe the answer was not immediately obvious. One well-documented case 
involved a granite erratic in Switzerland, which was determined to be composed of primary 
rocks of Alpine origin, but resting on a limestone formation many hundreds of miles from any 
mountains (see Rudwick 2014, pp. 117-25). Several explanations were offered: that it was 
deposited by the waters of the Noahic deluge; that it was carried and deposited by waters 
traveling down the Alps from a broken mountain dam; and only later that it was carried by 
glacial ice and then deposited after a subsequent melt. The process of adjudicating between each 
such purportedly explanatory histories (whether evolutionary patterns or seemingly bizarre 
geological deposits) is the subject of the next section.  
 It’s important to stress that the evidential underdetermination of historical hypotheses is 
quite different than underdetermination in science more broadly. Turner (2007) argues 
convincingly that the problem of underdetermination is rather severe in the historical sciences 
given that natural processes actively destroy the evidential traces on which historical scientists 
rely.3 There are two points that make this worthy of note. First, it is precisely for this reason that 
the explanatory task of the historical scientist necessarily involves the generation of a possibility 
space. If we can think of a natural history as a story concerning the artifacts of the natural world, 
then what the world presents us with is a story that’s missing a great many pages. The 
unfortunate fact of the matter is that there are many ways of filling those pages in, each of which 
                                                        
3
 Turner appeals to the role played by background theories in the historical sciences to motivate 
his point. Here, there relevant theory is taphonomy, which describes the mechanisms by which 
the relevant evidence is destroyed (remineralization, decomposition, etc.). 
PSA 2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -60-
 6 
is broadly compatible with our evidential situation.4 Second, widespread underdetermination is 
what motivates the earlier insight that the explanatory aspiration of historical science is to give 
the best approximation of the true causal history. It is implausible to think that any of the 
historical hypotheses we generate will fill in the missing pages perfectly, but we can have 
reasons to think that some hypotheses outperform others (of which more to come). 
 To summarize, possibility spaces are ineliminable from narrative explanations because of 
our epistemic position relative to the evidence at hand. What we want is to develop a causal 
history that explains the phenomenon in question (e.g. erratic blocks and evolutionary patterns), 
but right away we realize that many different and mutually incompatible histories could—
hypothetically—do the trick. The construction of a space of live possibilities allows us to have 
some degree of confidence that we’ve explored the relevant alternatives.5 Once we’ve developed 
a space of possibilities, the initial question (such as, “What accounts for the formation of atoll 
reefs?”) becomes importantly contrastive: “Why x and not x’?” where x and x’ are alternative 
possible causal histories accounting for the target phenomenon. We want to know how it is that 
possibilities come to be “foreclosed” upon as a narrative explanation develops, as Beatty (2016) 
puts it.  
 
3. Causal Mechanisms and Hypothesis Adjudication 
                                                        
4
 See Turner (2011) chapter 2 for more in-depth discussion. 
5
 There’s a way of reading this that might tempt one to see this as something akin to inference to 
the best explanation. Any such connection is largely superficial. The primary reason for this is 
that the explanatory scheme that I’m outlining is not meant to be making any especially strong 
claims about the strength of an explanation as related to its connection to reality. Perhaps none of 
the causal histories we generate are very accurate as descriptions of the true causal history.  
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I now turn my attention to an explication and defense of (2): adequate causal mechanisms 
enhance our epistemic position relative to alternative causal histories. Causal mechanisms are 
what provide reasons for preferring one possible causal history over another as regards the space 
of possible histories generated by the natural historical problem at hand. 
 
3.1. Mechanistic set-ups- 
Because contingency is generally seen as playing such a fundamental role in natural 
historical contexts, the relevant mechanisms are not likely to be cashed out in terms of 
‘invariances’ and ‘regularities,’ as is common in other scientific contexts (see Havstad 2011; 
Darden and Craver 2002). For the purposes of natural history we might instead think in terms of 
a more minimal conception of causal mechanisms that I’ll call mechanistic set-ups. A 
mechanistic set-up differs from paradigmatic mechanisms (as in Glennan (2002))6 in that it will 
often be the case that mechanistic set-ups are the result of one-off circumstances. Paradigmatic 
mechanisms characterize causal systems that are largely stable across time (think of protein 
synthesis, for instance). Mechanistic set-ups are not stable across time in this way, but still render 
outcomes causally expectable given that the right antecedent conditions obtain. That is, given 
that the right antecedent conditions obtain (and this may, of course, be a highly contingent 
affair), the causal output of the system is fully determined—we have a case of mechanical causal 
output. 
Nancy Cartwright and John Pemberton (2013) give a simple example of a mechanistic 
set-up using a toy sailboat. When the toy boat is placed in the water it displaces enough liquid to 
                                                        
6
 “A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the 
interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts can be characterized by 
direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations.” 
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stay afloat; it has a wind-catching device for locomotion; the wind-catching device is acted about 
by wind gusts in order to achieve locomotive action. If we take this example as having to do with 
the actions of an agent that brings about the mechanistic set-up then we might incline toward an 
interpretation of the situation in terms of paradigmatic mechanisms. But imagine there’s no agent 
involved at all; that is, let it be the case that nobody placed the boat on the water, and likewise 
nobody chose any windy day in particular for the use of the boat. Instead suppose that it is a 
series of contingent events (a child threw the boat in the garbage, it fell out of the garbage truck 
on the highway, and is now on the surface of a local pond, etc.) that have made things such that 
the boat is at some later time moving across the top of the water in the expected way.  
The one-offness of the circumstances in the revised toy boat example doesn’t seem to 
make the situation non-mechanistic in character. Rather, the mechanism just isn’t stable across 
time in the same way paradigmatic mechanisms are. This is a mechanism in a more minimal 
sense: it is a mechanistic set-up. In other words, the realization of appropriate antecedent 
conditions renders the outcome causally expectable, even though the antecedent conditions are 
highly contingent.7  
This case is so simple that it won’t have much bite against Currie. Recall that Currie’s 
claim is that mechanisms show to be of no use in complex narratives. In these cases the 
explanatory targets are diffuse, meaning that they involve complex networks of causal 
contributors (Currie 2014). An example of a diffuse target is Sauropod gigantism, Gigantism 
involves, at least, skeletal pneumatization, ovipary, increased basal metabolic rate, etc. Nothing 
seems to unify such causal contributions, and so there is no mechanism for gigantism, according 
to Currie—the explanatory target is too diffuse in complex narratives.  
                                                        
7
 See chapter 3 of Conway Morris (2003) for an in-depth discussion. 
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3.2. Abiogenesis, mechanistic set-ups, and hypothesis adjudication- 
Abiogenesis, I argue, qualifies as a minimal mechanistic set-up in the sense just argued 
for. That is, the set of facts that determined the development of the very first self-replicating, 
heterotrophic organisms are plausibly subject to a high degree of contingency (see Conway 
Morris 2003), but even so, life is a deterministic consequence of just such a contingent set of 
facts.8 Further, the instances that the theory aims to explain (e.g. self-replicating molecular 
systems; heterotrophic metabolic systems; protective membrane enclosures, etc.) are diffuse in 
the same sense as Sauropod gigantism. My aim here is not to give a full theoretical survey of 
abiogenesis, but instead to provide just enough content to justify the claim that work in this area 
fulfills the description of narrative already given, and that causal mechanisms play an important 
explanatory role, specifically to do with hypothesis adjudication. 
 Probably the first serious theoretical work on the origins of life is A.I. Oparin’s 1923 The 
Origins of Life (Falk and Lazcano 2012). The basic theoretical framework is familiarly 
Darwinian. Oparin had in mind a model of biological origins whereby life comes on-line in 
stages, rather than all at once. The prebiotic world, on this view, was one of something 
approximating ‘molecular competition.’ For Oparin this amounted to chemical assemblages 
witnessing differential stability, approximately underwriting a growth model of molecular 
evolution (Falk and Lazcano 2012; Pigliucci 1999). The primary thing to be explained, on this 
model, was the development of heterotrophic metabolism. Metabolic pathways are so complex 
                                                        
8
 Some recent work in origins of life research may end up giving reasons to question the assumed 
contingency of life’s emergence. See Kauffman (1993) for a classic treatment of the “self-
organization” thesis, and England (2015) for more recent theoretical developments. 
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that Oparin thought their development must be accounted for in a basically stepwise fashion. 
Differential stabilities of chemical assemblages would make it such that certain molecules would 
make up increasingly large proportions of the chemical ‘population,’ making them live 
candidates for further downstream innovation (like complex metabolic pathways). 
 Oparin-type selection models have mostly—though perhaps not entirely—fallen by the 
wayside. Contemporary work is focused primarily on accounting for the possibility of self-
replication and autocatalysis (Penny 2005). The thought is that biological origins must be 
accounted for in something like a two-step process, one involving the development of self-
replicating material suitable for hereditary mechanisms, and another for things like metabolism 
and heterocatalytic functions like protein construction (Falk and Lazcano 2012; Conway Morris 
2003). One of the more promising research strains in this area concerns what’s known as the 
‘RNA World’ (Conway Morris 2003). It’s widely believed to be the case that the first replicators 
were RNA (or RNA-like) molecules. So, RNA World researchers are attempting to simulate the 
conditions of the prebiotic Earth in the laboratory in order to see whether the RNA model of 
biological origins can carry its empirical weight. 
 Of note for the purposes of this paper is that the dispute between metabolism-first and 
replication-first models of abiogenesis is precisely over whether the causal mechanisms in play 
can adequately account for the target phenomenon: namely, the development of living organisms 
in the ancient history of Earth. H.J. Muller developed a theoretical agenda stressing the need for 
self-replicators at the historical foundations of life (Falk and Lazcano 2012). Oparin took 
heterotrophic metabolic pathways as the primary puzzle to be solved (Oparin 1938; Falk and 
Lazcano 2012). The replication-first view has emerged as the going view among contemporary 
researchers primarily because it offers a more plausible mechanism for life’s early development. 
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In order to build complex metabolic pathway it seems like it’s first necessary to have a genome 
space that’s large enough to enable downstream innovation of complex functions. So it is that the 
replication-first view and the research agenda dictated by projects like RNA World are taken to 
be more explanatory than Oparin-type explanations given in terms of selection among molecular 
assemblages.  
 
4. Putting Things Together 
Let’s recall once more the two key claims being advanced: (1) the conceptual structure of 
narrative explanation nearly always involves a space of alternative possibilities, and (2) adequate 
causal mechanisms enhance our epistemic position relative to alternative causal histories. 
Widespread underdetermination in the historical sciences leads to the persistent appearance of 
possibility spaces as specified by (1), and the development of adequate causal mechanisms 
specified under (2) enhances our ability to adjudicate the alternatives we’re faced with. Causal 
mechanisms put us in a position to address the contrastive question, “Why x and not x’?” Causal 
mechanisms are the devices by which historical counterfactuals become foreclosed upon in the 
sense of Beatty (2016). 
 Because explanation in the historical sciences is contrastive in the above sense, I argue 
that some notion of mechanism is involved in every case of successful narrative explanation. 
Currie (2014) argues that causal mechanisms are appropriate only for the purposes of simple 
narratives apt to be embedded in terms of regularities. Complex narratives with their diffuse 
explanatory targets require something more piecemeal that doesn’t count as a causal mechanism. 
My more minimal conception of causal mechanisms given in terms of mechanistic set-ups sheds 
light on why this can’t be right. Mechanistic set-ups aren’t stable across time like paradigmatic 
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mechanisms, and yet we have good reason to think that the consequences of such set-ups are 
mechanistically determined (see Penny 2005; Glennan 2010).9 It is just this sort of conception of 
mechanism that helps us to make sense of explanatory success in abiogenesis (such as it is).  
 Surely the genesis of the first biotic creatures is every bit as diffuse an explanatory target 
as Sauropod gigantism. I’ve argued (and I think convincingly) that it is precisely due to the 
adequacy of some underlying mechanism that one explanatory agenda in abiogenesis has been 
accepted over the alternatives. The complexity of the narrative and the diffuseness of the 
explanatory target appear to be beside the point. Without an adequate mechanism—however 
minimally construed—we can’t answer the contrastive question, and so we have no explanation 
at all. 
 
5. Objection and a Reply 
According to Currie (2014) mechanistic set-ups (ephemeral mechanisms (Glennan 2010)) look 
like they’re simply pointing to claims about sensitivity to initial conditions. If that’s right, then 
there’s a problem, because causal processes in natural historical contexts are often thought to be 
contingent not just in the sense that they display sensitivity to initial conditions. Such processes 
are taken to be subject to contingencies in a more robust sense involving “causal cascades” 
themselves (Currie 2014). It is not unreasonable, for instance, to think that whether a chemical 
assemblage will manage to hit the right configuration and produce a self-replicating RNA strand 
is not just a matter of realizing the right set-up conditions (independent of the chances of hitting 
                                                        
9
 Penny notes some interesting experimental results in which living organisms are frozen to near 
absolute zero, meaning that all information concerning the positions and velocities of the 
particles in their make-up is lost. They can, nonetheless, be successfully reanimated. Given that 
the only information that’s retained after such a deep freezing involves the chemical structure of 
the organisms, a natural inference is that ‘life’ is a mechanical consequence of chemical parts. 
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on such a configuration). Whether the chemical elements enter into the appropriate causal 
relations for manifesting autocatalysis might itself be a probabilistic matter. Having the right 
elements might not be all you need—you might need the right elements plus a bit of probabilistic 
luck. Objective probabilities of this sort might do some damage to the mechanistic account, since 
it would seem not to be the case that an explanandum just follows from a causal set-up. The force 
of this objection is at least partly dependent on one’s answer to the question of where in the 
world we ought to ‘place’ objective chances (if there are any). 
Most of our intuitions about objective probabilities (probably) derive from our ongoing 
observations of the world. A lot of stuff in the world just seems chancy. We regularly speak in 
terms of the “odds” or “chances” of developing cancer and the like. Simplifying quite a bit, when 
we say that there’s a 40 percent chance that Susan will live for more than 5 years after being 
diagnosed with some cancer that has developed to some particular stage, what we’re saying is 
that approximately 40 percent of people that present as cases sufficiently similar to Susan have 
lived for 5 years or more.  One way to read this is in terms of causal indeterminacy. That is, there 
is really no matter of the fact at time t as to what will be the case at time t’, aside from the 
probabilistic facts about cancer populations. The future is (to some degree) causally open, as the 
causal cascades are operating in a fundamentally probabilistic way. 
Such a reading, however, is by no means forced. Bruce Glymour (1998) offers a picture 
wherein objective probabilities are placed at the level of causal interactions. That is, entities e 
and e* enter into causal interactions with each other on a probabilistic basis, but when they do, 
the downstream effects unfold in a fully deterministic fashion. Probabilistic partitions of the 
world, then, are just reflections of whether certain causal interactions became manifest in certain 
subpopulations or not. If 40 percent of patients with a certain cancer at a particular stage will 
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survive for more than five year, it’s because free radicals (probabilistically) failed to enter into 
certain causal interactions with healthy cells. The opposite is the case for the contrasting class of 
fatal cases. On this picture, determinism of the relevant kind seems to be preserved. In such cases 
as the right causal interactions are realized, downstream effects unfold in mechanical fashion. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I argued for two main claims: (1) the conceptual structure of narrative explanation 
nearly always involves a space of alternative possibilities, and (2) adequate causal mechanisms 
enhance our epistemic position relative to alternative causal histories. The reason that narrative 
explanations involve possibility spaces has to do with our epistemic position relative to the 
available evidence. Undetermination so permeates the historical sciences that any problem for 
which we seek an explanation will involve an array of possible alternative causal histories, each 
of which is broadly consistent with the available evidence. It is the introduction of an adequate 
causal mechanism that puts us in a position to improve our epistemic lot—with a good 
mechanism in hand, we can begin to foreclose upon alternatives.  
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Abstract.  There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that core parts of 
the  scientific  process  involve  non-epistemic  values.   This  undermines  the  traditional 
foundation  for  public  trust  in  science.   In  this  paper  I  consider  two  proposals  for 
justifying  public  trust  in  value-laden  science.   According  to  the  first,  scientists  can 
promote  trust  by  being  transparent  about  their  value  choices.   On  the  second,  trust 
requires that the values of a scientist align with the values of an individual member of the 
public.  I argue that neither of these proposals work and suggest an alternative that does 
better:  when scientists must appeal to values in the course of their research, they should 
appeal to democratic values, the values of the public or its representatives.
1.  Introduction
The American public’s trust in science is a complicated matter.  Surveys reveal that trust in 
science has remained consistently high for decades, and scientists remain among the most highly-trusted 
professional groups (Funk 2017).  However, within some segments of society (especially conservatives) 
trust has declined significantly (Gauchat 2012), and there are obviously serious gaps in trust on certain 
issues, such as climate change, vaccine safety, and GM foods (Funk 2017).  The picture, then, is a 
complex one, but on balance it is clear that things would be better if the public placed greater trust in 
science and scientists, at least on certain issues.
As a philosopher, I am not in a position to determine what explains the lack of trust in science, 
nor to weigh on what will in fact increase trust.  Instead, in this paper I will look at the question of what 
scientists can do to merit the public’s trust — under what conditions the public should trust scientists.  
Indeed, it seems to me that we need to answer the normative question first:  if we take steps to increase 
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public trust in science, our goal should not simply be to make scientists trusted, we should also want them 
to be trustworthy.
In what follows, I’ll first explain how recent work in the philosophy of science undermines the 
traditional justification given to the public for trusting science.  I’ll then consider two proposals that have 
been offered to ground public trust in science:  one calling for transparency about values, the second 
calling for an alignment of values.  I’ll argue that the first proposal backfires — it rationally should 
decrease trust in science — and the second is impractical.  I’ll then present an alternative that is 
imperfect, but better than the alternatives:  when scientists must appeal to values in the course of their 
work, they should appeal to democratic values — roughly, the values of the public or its representatives.  
2.  Trust and the Value-Free Ideal
Why should the public trust scientists?  The typical answer to that question points to the nature of 
science.  Science, it is said, is about facts, and not values.  It delivers us objective, verifiable truths about 
the world — truths not colored by political beliefs, personal values, or wishful thinking.  Of course, there 
are scientists who inadvertently or intentionally allow ideology to influence their results.  But these are 
instances of bad science.  Just as we should not allow the existence of incompetent or corrupt carpenters 
to undermine our trust in carpentry, we should not allow the existence of incompetent or corrupt scientists 
to undermine our trust in science.  So long as we have institutions in place to credential good scientists 
and root out corrupt ones, we should trust the conclusions of science.
There is, unfortunately, one problem with this story:  science isn’t actually like that.  In the past 
few decades, philosophers of science have shown that even good science requires non-epistemic value 
judgments.  Without wading into the nuanced differences between views, I think it is fair to say that there 
is a consensus among philosophers of science that non-epistemic values can appropriately play a role in at 
-    -2
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least some of the following choices:  selecting scientific models, evaluating evidence, structuring 
quantitative measures, defining concepts, and preparing information for presentation to non-experts.   1
These value choices can have a significant impact on the outcome of scientific studies.  Consider, 
for example, the influential Global Burden of Disease Study (GBD).  In its first major release it described 
itself as aiming to “decouple epidemiological assessment from advocacy” (Murray and Lopez 1996, 247).  
In the summary of their ten volume report, the authors describe their study as making “a number of 
startling individual observations” about global health, the first of which was that, “[t]he burdens of mental 
illnesses…have been seriously underestimated by traditional approaches… [P]sychiatric conditions are 
responsible…for almost 11 per cent of disease burden worldwide” (Murray and Lopez 1996, 3).  Many 
others have cited and relied on the GBD’s conclusions concerning the magnitude of mental illness 
globally (Prince et al. 2007).  And nearly two decades later, the same GBD authors, in commenting on the 
legacy of the 1996 study, proudly noted that it “brought global, regional, and local attention to the burden 
of mental health” (Murray et al. 2012, 3).  
It turns out, however, that the reported burden of mental health was driven largely by two value 
choices:  the choice to “discount” and to “age-weight” the health losses measured by the study.  
Discounting is the standard economic practice of counting benefits farther in the future as being of lesser 
value compared to otherwise similar benefits in the present, and age-weighting involves giving health 
losses in the middle years of life greater weight than otherwise similar health losses among infants or the 
elderly.  Further details about discounting and age-weighting aren’t relevant to this paper; all we need to 
note is that the study authors acknowledged that each reflects value judgments, and that a reasonable case 
could be made to omit them (Murray 1996; Murray et al. 2012).   Given other methodological choices 2
made by the authors, these two weighting functions combine to give relatively more weight to health 
 On these points see e.g. Reiss (2017) and Elliott (2011).1
 Indeed, in 2012 the GBD ceased age-weighting and discounting.  There was also a third value choice that drove the 2
large burden attributed to mental health:  the choice to attribute all suicides to depression (Murray and Lopez 1996, 
250). Because I do not know precisely how this affected the results, I set it aside here.  For much more on 
discounting, age-weighting, and other value choices in the GBD, see Schroeder (2017).
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conditions which (1) commonly affect adults or older children (rather than the elderly or young children), 
(2) have disability (rather than death) as their primary impact, and (3) have their negative effects 
relatively close to the onset or diagnosis of the condition (rather than far in the future).  It should not be 
surprising, then, that when the GBD authors ran a sensitivity analysis to see how the decision to discount 
and age-weight affected the results, they discovered that the conditions most affected by these choices — 
unipolar major depression, anaemia, alcohol use, bipolar disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
chlamydia, drug use, panic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder — were largely composed of mental 
health conditions (Murray and Lopez 1996, 282).  Overall, the global burden of disease attributable to 
psychiatric conditions drops from 10.5% to 5.6%, when the results are not age-weighted or discounted 
(Murray and Lopez 1996, 261, 281).
I don’t want to comment here on the wisdom of the GBD scientists’ decision to discount and age-
weight.   They offer clear arguments in favor of doing so and many other studies have done the same, so 3
at minimum I think their choices were defensible.  The point is that what was arguably the top-billed 
result of a major study — a result which was picked up on by many others, and which was still being 
proudly touted by the study authors years later — was not directly implied by the underlying facts.  It was 
driven by a pair of value judgments.  Had the GBD scientists had different views on the values connected 
to discounting and age-weighting, they would have reported very different conclusions concerning the 
global impact of mental illness.4
This case is not unique.  The dramatically different assessments given by Stern and Nordhaus on 
the urgency of acting to address climate change can largely be traced to the way each valued the present 
versus the future (Weisbach and Sunstein 2009).  Similar conclusions are plausible concerning the value 
choices involved in classifying instances of sexual misbehavior in research on sexual assault, the value 
 I do so in Schroeder (unpublished-a).3
 Although the sensitivity analysis was conducted by the original study authors, they do not draw any connection to 4
their prominent claims concerning the global extent of mental illness.  To my knowledge, this paper is the first to do 
so.
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choices impacting the modeling of low-level exposures to toxins (Elliott 2011), and the value choices 
involved in constructing price indices (Reiss 2008).  
A natural — and not implausible — response to these cases is to suggest they are outliers.  
Although some scientific conclusions are sensitive to value choices, the vast majority are not.  The Earth 
really is getting warmer and sea levels really are rising, due to human activity.  Vaccines really do prevent 
measles and really don’t cause autism.  These conclusions are not sensitive in any reasonable way to non-
epistemic value judgments made by scientists in the course of their research.  The problem, however, is 
that there is no clear way for a non-expert to verify this — to tell which cases are the outliers and which 
are not.  This, I think, justifies a certain amount of skepticism.  “Although some of our conclusions do 
depend on value judgments, trust us that this one doesn’t,” isn’t nearly as confidence-inspiring as, “Our 
conclusions depend only on facts, not values.”  
I conclude, then, that rejecting the view of science as value-free, combined with high-profile 
examples of scientific conclusions that do crucially depend on value judgments, undermines the claim of 
science to public trust in a significant way.  In other words, it explains why it may be rational for the 
public to place less trust in the conclusions of science on a broad range of issues — including in areas, 
such as climate change and vaccine safety, where major conclusions are not in fact sensitive to different 
value judgments.5
3.  Grounding Trust in Transparency
Good science is not value-free, which undermines the standard justification given for trust in 
science.  What, then, can scientists do to merit the public’s trust?  The standard response has been to 
appeal to transparency.  If values cannot or should not be eliminated from the scientific process, scientists 
 For similar conclusions see Douglas (2017); Wilholt (2013); Irzik and Kurtulmus (forthcoming); and Elliott and 5
Resnik (2014).
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should be “as transparent as possible about the ways in which interests and values may influence their 
work” (Elliott and Resnik 2014, 649; cf. Ashford 1998; Douglas 2008; McKaughan and Elliott 2018). 
Obviously, in order for this proposal to work, scientists would need to be aware — much more aware than 
most are today — of the ways in which value judgments influence their work.  But, since we have 
independent reason to want such awareness, let us assume that calls for transparency are accompanied by 
a mechanism for increasing such awareness by scientists.
Would such a proposal work?  Transparency about values can help ground trust in some 
situations, but I see no reason to think that it should broadly support public trust in science.  Transparency 
is only useful in supporting — as opposed to eroding — trust if it enables the recipient of that information 
to determine how it has affected the author’s conclusions.  (Knowing I have a conflict of interest will 
typically reduce your trust in what I tell you, unless you can determine how that conflict influenced my 
conclusions.)  Transparency, then, will only promote trust in a robust way if the public understands how 
value choice influenced the results, and understands what alternative value choices could have been made 
and how they would have influenced the results.  These criteria may be satisfiable when the effect of a 
value choice is relatively simple.  Suppose, for example, that a scientist classifies non-consensual kissing 
as “sexual assault”, rather than “sexual misconduct”, on the grounds that she believes it has more in 
common with rape (a clear instance of sexual assault) than it does with contributing to a sexualized 
workplace (a clear instance of sexual misconduct).  The value judgment here is relatively simple to 
explain, an alternative classification is obvious, and (if the statistics involved are simple) the effect of 
alternative classification on the study may be relatively straightforward.  So transparency could work 
here.
Many value choices, however, are much more complex.  Think about choices embedded in 
complex statistical calculations — for example, those involved in aggregating climate models (Winsberg 
2012) or in calculating price indices (Reiss 2008).  In cases like these, it will be very hard to clearly 
explain the importance of any individual value choice and harder still to explain what alternative choices 
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could have been made.  Further, many studies involve a large number of value judgments.  Schroeder 
(2017), for example, identifies more than ten value choices which non-trivially influenced the Global 
Burden of Disease Study’s results.  Even if each of those value choices could be explained individually, it 
would be virtually impossible for a non-expert to figure out the interaction effects between them. 
What these cases show is that even if scientists make a serious effort at transparency — not 
simply listing their value judgments, but attempting to explain how those judgments have influenced their 
results — in many cases it simply won’t be possible to communicate to the public how those values have 
impacted their work.   And, if the public can’t trace the impact of those values, transparency doesn’t 6
amount to much more than a warning — a reason to distrust, rather than to trust.  A parallel realization 
can be seen in the way many medical schools and journals have handled researchers’ conflicts of interest.  
Whereas in the past disclosures of conflicts of interest — essentially, transparency — were often regarded 
as sufficient; many have now realized that merely knowing about such conflicts does not appreciably help 
a reader to interpret a study.  There is thus a growing move towards banning all significant conflicts of 
interest.  7
4.  Grounding Trust in an Alignment of Values
The previous section argued that transparency about values is not typically a solution to the 
problem of public trust in science.  That problem, we can now see, was not caused by the fact that values 
were hidden; it was caused by the fact that the values of scientists may diverge from the values of any 
 McKaughan and Elliott (2018, and in other works) suggest that scientists, through a particular sort of transparency, 6
seek to promote “backtracking” — that is, to enable non-experts to understand how values have influenced 
scientists’ results and to see how those results might have looked given alternative values.  They seem to suggest 
that, at least in the cases they consider, this will frequently be possible.  I am claiming that this will not generally be 
feasible.  See Schroeder (unpublished-a) for a more detailed discussion of a particular case.
 See e.g. <https://ari.hms.harvard.edu/interim-policy-statement-conflicts-interest-and-commitment>7
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individual member of the public.   To promote public trust in science, then, it seems that we need to 8
eliminate that divergence.  This is the insight that motivates Irzik and Kurtulmus (forthcoming; cf. 
Douglas 2017; Wilholt 2013), who argue that what they call “enhanced” trust requires that a member of 
the public knows that a scientist has worked from value choices that are in line with her own.  
If this proposal were feasible, I think it would provide a good foundation for trust.  And, in certain 
limited cases, it may be feasible.  When science is conducted by explicitly ideological organizations, 
members of the public may be able to make quick and generally accurate judgments about what values 
scientists hold, and accordingly may be able to seek out research done by scientists who share their 
values.  (A pragmatic environmentalist, for example, might be confident that scientists employed by the 
Environmental Defense Fund are likely to share her values.)  
Most science, however, is not conducted by explicitly ideological organizations.  In these cases, it 
will typically be very hard for members of the public to confidently determine whether a given study 
relied on value judgments similar to her own.  Even when this can be done (perhaps as a result of 
admirable transparency and clarity on the part of a scientist), it will require sustained and detailed 
engagement from the public, who will have to pay close attention not just to the conclusions of scientific 
studies, but also to their methodology.  Although such close attention to the details of science would be 
beneficial for a great many reasons, it unfortunately is not realistic on a broad scale.  There are simply too 
many scientific studies out there that are potentially relevant to an individual’s decisions for even attentive 
members of the public to keep up.  If our model for trust in science requires an alignment of values 
between the scientist and individual members of the public, trust in science can’t be a broad phenomenon.  
Further, I don’t think we want our foundation for trust in science to make that trust accessible only to 
those with the education and time to invest in exploring the details of individual scientific studies.
 It seems relevant to note here that distrust in science is greatest among those who identify as politically 8
conservative, while studies show that university scientists in the U.S. overwhelming support liberal candidates for 
political office.  Whether or not this in fact explains the distrust conservatives have in science, the argument thus far 
shows why such distrust could have a rational foundation.
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I also — somewhat speculatively — worry that adopting this proposal would exacerbate another 
problem.  Suppose the proposal works and, at least on some issues, members of the public are able to 
identify and rely upon science conducted in accordance with their own values.  This, I think, might lead to 
a further “politicization” of science, as each side on some issue seeks scientists who share their values.  
Of course, once we allow a role for values in science, value-based scientific disagreement isn’t 
necessarily a problem.  Faced, for example, with one experimental design that is more prone to false 
positives and another that is more prone to false negatives, either choice may be scientifically legitimate.  
It may therefore be appropriate for more environmentally-minded citizens to rely on different studies than 
citizens more concerned about economic development.  I worry, though, that in a culture where the public 
specifically seeks science done by those who share their values, it will be too easy to write off any 
differences in conclusions as due to value judgments — too easy for environmentalists to assume that any 
time pro-environment and pro-industry scientists reach different conclusions, it must be due to different 
underlying, legitimate value judgments.   In reality, though, most such disagreements are the result of bad 
science.  The worry, then, is that if we grow too comfortable with each side of an issue having its own 
science, it will be harder to distinguish scientific disagreements that can be traced to legitimate value 
judgments, from disagreements that are based on illegitimate value judgments or simple scientific error.  
This would be a major loss.
5.  Grounding Trust in Democratic Values 
I’ve argued that neither transparency about values nor an alignment of values can provide a broad 
foundation for public trust in science.  Let me, then, suggest a proposal that, though imperfect, can do 
better.  From what’s been said so far, we can note a few features that a better solution should have.  First, 
both the transparency and aligned values proposals ran into trouble because they require a great deal of 
attention and sophistication from the public.  Most individuals simply don’t have the training to 
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understand more technical value choices, or value choices embedded within complex calculations.  And, 
even when such understanding is possible, it will often require a level of attention that will in practice be 
accessible only to the well-off.  We should therefore look for a foundation for public trust which doesn’t 
require such detailed understanding of or close attention to individual scientific studies.  Second, I 
suggested that the aligned values proposal, in telling individuals to seek out studies conducted in 
accordance with their own values, could reinforce a kind of politicization that may have bad 
consequences.  It would be better to find a proposal that wouldn’t so easily divide scientists and the public 
along ideological lines.  Third, the problem with the transparency proposal (which the aligned values 
proposal tried, impractically, to address) was that values, even if transparent, can be alien.  In order for an 
individual to truly trust science, that science must be built on values that have some kind of legitimacy for 
her. 
I think scientists can satisfy two-and-a-half of these three criteria by appealing to democratic 
values — the values of the public and its representatives — when value judgments are called for in the 
scientific process.  The details of this proposal go beyond what I can say here.   But, briefly, the idea is 9
that we look to political philosophy to tell us how to determine the (legitimate) values representative of 
some population.  In some cases, those values might be the output of a procedure, such as a deliberative 
democracy exercise, a citizen science initiative, or a public referendum.   In other cases, it might be more 10
appropriate to equate a population’s values with the views, suitably “filtered” and “laundered”, currently 
held by its members.  (“Filtering” may be necessary to remove politically illegitimate values, e.g. racist 
values, and “laundering” to clean up values that are unrefined or based on false empirical beliefs.)  In 
cases where there is a broad social consensus, that might count as the relevant democratic value; in cases 
where there is a bimodal distribution of values, we might say that there are two democratic values; etc.
 See Schroeder (unpublished-b) for a bit more.  Many other philosophers have argued that there should be an 9
important place for democratic values in science.  See, for example, Kitcher (2011), Intemann (2015), and Douglas 
(2005).
 The extensive literature on “mini-publics” offers a promising starting point.  See e.g. Escobar and Elstub (2017).10
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Suppose, then, that political philosophers, informed by empirical research, can give us a way of 
determining democratic values.  I suggest that when value judgments are called for within the scientific 
process,  scientists should use democratic values when arriving at their primary or top-line results — the 11
sort of results reported in an abstract, executive summary, or in the initial portions of the analysis.  
Scientists could then offer a clearly-designated alternative analysis based on another set of values, e.g. 
their own.  I think this proposal can address two of the concerns with which I began this section, and can 
make some progress towards answering the third.
Let us first consider the too-much-attention and politicization problems.  On the democratic 
values proposal, if an individual can trust that a study was competently carried out — a matter I’ll return 
to below — then she can know, without digging into the methodological details, that its conclusions are 
based on objective facts plus democratic values.   This means that, in most cases, the public need not pay 12
detailed attention to the methodological details of individual studies — thus solving the too-much-
attention problem.  Further, if scientific conclusions are based on objective facts plus democratic values, 
any two scientists investigating the same problem in the same social and political context should reach 
roughly the same conclusion.  This recovers a kind of objectivity for science — not objectivity as freedom 
from values, but objectivity as freedom from personal biases.  On this picture, the individual 
characteristics of a scientist should have no impact on her conclusions — a conception of objectivity that 
has been defended on independent grounds (Reiss and Sprenger 2014; cf. Daston and Galison 2007 on 
“mechanical objectivity”).  If they are both doing good science, the environmentalist and the industrialist 
should reach the same top-line conclusions.  And if the environmentalist and industrialist reach different 
 This proposal is restricted to value judgments that arise within the scientific process.  In particular, I do not mean 11
for it to apply to problem selection.  Scientists should be free to choose research projects that are not the projects 
that would be chosen by the general public.  (The public, however, is under no obligation to fund such projects.)  I 
treat the choice of research topics differently than choices that arise within the course of research because I think 
that scientists have different rights at stake in each case.  For some related ideas, see Schroeder (2017b).
 There may also, of course, be methodological choices not based on non-epistemic values (including choices based 12
on epistemic values).  I set these aside here, since the problems of trust I’m concerned with don’t arise in the same 
way from them.
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top-line conclusions, it means that one or the other has made some sort of error.  This, I think, provides a 
solution to the politicization problem:  on the democratic values proposal, good science (at least in its 
primary analyses) will speak with a single voice.
The democratic values proposal therefore solves two of the three problems we noted above.  Of 
course, it only does so if the public can be confident that scientists really are making use of democratic 
values.  Why should the public assume that?  Right now, I think the answer is:  they shouldn’t!  For the 
democratic values proposal to work, it must be accepted by a significant portion of the scientific 
community, or by an easily-identifiable subset of the scientific community.  If that were to happen, 
though, then the problem here becomes the more general one of how the public can trust scientists to 
enforce their own norms.  The procedures and policies now in place work reasonably well, I think, to 
expose unethical treatment of research subjects, falsification of data, and certain other types of 
misconduct.  I am therefore optimistic that, given a greater awareness of the role value judgments play in 
scientific research, a system could be devised to identify scientists who depart from a professional norm 
requiring the use of democratic values. 
6.  Science, Values, and Democracy
I’ve argued that the democratic values proposal can address two of the problems that faced the 
alternative views.  But what about the third?  On the transparency proposal, the values of scientists can 
truly be alien.  If a scientist conducts research based on her own values, then, unless I happen to share 
those values, I have no meaningful relationship to those values.  If, however, a scientists appeals to 
democratic values, then there is a relationship, even if I don’t share those values.  If democratic 
procedures or methods were carried out properly, then my values were an input into the process which 
yielded democratic values.  My values are, in a sense, represented in the output of that process.  This, in 
turn, means that those values should have a kind of legitimacy for me.  In a democracy, we regularly 
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impose non-preferred outcomes on people when they are out-voted.  So long as democratic procedures are 
carried out properly, this seems to be legitimate — not ideal, perhaps, but better than any available 
alternative.  On the democratic values proposal, then, when a particular scientific conclusion is 
uncontested, the public can trust that that conclusion is one drawn solely from the facts, plus perhaps the 
values that we share.  For most of us, who don’t have the time, inclination, or ability to dig into the details 
of each scientific study we rely on, or who have a strong commitment to democracy, that will be enough.  
I think that the foregoing provides a reasonable answer to the alien values concern.  It is of course 
not a perfect answer.  It would be better, at least from the perspective of trust, to get each member of the 
public access to “personalized” science conducted in accordance with her values.  This, however, is 
impractical, as we saw when discussing the aligned values proposal.  So long as that is the case, there is 
no way to accommodate everyone.  Democratic values seem like a reasonable compromise in such a 
situation.  
All of that said, it would be nice if we could say a bit more to those ill-served by democratic 
values.  What should we say, for example, to an individual who knows that her values lie outside the 
political mainstream on some issue and is therefore distrustful of science done with democratic values on 
that issue?  The first thing to note is that, in such cases, the democratic values proposal fares no worse (or 
at least not much worse) than the transparency or aligned values proposals.  The democratic values 
proposal is fully consistent with transparency - something we have independent reason to want.  So, in 
cases where the transparency proposal works (e.g. cases where the value choices are few, easy to 
understand, and computationally simple), the same advantages can be had with the democratic values 
proposal.  Individuals who disagree with a particular value judgment and have the time and expertise to 
do so can determine how results would have looked under a different set of value judgments.  Also, recall 
that I am proposing only that primary or top-line results be based on democratic values.  In cases where 
value judgments can make a big difference — as in the Global Burden of Disease Study case discussed 
earlier — we might hope that scientists who hold contrary values will note the dependence of those 
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results on values by offering secondary, alternative analyses that begin from different value judgments.  
Those who have the time and expertise to dig into the methodology of scientific reports can do so, seeking 
out results based on values they share, as the aligned values proposal would recommend.
If the foregoing is correct, the democratic values proposal does better than the alternatives in most 
cases, and no worse in others.  That should be sufficient reason to prefer it.  But I think we can say a bit 
more.  In what cases is the complaint from minority values most compelling?  It is not, I think, when it 
comes from people whose values lie outside the mainstream on some issues, but within the mainstream on 
many other issues.  The much more compelling complaint comes from people whose values consistently 
lie outside the mainstream — people who are consistently out-voted.  Oftentimes (though of course not 
always) when this happens, it involves individuals who are members of groups that are or have been 
marginalized by mainstream society.  Think, for example, of cultural or (dis)ability-based groups whose 
values and ways of life have been consistently treated as being less valuable and worthy of respect than 
the values and ways of life of the majority.
I think the democratic values proposal has two important features that can partially address such 
complaints.  First, remember that the democratic values proposal launders and filters the actual values 
held by the public.  Certain values — e.g. racist or sexist ones — conflict with basic democratic principles 
of equal worth, and so cannot be candidate democratic values.  Thus, even in a racist society, telling 
scientists to work from democratic values will not tell them to work from racist values.   Second, in what 13
I regard as its most plausible forms, democracy is not a form of government based on one person-one 
vote.  It is a form of government based on the idea that all citizens are of equal worth and have a right to 
equal consideration.  This suggests that, in cases where minority values are held by a group that is or has 
been the subject of exclusion or discrimination, democratic principles may sometimes require giving 
those values extra weight, or a voice disproportionate to their statistical representation in the population, 
as a way of accounting or compensating for past unjust treatment.  Thus, democratic principles may in 
 See Schroeder (unpublished-b) for more on this.13
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some cases require treating the values held by an excluded minority as democratically on a par with the 
conflicting values held by the majority.14
These considerations, I think, lessen the force of the complaint from minority values, especially 
in its most serious incarnation.  But I don’t think they eliminate it.  There will still be people whose values 
will consistently be marginalized by the democratic view.  In such cases, the main recourse available is an 
appeal to alternate results.  If individuals with minority views can count on there being scientists who 
share those views, they can expect that the kind of alternative analysis they would prefer will be out there, 
at least in cases where it makes a difference.  Of course, scientists are currently a rather homogeneous 
bunch along many dimensions.  So this suggests that the call to work from democratic values provides 
(yet further) support for the importance of increasing diversity within the scientific community.15
 See Kelman (2000) for an example of this sort of argument in the context of disability.14
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TO BE ADDED15
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Abstract 
Scientific models need to be investigated if they are to provide valuable information 
about the systems they represent. Surprisingly, the epistemological question of what 
enables this investigation has hardly been investigated. Even authors who consider the 
inferential role of models as central, like Hughes (1997) or Bueno and Colyvan (2011), 
content themselves with claiming that models contain mathematical resources that 
provide inferential power. We claim that these notions require further analysis and ar-
gue that mathematical formalisms contribute to this inferential role. We characterize 
formalisms, illustrate how they extend our mathematical resources, and highlight how 
distinct formalisms offer various inferential affordances. 
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1. Introduction. When analyzing scientific representations, philosophers of science 
are keen on mentioning that some models provide scientists with “mathematical re-
sources” and “inferential power”, but they seldom give a detailed analysis of these no-
tions. This paper is devoted to the discussion of what appears to us as major mathe-
matical resources, namely, formalisms. We thus present an analysis of the notion of 
formalism as well as examples from which we argue that formalisms should be ac-
knowledged as major units of scientific activity. 
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review what philosophers of science 
have to say about mathematical resource and inferential power and observe that it is 
disappointing. In order to fill the gap we have identified, we put forward in Section 3 
the three components we identify within the notion of mathematical resource. Section 
4 is devoted to one of these components, namely, formalism. At last, in Section 5, we 
provide the reader with examples of how the choice of a formalism influences the type 
of knowledge scientists may draw from their representations. 
2. Scientific representations and inferences therefrom. At what conditions can sci-
entific models be used to gain information about target systems? First, a suitable se-
mantic relation between the model and the system(s) that it stands for should obtain, 
so that by investigating the model, we can make legitimate inferences about its target 
system(s). This cannot be done unless nontrivial inferences about the model itself, as a 
mathematical object, can be carried out. Models are usually referred to by proper 
names (like “Ising model” or “Lotka-Volterra” model”) or by expressions that high-
light some of their mathematical properties (like “the harmonic oscillator” or “the ide-
al gas”). There is however more to be learnt about them than their prima facie proper-
ties. For example, solving the Ising model reveals more about Ising-like systems than 
their description as “sets of discrete variables representing magnetic dipole moments 
of atomic spins that can be in one of two states”; similarly, the mathematical content of 
an harmonic oscillator goes beyond “being a system that, when displaced from its 
equilibrium position, experiences a restoring force that is proportional to the displace-
ment”. Philosophers of science are aware of the need to investigate the epistemology 
of models and how we find out about concealed truths about model systems (Frigg, 
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2010, 257) but are surprisingly silent about how it is actually performed.  They are 1
content with saying that the model is “manipulated” (Morgan and Morrison, 1997, 
chapter 2, passim) or that we can “play” with it (Hughes, 2010, 49), which are sugges-
tive, but metaphoric characterizations. 
Surprisingly, even accounts of applied mathematics and scientific representation that 
give central stage to their inferential role hardly analyze how it is fulfilled and which 
elements of the models contribute to it. Let us illustrate this point with Bueno’s and 
Colyvan’s work. They claim that “the fundamental role of applied mathematics is in-
ferential" (Bueno and Colyvan, 2011, 352) and accordingly propose an “inferential 
conception" of the application of mathematics that extends Hughes’ three-step DDI 
account of scientific representation (see below).  First, a "mapping from the empirical 2
set up to a convenient mathematical structure” (ibidem, 353) is established (immersion 
step); by doing so, it becomes possible “to obtain inferences that would otherwise be 
extraordinarily hard (if not impossible) to obtain” (ibidem, 352) (derivation step); fi-
nally, the mathematical consequences that were obtained are interpreted step in terms 
of the initial empirical set up (ibidem, 353) (interpretation step). Bueno and Colyvan 
further highlight the importance of the inferential role of mathematics for mathemati-
cal unification, novel predictions by mathematical reasoning or mathematical explana-
tions (ibidem, 363). However, the analysis of how this inferential role is carried out 
shines by its absence. Bueno and Colyvan mostly analyze mathematical resources in a 
semantic perspective  and insist on the difference in content and interpretation that 3
these make possible, e.g., when “mathematics provides additional entities to quantify 
 Frigg, while clearly stating the problem, does not really address it and is content with 1
briefly emphasizing the advantages of his fictional account of model concerning the 
epistemology of models (Frigg, 2010). As to the epistemological section of Frigg and 
Hartmann’s review article about scientific models, it merely points at experiments, si-
mulations, thought-experiment as ways of investigating models (Frigg and Hartmann, 
2017).
 Suarez’s inferential conception (Suarez, 2004) hardly addresses either the question 2
of how inferences from models are actually carried out. For lack of space, we shall not 
discuss it here.
 Their discussion is mostly directed at the shortcomings of Pincock’s “mapping ac3 -
count” of the application of mathematics (Pincock, 2004).
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over” (complex numbers), or is “the source of interpretations that are physically mean-
ingful” and provide “novel prediction” about physical systems, like with the case of 
the interpretation of negative energy solutions to Dirac’s equation (ibidem, 366). 
In another paper, Bueno suggests that results are derived “by exploring the mathe-
matical resources of the model” in which features of the empirical set up are immersed 
(Bueno, 2014, 379, see also 387) and that results emerge “as a feature of the mathe-
matics” (ibidem) or by using “the particular mathematical framework” (ibidem, 385). 
What this inferential power of mathematics should be specifically ascribed to remains 
unclear. Bueno and Colyvan (2011, 352) just claim that the “embedding into a mathe-
matical structure makes it is possible to obtain inferences”. They also emphasize how, 
with the help of appropriate idealizations, “the mathematical model [can] directly 
[yield] the results” (ibidem, 360, our emphasis). But elsewhere in the paper, conse-
quences are said to be drawn “from the mathematical formalism, using the mathemati-
cal structure obtained in the immersion step” (ibidem, 353, our emphasis). 
What are we to make of these various claims? A prima facie plausible answer to this 
question might be that structures and formalisms are the two sides of a same inferen-
tial coin. However, this answer is not satisfactory, since, as is well-known, mathemati-
cal structures can be presented in different formalisms, which, as we shall see in Sec-
tion 4, are associated with different inferential possibilities. Another blind spot in 
Bueno’s and Colyvan’s account is that while the derivation step is claimed to be “the 
key point of the application process, where consequences from the mathematical for-
malism are generated’’ (ibidem, 353), the question of how inferences are drawn with 
the help of formalisms is left under-discussed. 
We draw from this brief analysis of Bueno’s and Colyvan’s views that the notions of 
mathematical resource and inferential power, which are commonly used when dis-
cussing applications of mathematics, are often mere labels in need of further investiga-
tion. Coming back to the seminal ideas presented by Hughes and extended by Bueno 
and Colyvan is of little help because Hughes’ paper lacks precise answers to the fol-
lowing precise questions: What are exactly mathematical resources? What is their in-
ferential power? In his DDI (Denotation, Demonstration, and Interpretation) account 
of scientific representation, Hughes claims that scientific representations have an ‘‘in-
ternal dynamic’’, whose effects we can examine (1997, 332), and “contain resources 
which enable us to demonstrate the results we are interested in”. A general notion of 
resource is appropriate to capture the variety of ways in which demonstrations can be 
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carried out; however, the claim that the deductive power comes from “the deductive 
resources of mathematics they employ” (ibidem, 332) is too vague and is left unana-
lyzed.  
3. Components of mathematical resources. How are the notions of inferential power 
and mathematical resources to be analyzed? Are they linked to structures or to symbo-
lic systems and formalisms? In this section, we claim that formalisms are an important 
component of the notions of inferential power and mathematical resource and should 
be analyzed in their own right. 
Let us begin by briefly presenting what are, according to us, the three main compo-
nents of the notions of mathematical resource and associated inferential power. First, 
mathematical structures, to the extent that they are tractable, are undoubtedly an im-
portant part of the mathematical resources that are used in mathematical modeling. As 
argued by Cartwright, theories are no “vending machines” that “drop out the sought-
for representation" (1999, 247); scientific models are no vending machines either and 
scientists must make the best of the models that they know to be tractable. According-
ly, the content of models often needs to be adapted by means of idealizations, approx-
imations (Redhead 1980), abstractions, by squeezing representations into the straight-
jacket of a few elementary models (Cartwright, 1981), or by drawing, from the start, 
on the pool of existing tractable models (Humphreys, 2004, Barberousse and Imbert, 
2014). 
Second, mathematical knowledge associated with structures is also to be counted as 
a distinct mathematical resource, which allows for new inferences when it is available. 
Let us take the well-known example of Koenigsberg’s seven bridges. The impossibility 
of crossing them once and only once in a single trip can be demonstrated by applying a 
result from graph theory. Similarly, the explanation of the life-cycle of the Magicicada 
(Baker 2009, Colyvan 2018) is provided by the application of a number-theoretic 
property of prime numbers to life-cycles of species. 
At last, formal settings or formalisms provide languages in which theories are devel-
oped, calculations carried out, and inferences drawn from models. Examples of for-
malisms are Hamiltonian formalism, path integrals, Fourier representation, cellular 
automata, etc. We provide a detailed analysis of some of these below. Contrary to 
mathematical structures, formalisms are partly content neutral (though form and con-
tent are often intertwined in scientific representations). As providing a partially stan-
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dardized way of making inferences, they are important tools for scientists, which in 
turn justifies considering them as important units of analysis in the philosophy of sci-
ence. Other authors have started exploring the idea that format matters in scientific 
activities. Humphreys gives general arguments to this effect and emphasizes the dif-
ference between formats that are appropriate for human-made and format that suit 
computational inferences (2004). Vorms (2009) also emphasizes the general impor-
tance of formats of representation when toying with theories or models. Formalisms 
are a specifically mathematical type of format whose role needs further investigation. 
This is what we do in the next section. 
4. What are formalisms? As briefly stated above, formalisms are mathematical lan-
guages that allow one to present mathematical statements or objects and draw infer-
ences about them by means of general inference rules. For example, Hamiltonian for-
malism is one of the formalisms through which scientists may find out means to solve 
differential equations. Path integrals is another formalism of this kind, with the help of 
which one may also solve (partial) differential equations. Let us illustrate the latter 
point further: the integral solution of the Schrödinger equation requires using a math-
ematical object, the propagator, whose calculation the path integrals formalism makes 
easier. Fourier representation or formalism enables one to represent mathematical 
functions as the continuous sum of sine functions (or complex exponential functions), 
so that harmonic analysis, i.e. the decomposition of a signal in its harmonic frequen-
cies, may be performed. It also provides modelers with a way to express the solutions 
of some partial differential equations, such as the heat equation. Finally, formalisms 
like numerical integrators, cellular automata, lattice Boltzmann methods, and discrete 
variational integrators, are indispensable in current computational science.  
Formalisms consist in the following elements: 
i. elementary symbols; 
ii. syntax rules that determine the set of well-formed expressions; 
iii. inference rules; 
iv. a partly detachable interpretation, both mathematical and physical. 
Their use is facilitated by  
v. translation rules that indicate how to shift from one formalism to another. 
Let us illustrate these elements by discussing in more detail the above examples. In 
the Hamiltonian formalism, elementary symbols are used for a variable and its conju-
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gate momentum: “(q, p)”, or for Poisson brackets ‘’{.,.}’'. Among the syntax rules that 
are specific to Hamiltonian formalism, some allow one to rewrite Hamilton equations 
by using the canonical variables. Inferences rules allow the users to use action-angle 
variables (I, theta) and to solve equations by using these coordinates because this 
change of variables opens the possibility to deal with integrable systems, thus provid-
ing a systematic method to solve exactly, i.e., in closed forms, differential systems like 
the simple pendulum, and more generally, any 1D-conservative system. Indeed, due to 
this change of variables, one takes full advantage of the existence of conserved quanti-
ties in mechanical systems, which are then used as variables (actions) in Hamilton 
equations. This allows constructing the solution of the equations by “quadrature’' (Ba-
belon et al. 2003, chapter 2). An example of a translation rule is the Legendre trans-
form that allows one to shift to Lagrangian formalism. Similarly, in the case of Fourier 
transforms, an elementary specific symbol is f^, which corresponds to the Fourier 
transform of the function f. Scientists use sets of rules that describe the Fourier trans-
forms of some typical functions, such as the constant function, the unit step function, 
and the sinusoids, but also rules for the convolution product, viz. the Fourier transform 
of the convolution f o g is the product of Fourier transforms of f and g: (f o g)^  = f^. 
g^,  so that solutions of equations may be found within Fourier space. An inverse 
Fourier transform is also defined, which enables one to move back from the Fourier 
transform f^ to the function f (this is again a translation rule). 
As emphasized above, formalisms are (partly) content neutral and thus “exportable”, 
even though they usually come with a privileged physical interpretation. As a matter of 
fact, most formalisms have been developed within a peculiar modeling context or are 
linked to a physical theory. From this origin, the most successful ones may become 
autonomous and depart from their original, physical interpretation. For example, 
Hamiltonian formalism was initially developed in the context of classical mechanics 
but is nowadays autonomous and used in other physical contexts. Path integrals origi-
nally come from the study of Brownian motion (Wiener 1923) and quantum mechanics 
(Feymann 1942) but are currently used in other fields like field theory and financial 
modeling. 
The mathematical interpretation of formalisms may sometimes be detachable. For 
example, the transition rules associated with cellular automata (see below) do not have 
any obvious mathematical interpretation. Further, although some formalisms are lin-
ked to acknowledged mathematical theories (e.g.,  the Fourier formalism is linked to 
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the theory of  complex functions), they differ from genuine mathematical theories, as 
shown by the example of path integrals, in which the formalism is used in the absence 
of any uncontroversial mathematical theory that could back it up. The definition of a 
path integral: 
 
requires using a measure “Dx’', to which no general, rigorous definition can be given 
yet. This mathematical concern does not prevent physicists from using path integrals 
anyway, as testified by the following quote: “The question of how the path integral is 
to be understood in full generality remains open. Given this, one might expect to see 
the physicists expending great energy trying to clarify the precise mathematical mean-
ing of the path integral. Curiously, we again find that this is not the case” (Davey 
2003, 450). 
Let us finally emphasize that formalisms also differ from formulations of physical 
theories and allow philosophers of science to address different philosophical problems. 
Formulations of theories, in particular axiomatic ones, are explored when questions 
about conceptual content and metaphysical implications are raised. They pertain to 
foundational issues. Whether a given formulation involves calculus is a peripheral is-
sue in this context. By contrast, the primary virtue of a formalism is to allow modelers 
to draw actual inferences from a theory or model. The inferential rules it contains are 
more important than the mathematical rigor of the language in which it is expressed. 
5. Choosing a formalism. So far, we have argued that the inferential power that is re-
quired to explore models is partly brought about by formalisms, and we have given 
examples thereof. Accordingly, formalisms have to be carefully examined by philoso-
phers of science if they are to provide a fine-grained analysis of how scientific knowl-
edge is produced in practice. We now aim to show that there is no unique description 
of formalism-rooted inferential power since different formalisms allow for different 
types of inferences and are adapted to different types of inquiries. We do so by provid-
ing examples of these differences and of the factors that guide scientists when choos-
ing the formalism that is best suited to the task at hand. 
How do scientists decide which formalism to use in a given inquiry? The choice may 
first depend on the type of models at hand. For example, the path integral formalism is 
K(b,a) = e
2 iπ
h
Ldt
tb
ta
∫
a
b
∫ Dx(t)
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well adapted to solve systems with many degrees of freedom (Zinn-Justin 2009) and 
makes ‘‘certain numerical calculations in quantum mechanics more tractable’’ (Davey 
2003, 449). Lagrangian formalism offers a well-suited framework to solve equations 
describing constrained systems (Goldstein 2002, 13, Vorms 2009, 15). Fourier repre-
sentation allows one to solve, e.g., the differential equations describing the time evolu-
tion of electrical quantities in networks. In this case, differential equations are trans-
formed into algebraic equations on variables in Fourier space, which may be easier to 
solve. Finally, with the change of action-angle variables, Hamiltonian formalism po-
tentially provides exact solutions for integrable systems, which have as many indepen-
dent conserved quantities as degrees of freedom. 
The use of a particular formalism is also guided by epistemic goals. Depending on 
the chosen formalism, different kinds of properties, general (e.g. periodicity, symme-
try) or particular (dynamical), may be inferred from the same model. Let us illustrate 
this point with the example of prey-predator models in ecology. Among these, some 
obey Lotka-Volterra (LV) equations and represent transforming populations with a sys-
tem of two coupled equations. If they are investigated within the Hamilton formalism, 
general properties of these models can be found without setting initial conditions or 
numerical values for the involved parameters. The reframed models can indeed be 
shown to be integrable, like the simple pendulum in classical mechanics. Dutt explicit-
ly emphasizes the advantages of using this formalism for a two-species LV system:  
‘‘In dealing with the problems involving periodicity, the Hamilton-Jacobi 
canonical theory has a distinct advantage over the conventional methods of 
classical mechanics. In this approach, one introduces action and angle vari-
ables through canonical transformations in such a way that the angle variable 
becomes cyclic. One then obtains the frequency of oscillation by taking the 
derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the action variable. One may 
thus bypass the difficulty in obtaining the complete solutions of the equations 
of motion, if these are not required.’’ (Dutt, 1976, 460, our emphasis) 
LV models can also be solved with the help of computers and generic numerical in-
tegrators when the aim is to obtain particular dynamics for specific values of parame-
ters and initial conditions. Such numerical solutions of the LV model can also be pro-
vided by specific formalisms, such as discrete variational integrators (Krauss 2017, 34; 
Tyranowski 2014, 149). In that case, discrete equations are derived from a discrete 
least action principle, which is well-suited to conservative systems, like the LV sys-
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tem. Discrete variational integrators allow for the preservation of general properties 
like the conservation of global quantities, viz. energy, momenta, and symplecticity. 
This discrete formalism comes with mathematical constraints on the discretization of 
time since the time step has to be adaptive in order to guarantee the conservation of 
global quantities (Marsden & West 2001, Section 4.1). 
Finally, let us mention that LV models can also be studied by using cellular au-
tomata (CA) and associated formalism, with the following advantages: 
[a rather general predator-prey model] is formulated in terms of automata 
networks, which describe more correctly the local character of predation than 
differential equations. An automata network is a graph with a discrete variable 
at each vertex which evolves in discrete time steps according to a definite rule 
involving the values of neighboring vertex variables. (Ermentrout and Edem-
stein-Keshet 1993, 106)  
On the one hand, CA are discrete dynamical systems, but on the other, they are also a 
nice means to practice science with the help of a computationally simple formalism (in 
terms of transition rules). They can be extremely powerful. For example, rule 110 is 
Turing complete and, like lambda-calculus, can emulate any Turing machine and 
therefore complete any computation. In contrast with the case of Hamilton formalism, 
CA-based inferences from prey-predator models are carried out for specific values and 
parameters. As CA are described by local rules, these inferences merely pertain to lo-
cal variations in the model. However, the simplicity of these rules is a tremendous ad-
vantage for modeling and code-writing. For instance, CA allow one to easily add rules 
for the pursuit and evasion of populations as well as rules for age variation (Boccara et 
al. 1993, Ermentrout and Edemstein-Keshet 1993, see also Barberousse and Imbert 
2013 for an analysis of CA as used in fluid dynamics and compared with Navier-
Stokes based methods). 
Let us now turn to a different example illustrating how different the epistemological 
effects of using this or that formalism may be. Crystals are currently modeled as lat-
tices that come under two forms, lattices in real space and lattices in reciprocal space. 
Each is associated with a specific formalism. Within the real space lattice formalism, 
crystals are described with a vector R expanded on a vector basis (a1, a2, a3) which cor-
responds to crystal directions, and alpha, beta, gamma are the corresponding angles. 
Inferences about symmetry of crystals are usually made within this type of representa-
tion since the real space is well adapted to studying discrete translations and rotations. 
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Crystals can also be described with the help of a vector R* in a lattice in reciprocal 
space. There is a clear correspondence between the two spaces since they are dual. 
Given R in the real space, we can derive R* in the reciprocal space, and conversely. 
The two spaces are related by a Fourier transform. However, the reciprocal space can 
be more convenient because inferences about diffraction and interference patterns are 
easier to carry out in the Fourier representation. As stressed by Hammond in a text-
book of crystallography: 
the reciprocal lattice is the basis upon which the geometry of X-ray and elec-
tron diffraction patterns can be most easily understood and […] the electron 
diffraction patterns observed in the electron microscope, or the X-ray dif-
fraction patterns recorded with a precession camera, are simply sections 
through the reciprocal lattice of a crystal (Hammond 2009, 165). 
This example shows that facilitating inferences may have various epistemological 
effects. Some are relevant to computational aspects and the predictions or explanations 
that scientists are able to produce in practice. Others pertain to the way scientists un-
derstand and reason about models and their target systems. This example also shows 
how different epistemic goals (symmetry-oriented vs. interference-oriented investiga-
tions of crystals) determine which formalism is chosen. 
Overall, the above shows that formalisms not only have an important impact on the 
amount of results scientists may produce, but also on the types of results that are at-
tainable. The examples we have discussed also highlight that the existence of a variety 
of formalisms is a source of epistemic richness and enhanced inferential power for sci-
entists because it provides them with multiple ways of investigating the same mathe-
matical structures or structures that are related by suitable morphisms. 
6. Conclusion. The above proposals are meant to contribute to the epistemological 
question of what provides models with inferential power and helps scientists succeed-
ing in their inquiries. We have shown that some of this inferential power is brought 
about by the formal symbolic tools that scientists use to present and investigate math-
ematical models. Our second claim is that all formal settings do not enable the same 
types of inferences nor are suited to all epistemic goals. Accordingly, a fine-grained 
analysis of the conditions of scientific progress needs, among other things, to focus on 
formalisms. 
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Our epistemological analysis is not tied to any particular theory of scientific repre-
sentation. However, by showing that inferences actually hinge on choice of formalism, 
it suggests that a theory of scientific representation that is cashed out in terms of struc-
tures is too abstract to account for the various ways equations are solved in practice 
and information extracted from scientific models. 
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Representation Re-construed: 
Answering the Job Description Challenge with a 
Construal-based Notion of Natural Representation 
Abstract: Many philosophers worry that cognitive scientists apply the 
concept REPRESENTATION too liberally. For example, William Ramsey 
argues that scientists often ascribe natural representations according to the 
“receptor notion,” a causal account with absurd consequences. I 
rehabilitate the receptor notion by augmenting it with a background 
condition: that natural representations are ascribed only to systems 
construed as organisms. This Organism-Receptor account rationalizes our 
existing conceptual practice, including the fact that scientists in fact reject 
Ramsey’s absurd consequences. The Organism-Receptor account raises 
some worrying questions, but as a more faithful characterization of 
scientific practice it is a better guide to conceptual reform. 
Abstract: 100 words 
Total: 4,995 words 
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1. Introduction. There is a common complaint among philosophers that scientists 
use the word “representation” too liberally. Representation is often contrasted with 
indication: representation is a distinction achieved by maps, linguistic performances, 
and thoughts, whereas indication is a less-demanding state achieved by thermostats, 
which indicate ambient temperature, and refrigerator lights, which indicate whether 
the door is open (Dretske 1981; Cummins and Poirier 2004). However, cognitive 
scientists often ascribe representations when it seems that mere indication is all that is 
called for. We commonly say that hidden layers in a neural network represent 
concepts, or that neurons in V1 represent visual edges, because they reliably respond 
differently to the circumstances they are said to represent (Ramsey 2007, 119–20; cf. 
Hubel and Wiesel 1962). But these “representations” are thin-blooded compared to 
paradigmatic conventional representations. For example, they cannot be invoked in 
the absence of an appropriate stimulus. So are cognitive scientists conceptually 
confused? Do they exaggerate their claims? And if the natural representations posited 
by cognitive scientists aren’t genuine representations, is the cognitive revolution dead? 
William Ramsey provides an excellent book-length exploration of these worries, 
articulating a qualified pessimism about their answers: 
…we have accounts that are characterized as “representational,” but where 
the structures and states called representations are actually doing 
something else. This has led to some important misconceptions about the 
status of representationalism, the nature of cognitive science and the 
direction in which it is headed. (2007, 3) 
Ramsey describes the “job description challenge”: to give an account of the distinctive 
properties of representations in virtue of which appealing to them serves a special 
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explanatory role. If the job description challenge can be met, then we can formulate a 
plan for conceptual reform. 
I undertake Ramsey’s challenge, but with a metadiscursive twist: I describe the 
Organism-Receptor account, which articulates conditions for ascribing 
representations, in virtue of which such ascriptions achieve a special explanatory 
purpose. The account is merely suggestive about the properties that distinguish first-
order representational states from non-representational states; it says more about the 
mental state of the ascriber than about the representation-bearing system. However, 
the Organism-Receptor account provides a more adequate characterization of 
scientists’ practice than Ramsey’s. 
My main aim in this paper is to push back against pessimistic evaluations of the 
existing practice of representation-ascription in cognitive science, like Ramsey’s. I will 
focus on Ramsey’s critique of the “receptor notion,” a flawed causal theory of 
representation that he attributes to some cognitive scientists. Ramsey argues that the 
receptor notion has absurd consequences, although scientists do not accept them. By 
augmenting the receptor notion with a construal-based background condition, I can 
explain why scientists do not draw these absurd conclusions. Whereas Ramsey’s 
pessimistic account of scientists’ practice of ascribing representations finds it wanting 
and is extensionally inadequate, mine rationalizes our extant conceptual practice 
(though that practice is not beyond criticism). I conclude that my apologetic account 
is a more charitable and adequate interpretation of existing scientific practice than 
Ramsey’s. 
2. Ramsey on the “Receptor Notion.” Ramsey argues that natural 
representations in cognitive science are often ascribed according to the “receptor 
notion,” a crude causal theory of representation. According to the receptor notion, a 
state s represents a state of affairs p if s is regularly and reliably caused by p (2007, 119). 
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Ramsey claims that the receptor notion is what justifies the ascription of 
representations to cells in V1 that detect visual edges, cells in frog cortex that detect 
flies, and the mechanisms in Venus flytraps that cause their “jaws” to close (119–23). 
Ramsey argues that this receptor notion is too liberal to be useful to scientists. For 
example, it is susceptible to the “disjunction problem” (Fodor 1987): since frog neurons 
respond reliably to visual stimulation by flies or (say) BBs, we should say that the 
content of the representation is fly-or-BB, rather than fly. Likewise, Venus flytraps 
represent objects in a particular range of sizes rather than edible insects, and the 
human concept GOAT represents goats-or-weird-looking-sheep. Such disjunctive 
content-ascriptions are usually considered absurd. Absent a clever fix, we must 
embrace unwieldy, disjunctive contents for representations or we must reject the 
receptor notion (Ramsey, 129).  
Dretske’s (1988) teleofunctional theory of representation is a sophisticated twist 
on the receptor notion that avoids the disjunction problem. On Dretske’s view, a 
representational state must not only be causally dependent on the state of affairs it 
represents, but must serve a function for its containing system in virtue of this causal 
dependency. This extra condition motivates constraints on representational content 
that eliminate problematic disjunctive contents. Dretske’s theory is subject to some 
subtle criticisms that I will discuss in Section 6, but the Organism-Receptor account 
will preserve some of the teleological character of Dretske’s theory. 
Ramsey’s most compelling objection to the receptor account, including Dretske’s 
sophisticated version, is that it justifies ascribing representational contents to states 
that are not, in fact, representational: smoke “represents” fire since the latter causes the 
former. Likewise, the firing pin of a gun “represents” whether the trigger is depressed, 
and rusting iron “represents” the presence of water and oxygen (138–47). Ramsey 
claims, plausibly, that these are absurd consequences. I find Ramsey’s reductio 
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compelling, but reject a different premise than he does. Rather than conclude that 
cognitive scientists have a bad conceptual practice, I question whether his 
characterization of the receptor notion is a charitable understanding of what happens 
in cognitive science. After all, cognitive scientists do not generally claim that GOAT 
denotes goats-or-sheep (at least for competent judges of goathood), or that firing pins 
represent anything. 
3. A Construal-based Notion of an Organism. I argue that something like the 
receptor notion can be salvaged if being a receptor is contextualized in terms of 
construal. Construal (also called “seeing-as”) is a judgment-like attitude whose 
semantic value can vary licitly independently of the state of affairs it describes. For 
example, we can construe an ambiguous figure like the Necker cube as if it were 
viewed from above or below, or the duck-rabbit as if it were an image of a duck or of a 
rabbit (Roberts 1988; see also Wittgenstein 1953). We can construe an action like 
 
Ambiguous figures. Left: The Necker cube. Right: The duck-rabbit (image from 
Jastrow 1899). 
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skydiving as brave or foolhardy, depending on which features of skydiving we attend 
to. 
On a construal-based account of conceptual norms, a concept (e.g. 
REPRESENTATION) is ascribed relative to a construal of a situation. For example, 
perhaps I fear something only if I construe it as dangerous to me or detrimental to my 
ends (Roberts 1988). Daniel Dennett’s (1987) intentional stance is a more familiar 
example: according Dennett, a system has mental states if and only if we construe it in 
such a way that its behavior is explainable in terms of a belief-desire schema.  
I propose that construing something as an organism involves construing it such 
that it has goals and behavior, and believing that it has mechanisms that promote 
those goals by producing that behavior. More precisely: 
Organism-Construal. A subject a construes a system x as an organism in a 
context1 c if and only if, in c,  
(O1) a attributes a set of goals G to x, 
(O2) a attributes a set of behaviors B to x, 
(O3) a believes that the elements of B function to promote elements of G, 
(O4) a believes that x possesses a set of mechanisms M, and 
(O5) a believes that the elements of M collectively produce the elements of B. 
My main argument does not rely on all the details of Organism-Construal; it could be 
replaced by a different explication of what it is to see something as an organism. But 
Organism-Construal captures an intuitive notion of a critter. First of all, we normally 
take living critters to have goals, such as survival and reproduction, and behaviors that 
                                                             
1 The relevant notion of a context is something like MacFarlane’s (2014) “context of 
assessment.” 
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promote those goals. However, Organism-Construal does not require that an 
organism really have goals (whatever that involves) or exhibit behavior (however that’s 
distinguished from other performances). To see something as an organism according 
to Organism-Construal, the construing subject need only attribute goals to the 
system, and see some of its performances as behaviors that promote those goals. Such 
goals could include relatively specific aims such as locating food, getting out of the 
rain, or driving home. We sometimes also attribute goals and behaviors to non-living 
things, such as automated machines. For example, we might say that a robot vacuum 
has the goal of cleaning the floor, which it accomplishes by sucking up dust. Or I 
might say that my GPS navigation computer is trying to kill me, which it accomplishes 
by consistently giving me directions that lead me through strange, dangerous 
backroads. Condition (O3) is expressed in terms of belief instead of attribution, 
meaning that the construing subject must sincerely believe that an organism’s putative 
behaviors function to promote its putative goals. When and insofar as someone 
construes a system in this way, the conditions (O1)–(O3) above are satisfied. 
Conditions (O4)–(O5) require that the system’s behavior be explainable by 
appeal to mechanisms. “Mechanisms” here should be understood in roughly the sense 
meant by the new mechanists (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen 2005; Craver 2007): organized structures of component parts and 
operations that produce a phenomenon, and the description of which is an 
explanatory aim of some scientific projects. Much explanation in biology and 
neuroscience plausibly follows a mechanistic model, and likewise in cognitive science. 
Daniel Weiskopf (2011) has argued that cognitive explanations are not properly 
mechanistic, but even on his view cognitive explanations are extremely similar to 
mechanistic ones, distinguishable only because the relationship between components 
of cognitive models and their physiological realizers is relatively opaque. Regardless, 
cognitive scientists use the word “mechanism” to refer to the referents of their models, 
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just as biologists and neuroscientists do. I am more moved by the similarities between 
the biological and the cognitive sciences than the differences. Therefore, like 
Catherine Stinson (2016), I acknowledge Weiskopf ’s concerns but nevertheless adopt 
the language of “mechanisms.” 
Not all of a system’s mechanisms function to produce behavior. For example, 
biological organisms have metabolic and other mechanisms that maintain bodily 
integrity. Such mechanisms may need to function correctly as a background condition 
for the organism to behave, but scientists do not typically take behavioral patterns to 
be the explanandum phenomena of such mechanisms. Let us call mechanisms that do 
contribute to the explanation of behavior behavioral mechanisms. As for what it 
means for a system to “possess” a mechanism, a mereological criterion will do for 
now: the mechanism must be a part of the system. Condition (O5) is meant to limit 
the mechanisms in the set M to behavioral mechanisms. 
So far so abstract; let’s consider an example. The robot Herbert was designed to 
wander autonomously through the MIT robotics lab, avoiding obstacles, and 
collecting soda cans with its arm (Brooks, Connell, and Ning 1988). Herbert can be 
construed as an organism, even though it is not alive, as long as one (O1) attributes 
goals, like avoiding collisions and collecting soda cans, to Herbert, (O2) sees some of 
Herbert’s performances as behaviors, (O3) believes that Herbert’s behaviors promote 
its goals, and (O4) believes that Herbert possesses mechanisms that (O5) explain its 
behavior. Herbert does possess mechanisms for accomplishing goals; it is equipped 
with sensors, computers, and motors that coordinate its locomotion and its grasping 
arm. And most people readily anthropomorphize Herbert enough to see it as a goal-
directed, behaving system (pace Adams and Garrison [2013], who insist that Herbert 
has its designers’ goals, but no goals of its own). Anyone willing to engage in the 
imaginative attribution of goals and behavior to Herbert can see Herbert as an 
organism, even if on reflection they believe Herbert is not literally an organism. The 
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willingness to ascribe representations to a system plausibly waxes and wanes along 
with one’s willingness to construe the system as an organism in something like the 
sense described above. There are psychological limits on the willingness to attribute 
goals and behaviors to systems relatively unlike animals, and these limits may vary 
between individuals. 
4. The Receptor Notion Re-construed. Returning now to the receptor notion of 
natural representation, I suggest that it can be augmented in the following way: 
Organism-Receptor. A state s represents a state of affairs p if 
(R1) s is regularly and reliably caused by p, and 
(R2) s is a functional state of a behavioral mechanism possessed by an organism. 
Organism-Receptor is not a construal-based explication, but it depends on a 
construal-based account of ORGANISM. It preserves the spirit of Ramsey’s receptor 
notion, with the added condition that representations be ascribed to parts of systems 
construed as organisms. Representation-ascriptions guided by Organism-Receptor 
inherit their plausibility from the plausibility of the corresponding construal of some 
system as an organism. Most accounts of cognitive representation require there to be a 
representational subject of some kind (e.g. Adams and Aizawa 2001; Rupert 2009; 
Rowlands 2010), and on Organism-Receptor the organism serves this role. We can 
constrain the acceptable contents of these representations by requiring they 
correspond to descriptions of p according to which p is relevant to the pursuit of an 
organism’s goals. This appeal to goals is not ad hoc, since according to Organism-
Receptor representations are ascribed to organisms, i.e. systems to which we’ve already 
attributed a set of goals. Thus, like Dretske’s (1988) and Millikan’s (1984) 
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teleofunctional accounts, this construal-based account addresses the disjunction 
problem by appealing to goals of organisms. 
The metadiscursive job-description challenge is to provide criteria of ascription 
for representations, in virtue of which representation-ascriptions achieve some 
explanatory purpose. I have provided criteria of ascription, so what is their purpose? 
On Donald Davidson’s (1963, 5) account of intentional action, actions are performed 
under the guise of a privileged description (or set of descriptions). Davidson flips the 
light switch in order to turn on the light, but not in order to alert the prowler outside 
(whose presence is unknown to Davidson) that he is home, though he also does the 
latter. Davidson calls this feature of action its “quasi-intensional character.” Behavioral 
mechanisms also have something like a quasi-intensional character, since there are 
privileged descriptions that make explicit how they and their components contribute 
to an organism’s capacity to pursue its goals. For example, edge-detecting cells in V1 
fire in order to identify boundaries in an organism’s environment, not to consume 
glucose, though they also do the latter. The use of representation-talk by cognitive 
scientists, as licensed by Organism-Receptor, is a way to habitually mark these 
privileged descriptions and distinguish them from other descriptions of the same 
states or events. And since cognitive science is concerned with the functional 
structure of behavior-coordinating mechanisms rather than other features of 
cognitive systems, it is easy to see why representation—even in this relatively thin 
sense—has always been the dominant theoretical perspective in cognitive science. 
This focus on quasi-intensional characterization may even be what makes the 
cognitive scientific perspective distinctive (on scientific perspectives, see e.g. Giere 
2006). 
The Organism-Receptor account provides us with resources to salvage the 
receptor notion from Ramsey’s reductio. It is plausible to suppose that cognitive 
scientists generally ascribe natural representations to systems against an imaginative 
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background like this. After all, most cognitive science concerns the mechanisms of 
living systems, especially animals (except in computer science and some 
computational modeling, where the object of attention is a formal object like a 
connectionist network that is presumed to be analogous in some way to such a 
mechanism). Such systems are easily construed as organisms in the sense of 
Organism-Construal. Non-living things and even non-animals are in general more 
difficult to construe as organisms in that sense, since they are often perceived to lack 
goals, the capacity to behave, or both. 
5. The Organism-Receptor Notion in Context. Consider a strong case of 
representation, like fly-detecting cells in frog visual cortex. We construe frogs as 
systems that exhibit goal-directed behavior and believe they possess mechanisms that 
explain that behavior. Frog visual cortex contains mechanisms that (along with other 
mechanisms) explain behaviors like fly-catching. When we identify cells in frog visual 
cortex that fire in response to the visual presence of flies (or fly-like objects), we 
ascribe representational properties to those cells. The contents we ascribe to 
representations in frog visual cortex are constrained by the goals we attribute to frogs. 
That a small insect is present is a suitable content because flies can be consumed for 
energy; that a wiggly BB is present does not have this significance for frogs, although 
BBs may be indistinguishable from insects by the mechanisms in the frog’s visual 
cortex. Nevertheless, the relationship between fly-presence and the frog’s goals 
provide a ground for privileging non-disjunctive descriptions of representational 
content. 
The Organism-Receptor account also explains why liminal cases of 
representation, like the case of Herbert, are liminal. We can say that Herbert 
represents such states of affairs as the presence of obstacles and soda cans, because 
states of Herbert’s sensors are regularly and reliably caused by those states of affairs. 
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And we can ascribe contents to representations by drawing on descriptions of 
Herbert’s environment that relate to the goals we ascribe to Herbert. However, our 
willingness to take these representations seriously as natural representations that bear 
content intrinsically covaries with our willingness to take Herbert seriously as an 
organism. We are not as comfortable attributing genuine goals and behaviors to 
Herbert as we are attributing goals and behaviors to frogs.2  
Finally, absurd cases like the firing pin can be excluded (for the most part) since 
guns are not easily construed as “organisms.” Firearms are difficult to 
anthropomorphize, since they do not exhibit autonomous behavioral dynamics and 
we don’t normally see them as having goals of their own. It is not impossible to ascribe 
goals to weapons or other tools, but the ascription of folk-psychological properties to 
tools, like the folk ascription of a bloodthirsty disposition to a sword, generally 
depends on the way a tool influences its users’ behavior. (I suspect this dependence 
might offer some novel explanations of why Clark and Chalmers’ [1998] extended 
cognition hypothesis is attractive to some.) The attribution of autonomous behaviors 
to tools like swords is fanciful. Perhaps we might imagine a tool exhibits psychic 
“behavior,” but anyway we do not believe that swords possess mechanisms that 
produce this “behavior” (though if we did, such a construal would be more 
compelling). If the firing pin of a gun is not a component of a behavioral mechanism, 
it cannot represent anything according to the Organism-Receptor account. 
So the Organism-Receptor account licenses an ascriptive practice that resembles 
the crude receptor notion when the role of construals is not made explicit. It is 
unusual in that it inverts Ramsey’s preferred order of ascription: Ramsey wishes to 
                                                             
2 Notably, Rodney Brooks himself does not claim that it is proper to ascribe 
representational capacities to Herbert (Brooks, Connell, and Ning 1988; Brooks 1991), 
but Brooks plausibly had in mind a more demanding account of representation. 
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ascribe cognitive structure to systems in virtue of their representational structure (see 
e.g. Ramsey, 222–235), whereas I suggest that we in fact ascribe representational 
structure in virtue of seeing a system as a system with goal-directed behavior, i.e. as a 
potentially cognitive system. 
6. Worries. Since the Organism-Receptor account shares a certain teleological 
character with Dretske’s account, I will discuss Ramsey’s two most developed 
objections to Dretske, along with other worries specific to the Organism-Receptor 
account. First, Ramsey objects that Dretske’s account is question-begging with regard 
to the job-description challenge. Roughly, teleological normativity (i.e. functioning 
and malfunctioning) is not sufficient to explain intentional normativity (i.e. 
representation and misrepresentation), and since Dretske provides no satisfying 
criteria for what it is for a state to function as a representation, he cannot bridge that 
gap (Ramsey 2007, 131–2). But the Organism-Receptor account has more resources 
than Dretske’s teleofunctionalism. Construing a system as an organism involves 
construing it as exhibiting behavior, which allows us to distinguish behavioral 
mechanisms from other mechanisms. On the Organism-Receptor account, 
misrepresentations are malfunctions of behavioral mechanisms (like frog vision), but 
not of other mechanisms (like a frog’s circulatory system or a gun’s firing mechanism). 
My reply invites a rejoinder: on the Organism-Receptor account the functional 
roles of representations will be extremely diverse, and representations will be 
common. They will not just include IO-representation and S-representation (roughly, 
information-processing relata and models for surrogative reasoning; Ramsey 2007, 
68ff.), which Ramsey and most cognitive scientists regard as genuinely 
representational. They will also include more controversial varieties of 
“representation,” such as Millikan’s (1995) “pushmi-pullyu” representations: Janus-
faced mechanistic components that simultaneously indicate a state of affairs and cause 
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an adaptive or designed response. In other words, representations will include what 
Ramsey calls “causal relays” like the firing pin in a gun, the inclusion of which in the 
extension of REPRESENTATION was the ground for his reductio! However, the 
absurd cases can be avoided. The firing pin case is excluded because guns are poor 
examples of organisms. And pushmi-pullyu representations include cases with 
significant intuitive appeal to many scientists, like the predator calls of vervet 
monkeys (Millikan 1995; cf. Seyfarth, Cheney, and Marler 1980). While this 
conception of representation has a more liberal extension than Ramsey is comfortable 
with, it is liberal enough to explain common representation-ascriptions in cognitive 
science without being so liberal as to countenance absurd cases like Ramsey’s firing 
pin, so I submit it is adequate to scientific practice. 
Ramsey’s second objection is that Dretske is committed to a false principle: that 
if a component is incorporated into a mechanism because it carries information, then 
its function is to carry information (132–9). However, the Organism-Receptor account 
constrains the causal dependence criterion (R1) by relying on construals of systems as 
organisms instead of teleofunctional commitments. The account I describe is not 
committed to Dretske’s principle, and therefore is not subject to this objection.3 
Nevertheless, one might worry whether the organism criterion (R2) is a suitable 
condition on representation-ascription. I suggested five conditions (O1)–(O5) on what 
can be seen as an organism, but conditions (O1) and (O2) are fairly unconstrained. 
There are psychological limitations on when goals or behaviors can be plausibly 
attributed to a system, but what are those limits? And what factors influence 
interpersonal variability in willingness to make these attributions? The reason this 
practice isn’t bonkers is that it coheres with the explanatory purpose of 
                                                             
3 Ramsey’s discussion is rich and worthy of deeper engagement than this, but for 
reasons of space I leave the matter here. 
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representation-ascriptions: to make explicit the quasi-intentional character of 
behavioral mechanisms. Nevertheless, we should hope that these psychological 
limitations are vindicated by more principled considerations. Criticism is warranted if 
scientists attribute goals and behaviors when they should not. There is some extant 
work on the proper norms ascribing goals to organisms (e.g. Shea 2013; Piccinini 2015, 
chap. 6), but little serious work on how to understand the concept of BEHAVIOR in 
the context of cognitive science. We should worry about the practice of ascribing 
natural representations if scientists construe things that are not cognitive systems as 
“organisms.” Indeed, we might indeed worry that many cognitive scientists misuse the 
concept COGNITION, given the intense disagreements over its extension (see e.g. 
Akagi 2017). However, my present aim is not to evaluate scientific practice, but to 
describe it faithfully (with the hope that a more satisfactory evaluation will follow). 
Another worry about construal-based accounts is that they entail an 
unattractive anti-realism: if representations and their contents only exist relative to 
construals, they are mind-dependent rather than objective, right? This worry is 
unfounded. I am undertaking a modified version of Ramsey’s job description 
challenge: my aim is to describe the ascription of representations in virtue of which 
they serve an explanatory purpose, not to distinguish genuinely representational 
states from non-representational states. The Organism-Receptor account does not 
entail that representations exist relative to construals, only that they are ascribed 
relative to construals. My account is consistent with the existence of a first-order 
account of the metaphysics of representation that justifies this practice (or doesn’t). 
After all, the duck-rabbit can be construed as a duck even if it is not a duck, and 
nothing about that fact entails that ducks (or unambiguous images of ducks) are not 
real. The Organism-Receptor account describes a norm that plausibly guides human 
scientists with imperfect capacities for knowledge. But while my solution to the 
metadiscursive job description challenge is not inconsistent with Ramsey’s solution to 
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the first-order job description challenge, it is inconsistent with Ramsey’s 
characterization of scientific norms for ascribing natural representations. 
7. Conclusion. I began by observing the common worry that scientists ascribe 
representations more liberally than many philosophers are comfortable with, and in 
particular that scientists rely on an unsatisfactory “receptor” criterion. I sketched an 
account on which scientists ascribe natural representations only to components of 
mechanisms of systems construed as “organisms.” Since in practice cognitive scientists 
attend almost exclusively to systems that are easily so construed, their behavior may 
appear to be guided by the crude receptor criterion whereas in fact it is guided by the 
Organism-Receptor criterion. However, while the Organism-Receptor account is still 
relatively liberal, a crucial difference between the two accounts is that the crude 
criterion has absurd consequences, whereas such consequences are eliminated or 
marginalized on the Organism-Receptor criterion. Since scientists do not in fact 
endorse these absurd consequences, I argue that the augmented criterion is a better 
hypothesis regarding norms for representation-ascription in cognitive science. 
This is proposal is not a comprehensive, new theory of representation, but it 
accomplishes two things. First, it provides argumentative resources for resisting the 
common worry that cognitive scientists use hopelessly liberal criteria for ascribing 
representations. Second, it offers a novel picture of practices for representation-
ascription in the biological and behavioral sciences, one that is less pessimistic picture 
than Ramsey regarding conceptual rigor in cognitive science. The picture is not 
beyond criticism—in particular, it wants for a more detailed account of the grounds 
that warrant attributing behaviors and goals to systems. But since it is more faithful to 
our practice than Ramsey’s it is likely to yield more productive suggestions for how to 
guide that practice into the future. I suggest that we safeguard conceptual rigor in 
cognitive science not by cleaving more faithfully to the representationalism of the 
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cognitive revolution, but by embracing role of construal in scientific inquiry, making 
it explicit, and subjecting it to reasoned criticism. 
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Abstract
It is a standard feature of the BSA and its variants that systematizations of the
world competing to be the best must be expressed in the same language. This
paper argues that such single language privileging is problematic because (1) it
enhances the objection that the BSA is insufficiently objective, and (2) it breaks
the parallel between the BSA and scientific practice by not letting laws and basic
kinds be identified/discovered together. A solution to these problems and the ones
that prompt single language privileging is proposed in the form of privileging the
best system competition(s).
1
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1 Introduction
According to the Best Systems Analysis (BSA), the laws of nature are the theorems of
the best systematization of the world—with ‘best’ standardly understood to mean the
simplest and most informative (on balance). It is currently a standard feature of the
BSA (since Lewis 1983) and its variants (Loewer 2007; Schrenk 2008; Cohen and
Callender 2009) that a single language must be privileged as the language in which all
systems competing to be the best will be expressed. Two problems have led these
authors to adopt single language privileging: The first is the Trivial Systems Problem
(TSP), according to which, in brief, allowing for suitably gerrymandered languages can
guarantee that the “best” system will have axioms and theorems undeserving of the
name “law” (see Lewis 1983 for its initial development). Language privileging provides a
quick fix to the TSP as long as the privileged language is not among the suitably (and
problematically) gerrymandered. The second is the Problem of Immanent Comparisons
(PIC) suggested by Cohen and Callender (2009). The PIC takes it to be the case that
there are only “immanent” measures for simplicity, strength, and their balance—that is,
measures defined for only one language. With single language privileging, no two
systems ever need to be compared when expressed in different languages, and so having
to use only immanent measures is not an issue.
Though single language privileging solves these problems for the BSA and its
variants, it creates new ones of its own. For one, the BSA is already often criticized for
being insufficiently objective—because it is unclear that there is an objective answer to
the question of what makes a system the best—and single language privileging has the
potential to fuel those criticisms by requiring proponents of the BSA to say which
2
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language gets privileged. Relativizing laws to languages (as in Schrenk 2008 and Cohen
and Callender 2009) goes some way to resist such criticisms, but, as Bialek (2017)
argues, relativity itself should be minimized (as much as scientific practice allows) when
responding to those who employ the ‘insufficiently objective’ critique of the BSA.
Another issue with language privileging—a version of which is suggested in a specific
critique of Lewis (1983) by van Fraassen (1989), and is here newly generalized as an issue
for any single language privinleging—is that it breaks the supposedly close connection in
scientific practice between the discovery of the laws and the discovery of basic kinds.1
Both problems are, ultimately, overstated, and may be resolved not with single
language privileging, but with the privileging of classes of languages. This addresses
both of the issues just raised. For one, it restores the co-discovery of laws and basic kinds
to the BSA by making the search for laws (via a best system competition conducted in
the course of scientific practice) include a search through a class of languages for the one
that yields the best system-language pair. It also helps to limit the degree to which laws
may need to be relativized to language by reducing the problem of privileging a language
(class) to the already present problem of choosing a measure of ‘best’.
The outline of this paper is as follows. I begin, in Section 2, by laying out the PIC. In
Section 3, I argue that the PIC ignores the existence of measures (illustrated by the
1Depending on the specific interests of the author, there has been talk of “basic
kinds” (as in Cohen and Callender 2009), “fundamental kinds” (Loewer 2007), and
“perfectly natural predicates” (Lewis 1983). These are progressively more restrictive
ways of interpreting the predicates of a language that appear in the axioms of a best
system expressed in that language. Throughout the paper I use the more general phrase
“basic kinds”, but nothing about that usage precludes a more restrictive reading.
3
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Akaike Information Criterion) that, while not transcendent (since they cannot compare
systems expressed in any two languages), are also not immanent (since they can compare
systems expressed in some different languages). Being sensitive to the existence of such
measures suggests a slightly different problem of transcendent measures, which may be
resolved through privileging classes of languages. The problem for single language
privileging of breaking the connection between the discovering laws and basic kinds is
developed in Section 4, and its resolution via language-class privileging is demonstrated.
In Section 5, I argue that the question of which language class to privilege is reducible to
the question of which measure(s) of ‘best’ (simplicity, informativeness, etc.) should be
used. Lastly, in Section 6, I note that the reducibility just introduced suggests a new
solution to the TSP that is focused on choosing appropriate measures of ‘best’, with the
conclusion being that none of the problems that have prompted language privileging
actually require it for their resolution.
2 The Problem of Immanent Comparisons
The “Problem of Immanent Comparisons” (PIC) begins with an appeal in Cohen and
Callender (2009) to a distinction in Quine between immanent and transcendent notions.
Quine writes: “A notion is immanent when defined for a particular language;
transcendent when directed to languages generally” (Quine 1970, p. 19). Measurements
of simplicity, since they depend on the language in which a system is expressed, are
taken by Cohen and Callender to be immanent in this Quinean sense. Strength, or
informativeness, is similarly immanent, since it is assumed to depend on the expressive
power of the language in which a system is expressed. And, to finish out the set, balance
4
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is said to be immanent as well, since it will be a measure dependent on immanent
measures of simplicity and strength. If two systems are competing to be the best and are
expressed in different languages, then we would need transcendent measures of
simplicity, strength, and balance, in order to implement the best system competition.
But “there are too few (viz. no) transcendent measures” of simplicity, strength, and
balance (Cohen and Callender 2009, p. 8). Cohen and Callender write that
Prima facie, the realization that simplicity, strength, and balance are
immanent rather than transcendent—what we’ll call the problem of
immanent comparisons—is a devastating blow to the [BSA and its variants].
For what counts as a law according to that view depends on what is a Best
System; but the immanence of simplicity and strength undercut the
possibility of intersystem comparisons, and therefore the very idea of
something’s being a Best System.
(Cohen and Callender 2009, p. 6, emphasis in original)
The only solution to the PIC, since (supposedly) systems can only be compared when
they are expressed in the same language, is to adopt single language privileging.
3 Neither Immanent nor Transcendent
The issue with the PIC is that it ignores the existence of a large middle ground of
measures that are neither immanent nor transcendent. To start, let us examine the
central claim of the PIC: that simplicity, strength, and balance must be immanent
measures. In defense of the idea that simplicity is immanent, Cohen and Callender
5
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(2009, p. 5) defer to Goodman (1954) by way of Loewer, who writes: “Simplicity, being
partly syntactical, is sensitive to the language in which a theory is formulated” (Loewer
1996, p. 109). Loewer and Goodman are exactly right. Simplicity is language sensitive.
For example, let us adopt a naive version of simplicity, SimpC(−), that is measured by
the number of characters it takes to express a sentence (including spaces and
punctuation). Consider the following sentence.
This sentence is simple.
Its SimpC-simplicity is 24 characters. The same sentence in Dutch is
Deze zin is eenvoudig.
The sentence’s SimpC-simplicity now is 22 characters. So the SimpC-simplicity of a
sentence depends or is sensitive to the language in which the sentence is expressed. Does
that language sensitivity mean that SimpC is immanent? It depends on what is meant
by being “defined for a particular language”.
SimpC is, in some sense, “defined for a particular language”. Insofar as the measure
gives conflicting results for a sentence expressed in different languages, it would be
ill-defined if we took it to be directed at sentences irrespective of the language in which
they are expressed. One way of dealing with this would be to think that we have a
multitude of distinct simplicity measures: SimpCEnglish(−), SimpCDutch(−), and so on.
But doing that disguises an important fact: each of these measures of simplicity is the
same measure, just relativized to particular languages. Drawing our inspiration from the
“package deal” of Loewer (2007)—in which the BSA holds its competition between
system-language pairs (or packages)—we could just as easily deal with the language
6
PSA 2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -128-
sensitivity of SimpC by saying it is defined for sentence-language pairs. We don’t need,
then, different measures of simplicity. Just the one will do:
SimpC(pThis sentence is simple.q,English) = 24 char.
SimpC(pThis sentence is simple.q,Dutch) = 22 char.
In this way, SimpC is better understood as transcendent, and not immanent, because it
is, as Quine put it, “directed to languages generally”.
Of course, SimpC can’t be directed to all languages, since it will be undefined for
any languages that don’t have a written form with discrete characters. This suggest that
there is an important middle ground between immanent and transcendent measures.
When a measure falls in that middle, as SimpC seems to, I will say that it is a
“moderate measure”.
So which conception of SimpC is the right one? The “devastating blow” that
immanence deals to the BSA and its variants is that it “undercut[s] the possibility of
intersystem comparisons” (Cohen and Callender 2009, p. 6). In our naive example,
SimpCEnglish(pThis sentence is simple.q)
is—if SimpC is immanent—incomparable to
SimpCDutch(pThis sentence is simple.q).
But obviously it’s not. pThis sentence is simple.q is SimpC-simpler in Dutch than in
English (when being SimpC-simpler means having a lower value of SimpC).
7
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Nothing prevents a transcendent or moderate measure from taking a language as one
of its arguments. Such a measure is transcendent (or moderate), but language sensitive,
and, importantly, it allows for comparisons even when a variety of languages are
involved. That being the case, the mere language sensitivity of simplicity, strength, and
their balance is not enough to guarantee that they are immanent, nor is it enough to
guarantee the incomparability of systems expressed in different languages.
In response to the existence of a measure like SimpC, it might be suggested that
there may well be transcendent (or moderate) measures plausibly named “simplicity”
(etc.), but these are not the ones relevant to the BSA; the measures that do appear in
BSA will be immanent. It is absolutely right to question the plausibility of a measure as
naive as SimpC having a role to play in the BSA. (I certainly do not intend to defend
SimpC as the right measure of simplicity for the BSA.) But I do not think it is clear
why we should assume that the right measures are immanent. Rather, I think that
moderate measures are, if anything, the norm, and an example may be found in the
selection of statistical models.
Following Forster and Sober (1994), statistical model selection has standardly been
associated in philosophy with the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC):
AIC(M) = 2[number of parameters of M ]− 2[maximum log-likelihood of M ]
The full details of AIC are not terribly important for our purposes here; it is enough to
point out that that first term is concerned with the number of parameters of the
statistical model M . Forster and Sober note that the number of parameters “is not a
merely linguistic feature” of models Forster and Sober (1994, p. 9, fn. 13). But the
8
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number of parameters is a linguistic feature of a model. Since AIC can compare models
with different numbers of parameters, it can—if we think of statistical models as the
system-language pairs of the BSA, and AIC as central to the best system
competition2—compare systems expressed in different languages. AIC is thus a
moderate measure.
It is important to note, however, that AIC is also not a transcendent measure.
Kieseppa¨ (2001) offers a response to critics of AIC who are concerned that the measure
is sensitive to changing the number of parameters of a model by changing the model’s
linguistic representation. The response turns on the justification of “Rule-AIC”, which
says to pick the model with the smallest value of AIC, on the grounds that the predictive
accuracy of model M is approximately the expected value of the maximum log-likelihood
of M minus the number of parameters of M . Crucially,
the theoretical justification of using (Rule-AIC) is valid when the considered
models are such that the approximation [just mentioned] is a good one.
(Kieseppa¨ 2001, p. 775)
Let M be parameterized to have either k or k′ parameters. Then there are two claims
that are relevant to the justification of Rule-AIC:
predictive accuracy of M ≈ E[(maximum log-likelihood of M)− k]
predictive accuracy of M ≈ E[(maximum log-likelihood of M)− k′]
2To make the connection between AIC and the BSA even stronger, it it worth noting
that Forster and Sober (1994) take the “number of parameters” term to be tracking the
simplicity of a model.
9
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The predictive accuracy of M is independent of the number of parameters used to
express M .3 But the right side of the approximation in each claim does depend on the
number of parameters. In general, both of these claims will not be true. Since Rule-AIC
is only justified by the truth of these approximations, it will only be applicable to
whichever parameterization of M makes the approximation true. The only time when
both claims are true, and thus when AIC is applicable to both parameterizations, is
when the difference between E[(maximum log-likelihood of M)− k] and E[(maximum
log-likelihood of M)− k′] is negligible. Kieseppa¨ concludes:
This simple argument shows once and for all that the fact that the number of
the parameters of a model can be changed with a reparameterisation does
not in any interesting sense make the results yielded by (Rule-AIC)
dependent on the linguistic representation of the considered models.
(Kieseppa¨ 2001, p. 776)
From the epistemic perspective that is Kieseppa¨’s concern, I can find room to agree
that there is no “interesting sense” in which Rule-AIC is language dependent. This is
because, if we are looking to employ Rule-AIC in statistical model selection, what is
available to us is a procedure to check if the given parameterization is one that can
support the justification of Rule-AIC. If the justification will work, then Rule-AIC
applies, and if not, not. Rule-AIC isn’t language dependent “in any interesting sense”
insofar as it simply doesn’t apply to the problematic languages/parameterizations that
undermine its justification.
3This is intuitively true. It is also true in the formal definition of predictive accuracy
given in Kieseppa¨ (1997) and used in this argument from Kieseppa¨ (2001).
10
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However, from the perspective of the BSA and the PIC, these failures of Rule-AIC
are interesting. AIC (the measure) is not immanent, but it is also not transcendent; it is
merely moderate. Some reparameterizations of considered models will lead to the
inapplicability of Rule-AIC. If Rule-AIC was how we were deciding which system was
best, the existence of these problematic reparamterizations would be, as Cohen and
Callender put it, a prima facie devastating blow to the BSA.
Towards the end of their introducing the PIC, Cohen and Callender write that
What is needed to solve the problem is a transcendent
simplicity/strength/balance comparison of each axiomatization against
others. The problem is not that there are too many immanent measures and
nothing to choose between them, but that there are too few (viz., no)
transcendent measures.
(Cohen and Callender 2009, p. 8, emphasis in original)
Cohen and Callender are probably right that there are “too few (viz., no) transcendent
measures”. In response to this, PIC says that measuring the goodness of a system must
be done with immanent measures, and so no systems expressed in different languages
may be compared in the best system competition. But non-transcendence is not a
guarantee of immanence. We might call the problem that remains the problem of
transcendent measures (PTC). Measures like AIC are not immanent, but they also aren’t
transcendent. That non-transcendence gives rise to a degree of language sensitivity that
will sometimes prevent us from comparing systems expressed in different languages.
In response to the PIC and the supposed immanence of measures appropriate for the
BSA, Cohen and Callender (2009) proposed the Better Best Systems Analysis (BBSA),
11
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which relativizes laws to single languages. According to the BBSA, a best system
competition is run for every language L (with some restrictions on “every” that aren’t
especially important here) where all the competing systems are expressed in L and the
theorems of the system that is the victor of the competition are the laws relative to L.
But now it seems that we might have at our and the BSA’s disposal moderate measures.
In the face of the non-transcendence of these measures—that is, in the face of the
PTC—the BBSA’s strategy of language relativity is still a good one.4 Our language
relativity does not, however, have to involve privileging single languages. The alternative
is to relativize to classes of languages constructed to ensure the applicability of the
measures employed in our best system competition.
4 Discovering Laws and Kinds Together
Before saying more about what relativizing laws to classes of languages would be like in
any detail, it is important to say something about why we should pursue language-class
relativity over the single language relativity of the BBSA. So, why should we? The
reason is that one of the great virtues of the BSA and its variants is their offering of a
metaphysics for laws that parallels the search for laws that is to be found in scientific
practice, and that parallel is broken by single language privileging. A feature of the
4Without going into excessive detail about benefits (and costs) of the BBSA’s
relativity strategy over competitors, I hope it is enough to note that relativizing the laws
allows us to sidestep the question of which language should be privileged entirely, since,
ultimately, all languages will get a turn at being privileged, and thus, effectively, none
are privileged over all.
12
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search for laws in scientific practice is that it happens in conjunction with a search for
the basic kinds of the world. This feature encourages us to acknowledge the importance
of language in the BSA, since the basic kinds of the world are, presumably, going to
correspond with the basic kinds that appear in the language in which the laws are
expressed. Thus, when Lewis first recognizes the language sensitivity of simplicity, he
concludes on a celebratory note by saying that the variant of single language privileging
he introduces has the virtue of “explaining” why “laws and natural properties get
discovered together” (Lewis 1983, p. 368).
For Loewer’s Package Deal Analysis, the idea that laws and kinds are discovered
together is central to the view. Indeed, the phrase “package deal” has its roots in Lewis,
who says just before the “discovered together” remark that “the scientific investigation
of laws and of natural properties is a package deal” (Lewis 1983, p. 368). While Loewer
ultimately endorses a version of single language privileging, it is accompanied with a
rough account of how a “final theory”—i.e., a candidate system-language pair—is arrived
at:
a final theory is evaluated with respect to, among the other virtues, the
extent to which it is informative and explanatory about truths of scientific
interest as formulated in [the present language of science] SL or any language
SL+ that may succeed SL in the rational development of the sciences. By
‘rational development’ I mean developments that are considered within the
scientific community to increase the simplicity, coherence, informativeness,
explanatoriness, and other scientific virtues of a theory.
(Loewer 2007, p. 325)
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If the practice of science parallels the Package Deal Analysis, then the processes of
discovering the laws and basic kinds are one and the same.
And it seems Cohen and Callender are also on board with laws and kinds being
discovered together when they offer this nice remark on the phenomenon:
historical disputes between theorists favoring very different choices of kinds
seem to us to be disputes between two different sets of laws [...] it has
happened in the history of science that people have objected to particular
carvings—most famously, consider the outrage inspired by Newton’s category
of gravity. But given the link between laws and kinds, this outrage is
probably best seen as an expression of the view that another System is Best,
one without the offending category. If that other system doesn’t in fact fare
so well in the best system competition—as in the case of the systems
proposed by Newton’s foes—then the predictive strength and explanatory
power of a putative Best System typically will win people over to the
categorization employed. While it’s true that some choices of [kinds] may
strike us as odd, no one would accuse science—the enterprise that gives us
entropy, dark energy, and charm—as conforming to pre-theoretic intuitions
about the natural kinds of the world. Yet these odd kinds are all embedded
in systematizations that would produce what we would consider laws.
(Cohen and Callender 2009, pp. 17–18)
With everyone in agreement, what is the problem? Language privileging, essentially,
happens before the identification (in the BSA and its variants) or discovery (in scientific
practice) of the laws. Though Cohen and Callender will not “accuse science” of
14
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“conforming to pre-theoretic intuitions about the natural kinds of the world”, that is
exactly what the BBSA (and any other single language privileging variant of the BSA)
does when it privileges sets of kinds prior to a best system competition. Furthermore,
PIC makes it such that “the predictive strength and explanatory power of a putative
Best System” cannot “win people over to the categorization employed” because
comparing two putative Best Systems expressed in different languages (with different
“categorizations”) is supposed to be impossible.5
Relativizing to classes of languages solves this problem. Scientists are able to
approach the discovery of laws and kinds with pre-theoretic intuitions about how to
systematize the world, the language to use when doing that, and the best system
competition. As we will see below, the intuitions regarding language and the best system
competition will locate them in a particular language class. Scientists will move away
from their intuitions about language (and systematizing) when, much as Loewer
describes above, there are languages in the relevant language class that may be paired
with systems to yield a system-language pair that is scored better by the best system
competition than the pre-theoretic system-language pair.6
5At least, it is impossible according to PIC for the BSA and its variants. If it is
possible for scientists, then it is wholly unclear why it would be impossible for the BSA.
6This movement is only metaphorical for the BSA, where all the possibilities are
considered and judged simultaneously. It is helpful, though, to think in the more
methodical terms—of considering particular transitions from one system-language pair
to another, the benefits that they might bring, and then adopting them or not—because
that is what will happen in actual scientific practice.
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5 Limiting Language Relativity
Let us begin addressing how language-class relativity can work by looking in more detail
at the single language relativity of the BBSA. In the BBSA, there are the fundamental
kinds Kfund. The set of all kinds K is the set including Kfund closed with respect to
supervenience relations—that is, K includes every kind that can be defined as
supervening on the arrangement of the Kfund kinds in the actual world. A language L is
determined by the set of kinds for which it has basic predicates, and there is a language
Li for every Ki ⊆ K. For any two languages L and L
′, the supervenience relations
between the kinds of the languages and Kfund can be thought of as schemes for
translation between L and L′. The set of all languages Lall can be thought of as the set
of languages that includes Lfund closed with respect to all translations. A class of
languages Li is a set of languages including Lfund closed with respect to some acceptable
(all, in the case of Lall) translations.
To illustrate, let us consider a ‘coin flip’ world. Such a world is a string of Hs and Ts,
which we will assume are the only two fundamental kinds. Another set of kinds might be
Kex = {a, b, c, d}, where the translation that gets us to the corresponding language Lex
from Lfund maps the pairs HH, HT, TH, and TT, to a through d, respectively. An example of
a class of languages that includes Lex could be Ln-tuple: Let an acceptable translation for
Ln-tuple be one that, for a given n takes the set of all n-tuples of H and T, and maps them
to a set of kinds Kn = {kn,1, kn,2, ...kn,2n}. Lfund, then, is just L1. When a through d are
k2,1 through k2,4, our Kex and Lex are precisely K2 and L2. All, and only, the languages
that may be formed through this procedure will be members of the class Ln-tuple.
A language-class relative variant of the BSA will run a best system competition for
16
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every class of languages Li. Then S is the set of all systematizations of the world, the set
of all competing system-language pairs for the Li-relative best system competition is
given by S × Li.
We can apply this conception of language-class relativity to our other running
example of statistical model selection with AIC. Recall that some reparameterizations of
statistical models would prove problematic for the use of AIC. To reparameterize a
model is akin to translating it from one language to another. We can understand, then,
the problem of language sensitivity for AIC as being related to some set of problematic
translations. If we subtract these problematic translations from the set of all
translations, then we have a set of acceptable translations which defines a class of
languages that we can call LAIC . LAIC is precisely the set of all languages such that a
system expressed in any one of them will be comparable to a system expressed in any
other using AIC. As long as the moderate measures used in the best system competition
have clearly problematic and/or acceptable translations associated with them, then the
class of languages that may be used to express competing systems will be determined by
the measures used in the best system competition.
This will have one of two effects on the extent to which the BSA must be relativized
to classes of languages, but before going into those details it will be helpful to
characterize “competition relativity”. Competition relativity should be understood in
much the same way that language relativity is understood. The competition of the BSA
is the thing that takes system-language pairs as its inputs, and outputs a best pair from
which we can read off the laws. The competition decides what system-language pair is
best by considering how well they measure up with respect to some collection of
theoretical virtues (like simplicity and informativeness) and the actual world. Much as
17
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we might worry about what language to privilege, and side-step that problem by
relativizing laws to languages so that every language takes a turn as the privileged one,
we might also worry about which competition, or which set of theoretical virtues, to
privilege. Competition relativity sidesteps the problem of which collection of theoretical
virtues to use (and weighting between them, and means of measuring them, etc.) by
relativizing laws to every way of formulating a best system competition.7
So, either the BSA will be committed to competition relativity or not. Suppose that
it is not. For convenience, suppose further that Rule-AIC is all that there is to the best
system competition. In that case, the BSA will always be run using the LAIC class of
languages. Language-class relativity is not required since there is only one language class
that will ever be relevant to the BSA—namely LAIC , as determined by the best system
competition. Now suppose that there is competition relativity. A different best system
competition must be run for every competition function Ci in the set of all possible
competition functions C. In principle we will need to run best systems competitions for
every pair in C × L, where L is the set of all language classes. Let Lj be the class of
languages constructed according to the translations that are acceptable for the measures
that comprise Ci when i = j. In practice, however, it will only make sense to run a
competition once for each Ci ∈ C, since the pairs Ci,Lj will be unproblematic only when
i = j. Language-class relativity in this situation will be redundant with competition
relativity. We also have it that, in either case (of needing competition relativity or not),
single language relativity remains unnecessary for all the same reasons that
recommended language-class relativity.
7See Bialek (2017) for an extended discussion of competition relativity and the
possibility of its inclusion in the BSA.
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6 The Trivial Systems Problem
The redundancy of any sort of language privileging relativity with competition relativity
offers an interesting solution to the Trivial Systems Problem (TSP) that initiated the
trend of single language privileging.
Recall that the TSP is concerned with the possibility of suitably gerrymandered
languages that can guarantee that the “best” system will have axioms and theorems
undeserving of the name “law”. In the introduction fo the problem, Lewis imagines a
system S and predicate F “that applies to all and only things at worlds where S holds”
(Lewis 1983, p. 367). The system S, then, maybe be expressed by the single axiom
∀xFx, simultaneously achieving incredible informativeness—because of the specific
applicability of F—and incredible simplicity—because, Lewis assumes, ‘∀xFx’ is about
as simple as a system could be. So S will be the best system despite a variety of reasons
why it shouldn’t be, the foremost of which are that: (1) ∀xFx will be a law unlike any
we would expect to find, (2) F would be a basic kind unlike any we would expect to find,
and (3) every regularity of the world is a theorem of ∀xFx, so there would be no
distinction between accidental and lawful regularities.
The problem is solved as long as we can avoid languages that include problematic
predicates like F . Single language privileging solves this problem as long as the
privileged language does not include the (or any) problematic predicate(s).
Language-class privileging likewise solves the problem as long as no language in the class
includes the (or any) problematic predicate(s). That alone might be enough said, but the
redundancy of language-class choice on competition choice offers a more nuanced
solution: The best system competition could be chosen such that the corresponding class
19
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of languages does not include F or any similarly problematic predicates. But it could
also be chosen such that F and its ilk are certain to not be the best. Lewis assumes with
no discussion that ∀xFx is an incredibly informative and simple system, but, even if that
is true for the measures/competition, it need not be true for every competition. If there
is competition relativity, then there may be competitions for which a trivial system like
∀xFx is the victor, but for the same reasons that such a system is problematic, scientists
will simply be uninterested in the laws relative to those competitions.8 If there isn’t
competition relativity, it seems unlikely that science would unequivocally endorse a
competition that yields a trivial system (or, if it does, then we would need to take a step
back and seriously reconsider our aversion to such a system).
In the end, there is no apparent need for any language privileging or relativity in the
BSA.9 Its role in solving the problems of immanent (or transcendent) comparisons and
trivial systems will be unnecessary (if a single moderate best system competition can be
identified) or redundant with competition relativity.
8In much the same way that Cohen and Callender (2009) allow for there to be
uninteresting sets of laws determined relative to languages that include F -like predicates.
9The problems discussed is not the only reason one might want to adopt language
relativity in the BSA. It should also be noted that one of the virtues of the BBSA’s
single language relativity is that it allows the view to accommodate an egalitarian
conception of special science laws. Language relativity, however, is not the only way of
getting special science laws out of the BSA. This is an important issue to which the
discussion in this paper is relevant, but a proper exploration of it warrants a more
focused and extended treatment.
20
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Abstract
For two centuries, collaborative research has become increasingly
widespread. Various explanations of this trend have been proposed.
Here, we offer a novel functional explanation of it. It differs from ac-
counts like that of Wray (2002) by the precise socio-epistemic mech-
anism that grounds the beneficialness of collaboration. Boyer-Kassem
and Imbert (2015) show how minor differences in the step-efficiency of
collaborative groups can make them much more successful in particular
configurations. We investigate this model further, derive robust social
patterns concerning the general successfulness of collaborative groups,
and argue that these patterns can be used to defend a general functional
account.
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1 Introduction
For two centuries, co-authoring papers has become increasingly widespread
in academia (Price, 1963, Beaver and Rosen, 1979), especially in the last few
decades. Since the 1950s, the percentage of co-authored papers has grown at
a common rhythm for science and engineering, social sciences, and patents;
the mean size of collaborative teams has also increased, and even more so in
science and engineering. No such increase is visible for the art and humanities
(Wuchty et alii, 2007).
Various explanations of this collaborative trend have been proposed: for
example, it may be caused by scientific specialization, it may increase the
productivity or reliability of researchers, or be promoted by the rules of credit
attribution. Here, we aim at offering a new functional explanation of this trend
by showing that collaboration exists because it increases the successfulness of
scientists. The present explanation differs from accounts like that of Wray
(2002) by the social and epistemic mechanism that grounds the beneficialness
of collaboration. We analyze further an existing model that shows how minor
differences in the step-efficiency of collaborative groups at passing the steps
of a project can make them much more successful in particular configurations
(Boyer-Kassem and Imbert, 2015) and show how it can be used to build a
general and robust functional explanation of collaboration.
We introduce the model in section 2. After presenting functional explana-
tions (section 3), we show how the model can be used to derive robust social
patterns of the successfulness of collaborative groups (section 4), and argue
that these patterns can refine and strengthen functional explanations of col-
laboration like the one defended by Wray (sections 5 and 6).
2 Boyer-Kassem and Imbert’s Model: Main
Results and Explanatory Lacunas
Boyer-Kassem and Imbert (2015) investigate a model in which n agents
struggle over the completion of a research project composed of l sequential
steps. At each time interval, agents have independent probabilities p of pass-
ing a step. When an agent reaches the end of the project, she wins all the
scientific credit and the race stops (this is the priority rule). Agents can orga-
nize themselves into collaborative groups for the whole project, meaning that
they only share information, i.e. step discoveries — clearly, there are more
favorable hypotheses associated with collaborating, like having new ideas or
double-checking (see below). Within a group, agents make progress together,
and equally share final rewards. Thus, a group of k agents (hereafter k-group)
passes a step with probability pg(k, p) = 1− (1− p)
k. In forthcoming illustra-
2
PSA 2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -146-
tions, the value of l is set to 10 and that of p to 0.5, which is not particularly
favorable for groups (ibidem, 674). If collaboration is beneficial with these
hypotheses, it will be even more so with more favorable or realistic ones. A
community of n agents (hereafter, n-community) can be organized in various
k-groups. For example, a 3-community can correspond to configurations (1-1-
1), (2-1) or (3). The individual successfulness of an agent in a k-group in a
particular configuration is defined as the average individual reward divided by
time. It has been obtained for all configurations up to n = 10, on millions of
runs.
Note that this model is not aimed at quantifying the actual successful-
ness of collaborative agents, but at analyzing the differential successfulness of
agents depending on their collaborative behavior. The main finding is that
minor differences in the efficiency at passing steps can be much amplified and
that, even with not-so-favorable hypotheses, collaboration can be extremely
beneficial for scientists. For example, in a (5-4) (resp. (2-1)) configuration,
whereas the difference in step efficiency between the 5 (resp. 2) and the 4-
group (resp. 1-group) is 3% (resp. 50%), the difference in individual success-
fulness is 25% (resp. 700%). The scope of these results actually goes beyond
the initial hypotheses in terms of information sharing. Formally speaking, the
model is a race between (collective) agents i with probabilities pi of passing
steps. Whatever the origin of the differences in pi, they are greatly amplified
by the sequential race. In other words, any factor, whether epistemic or not,
that implies an increase in pi of a k-group (e.g. if a collaborator is an expert
concerning specific steps, if increased resources improve step-efficiency, etc.)
makes this group as successful as a larger group — hence the generality of this
mechanism.
Still, these results do not explain scientific collaboration by themselves.
First, collaboration is beneficial for particular k-groups in particular configu-
rations only: a 2-group is very successful in configuration (2-1-1-1-1) but not in
(7-2). Thus, the model mostly provides possibility results about what can be
the case in certain configurations. Second, the explanandum is a general social
feature of modern science, not some collaborative behavior in some particu-
lar case, so the explanans must also involve general statements about the link
between collaboration and beneficialness. Then, if the model presents generic
social mechanisms with explanatory import, one needs to describe at a general
level the effects of these mechanisms and provide some general, invariant pat-
tern between collaboration and beneficialness. This is what we do in section 4.
A final serious worry is that the beneficialness of a state by no means explains
why it exists, nor perseveres in being. A link needs to be made between the
beneficialness of collaboration and its existence over time. We suggest that
this connection can be accounted for functionally.
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3 Functional Explanations and Collaboration
We review in this section how functional explanations work and how they
can be used in the present case. We follow Wray’s choice to use Kincaid’s ac-
count because it is simple, widely accepted, and that nothing substantial hinges
on this choice. Functional explanations explain the existence of a feature by
one of its effects, usually its usefulness or beneficialness. As such, they can
be sloppy and badly flawed. The usefulness of the nose to carry glasses does
not explain that humans have one. Nevertheless, if stringent conditions are
met, it is usually considered that functional explanations can be satisfactory,
typically within biology. Even Elster, who otherwise favors methodological in-
dividualism, agrees that functional explanations can be acceptable in the social
science (Elster, 1983). According to Kincaid (1996, 105-114), P is functionally
explained by E, i.e. P exists ”in order to promote <effect E>” if:
(1) P causes E,
(2) P persists because it causes E,
(3) P is causally prior to E.
Then, a functional explanation of collaboration should have the following
form:
(1c) Scientists’ collaborative behavior causes the increase of their individual
successfulness.
(2c) Scientists’ collaborative behavior persists (or develops) because it causes
a higher individual successfulness.
(3c) Collaborative behavior is causally prior to this increased individual suc-
cessfulness that is rooted in collaborative behavior.
We agree with Wray (2002, 161) that it is implausible to consider that the
high successfulness of scientists is the initial cause of collaboration since many
scientists have been successful (and continue to be in some fields) without
collaborating. In the same time, there can be various contingent reasons why
some researchers have decided to engage in some collaboration. So, what calls
for an explanation is the fact that collaboration is widespread and persistent,
not its occasional existence.
4 Collaboration Causes Successfulness
We now argue that the above model provides strong evidence in favor of
(1c). To explain the general collaborative patterns described above, the causal
4
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relation between collaboration and successfulness needs to be general and ro-
bust. Hence, one needs to go beyond the description of the beneficialness of
collaboration in particular situations. A first route is to find general results
about when it is beneficial for individuals to collaborate, such as the following
theorem (see the appendix for the proof).
Theorem. When m groups of equal size k merge, the individual success-
fulness of agents increases.
In other words, as soon as several k-groups of the same size exist, they
would improve the individual successfulness of their members by merging. A
corollary is that single individuals always have interest in collaborating. How-
ever, this theorem only covers a small subset of possible configurations, and
cannot provide a general vindication for the causality claim (1c). Further,
agents might only use it if they are aware of it and are in a position to identify
groups of equal-size competitors, which cannot be assumed in general.
To overcome these difficulties, we now assess agents’ successfulness irre-
spective of what they know about other competitors: we consider the average
successfulness of k-groups over all possible configurations for each community
size. For example, we average the individual successfulness of 4-groups in con-
figurations (4-1-1-1); (4-2-1) and (4-3)1. In order to study the robustness of the
causal relation between collaboration and successfulness, we investigate in the
next paragraphs how much collaborating remains beneficial under variations
of key parameters of the competition context.
Successfulness and community size. Figure 1 shows the average suc-
cessfulness within k-groups for communities of various sizes. First, the suc-
cessfulness of loners brutally collapses and is much lower than that of other k-
groups as soon as n > 2. This confirms that except when nobody collaborates,
or in very small communities, loners are outraced. Second, for all group sizes,
individual successfulness decreases for larger communities, as can be expected
when the number of competing groups and their size increases. Nevertheless,
the successfulness of k-groups remains high and stable up to some commu-
nity size s larger than k till they are eventually outperformed by larger groups
or till growing bigger would mean over-collaborating (see (Boyer-Kassem and
Imbert, 2015, 679-80) for an analysis of over-collaboration in large groups).
Third, the larger the groups are, the longer and flatter this initial plate of
successfulness is and the less steep the decrease in successfulness is. Fourth,
1There is no clear rationale about how to weigh configurations. From a combinatorial
viewpoint, configuration (1,1,1,1,1,1,1) has one realization and (3,2,1,1) several ones. But
from an empirical viewpoint, when scientists hardly collaborate, configuration (1,1,1,1,1,1,1)
is usual and (3,2,1,1) extremely rare. We have privileged simplicity and chosen to give equal
weight to all configurations.
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when n is much larger than k, the successfulness of k-groups increases with k.
However, this increase is a moderate one and small groups still do reasonably
well, which is somewhat unexpected, given the general amplification effect —
but see the analysis of figure 3 below for more refined analyses. Typically,
in 10-communities, 2-groups do badly but remain somewhat viable since their
average successfulness remains between 1/3 to 1/2 of that of 3 or 4-groups.
Overall, not collaborating is in general not a viable strategy. Collaborating
moderately (k = 2 or 3) can be very rewarding when there are few competitors
(e.g. in small research communities, or on ground-breaking questions that are
only known to a handful of scientits). Smalls groups remain viable but tend
to be outraced when communities become significantly larger (typically, con-
cerning questions belonging to normal science that many researchers are likely
to tackle). Thus, moderately collaborating is a viable but more risky strategy
when uncertainty prevails about the number and size of competing groups. Fi-
nally, while large collaborative groups rarely get exceptionally high gains, they
are extremely safe, with moderate differences in successfulness between them
or when the community size increases.
Successfulness and group size. Figure 2 shows the variation of indi-
vidual successfulness with group size for various community sizes. First, for
n > 2, the successfulness curve has a one-peaked (discrete) form, the maximum
of which grows with the community size. Second, these one-peaked curves are
not symmetric: the increase in successfulness is steep (but less so for larger
groups), the decrease is gradual (idem). Large groups predate resources so
groups need to grow big quickly to get some share and because returns can
be increasing (Boyer-Kassem and Imbert 2015, 678), the increase in success-
fulness is steep. The decrease after the peak is slow because large group are
hard to predate but over-collaborating can become suboptimal when the in-
crease in gain by predation no longer makes up for the need to share between
more people). These results are not trivial because at the configuration level,
the successfulness of groups is contextual. They are important, too. A one-
peaked profile is usually assumed in the literature about coalitions. Here, it
emerges from a micro-model, and gets its justification from it. Overall, these
patterns show again that agents have a large incentive to collaborate substan-
tially, whatever the competing environment.
Successfulness in more or less collaborative communities. Figure 3
finally shows how the successfulness of k-group members varies with the degree
of collaboration in their competition environment.2 Here again, what matters
2Here, the degree of collaboration in each configuration is assessed by computing the
average size of k-groups. For each k, we then compute the average successfulness of a
member of a k-group over configurations having a degree of collaboration within intervals
[1, 1.5] (represented at coordinate “1.25” on the x-axis), [1.25, 1.75], [1.5, 2] ... [3.5, 4]. We
6
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Figure 1: Variation of individual suc-
cessfulness with community size.
Figure 2: Variation of individual suc-
cessfulness with the size of groups.
Figure 3: Variation of successfulness with the degree of collaboration in com-
munities.
is less the exact value of the successfulness than the differential successfulness
between more or less collaborating individuals. The graph confirms that suc-
cessfulness depends less on the absolute size of groups than on how much they
collaborate in comparison with their competitors. Scientists who collaborate
more than average are very successful; those who collaborate as their peers
do reasonably well; those that collaborate less than average are outraced by a
large margin. This general result is not unexpected given all the above results,
but the graph highlights that success for intensively collaborating scientists,
and underachievement for under-collaborators can be very large. This is an
important finding because if, as we shall see, successful scientists pass over
their collaborative habits more than their peers, then the feedback loop pro-
vides a mechanism that favors the increase of the degree of collaboration by
promoting those that collaborate more than others.
have chosen overlapping intervals to smoothen results. The average is computed up to
communities of size 10.
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Partial conclusion. Overall, the results show that — everything else
being equal — collaborating a lot entails successfulness. This relation is ro-
bust under changes in the size of communities or in the exact size of groups.
Further, those who collaborate more than average are much more successful.
Collaborating too much is not a significant problem, under-collaborating is.
So, collaborating a lot is a safe working habit, especially in the absence of
information about the size and structure of the competing community. In light
of this evidence, (1c) seems adequately supported.
5 Collaborative Practices Develop Because of
the Success of Collaborative Scientists
We have so far argued that collaborative scientists, especially when they
collaborate more than others, are more successful. We now need to argue
that, because of this differential successfulness, collaborative habits persist
and possibly develop in scientific communities (2c). A wide variety of social
mechanisms across scientific contexts can contribute to this feedback loop.
Accordingly, we shall be content with giving various evidence that strongly
suggests that this link is a likely one.
Transmission. Knowing how and when to collaborate is not straightfor-
ward. Like other know-how skills, it can be developed by exercising it with
people who already possess the relevant procedural knowledge. In this case,
people who already collaborate can endorse this role of cultural transmission for
colleagues and above all students (Thagard, 2006). Working with students is
an efficient way to train them as scientists (Thagard, 1997, 248—50), so scien-
tists have incentives to enroll students in their collaborative groups. Then, the
cultural transmission of collaborative practice does not require any particular
effort on top of that. The very circumstances that make collaboration possi-
ble and beneficial also make its transmission easier: when a research project
can be divided into well-defined tasks, the solutions of which can be publicly
assessed and shared, it is easier to enroll other people and thereby transmit
collaborative skills to them (ibidem). Thus, collaborative habits can be passed
over and need not be reinvented by newcomers.
Transmission opportunities. We now argue that collaborative scien-
tists, because they are more successful, will more often be in a position to
transmit their collaborative habits and that the collaboration rate will there-
fore increase. Within applied science, in which collaboration is also widespread
(Wuchty, 2007), research projects are usually directed at finding profitable
applications, which can be patented. Thus, fund providers are directly and
strongly interested in hiring and providing resource to successful scientists,
8
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who develop such applications. Within pure science, the connection is less
straightforward. But because scientific success is the official goal of science,
successful scientists can be expected to stand better chances to get good posi-
tions and grants, develop research programs, and pass over their collaborative
habits.
Note that it is merely needed that the function between the pragmatic re-
wards of scientists and their success is on average increasing. This remains
compatible with the fact that some epistemically successful scientists get little
resource and some unsuccessful scientists get a lot — which seems to be the
case. Actually, non-epistemic factors may even tend to over-credit successful
scientists, and in particular collaborative ones. First, individual successfulness
has been assessed in the model with a conservative estimate. It seems that
an agent’s publication within a k-group is actually more appreciated than just
1/k of a single-authored publication. For instance, a large French research
institution in medicine officially weighs the citations of a paper with “a factor
1 for first or last author, 0.5 for second or next to last, and 0.25 for all others”
(Inserm 2005). Also, a publication within a 10-group will generally be more
visible than one single-authored publication, since more people can promote
or publicize collective publications and research topics. Second, sociology of
science seems to indicate that scientific credit tends to accrue to a subset of sci-
entists who are perceived as extremely successful — this is the Matthew effect
(Merton, 1968). Then, to the extent that access to resources increases with
scientific credit, successful collaborative scientists can be expected to benefit
from this effect and transmit more their working habits. The concentration
of credit and resource may further stimulate collaborative behavior with these
fortunate scientists.
Other types of mechanisms may contribute to this process, like conscious
ones. So far, agents have only been supposed to follow their working habits
and sometimes transmit them. But supplementary intentional or imitative pro-
cesses may also feed this dynamics 3. Once winners of the scientific race publish
co-authored articles, it becomes easy for others to see that successful scientists
are highly collaborative ones. (For instance, if agents of a 3-group are 4 times
more successful than a single agent, this means that their groups publishes
12 more articles than this agent). Accordingly, the belief that collaborating
is beneficial can be acquired as collaborating becomes usual. Furthermore,
resources may accrue to scientific institutions that host individually success-
ful scientists, and indirectly to these scientists. Agents in the model can be
reinterpreted as teams or collective entities which decide to share results or to
combine their expertise to produce collective articles. Then, these institutions
3Kincaid mentions that “complex combinations of intentional action, unintended conse-
quences of intentional action, and differential survival of social practices might likewise make
these conditions [(1)–(3) in our Section 3] true” (Kincaid 1996, 112).
9
Seattle, WA; 1-4 November 2018 -153-
and their members will be more successful, may attract resource, and will keep
developing and transmitting their working habits.
In light of the above discussion, we believe that the causal connection be-
tween the success of collaborative scientists and the persistence and develop-
ment of collaborative practices is highly plausible.
6 Discussion
Good functional explanations should be unambiguous about when the causal
mechanisms that they rely on are efficient. In the present case, the following
conditions can be emphasized.
First, conditions for the application of the priority rule should be met. In
particular, (i) it should be possible to single out problems and to state uncon-
troversially when they are solved. Second, for the model to apply, (ii) scientific
problems should be dividable into subtasks, and (iii) the solutions of these
subtasks should be communicable. Finally, the model assumes that (iv) the
completion of these subtasks should be sequential, but our conclusions still hold
if this condition is relaxed. Indeed, if some subtasks can be tackled in parallel
then the project can be completed even more quickly by different agents of a
group, and collaboration is even more successful. Conditions (i)-(iii) are some-
what met in the formal and empirical sciences, less so in the social science, and
almost not in the humanities. For example, as noted by Thagard (1997, 249),
the humanities do not obviously lend themselves to the division of labor and to
teacher/apprentice collaborations. Similarly, the importance of interpretative
methods and the coexistence of incompatible traditions may prevent consensus
on the nature of significant problems and what counts as a solution. This may
account for the differences concerning collaborative patterns in these fields.
As mentioned above, different causal pathways may connect the success-
fulness of collaborative scientists to the persistence and development of col-
laborative practices. Thus, conditions for the fulfillment of claim (2c) cannot
be uniquely specified. But several points are worth mentioning. First, the
activity of epistemically successful scientists should be favored by scientific in-
stitutions. This can be the case if it is agreed that scientific success, in the
form of publications or patents, is valued and promoted. Concerning scientific
results that lead to patents, applications and financial gains, this condition is
met when public or private funders value such outputs. Concerning pure sci-
entific results, this means that there should be a wide agreement about which
results are scientifically good and significant, and there should exist common
and accessible publication venues, the value of which is consensual. Again,
these conditions are approximately met in the formal and empirical sciences,
less so in the social science and, almost not in the humanities in which scholars
do not share paradigms, methods or norms about what is scientifically sound
10
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and significant, and cultural and linguistic barriers can restrain the existence
of unified communities and common publication venues. Second, in contexts
in which researchers and projects are regularly evaluated, especially by agents
or institutions who are not in a position to asses the scientific value of their
work, the existence of a common standard of success in terms of publications
(through simple and calibrated publication indicators) may even more favor
researchers who are successful, and therefore the development of collaboration.
Finally, when resources are crucial to carry out or facilitate research, snowball
effects can favor even more successful scientists, and in particular collaborative
ones. This resource accessibility condition, which is central in Wray’s explana-
tion, is not in ours. But we agree that in such cases, the functional mechanisms
that we describe will be even stronger. In this sense, our account encompasses
Wray’s. This condition about resources may be another reason for the differ-
ence in collaborative behavior between the formal or empirical sciences, the
social sciences and the humanities.
7 Conclusion
We have argued that collaborating a lot is overall a safe and success-
conducing practice. This conclusion is robust for various sizes of groups,
communities and degrees of collaboration; everything being equal, those who
collaborate more than average do better. Then, to the extent that the success-
fulness of researchers gives them more opportunities to transmit their research
habits, the development of collaborative practices in communities can be func-
tionally explained. We have further emphasized that the conditions for this
functional pattern to work are specifically met in the scientific fields in which
collaboration is well-developed. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to consider
that this functional mechanism is an important element of the explanation of
the development of collaboration in modern science.
The explanation of collaboration is probably a multi-factorial issue. Never-
theless, an asset of our general functional explanation is that it highlights the
unexpected force of beneficial aspects of collaborative activities and suggests
important roles for contextual factors that are associated with the rise of col-
laboration. As such, it is general and unifying. For instance, the competition
model shows how the division of scientific labor, the use of specialized experts
(Muldoon 2017), or the increased reliability of collaborative teams (Fallis 2006,
200) can increase the probability that groups pass research steps and have am-
plified effects in terms of successfulness. Similarly, factors like the need to
access resources to carry out or facilitate research can create a snowball effect
that favors epistemically successful (collaborative) researchers (Wray 2002).
And factors like the globalization of research or professionalization (Beaver,
1979) can be seen as conditions favoring the application of the priority rule
11
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and scientific competition.
Finally, while nothing in the model provides an internal limit to the growth
of collaboration, one can note that there is a wealth of reasons why collabo-
rating groups cannot develop forever. For example, communities are limited
in size, spatially distributed, and collaboration is all the more costly as groups
are large. The model could be easily modified to integrate factors that limit
the success and development of collaboration.
8 Appendix: Proof of the Theorem
Consider first the simple case where the m k-groups don’t have other com-
petitors. By symmetry, all groups have the same probability 1/m to win the
race and get the reward — call this reward r. So, the individual expected
reward is r/(km). Suppose now the groups merge and all km agents collabo-
rate. Each of them will receive the same reward, so their expected individual
rewards are r/(km) too. However, what matters in the model is not the ex-
pected reward, but the successfulness, which is this quantity divided by time.
Because within a collaboration agents share all the steps they pass, the larger
km-group will be at least as quick, and sometimes more, than all k-groups —
more precisely: for a given drawing of all random variables corresponding to
attempts to pass the steps, for all agents and temporal intervals, the km-group
will move at least as quickly as all k-groups. So the individual successfulness
is at least as high when identical groups merge.
Consider now the case where there are other competitors than them groups.
For a given drawing of all random variables, either the winner is one of the m
groups, or another competitor. In the former case, the above reasoning can be
made again, and the same conclusion holds. In the latter case, there is nothing
to lose, and because the km-group is sometimes quicker than the m k-groups,
there can be additional cases where it outcompetes the other competitors; then,
the individual successfulness increases with the merging. QED.
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Abstract 
 
“What is a gene?” is an important philosophical question that has been asked over and 
over. This paper approaches this question by understanding it as the individuation 
problem of genes, because it implies the problem of identifying genes and identifying 
a gene presupposes individuating the gene. I argue that there are at least two levels of 
the individuation of genes. The transgenic technique can individuate “a gene” as an 
individual while the technique of gene mapping in classical genetics can only 
individuate “a gene” as a type or a kind. The two levels of individuation involve 
different techniques, different objects that are individuated, and different references of 
the term “gene”. Based on the two levels of individuation, I discuss important 
philosophical implications including the relationship between individuality and 
individuation and that between individuals and kinds in experimental contexts. I also 
suggest a new gene conception, calling it “the transgenic conception of the gene.”  
 
Keywords: gene concept, individuality, individuation, experiment, classical genetics, 
transgenic technique 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PSA 2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -158-
2 
 
1. Introduction: what is a gene and why individuation matters 
 
“What is a gene?” and its related questions have been asked over and over by 
philosophers, historians, and scientists of biology (Beurton, Falk, and Rheinberger 
2000; Carlson 1991; Falk 1986, 2010; Gerstein et al. 2007; Griffths and Stotz 2006, 
2013; Kitcher 1982, 1992; Pearson 2006; Stotz and Griffiths 2004; Snyder and 
Gerstein 2003; Waters 1994, 2007). Those questions are frequently embedded in 
discussions about the definition of the term “gene” and the gene concept. As a 
consequence, the phrase “a gene” in this question usually refers to a type of gene. 
However, should we use “a gene” to refer to an individual gene, i.e., a gene token? 
Could it in fact be this?  
    The question “what is a gene” explicitly implies the problem of identifying 
genes, and identifying a gene presupposes individuating the gene. In what ways are 
genes individuated and how do scientists individuate them? I call this the 
individuation problem of genes. This paper shall approach the problem from three 
different but related perspectives.  
From the epistemic perspective, a concept of the gene provides at least a working 
definition, which by nature is a hypothesis, for scientific research. Any hypothesis of 
the gene may be in error and may be confirmed only by experimentally individuating 
particular tokens of some gene. From the semantic perspective, according to a 
Fregean philosophy of language, the concept of reference usually serves for proper 
names that refer to individuals or particulars. We may extend the concept of reference 
to general terms (e. g., “humankind” or “gene kind”) for the case in which some token 
of a kind is presented, and so we use a general term to refer to the kind. This means 
that at least some token of a kind has to be individuated. This semantic perspective 
presupposes an ontological perspective: the existence of a kind should be presented or 
demonstrated by the existence of at least a token of the kind. In the case of the gene, 
the ontological requirement means that we have to individuate a token of some gene 
kind. All three perspectives indicate the key status of individuation for answering the 
question of what a gene is. 
    According to the literature of analytic metaphysics, “individuation” is understood 
in a metaphysical and an epistemic sense. In the epistemic sense, someone 
individuating an object “is to ‘single out’ that object as a distinct object of perception, 
thought, or linguistic reference.” (Lowe 2005: 75) This epistemic sense presupposes 
the metaphysical sense, in which what ‘individuates’ an object “is whatever it is that 
makes it the single object that it is – whatever it is that makes it one object, distinct 
from others, and the very object that it is as opposed to any other thing.” (Lowe 2005: 
75) Bueno, Chen, and Fagan (2018) add a practical sense to the term, interpreting 
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“individuation” as a practical process through which an individual is produced. They 
characterize the relation between “individuation” and “individuals” as when “an 
individual emerges from a process of individuation in the metaphysical sense. 
Epistemic and practical individuation, then, are processes that aim to uncover stages 
of that metaphysical process.” (Beuno, Chen, and Fagan 2018) The approach to the 
individuation of genes I adopt herein follows their characterization, especially by 
focusing on the process of epistemic and practical individuation. Reversely, the case I 
am investigating in this paper offer an illustration for the new sense of individuation. 
Although philosophers have investigated concepts of the gene and its change by 
examining many cases in scientific practices, they have seldom considered the role 
that the transgenic technique developed in biotechnology may play in philosophical 
discussions. This paper explores experimental individuation of genes from the 
direction of that technique, considering the possibility that a gene is individuated as an 
individual in the relevant contexts. 
This paper thus addresses two central questions: (Q1) In what sense, can we 
reasonably say that classical geneticists have individuated a gene? (Q2) Are there 
experiments that can individuate a gene as an individual? Some new questions such as 
the relationship between individuality and individuation will be derived from the 
answer to the two questions. This paper is thus structured in the following way. 
In the second section, I review the literature about the concepts and references of 
genes. Section 3 argues that the answer to Q1 is that the geneticists individuate a gene 
as a type, because they used the chromosomal location technique. Section 4 argues 
that the answer to Q2 is the experiments that use the transgenic technique. The two 
answers indicate two different kinds of individuation: individuation of a type and 
individuation of an individual. This raises a new question about whether or not 
“individuation of a type” is a consistent phrase. In order to respond to this, section 5 
discusses in what sense we individuate a type and compare between two kinds of 
individuation defined by two different kinds of experiments and techniques: the 
chromosomal locution of genes and the transgenic experiment. My argument thus 
involves the relationship between kind and individual in the context of 
experimentation. Given the new question, Section 6 argues that transgenic 
experiments can demonstrate a gene type by individuating its tokens, while gene 
mapping experiments in classical genetics only individuate gene types. Thus, a new 
gene conception, calling it “the transgenic conception of the gene,” can be proposed. I 
further discuss the relationship among the classical gene concept, the molecular gene 
concept, and the transgenic conception. In the seventh section, I defend the thesis that 
practices of individuation in scientific investigations are prior to characteristics of 
individuality identified by traditionally metaphysical speculations. 
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2. Concepts and references of the gene 
 
The rapid change of the gene concept has produced a large multitude of gene 
concepts that have bewildered scientists (Gerstein et. al. 2007; Pearson 2006; Stotz 
and Griffiths 2004). The confused situation has attracted many philosophers and 
scientists to provide clarifying analyses. Although scientists as well as philosophers 
have made endeavors to overcome the predicament, they are motivated differently. 
Scientists believe that they need a unified concept to help them conduct research and 
to communicate with each other, because, as developmental geneticist William 
Gelbert says, “it sometimes [is] very difficult to tell what someone means when they 
talk about genes because we don’t share the same definition” (Pearson 2006: 401). 
Thus, most scientists seek to redefine the “gene” and tend to adopt a single preferred 
perspective on the gene concept, although they are well aware with the plurality of 
gene definitions (Wain et. al. 2002; Gerstein et. al. 2007).  
Philosophers at different times have been interested in clarifying concepts of the 
gene and in investigating the patterns of associated conceptual change. In contrast to 
actual definitions used by working scientists, they often consider more abstract 
concepts of the gene that can guide several different definitions in the context of 
scientific research. Consequently, they conclude that it is almost impossible to find a 
unified concept of the gene, and hence they take different stances to respond to this 
situation (rf. Waters 2007). Some are gene skeptics (e.g., Kitcher 1992). Some take a 
dualistic position, such as Moss (2003), who distinguishes between Gene-P and Gene-
D based on the fields in that gene concepts are applied. Some are pluralists, such as 
Griffiths and Stotz (2006, 2013), who differentiate between three senses of the gene: 
the instrumental gene, the nominal molecular gene, and the postgenomic molecular 
gene. Still others are both pluralists and pragmatists. Waters (2018) emphasizes that 
scientists do and should apply different gene concepts under various investigative 
contexts.  
    With some exceptions, few philosophers explore the reference problem of the 
term “gene”. Although Fregean semantics holds that the sense/concept or intension of 
a name determines its reference or extension, the matter about how a sense determines 
the reference is not easily seen from the scientific context. The determination of a 
theoretical term’s reference usually involves experimental procedures and techniques 
that should be investigated and analyzed. Weber (2005, ch.7) does impressive work by 
providing several reference-determining descriptions of the term “gene” in the history 
of genetics. Based on those descriptions and the analysis of Drosophila genetic 
practices, he suggests that the pattern of referential change for “gene” is a kind of 
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freely floating reference. He also argues that different gene concepts refer to different 
natural kinds, which are overlapping but not coextensive.1 According to Weber, 
reference for “gene” is fixed in the following manner for classical and molecular 
genes.  
 
Reference of [classical] “gene” (2): Whatever (a) is located on a chromosome, 
(b) segregates according to Mendel’s first law, (c) assorts independent of other 
genes according to Mendel’s second law if these other genes are located on a 
different chromosome, (d) recombines by crossing-over, (e) complements 
alleles of other genes, and (f) undergoes mutations that cause phenotypic 
differences. (Weber 2005: 210) 
 
Reference of [molecular] “gene” (5): The class of DNA sequences that 
determine the linear sequence of amino acids in a protein. (Weber 2005: 212) 
 
Both classical and molecular gene concepts do refer to natural objects, because, as 
Weber notes (2005: 210-211), some tokens satisfying the reference-determining 
descriptions are experimentally presented when using the concepts with the intention 
of referring to sets of entities in historical occasions. However, one should note that 
the experimented tokens in classical genetics seems to be only some organisms with 
specific phenotypes (say, fruit flies or other kinds of organisms) while the 
experimented tokens in molecular biology may be some DNA segments. This 
difference raises interesting problem: what tokens are individuated in different 
contexts of experiments? 
    Before moving to the next section, I want to clarify that the individuation 
problem of gene concept’s tokens is not the issue of gene individuality as raised by 
Rosenberg (2006: 121-133).2 He defends the gene individuality thesis in parallel to 
the species individuality thesis, but Reydon (2009) objects to his argument and 
defends the gene as a natural kind. This paper aims to discuss how a gene kind and its 
tokens are individuated rather than whether or not an allele such as Hbf (the human 
fetal hemoglobin gene) is an individual.   
 
3. Chromosomal location of a gene 
                                                 
1 Baetu (2011: 411) argues that “the referents of classical and molecular gene concepts are coextensive 
to a higher degree than admitted by Waters and Weber…” However, Baetu builds his argument in terms 
of Benzer’s work on phage. In my view, he does not successfully refute Waters’ and Weber’s 
arguments, because the referential change occurred within the classical gene concept, as Weber 
cogently argues.  
2 Rosenberg uses “natural selection and the individuation of genes” as the title of the section in which 
he discusses the gene individuality thesis. 
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    Weber’s argument indicates that we may and should consider the reference of the 
classical gene concept independently of the molecular gene concept and others. 
Weber’s reference-determining description of “gene” (2) indicates that the 
chromosomal location (or mapping) of genes plays a key role in determining 
referents. However, the question “what tokens are individuated and thus referred to?” 
does not be answered.  
Classical geneticists in the early 20th century located and labeled some specific 
classical genes on some specific chromosomes. The earliest genetic map (see Figure 
1) of Drosophila melanogaster (fruit fly) was depicted in 1915. Figure 1 shows that 
the gene (allele) pair of Drosophila’s grey body and (mutant) yellow body is located 
at the first locus on the first chromosome. The second gene pair of red eyes and 
(mutant) white eyes is located below the grey body gene. The other genes are located 
below the first two in order. However, every gene is differently distant from the first 
gene and thus occupies a single locus without overlapping. Accordingly, are we able 
to say that the location of a gene individuates the gene? Before answering this 
question, it is necessary to discuss how classical geneticists locate a gene on a 
chromosome. In other words, what technique is used in the process of locating genes? 
 
    Fig. 1. Genetic map of Drosophila in 1915. Reproduced from Morgan, T. H. et. 
al. (1915).  
 
    Chromosomal location or mapping of genes is a well-known story (Darden 1991, 
Waters 2004, Weber 2005, 2006; Falk 2009). For the purpose of this paper, I introduce 
a very brief version. In the 1910s, Thomas Hunt Morgan’s team developed a 
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technique to map the linear relations among factors (genes) in linkage groups, using 
Mendelian breeding data. Morgan and his team discovered that a pair of 
chromosomes may cross over with each other partially during the period of meiosis. 
Crossing over produces a specific ratio of the linked traits. Morgan believed that “the 
percentage of crossing over is an expression of the ‘distance’ of the factors from each 
other.” (Morgan et.al. 1915: 61) Sturtevant then used percentages of linked characters 
that exhibited crossing over to calculate the relative positions of the factors to each 
other. This is the kernel technique for constructing genetic maps. By using genetic 
maps, Morgan’s team determined the loci of many genes on the four chromosomes of 
Drosophila. Given the genetic maps, the classical geneticists assume that no other 
genes are located at the same position of a chromosome.3 As a consequence, the 
single location of a gene actually indicates the individuality of genes. 
Genetic maps by nature are diagrammatic models for the actual loci of genes in 
chromosomes. They are inferences from the statistical data of breeding experiments. 
Models represent the general. When we say that the location of a gene in a genetic 
map represents the locus of a classical gene on a chromosome, we really mean that it 
represents the locus of a type of classical gene on an identical type of chromosome in 
a cell within a kind of organism. Of course, this implies that a token of a type of 
classical gene on a token of a type of chromosome can be cognitively identified and 
discerned, because we can distinguish it from the tokens of the other genes. As a 
result, we can also count genes within cells. The located genes thus satisfy the two 
traditional characteristics of individuality: distinguishability and countability.4  
If all chromosomes were stick-shaped substances of uniform material without 
complicated structure, then the chromosomal location of classical genes would be able 
to genuinely individuate them. According to molecular biology, however, 
chromosomes are a long chain of double helix DNA molecules that curl themselves 
up in twisted shapes. In such a case, we cannot delineate a located classical gene or 
depict its contour or boundary, because the chromosomal locus at which the gene is 
located includes a twisted part of the long DNA molecule. Even by invoking the 
knowledge from molecular biology, one would still be puzzled by the problem of 
defining the molecular gene.  
 
4. Individuating molecular genes as individuals 
 
Ever since the era of molecular biology, the continuously accumulating 
knowledge of genetics has not solved the individuation problem of genes. Instead, it 
                                                 
3 Of course, a full story is more complicated. For the simplifying purpose, I skip the relevant 
discussion about gene mutation.  
4 The implications of using these criteria will be discussed in the sixth section.  
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has brought more troubles about the definition of the gene concept. Is a gene “a 
sequence of DNA for encoding and producing a polypeptide”? Should we include the 
start and stop codons (i. e., the regulation problem)? Should we count those introns 
deleted during the process of transcription into the investigated gene (i.e., the splicing 
problem)? The difficulty in defining the molecular gene concept directly contributes 
to the impediment of individuating a gene.  
Many gene sequencing projects have been conducted during the genomic era. 
Scientists do not identify a DNA sequence as a gene and discern the gene from others 
by using gene sequencing per se, because it offers only syntactical orders of genetic 
codes. Gene annotation, which is used to infer what those annotated sequences do, has 
been developed to offer senses or intensions for them. However, the impediment of 
discerning genes remains, because the definition of the gene is still vague and 
confusing (rf. Baetu 2012; Gerstein et. al. 2007; Griffiths and Stotz 2013, ch. 4). In 
fact, gene annotation is based on several assumptions, by which scientists infer that a 
few sequences may be genes that contribute to phenotypes or functions. Those 
assumptions need to be confirmed by experimental investigations. Many techniques 
such as directed deletion, point mutation making, gene silencing, and transgenesis in 
reverse genetics have been developed to determine what a gene is and what it does 
(Gilchrist and Haughn 2010).  
I argue that the transgenic technique is a very definite and powerful way to 
individuate a gene. It can even individuate molecular genes as individuals without a 
clear boundary of a gene or a clear definition of the gene, although the technique is 
limited.5 How does the transgenic technique do this? What conditions of individuality 
allow the technique to individuate a gene as an individual?  
    Chen (2016) proposes a conception of experimental individuality with three 
attendant criteria (separability, manipulability, and maintainability of structural unity) 
and argues that the first experiment of bacteria transformation individuated an 
antibiotic resistance gene by satisfying the three criteria.6 Below I reiterate this story 
in brief. 
Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer combined DNA of Escherichia coli (E. coli) in 
1973 and 1974 by transferring two different DNA segments encoding proteins for 
ampicillin and tetracycline resistance into E. coli, thereby realizing the transformation 
of this bacterium (Cohen et. al. 1973; Chang and Cohen 1974). Both DNA segments 
are called an “antibiotic resistance gene.” Cohen and Boyer used small circular 
                                                 
5 The technique cannot be applied in many occasions because of technological difficulties. It should 
not be applied to humankind due to ethics consideration. In addition, many gene-modification 
organisms produced by using the technique may involve ethical issues.  
6 Chen (2016) uses the creation of Bose-Einstein condensates in physical experiments as the other 
example. Chen’s intent is to argue that biological entities and physical entities in laboratories share the 
same criteria of experimental individuality. 
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plasmids (extrachromosomal pieces of DNA) as vectors to transfer a foreign DNA 
segment into a bacterial cell. The plasmids were made by cutting out a (supposed) 
antibiotic resistance gene from other bacteria with the restriction enzyme EcoRI, 
linking the segment into a plasmid by using another enzyme, DNA ligase. The 
scientists then transferred the plasmid into an E. coli cell without the ability to resist 
antibiotics. The result, a modified E. coli cell, was able to resist antibiotics and 
contained the antibiotic resistance gene. In that experiment, the antibiotic gene was 
separated from its original bacteria and then was manipulated (i.e., linked and 
transferred). Its structural unity was not broken down, hence allowing it to be 
expressed in the other kind of bacteria. Scientists thus identify it as a gene, an 
individual biological entity, because the separated, manipulated, and maintained 
antibiotic gene was naturally separable, manipulable, and maintainable. The photos in 
Figure 2 show that scientists worked with a single DNA segment, as indicated by (b) 
in [A] and [B].  
 
 
Fig. 2. Two pictures of plasmids in bacterial transformation. Reproduced from Chang 
and Cohen (1974). 
 
I next interpret the performance of the technique used in transgenic experiments 
as the general process of individuating transgenes. The process has five stages. 
 
    (1) Use restriction enzymes to cleave specific segments from recognition sites of 
long DNA chains. A specific restriction enzyme can cut away a specific DNA segment 
at a specific site. 
    (2) Link the cleaved segment of DNA to a plasmid vector by using DNA ligase. 
The vector is a circular DNA that may come from a wild type of virus.  
(3) Incorporate the DNA segment in the vector into the genome of another 
organism by injecting the plasmid vector to a cell of the target organism. Of course, 
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they may fail when the intended feature is not expressed. 
    (4) Make copies of DNA segments by cloning the cell containing the transferred 
segment of DNA. The aim of DNA cloning is to copy a segment of interest (or a gene) 
from an organism and produce many copies. 
    (5) Observe the expression of the novel feature that the target organism does not 
typically have. If a DNA segment cut from an original organism is successfully pasted 
into a cell of a target organism and the target organism expresses the intended feature 
that the original organism has, then one concludes that the segment is a gene. 
 
The first stage corresponds to the separation condition, the second, the third, and 
the fourth stages to the manipulation condition, and the fifth stage to the maintenance 
condition. Accordingly, one can easily see that those cut, linked, transferred, pasted, 
and copied genes are particulars – individuals, because they satisfy the three criteria 
of experimental individuality that indicates their singularity and particularity. In other 
words, a single segment of DNA maintains its structural unity when being separated 
and manipulated. This is so, because cutting a gene from an original organism is in 
fact separating it from its environment and because transferring, pasting and copying 
a gene is manipulating it. If the gene does express the intended feature in a target 
organism, then this condition indicates that the unity of its chemical and informational 
structure has been maintained.  
 
5. Two kinds of individuation of genes 
 
The previous discussion indicates that two different objects have been 
individuated in different experimental and theoretical contexts. In the context of 
classical genetics, scientists used breeding experiments and theoretical inferences to 
locate a gene at some locus on a chromosome. They would individuate genes as types 
if they assume that no other genes could coexist at the same locus. If one interprets 
the meaning of “individuation” as “only individuals can be individuated,” then the 
phrase “individuating genes as types” sounds unreasonable. Is it better to say 
“unitization of genes” rather than “individuation of genes”?  
It is quite right to say classical geneticists unitize genes as types. In a sense, 
however, we may reasonably say that we individuate a gene as a type, because the 
type has tokens or members that are distinguishable and countable individuals. 
Classical geneticists suppose that all types of genes have corpuscular members, i.e., 
substantive individuals. In such a sense, talking of “individuating genes as types” is 
reasonable. If no distinguishable and countable members or samples of a kind can be 
identified, then the kind cannot be individuated. In other words, we cannot individuate 
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such a kind as water or air that is expressed by “mass” nouns at the macroscopic level, 
although we can individuate a sample of water by using a container or individuate a 
water molecule by specific technique at the molecular level. For the cases of 
experiments using the transgenic technique, molecular biologists physically 
individuate singular and particular gene tokens. Thus, we claim that scientists 
experimentally individuate genes as individuals in such a context.  
In consequence, two different sets of criteria for individuality are presupposed. 
Experiments using the location technique have individuated a type whose tokens or 
members are countable individuals rather than matter referred to by mass nouns. In 
such experimental contexts, we emphasize distinguishability and countability as the 
indexing features of individuals. Experiments using the transgenic technique 
individuate singular and particular individuals – gene tokens. For these experimental 
contexts, we emphasize singularity and particularity of individuals in contrast to 
universality of types or kinds. We assure the particularity and singularity of the 
individuals through the realization of experimental individuality, namely, the joint 
realization of separability, manipulability, and maintainability of structural unity. At 
this point, more philosophical implications will be discussed in next section. 
    The two individuated targets indicate two different referential levels of the term 
“gene” in the literature. As we have seen, when many philosophers and scientists ask 
“what is a gene,” they really refer to a type of gene in conjunction with discussing the 
gene concept or the definition of “gene.” Similarly, in some contexts of scientific 
investigation, scientists use “a gene” to refer to a type of gene as the phrase 
“chromosomal location of a gene”. In the context of transgenic experiments, however, 
“a gene” is used to refer to a genuine individual – a single and particular gene token, 
because scientists have worked with particular objects that maintain their structural 
unity when being separated and manipulated in the process of experimenting.  
The two referential levels indicate two different kinds or levels of experimental 
individuation, which are realized by two different techniques: the chromosomal 
location technique and the transgenic technique. Although the two techniques aim to 
the same target (i.e., genes or types of genes), they physically experiment and 
manipulate different objects. Experiments using the chromosomal location technique 
indirectly identify loci of genes by manipulating organisms that contain chromosomes 
with genes in breeding, while experiments using the transgenic technique directly 
manipulate DNA segments. Therefore, classical geneticists can only cognitively 
discern gene types by identifying their loci without practically interacting with gene 
tokens; they really practically interact with organismal individuals that contain 
different types of genes. Reversely, molecular biologists can practically interact with 
gene tokens and then cognitively infer out the existence of a gene type.  
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6. Gene concepts and individuation 
 
One may still wonder: Can the location technique individuate a singular and 
particular gene in the sense of individuating entities as individuals? The answer is 
obviously negative, because that technique cannot separate and manipulate a gene 
token and maintain its structural unity. On the contrary, one may ask: Can the 
transgenic technique individuate a type of gene? Here the answer is less clear. In the 
sense that scientists suppose that a token of a gene has been physically individuated in 
transgenic experiments, we are allowed to say that the technique also individuates a 
type of gene. However, scientists are not fully sure that the transgenic technique on a 
posited gene can be always successfully applied to another individual of the same 
organism. In fact, the probability of failure is quite high. Unless the experimental 
individuation of particular tokens can be performed repeatedly and stably, then one 
can say that the gene tokens indicate a general type of gene and that the type has been 
identified. However, the object individuated by the technique is not a type of gene, 
because the technique always requires manipulating particular segments of DNA -- 
gene tokens. If a kind of transgenic experiment with a specific transgene has been 
stably repeated, then a type of gene has been discovered by experimentally 
individuating its tokens in performing such an experiment.  
Since transgenic experiments may be successfully and stably performed by using 
different transgenes, one can extract a special conception of the gene that is 
characterized by the transgenic technique. I call this “the transgenic conception of the 
gene,” in which a gene is a transferrable DNA sequence which is able to express a 
phenotype/function on another kind of organisms. Of course, this does not imply that 
those technically untransferrable DNA sequences are not genes, given the fact that the 
number of transgenes is relatively few to the number of genes located at 
chromosomes. This is so because scientists do not always find the precise site of a 
gene (type) and available restriction enzymes to cut the DNA segment of the gene. 
Thus, the extension of the transgenic conception of the gene is not equivalent to that 
of the classical gene concept. Due to the limited number of transgenes, the transgenic 
conception is not yet co-extensional with the molecular gene concept. To be precise, 
the extension of the former is included within the extension of the latter, because all 
transgenes are molecular genes but not all molecular genes can be transplanted. In 
addition, the intension of the transgenic conception is implied in the intension of the 
molecular gene concept, because the technique was developed from molecular 
biology. As a consequence, the transgenic conception can be viewed as a sub-
conception of the molecular gene concept. Nevertheless, we have a conception 
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derived from scientific practices. 
 
7. The priority of individuation to individuality 
 
    Bueno, Chen, and Fagan (2018) promote an approach by which investigating 
processes of individuation in scientific practices is prior to metaphysical speculation 
on criteria of individuality. This paper obviously follows the approach. However, this 
does not mean that we do not need any criterion of individuality in identifying any 
individual in scientific practices. Rather, criteria of individuality are implied in or 
extracted from procedures of scientific practices, as the three conditions of 
experimental individuality are extracted from experimental practices (Chen 2016). 
Criteria of individuality based on scientific practices may or may not conflict with 
criteria from metaphysical theories. Considering the relationship between practical 
criteria and speculative criteria will help us understand practical individuation more 
deeply. 
The metaphysical tradition has identified at least six characteristics or indexing 
features of individuality in general: particularity, distinguishability, countability, 
delineability, unity, and persistence (Pradeu 2012: 228-229; Chen 2016: 351).7 
Recently, some philosophers argues that all biological entities are processes (Dupré 
2018, Nicholson and Dupré 2018, Pemberton 2018), so I would like to add 
processuality to the list. Indeed, I believe that all biological individuals pass through a 
life, i.e., a process (see also Chen 2018), therefore, processuality is a central 
characteristic of biological individuality. Those characteristics, originally come from 
metaphysical speculation, can singly, jointly, or collectively serve as epistemic criteria 
of individuality.  
In the context of scientific practices, they are the outcomes from rather than 
preconditions for the realization of individuation. For example, individuating genes as 
individuals in the context of transgenic experiments indicates that the separated, 
manipulated, and maintained genes are particular and singular tokens. As the 
experimental individuation of gene tokens is realized, those tokens are also 
distinguishable, countable, unitary, persistent, and passing through a process, because 
particular and concrete individuals are being separated, manipulated, and maintained. 
The practices of separation and manipulation indicate epistemic particularity, 
                                                 
7 Characteristics of individuality can serve as criteria of individuality and thus be involved in a theory 
of individuation. Bueno, Chen, and Fagan (2018) identify six theories of individuation in traditionally 
analytic metaphysics. A theory of individuation in the metaphysical sense involves not only “a theoretic 
construction of the nature of individuality and its attendant criteria,” but also other metaphysical 
concepts such as “property, trope, universal, particular, substance, substratum, time, space, sort or 
kind.” (p. 3) For my purpose, I will discuss only characteristics of individuality rather than any theory 
of individuation.  
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distinguishability, and countability. The practice of maintenance of structural unity 
indicates the unity, persistence, and processuality of the maintained gene token. 
However, all of the three practices would not indicate the delineation of a gene token, 
because the spatial boundary of the manipulated gene does not and cannot be 
delineated. Of course, this point does not mean that delineation is not a characteristic 
of individuality, but rather that it is not applicable to this case. 
Individuating genes as types in classical genetics indicates that the individuated 
types of genes contain distinguishable and countable tokens, because the 
individuation is the location of a gene at a chromosome in a diagrammatic model. 
Supposing that the loci of different genes do not overlap, then the special locus of a 
gene is thus distinguishable from the locus of another gene. As a consequence, a gene 
token at a chromosome in a cell of a kind of organism is thus distinguishable from 
another token of the identical type of gene. All gene types located at chromosomes are 
countable. Supposing that every organism contains a token of a specific type of gene, 
then tokens of that gene type are countable. However, chromosomal location of genes 
does not indicate particular and singular gene tokens, because the individuated objects 
are only types of genes. As I have argued, the kind of individuation practice did not 
touch down the manipulation of individuals and remained in the cognitive level which 
focuses on gene types in general.  
Although the concept of individuation can be reasonably applied to a kind whose 
members are individuals, all characteristics of individuality are not applicable. One 
cannot apply particularity, delineation, unity, and processuality to gene types, because 
a gene type is, in principle, universal, occupying multiple spaces, not cohesive, 
replicable, and non-processual. However, distinguishability and countability can be 
adequately applied to gene types, because one can distinguish one gene type from 
another gene type and count gene types when the chromosomal location is realized. In 
this case, thus, both distinguishability and countability cannot sufficiently 
demonstrate that the individuated objects are individuals. On the other hand, in the 
case of transgenic experiments, we can derive particularity, unity, and processuality 
from the three conditions of experimental individuation (separation, manipulation, 
and maintenance of structural unity). As a consequence, characteristics of 
individuality are derived from individuation; they are outcomes of practical 
individuation. 
 
8. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, I argue that there are at least two kinds of experimental 
individuation of genes. Scientists individuate genes as types in classical genetics and 
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individuate genes as tokens in transgenic experiments. Individuating a gene as a type 
or individuating a gene as an individual depends on the technique used in 
experimentation. I argue that characteristics of individuality identified in traditional 
metaphysics are not presupposed by individuation. Rather, they are outcomes or 
products derived from practical individuation in scientific experiments. I further argue 
that different kinds of experimental individuation presuppose different concepts of the 
gene: the classical gene concept and the transgenic conception of the gene. I argue 
that the transgenic conception can be viewed as a sub-conception of the molecular 
gene concept. An outstanding problem remains. Whether we can unify different 
concepts of the gene by integrating different experimental techniques, such as the 
chromosomal location technique, the technique of genetic sequencing, the techniques 
in reverse genetics, and the transgenic technique. Future analyses can approach this 
and other related questions in light of our new understanding of how classical 
geneticists individuated genes and the role experimental techniques play in identifying 
a gene as an individual. 
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The Verdict’s Out:
Against the Internal View of the Gauge/Gravity Duality
4993 words
Abstract
The gauge/gravity duality and its relation to the possible emergence (in some
sense) of gravity from quantum physics has been much discussed. Recently,
however, Sebastian De Haro (2017) has argued that the very notion of a duality
precludes emergence, given what he calls the internal view of dualities, on which
the dual theories are physically equivalent. However, I argue that De Haro’s
argument for the internal view is not convincing, and we do not have good reasons
to adopt it. In turn, I propose we adopt the external view, on which dual theories
are not physically equivalent, instead.
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1 Introduction
The gauge/gravity duality has generated much discussion about whether space-time
geometry or gravity emerges (in some sense) from quantum physics.1 Recently, however,
De Haro [2017] has argued that the very notion of a duality precludes the possibility of
emergence given what he calls the internal view of dualities, on which dual theories are
physically equivalent. In turn, this claim impinges upon the broader debate about
whether we can make claims about emergence given a duality. After all, since the
internal view of dualities is supposed to rule out emergence, any such debate is rendered
moot once we adopt the internal view. My goal here, though, is to argue that De Haro’s
argument for the internal view is not convincing. Instead, I propose we adopt the
external view of dualities, on which dual theories are not physically equivalent.
First, I introduce Fraser’s [2017] three-pronged distinction of predictive, formal and
physical equivalences, characterizing dualities in terms of this distinction (§2.1). I then
make things more concrete by briefly considering the gauge/gravity duality via the
Ryu-Takayanagi conjecture from the AdS/CFT (anti-de Sitter space/conformal field
theory) correspondence (§2.2).
Next, I introduce De Haro’s interpretive fork between the internal and external views
of dualities (§3). I illustrate how the internal view is supposed to preclude emergence,
but criticize De Haro’s argument for the internal view – that it is meaningless to hold
the external view given ‘some form of’ structural realism and how the two theories are
1One prominent physicist who is a proponent of emergent space-time is Seiberg 2007,
while philosophers like Rickles 2011/2017, Teh 2013, and Crowther 2014 have all tackled
the topic.
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‘totalizing’ in some way – by showing how it does not work without further assumptions
(§4). In turn, given the interpretive fork, I propose we adopt the external view instead.
In concluding remarks, I briefly discuss this result in relation to the broader debate
about emergence within the gauge/gravity duality.
2 Gauge/Gravity through AdS/CFT
2.1 Duality
Fraser [2017] takes two theories related by a duality to have two features: (i) they agree
on the transition amplitudes and mass spectra, and (ii) there is a ‘translation manual’
that allows us to transform a description given by one theory to a description given by
another theory. We may explicate (i) and (ii) by first considering distinct sorts of
‘equivalence’ proposed by Fraser [2017, 35]:
• Predictive equivalence: “there is a map from T1 to T2 that preserves the values of
all expectation values deemed to have empirical significance by T1 and that
preserves the mass spectra, and vice versa.”
• Formal equivalence: “there is a translation manual from T1 to T2 which maps all
quantum states and quantum observables deemed to have physical significance by
T1 into quantities in T2 and respects predictive equivalence, and vice versa.”
• Physical equivalence: “there is a map from T1 to T2 that maps each physically
significant quantity in T1 to a quantity in T2 with the same physical interpretation
and respects both formal and predictive equivalence, and vice versa.”
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Given our characterization of a duality as (i) and (ii), we may quite naturally say that
two theories are dual to one another when they are predictively and formally equivalent.
Furthermore, supposing that this three-pronged distinction exhausts the possible
equivalences relevant to physics, we might also say that two theories satisfying (i)-(iii)
are also fully, or theoretically, equivalent.
Here it would be germane to differentiate two distinct sorts of structures in a duality.
Given predictive and formal equivalence, the isomorphism holding between physical and
empirical quantities of the dual theories suggests a structure, which may be called the
empirical core of the duality. However, as Teh [2013, 301] also notes, despite the
empirical core, “duality is precisely an equivalence between two theories that describe (in
general) different physical structures, i.e. theories with non-isomorphic models.” In other
words, while there is an empirical core, by which physical and empirical quantities are
mapped onto one another, these quantities are generally related to other quantities in a
quite different manner on each side, viz. there is ‘excess structure’ exogenous to the
empirical core. Without further argument, we are not entitled to ‘discard’ this ‘excess
structure’, which also means that predictive and formal equivalence (characterizing the
empirical core) does not automatically entail physical, and hence full, equivalence.
Given Fraser’s framework, I will briefly introduce the gauge/gravity duality more
concrete by briefly examining the example of AdS/CFT correspondence.
2.2 The AdS/CFT Correspondence
The gauge/gravity duality, or holographic principle, postulates a duality between a
suitably chosen N -dimensional gauge quantum field theory (QFT) that does not describe
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gravity, and a quantum theory of gravity in (N+1 )-dimensional space-time (the ‘bulk’)
with an N -dimensional ‘boundary’, on which the gauge theory is defined. Hence the
slogan: gauge on the boundary, gravity in the bulk.
The AdS/CFT correspondence is a specific case of the gauge/gravity duality. On
the one hand, ‘AdS’ stands for anti-de Sitter space-time - a maximally symmetric
solution to the Einstein equations with a constant negative curvature and a negative
cosmological constant. More accurately, though, the ‘AdS’ in AdS/CFT
correspondence should be taken to refer to a string theory of quantum gravity defined on
a 5-dimensional AdS. ‘CFT’, on the other hand, refers to a quantum field theory with
scale (or conformal) invariance defined on the 4-dimensional boundary of the AdS. The
AdS-side theory is defined in the ‘bulk’, and the CFT-side theory is defined on the
‘boundary’ of the AdS space-time.
The AdS/CFT correspondence, then, refers to a postulated duality between the two
theories, satisfying (i) and (ii) from §2.1. (i) is satisfied given the postulate that bulk
fields propagating in the bulk are coupled to operators in the boundary CFT. Hence,
the AdS theory of gravity will predict exactly the ‘same physics’, viz. transition
amplitudes, expectation values and so on, as the CFT theory without gravity.
Beyond empirical, i.e. measurable, quantities, physically significant quantities of
AdS/CFT must also relate to one another since it is a duality. In other words, (ii) is
supposed to hold simply as a core postulate. This is not to say that (ii) is completely
unfounded: in particular, we have evidence suggesting that at least some physical
quantities of dual theories are related to one another in surprising ways, which in turn
supports the claim that (ii) holds. Here I will focus on one such relation, the
Ryu-Takayanagi conjecture.
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The Ryu-Takayanagi conjecture postulates that the entanglement entropy of two
regions on the boundary is related to the surface area within the bulk:2
(RT): SA =
Area(A˜)
4GN
RT tells us that the entanglement entropy of a region on the boundary of the AdS, SA,
viz. the von Neumann entropy3 in the CFT, is directly proportionate (by 4 times the
Newtonian gravitational constant) to the area of the boundary surface ˜A bisecting the
bulk, dividing the two entangled regions on the boundary. Below, Fig. 1. shows a
simplified diagram for visualizing RT.
Fig. 1. The area A˜ bisects the bulk space-time into two, and on the boundaries of the two parts we define the regions A
and B. The Ryu-Takayanagi formula tells us that given a change in SA we get a change in the size of A˜ by the proportion
of 1
4GN
. [Figure taken from Van Raamsdonk 2010]
RT paints an interesting picture for emergence of space-time geometry from quantum
theory: the area of a space-time itself is closely related to quantum entanglement
entropy in a surprising way. An increase in the entanglement entropy between two
2See Ryu & Takayanagi 2006 for technical details.
3The von Neumann entropy is given by SA = −Tr(ρAlogρA). The reduced density
matrix describing the region A, ρA, is obtained from tracing over the B -components of
the combined density matrix of A and the entangled region B, ρAB: ρA = TrB(ρAB).
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regions of a field described by CFT leads to a proportionately increasing boundary area
of the bulk, and hence a geometric (or gravitational) phenomenon is described in terms
of a quantum phenomenon.4
Given relations like RT, we can also see more clearly how AdS/CFT is supposed to
satisfy (ii): physically significant quantities, such as ‘area’ of space-time in the bulk and
‘entanglement entropy’ between two regions on the boundary, are mapped to one another
via suitable equations. Hence, AdS/CFT is a special case of the gauge/gravity duality:
a theory of quantum gravity on a (N+1 )-dimensional AdS space-time is dual to a CFT
defined on its N -dimensional boundary.
With the gauge/gravity duality made concrete, let us turn to the interpretive task.
3 The Internal View
Dieks et al. [2015] and De Haro [2017] proposes an interpretive fork for dualities: we can
either adopt an internal or external view. De Haro describes the internal view as such:
if the meaning of the symbols is not fixed beforehand, then the two theories,
related by the duality, can describe the same physical quantities. [...] we have
two formulations of one theory, not two theories. [De Haro 2017, 116]
On the contrary, the external view holds that:
the interpretative apparatus for the entire theory is fixed on each side. [...]
On this interpretation there is only a formal/theoretical, but no empirical,
equivalence between the two theories, as they clearly use different physical
4See Van Raamsdonk 2010 for an excellent summary of this picture.
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quantities; only one of them can adequately describe the relevant empirical
observations.
Is De Haro’s characterization of the external view adequate? The fact that there is no
‘empirical’ equivalence (what Fraser calls physical equivalence) between two theories
does not entail that at most one of them can adequately describe the relevant empirical
observations, where one description is ’correct’ and the other ’wrong’, nor does it entail
mutually exclusive physics where only one theory can be correct at any one time. To
assume so seems to rule out, by fiat, the possibility of emergence, since emergence relies
on both theories being in a way adequately descriptive of the world (except one is more
‘fundamental’ than the other). Hence, taking in account Fraser’s framework, I
re-characterize the external view as such: it is simply the claim that the two dual
theories are physically non-equivalent i.e. have distinct physical interpretations, despite
formal and predictive equivalence.
Given the interpretive fork, if we are led to forsake the internal view, then we are
motivated to accept the external view instead. As such, my strategy here is to show that
we should forsake the internal view, and in turn accept the external view instead.
To better understand what the internal view is claiming, I break it down into three
constituent claims.
The first claim is that of theoretical equivalence: under the gauge/gravity duality, the
two theories (e.g. AdS and CFT) are taken to be simply different formulations of a
single theory, describing the same physical quantities despite their obvious differences.
As Dieks et al. puts it, ‘the two theories collapse into one’ [2015, 209-210]. In light of
Fraser’s framework described in §2.3, this claim means that the gauge/gravity duality, on
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the internal view, involves the conjunction of predictive, formal and physical
equivalences. In other words, beyond a one-to-one mapping (a ’translation manual’) of
relevant physical quantities and the sharing of all transition amplitudes, mass spectra
and other observable predictions, the internal view claims that the two theories also have
the same physical interpretation. However, as Fraser [2017, 35] notes, “predictive
equivalence does not entail formal equivalence, and formal equivalence does not entail
physical equivalence.” Formal and predictive equivalence cannot entail physical
equivalence on their own.
The internal view’s claim of theoretical equivalence, then, must require an additional
claim of physical equivalence, in addition to formal and predictive equivalence: the dual
theories are taken to be physically equivalent, and hence have the same physical
interpretation. As per §2.1, this would indeed entail theoretical equivalence.
Physical equivalence is in turn justified by a third claim, that the two theories in a
duality should be left uninterpreted. As De Haro claims above, assume ‘the meaning of
the symbols is not fixed beforehand’. Then, given formal and predictive equivalence, we
have an isomorphism between the dual theories’ (now-uninterpreted) ‘physical
quantities’ and numerical predictions, viz. an uninterpreted empirical core. Ignoring the
‘excess structure’ exogenous to the empirical core, we can then take the empirical core to
be representing a single uninterpreted theory, where the now-uninterpreted ’quantities’ of
each dual theory now refer to the ‘places’ or ‘nodes’ of the empirical core’s structure. As
Dieks et al. (2015) puts it,
A in one theory will denote exactly the same physical quantity as B [...] if
these quantities occupy structurally identical nodes in their respective webs
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of observables and assume the same (expectation) values. [Dieks et al. 2015,
209]
Now, given this situation, it might seem plausible to claim that the dual theories are
really physically equivalent. Consider RT. On the internal view, we are led to say that
‘area’ really has the same meaning as ‘entanglement entropy’. After all, in the
theoretical structure that is supposed to matter on the internal view, viz. the empirical
core, the two terms are related structurally in the same way to other terms elsewhere
(sans a proportional constant). Given that the two theories is also stripped of all prior
physical meaning, this structural identity suggests that the ‘area’ and ‘entanglement
entropy’ are really describing the same quantities, despite their obvious non-isomorphism
more generally (e.g. different equations in computing these quantities in their respective
theories, the terms involved in calculating them, and so on). In other words, it seems
that we are allowed to proclaim physical equivalence on this view.
If we do accept this third claim, we get physical and hence theoretical equivalence,
and so the internal view does preclude the possibility of emergence: Theoretical
equivalence effectively rules out any account of emergence. If the two dual theories are
really just different formulations of one theory, then there is nothing for this new,
unified, theory to emerge from: nothing can emerge from itself in any interesting way.
Subsequently, a duality is supposed to preclude emergence on the internal view.
Agreed: physical equivalence entails theoretical equivalence, and theoretical
equivalence rules out any sort of emergence. However, are we forced to adopt physical
equivalence given the internal view? De Haro himself seems unclear on this point. Note
the use of “can” in his characterization of the internal view above: “the two theories,
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related by the duality, can describe the same physical quantities” [2017, 116, emphasis
mine]. Are we supposed to believe that physical equivalence can hold, or that it must
hold, on the internal view? In other words, since physical equivalence hangs on the third
claim of leaving terms of the dual theories uninterpreted, must we adopt the third claim,
or is it merely possible?
De Haro seems to suggest that theoretical, and hence physical, equivalence must hold,
since he assumes the two dual theories to be ‘two formulations of one theory ’ [emphasis
mine]. However, later on, he suggests that physical equivalence merely can hold, when he
considers an example of leaving dual theories uninterpreted beyond structural relations:
For what might intuitively be interpreted as a ‘length, a reinterpretation in
terms of ‘renormalisation group scale is now available.5 [De Haro 2017, 116,
emphasis mine]
The availability of an interpretative stance – in our case of RT, of interpreting bulk
boundary surface area to be the same physical quantity as entanglement entropy – surely
does not entail the necessity of the stance. Hence, there are two readings of the internal
view: on the weak reading, we take the modal talk – e.g. a reinterpretation being
‘available’ or how we ‘can’ describe the same physical quantities – seriously, and on the
strong reading we ignore the modal talk completely.
On the one hand, the claim that the internal view precludes emergence is not true on
the weaker view. On this view, if we assume that the terms on both sides of the duality
are uninterpreted, then there is no emergence; but this is not forced on us. In turn, this
5For context, though unmentioned in this paper, length and renormalisation group
scale are also dual quantities in AdS/CFT.
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makes the preclusion of emergence merely possible. However, this reading of the internal
view does not rule out emergence as De Haro claims. I will thus assume that De Haro
intends for us to take the strong reading of the internal view, which does claim that the
terms of the both sides are uninterpreted.
However, we have not yet seen a compelling reason for accepting the claim that we
have to see the terms of the dual theories as uninterpreted, and subsequently that
physical equivalence must hold. A fortiori we are not obliged to accept the internal view.
Indeed, something is odd about the argument structure I mapped out: To establish
the second claim of physical equivalence, we must establish the third claim, that we must
discard anything beyond the empirical core and to leave the terms uninterpreted.
However, to justify leaving the terms uninterpreted requires a convincing argument for
assuming physical equivalence between the two theories to begin with! Otherwise, we
have no reason to simply discard the ‘excess’ structure and leave the dual theories’ terms
uninterpreted.
Hence, further arguments are required to establish the third claim. Furthermore, if
we discover that this argument is wanting, we shall then have reasons to reject the
internal view.
4 De Haro’s Argument
De Haro does provide an argument, which runs on the idea that two plausible
commitments entails the internal view: the commitment that the dual theories are
theories of the whole world in some suitably totalizing manner, and the commitment to
“some form of structural realism” [2017, 116].
PSA 2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -186-
Let us begin by examining the two commitments. The first commitment implies that
dual theories are theories of the whole world, in the sense that they are “both candidate
descriptions of the same world” [Dieks et al. 2015, 14]. However, prima facie this is not
true, since on one hand we have a theory of gravity/space-time geometry, while on the
other we have a theory without (not to mention different dimensionalities). How can two
theories, one describing something the other does not, both be about the same world?
We can try to make this assumption intelligible by taking into account the translation
manual between the two theories. Given the translation manual, we can claim that the
CFT theory without gravity does describe gravity in a way. Consider RT: while the
entanglement entropy described within CFT does not appear to describe space-time
geometry by itself, the CFT plus the translation manual and AdS (in this case RT)
does describe space-time geometry, albeit in a higher-dimensional space-time. When the
entanglement described within the CFT changes, the boundary surface area in the
AdS-side theory with gravity changes as well. Hence, by considering the translation
manual given by the duality, the first commitment is made plausible.
The second commitment requires us to adopt some form of structural realism.
Structural realism here can be understood loosely, since nothing turns on the particular
account of structural realism we employ. Furthermore, De Haro himself does not specify
precisely what he means by ‘some form of’ structural realism. As such, I will likewise
adopt a loose notion of structural realism: I understand it to be the view that we should
be (metaphysically or epistemically) committed only to the mathematical or formal
structure of our theories, and this entails, among other things, that theoretical terms are
to be defined in terms of their relations to other places or nodes in this formal structure.
Now, De Haro then claims that the two commitments entail the internal view:
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If [the two commitments] are met, it is impossible, in fact meaningless, to
decide that one formulation of the theory is superior, since both theories are
equally successful by all epistemic criteria one should apply. [De Haro 2017,
116]
Since he does not flesh out his argument in much detail, I attempt to reconstruct his
argument in a plausible fashion: firstly, let us grant the two commitments. Do these
commitments commit us to the conclusion that it is meaningless to differentiate between
the two dual theories?
Dieks et al. [2015, 209] claims that given the first commitment, “it is no longer clear
that there exists an ‘external’ point of view that independently fixes the meanings of
terms in the two theories”. However, I must admit I do not see why this is the case: as I
explained above, the first commitment only makes sense if we understand both theories
as having pre-determined meanings, and then relating them via the duality/translation
manual. In other words, the first commitment is perfectly compatible with the external
view.
For the remainder of this paper I focus on the second commitment instead. I think
the second commitment does entail that differentiating the two theories is meaningless,
only if we believe that one should be a structural realist (epistemically/metaphysically)
only about the empirical core of the duality, discarding the ‘excess structure’ which made
the two theories distinct structures to begin with. In other words, we want to say that
this ‘excess structure’ was not physically significant to begin with: only the empirical
core was relevant to physics. It seems that this is required to make sense of the claim
that it is ‘meaningless’ to say that one formulation, e.g. the CFT side, is better than the
PSA 2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -188-
other, e.g. the AdS side. If structural realism commits us only to the empirical core of
the dual theories, then accordingly there is really only one structure in question. Hence,
it is meaningless to ask which structure is better (there is only one). If there is only one
structure, then the internal view seems to hold: under a structural realist view, the
terms of the dual theories are defined in terms of their places in the structure. Hence,
within the empirical core’s structure, the different terms of the dual theories really mean
the same thing, and hence we get some version of the internal view.
Why should we, even as structural realists, commit ourselves only to the empirical
core? The argument seems to me to be an epistemic one: we should believe that the
structure relevant to the two theories given the duality must really be common to both
theories because, as De Haro claims above, “both theories are equally successful” by all
epistemic criteria we apply. If this is true then it seems we have no way of differentiating
between the two theories, and the best explanation for this epistemic equivalence is to
appeal to their being ‘the same’ in some way. The only thing in common between the
dual theories is the empirical core, so we should take this to be what explains their
epistemic equivalence. Everything else (i.e. the ‘excess structure’) can be discarded,
since they are irrelevant differences. As such, structural realism should commit us only
to the empirical core.
However, it is not clear that the dual theories are indeed epistemically equivalent. In
a naive sense, they are epistemically equivalent if one takes ‘epistemic’ to be ‘empirical’
equivalence. Given the duality, i.e. formal and predictive equivalence, it is trivial that
the two theories are also ‘empirically’ equivalent. However, I do not think such a notion
of empirical equivalence exhausts the epistemic criteria for differentiating between
scientific theories. Of course, one main desideratum for scientific theorizing is to provide
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predictions, descriptions and explanations of phenomena. Beyond that, though, I contend
that another desideratum of scientific theorizing is to look for ways to develop better
scientific theories, be it a more unificatory theory, a more explanatory theory, and so on.
We see this in play when De Haro discusses the position/momentum duality in
quantum mechanics: “this duality is usually seen as teaching us something new about
the nature of reality: namely, that atoms are neither particles, nor waves. By analogy, it
is to be expected that gauge/gravity dualities teach us something about the nature of
spacetime and gravity” [2017, 117]. However, this is only possible if the two theories
were not epistemically equivalent! If they were epistemically equivalent, then how could
we learn anything new from one theory that we cannot already learn from another? If
’area’ and ’entanglement entropy’ really meant the same thing and had the same
physical interpretation, how could we learn something new when we realize that area can
be related (via RT) to quantum entanglement? Indeed, this criticism extends generally
to the internal view: how can we learn anything new from a duality if the dual theories
are just the ‘same theory’, and indeed are uninterpreted to begin with? We learn
something new when two different things are related in a surprising way, especially when
they are related to other quantities, on each side, in interesting ways; I do not see how
we can learn something new when one and the same thing is related to itself.
Furthermore, the two theories are not epistemically equivalent when we consider the
methodological concerns of physicists, who generally note that the CFT is
well-understood, while the dual string theory of gravity is not. For example, Horowitz
and Polchinski [2009] notes that we only approximately understand the gravitational
theory, but the CFT has been developed to very precise degrees. Lin points out that:
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A dictionary is reasonably well developed in the direction of using
classical gravity to study the CFT, but the converse problem how to
organize the information in certain CFT’s into a theory of quantum gravity
with a semi-classical limit is hardly understood at all. [2015, 11]
If both theories are equally successful by all epistemic criteria we have, then this
situation should not appear. Rather, it seems that scientific practice is of the opinion
that the two theories are, in fact, not epistemically equal: one is more successful than
the other in terms of a variety of criteria, such as precision of calculation, ease of
understanding, availability of a non-perturbative analysis, and so on. It is one reason
why AdS/CFT is such an interesting area of research: it allows us to understand a
hard-to-understand theory in terms of an easier-to-understand theory. Unless one is
given arguments for why such criteria should not be epistemically relevant, the dual
theories, I contend, are not epistemically equivalent.
Of course, one could assume that the goal or ideal, when we fully understand the
translation manual, is to render both theories equally epistemically successful. However,
this presumes that both sides will end up being just as easy to compute, or understand,
and so on. Of course, if we do discover a more fundamental characterization of why the
two dual theories are related by the duality as such, e.g. the sort of ‘deeper’ theory
Rickles [2011, 2017] hopes for, then clearly we are entitled to the internal view since this
‘deeper’ theory will ideally explain why the dual theories, despite their apparent
differences, can be seen as different facets of a single theory, just like how special
relativity unified electromagnetism and made it plausible to understand both the electric
and magnetic fields as facets of the ‘deeper’ Faraday tensor field. Right now, though,
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there is no such theory in sight, making this point inadequate for supporting the internal 
view.
Given the foregoing, it is not clear there is epistemic equivalence: the epistemic 
argument does not hold. The upshot is that we are not compelled to provide an 
explanation for why the dual theories are epistemically equivalent to begin with (they 
are not), and hence we have no need to commit ourselves only to the common empirical 
core, even as structural realists, nor to think that differentiating the dual theories is 
meaningless.
Recall the oddity I pointed out in §3, though. The claim of physical equivalence 
hangs on leaving the dual theories uninterpreted, but this latter claim was itself 
motivated by physical equivalence. It was hoped, then, that the epistemic argument 
could provide independent motivation for adopting physical equivalence. Given my 
criticism of De Haro’s additional argument, though, the circle returns, and leaves the two 
claims uncompelling. Hence, we should not adopt the internal view itself. Furthermore, 
my criticisms suggest that the dual theories are in fact not epistemically equivalent, and 
this suggests that the default stance is one where the two theories are not theoretically 
equivalent at all. Given the duality, the only way this can be so is to adopt the view 
that the dual theories are physically non-equivalent; in other words we should adopt the 
external view instead.
To conclude, given the dialectic set up by the interpretive fork, and the inadequacies 
of the internal view, I suggest that we adopt the external view instead.
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5 The Way Forward
Let me end by commenting on the external view and the broader debate on whether 
there is emergence given a duality (§1). In §3 we have seen how the internal view 
precludes emergence simply because there are no two distinct theories to speak of: we 
merely have two ways of looking at a single theory. This in turn swiftly rules out any 
talk of emergence. The external view, though, does not rule out emergence quite so 
easily, and there is some leeway to speak of emergence since we do have two distinct 
theories which are, as Teh noted, generically not isomorphic to one another. However, 
given the formal and predictive equivalences demanded by a duality relation, a duality 
relation is symmetric, and so there is nothing within a duality that will formally broker 
the asymmetry between two theories we often associate with emergence. One way to do 
so, as Teh (2013) suggests, is to introduce a claim of relative fundamentality, i.e. which 
theory is ’more fundamental’ than another, is required to break the symmetry and 
provide us with the required asymmetry for emergence. While the external view does not 
entail this, it does not rule it out either. Hence, the external view does not preclude 
emergence; instead, it directs attention about emergence and duality away from the 
interpretative fork, onto whether and how one can make claims about relative 
fundamentality in the context of dualities. Alas, this requires much more attention than 
I can afford here: I leave it for another day.
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Abstract
Finding causes is a central goal in psychological research. In this paper, I argue that the search 
for psychological causes faces great obstacles, drawing from the interventionist theory of 
causation. First, psychological interventions are likely to be both fat-handed and soft, and there 
are currently no conceptual tools for making causal inferences based on such interventions. 
Second, holding possible confounders fixed seems to be realistically possible only at the group 
level, but group-level findings do not allow inferences to individual-level causal relationships. I 
also consider the implications of these problems, as well as possible ways forward for 
psychological research.
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1. Introduction
A key objective in psychological research is to distinguish causal relationships from mere 
correlations (Kendler and Campbell 2009; Pearl 2009; Shadish and Sullivan 2012). For example,
psychologists want to know whether having negative thoughts is a cause of anxiety instead of 
just being correlated with it: If the relationship is causal, then the two are not just spuriously 
hanging together, and intervening on negative thinking is actually one way of reducing anxiety in
patients suffering from anxiety disorders. However, to what extent is it actually possible to find 
psychological causes? In this paper, I will seek an answer this question from the perspective of 
state-of-the-art philosophy of science.
In philosophy of science, the standard approach to causal discovery is currently interventionism, 
which is a very general and powerful framework that provides an account of the features of 
causal relationships, what distinguishes them from mere correlations, and what kind of 
knowledge is needed to infer them (Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 2000; Pearl 2000, 2009, 
Woodward 2003, 2015b; Woodward & Hitchcock 2003). Interventionism has its roots in 
Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), also known as causal Bayes nets, which are graphical 
representations of causal relationships based on conditional independence relations (Spirtes, 
Glymour and Scheines 2000; Pearl 2000, 2009). More recently, James Woodward has developed 
interventionism into a full-blown philosophical account of causation, which has become popular 
in philosophy and the sciences. Several authors have also argued that interventionism adequately 
captures the role of causal thinking and reasoning in psychological research (Campbell 2007; 
Kendler and Campbell 2009; Rescorla forthcoming; Woodward 2008).
2
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Based on interventionism, I will argue in this paper that the discovery of psychological causes 
faces great obstacles. This is due to problems in performing psychological interventions and 
deriving interventionist causal knowledge from psychological data.1 Importantly, my focus is not
on the existence or possibility of psychological causation, but on the discovery of psychological 
causes, which is a topic that has so far received little attention in philosophy.2 Although I rely on 
interventionism, my arguments are based on rather general principles of causal inference and 
reasoning in science, and will thus apply to any other theory of causation that does justice to such
principles. 
The focus in this paper will be on the discovery individual-level (or within-subject) causes, not 
population-level (or between-subjects) causes. The first refers to causal relationships that hold 
for a particular individual: for example, John’s negative thoughts cause John’s problems of 
concentration. The latter refers to causal relationships that obtain in the population as a whole: 
for example, negative thoughts cause problems of concentration in a population of university 
students. It widely thought that ultimate goal of causal inference is to find individual-level 
causes, and that a population-level causal relationship should be seen as just an average of 
individual-level causal relationships (Holland 1986): For example, the causal relationship 
between negative thoughts and problems of concentration in a population of university students 
is only interesting insofar as it also applies to at least some of the individual students in the 
1 See Eberhardt (2013; 2014) for difereet (aed domaie-iedepeedeet) problems for ieterveetioeist causal discovery.
2 There is ae exteesive debate oe the questioe whether ieterveetioeism viedicates eoe-reductive psychological 
causatioe by providieg a solutioe the causal exclusioe problem (e.g., Baumgarteer 2009, Eroeee 2012, Raatikaieee 
2010, Woodward 2015). I wil sidestep this debate here, as my focus is eot oe the existeece of eoe-reductive 
psychological causatioe, but oe the discovery of psychological causes, be they reducible or eot. 
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population.3 Thus, in this paper I will discuss population-level causal relationships only when 
they are relevant to discovering individual-level causes. 
Importantly, the distinction between population-level and individual-level causation is different 
from the distinction between type and token causation, even though the two distinctions are 
sometimes mixed up in the philosophical literature (see also Illari & Russo 2014, ch. 5). Token 
causation refers to causation between two actual events, whereas type causation refers to causal 
relationships that hold more generally. Individual-level causes can be either type causes or token 
causes. An example of an individual and type causal relationship would be that John’s 
pessimistic thoughts cause John’s problems of concentration: This is a general relationship 
between two variables, and not a relationship between two actual events. An example of an 
individual and token causal relationship would be that John’s pessimistic thoughts before the 
exam on Friday at 2 pm caused his problems of concentration in the exam. As interventionism is 
a type-level theory of causation, and the aim of psychological research is primarily to discover 
regularities, not explanations to particular events, in this paper I will only discuss the discovery 
of type (individual) causes. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. I will start by giving a brief introduction to 
interventionism, and then turn to problems of interventionist causal inference in psychology: 
First, to problems related to psychological interventions (section 2), and then to problems arising 
from the requirement to “hold fixed” possible confounders (section 3). After this, I will consider 
the possibility of the inferring psychological causes without interventions (section 4). In the last 
3 It has been argued that population-level (between-persons) causal relationships can also be real without applying to
any individual (Borsboom, Melenbergh, and van Heerden 2003). However, also those who believe in these kind of 
population-level causes agree that discovering individual causes is an important goal as wel. 
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section, I discuss ways forward and various implications that my arguments have for psychology 
and its philosophy. 
2. Interventionism
Interventionism is a theory of causation that aims at elucidating the role of causal thinking in 
science, and defining a notion of causation that captures the difference between causal 
relationships and mere correlations (Woodward 2003). Thus, the goal of interventionism is to 
provide a methodologically fruitful account of causation, and not to reduce causation to non-
causal notions or analyse the metaphysical nature of causation (Woodward 2015b).  In a nutshell,
interventionist causation is defined as follows:
X is a cause of Y (in variable set V) if and only if it is possible to intervene on X to change Y
when all other variables (in V) that are not on the path from X to Y are held fixed to some value 
(Woodward 2003). 
Thus, in order to establish that X is a cause of Y, we need evidence that there is some 
way of intervening on X that results in a change in Y, when off-path variables are held fixed.4 
Importantly, it is not necessary to actually perform an intervention: What is necessary is 
knowledge on what would happen if we were to make the right kind of intervention.
4 More precisely, this is the defeitioe for a contributing cause. X is a direct cause of Y if aed oely if it is possible to 
ieterveee oe X to chaege Y whee al other variables (ie V) are held fxed to some value (Woodward 2003). Thus, 
the defeitioe of a coetributieg cause alows there to be other variables oe the causal path betweee X aed Y, whereas
the defeitioe of a direct cause does eot. This does eot relect aey substaetive metaphysical distiectioe, as the 
questioe whether X is a direct or coetributieg cause is relative to what variables are iecluded ie the variable set. 
Importaetly, eotioe of a coetributieg cause is not relative to a variable set ie aey stroeg seese – if X is a cause of Y 
ie some variable set, thee X wil be a cause of Y ie al variable sets where X aed Y appear (Woodward 2008b). This 
is because the defeitioe of ae ieterveetioe is eot relativized to a variable set. 
5
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The notion of an intervention plays a fundamental role in the account, and is very 
specifically defined. Here is a concise description of the four conditions that an intervention has 
to satisfy (Woodward 2003). 
Variable I is an intervention variable for X with respect to Y if and only if:
(I1) I causes the change in X; 
(I2) The change in X is entirely due to I and not any other factors;
(I3) I is not a cause of Y, or any cause of Y that is not on the path from X to Y; 
(I4) I is uncorrelated with any causes of Y that are not on the path from X to Y. 
The rationale behind these conditions is that if the intervention does not satisfy them, 
then one is not warranted to conclude that the change in Y was (only) due to the intervention on 
X. Thus, in simpler terms, the intervention should be such that it changes the value of the target 
variable X in such a way that the change in Y is only due to the change in X and not any other 
influences (Woodward 2015b). For example, if the intervention is correlated with some other 
cause of Y, say Z, that is not on the path from X to Y (violating I4), then the change in Y may 
have been (partly) due to Z, and not just due to X.  Following standard terminology in the 
literature, I will call interventions that satisfy the criteria I1-I4 ideal interventions. I will now go 
through various problems in performing ideal interventions in psychology, starting from 
problems related to conditions I2 and I3 (section 3), and then turn to problems related to I4 and 
the “holding fixed” part of the definition of causation (section 4). 
3. Psychological interventions
6
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Before discussing psychological interventions, an important distinction needs to be made: The 
distinction between relationships where (1) the cause is non-psychological, and the effect is 
psychological, and (2) where the cause (and possibly also the effect) is psychological.5 A large 
proportion (perhaps the majority) of experiments in psychology involve relationships of the first 
kind: The intervention targets a non-psychological variable (X) such as medication vs. placebo, 
therapy regime vs. no therapy, or distressing vs. neutral video, and the psychological effect of the
manipulation of this non-psychological variable is tracked. In other words, the putative causal 
relation is between a non-psychological cause variable (X) and a psychological effect variable 
(Y). In these cases, it is possible to do (nearly) ideal interventions on the putative cause variable 
(X) by ensuring that the change in X was caused (only) by the intervention, that the intervention 
did not change Y directly, and that it was uncorrelated with other causes of Y. It is of course far 
from trivial to make sure that these conditions were satisfied, but as the variables intervened 
upon are non-psychological, making the right kinds of interventions is in principle not more 
difficult than in other fields. As regards the psychological effect variable (Y), there is no need to 
intervene on it; it is enough to measure the change in Y (which, again, is far from trivial, but 
faces just the usual problems in psychological measurement, which will be discussed below). 
The fact that many psychological experiments involve this kind of causal relationships may have 
contributed to the recent optimism on the prospects of interventionist causal inference in 
psychology. 
5 The line between psychological and non-psychological variables is likely to be blurry. However, for the 
present purposes it is not crucial where exactly the line should be drawn: My arguments apply to cases 
where it is clear that the cause variable is psychological (such as the examples in the main text), and such 
cases abound in psychological research. 
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However, psychological research also often concerns relationships of the second kind, that is, 
relationships where the cause is psychological. This is, for example, the case when the aim is to 
uncover psychological mechanisms that explain cognition and behavior (e.g., Bechtel 2008, 
Piccinini & Craver 2011), or to find networks of causally interacting emotions or symptoms 
(e.g., Borsboom & Cramer 2013). The reason why these relationships are crucially different from
relationships of the first kind is that now the variable intervened upon is psychological, so the 
conditions on interventions now have to be applied to psychological variables.  
Ideal interventions on psychological variables are rarely if ever possible. One reason for this has 
been extensively discussed by John Campbell (2007): Psychological interventions seem to be 
“soft”, meaning that the value of the target variable X is not completely determined by the 
intervention (Eberhardt & Scheines 2007; see also Kendler and Campbell 2009; Korb and 
Nyberg 2006). In other words, the intervention does not “cut off” all causal arrows ending at X. 
As a non-psychological example, when studying shopping behaviour during one month by 
intervening on income, an ideal intervention would fully determine the exact income that 
subjects have that month, whereas simply giving the subjects an extra 5000€ would count as a 
soft intervention (Eberhardt & Scheines 2007). Similarly, if we intervene on John’s 
psychological variable alertness by shouting “WATCH  OUT!”, this does not completely cut off 
the causal contribution of other psychological variables that may influence John’s alertness, but 
merely adds something on top of those causal contributions (Campbell 2007). As most or all 
interventions on psychological variables are likely to be soft, Campbell proposes that we should 
simply allow such soft interventions in the context of psychology. Campbell argues that these 
kind of interventions can still be informative and indicative of causal relationships (Campbell 
8
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2007), and this conclusion is supported by independent work on soft interventions in the causal 
modelling literature (e.g., Eberhardt & Scheines 2007; Korb and Nyberg 2006). 
However, the problem of psychological interventions is not solved by allowing for soft 
interventions. There is a further, equally important reason why interventions on psychological 
variables are problematic: Psychological interventions typically change several variables 
simultaneously. For example, suppose we wanted to find out whether pessimistic thoughts cause 
problems in concentration. In order to do this, we would have to find out what would happen to 
problems in concentration if we were to intervene just on pessimistic thoughts without 
perturbing other psychological states with the intervention. However, how could we intervene on
pessimistic thoughts without changing, for example, depressive mood or feelings of guilt? As an 
actual scientific example, consider a network of psychological variables that includes, among 
others, the items alert, happy, and excited (Pe et al. 2015). How could we intervene on just one 
of those variables without changing the others? 
One reason why performing “surgical” interventions that only change one psychological variable
is so difficult is that there is no straightforward way of manipulating or changing the values of 
psychological variables (as in, for example, electrical circuits). Interventions in psychology have 
to be done, for example, through verbal information (as in the example of John above) or through
visual/auditory stimuli, and such manipulations are not precise enough to manipulate just one 
psychological variable. Also state-of-the-art neuroscientific methods such as Transcranial 
Magnetic Stimulation affect relatively large areas of the brain, and are not suited for intervening 
on specific psychological variables. Currently, and in the foreseeable future, there is no realistic 
9
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way of intervening on a psychological variable without at the same time perturbing some other 
psychological variables. 
Thus, it is likely that most or even all psychological interventions do not just change the target 
variable X, but also some other variable(s) in the system. In the causal modelling literature, 
interventions of this kind have been dubbed fat-handed6 interventions (Baumgartner and 
Gebharter 2016; Eberhardt & Scheines 2007; Scheines 2005). For example, an intervention on 
pessimistic thoughts that also immediately changes depressive mood is fat-handed. Fat-handed 
interventions have been recently discussed in philosophy of science, but mainly in the context of 
mental causation and supervenience (e.g., Baumgartner and Gebharter 2016, Romero 2015), and 
the fact that psychological interventions are likely to be systematically fat-handed (for reasons 
unrelated to supervenience) has not yet received attention. 
An additional complication is that it is difficult check what a psychological intervention 
precisely changed, and to what extent it was fat-handed (and soft). In fields such as biology or 
physics there are usually several independent ways of measuring a variable: for example, 
temperature can be measured with mercury thermometers or radiation thermometers, and the 
firing rate of a neuron can be measured with microelectrodes or patch clamps. However, 
measurements of psychological variables, such as emotions or thoughts, are based on self-
reports, and there is no further independent way of verifying that these reports are correct. 
Moreover, only a limited number of psychological variables can be measured at a given time 
point, so an intervention may always have unforeseen effects on unmeasured variables.
6 According to Scheines (2005), this term was coined by Kevin Kely. 
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Why are fat-handed interventions so problematic for interventionist causal inference? The reason
becomes clear when looking at condition I3: The intervention should not change any variable Z 
that is on a causal pathway that leads to Y (except, of course, those variables that are on the path 
between X and Y). If the causal structure of the system under study is known, as well as the 
changes that the intervention causes, then this condition can sometimes be satisfied even the 
intervention was fat-handed. However, in the context of intervening on psychological variables, 
neither the causal structure nor the exact effects of the interventions are known. Thus, when the 
intervention is fat-handed, it is not known whether I3 is satisfied or not, and in many cases it is 
likely to be violated. In other words, we cannot assume that the intervention was an 
unconfounded manipulation of X with respect to Y, and cannot conclude that X is a cause of Y.  
4. The Problem of “Holding Fixed” 
The next problem that I will discuss is related to the last part of the definition of interventionist 
causation: X is a cause of Y (in variable set V) if and only if it is possible to intervene on X to 
change Y when all other variables (in V) that are not on the path from X to Y are held fixed to 
some value. The motivation for this requirement is to make sure that the change in Y is really 
due to the change X, and not due to some other cause of Y. To a large extent, this is just another 
way of stating what is already expressed in the definition of an intervention, in conditions I3 and 
I4: The intervention should not be confounded by any cause of Y that is not on the path between 
X and Y.7 In the previous section, we saw that fat-handed interventions pose a challenge for 
7 Ie receet publicatioes, Woodward oftee gives a shorter defeitioe of causatioe that does eot ieclude the “holdieg 
fxed” part, for example: “X causes Y if aed oely if ueder some ieterveetioes oe X (aed possibly other variables) the
value of Y chaeges” (Woodward 2015). This is uederstaedable, as the defeitioe of ieterveetioe already coetaies 
coeditioes I3 aed I4, which efectively imply holdieg fxed poteetial causes of Y that are corelated with the 
ieterveetioe aed are eot oe the path from X to Y. However, there are also good reasoes why the ful defeitioe has to
11
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satisfying this condition. However, as I will now show, it is problematic in psychology also for 
more general reasons. 
In psychology, it is impossible to hold psychological variables fixed in any concrete way: We 
cannot “freeze” mental states, or ask an individual to hold her thoughts constant. Thus, the same 
effect has to be achieved indirectly, and the gold standard for this is Randomized Controlled 
Trials (RCTs) (Woodward 2003, 2008). RCTs have their origin in medicine, but are widely used 
in psychology and the social sciences as well (Clarke et al. 2014; Shadish, Cook and Campbell 
2002; Shadish and Sullivan 2012). The basic idea of RCTs is to conduct a trial with two groups, 
the test group and the control group, which are as similar to one another as possible, but the test 
group receives the experimental manipulation and the control group does not. If the groups are 
large enough and the randomization is done correctly, any differences between the groups should
be only due to the experimental manipulation. If everything goes well, this in effect amounts to 
“holding fixed” all off-path variables. 
However, this methodology has an important limitation that has been overlooked in the literature
on interventionism. As the effect of “holding fixed” is based on the difference between the 
groups as wholes, it only applies at the level of the group, and not at the level of individuals. For 
this reason, results of RCTs hold for the study population as a whole, but not necessarily for 
particular individuals in the population (cf. Borsboom 2005, Molenaar & Campbell 2009). For 
example, if we discover that pessimistic thoughts are causally related to problems of 
ieclude the secoed compoeeet as wel. For example, coesider a situatioe where we ieterveee oe X with respect to Y,
aed Y chaeges, but this chaege is fuly due to a chaege ie variable Z, which is a cause of Y that is uncorrelated with
the ieterveetioe variable. Ie this situatioe, without the “holdieg fxed” requiremeet we would falsely coeclude that X
is a cause of Y.
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concentration in the population under study, it does not follow that this causal relationship holds 
in John, Mary, or any other specific individual in the population. This is related to the 
“fundamental problem of causal inference” (Holland 1986): Each individual in the experiment 
can belong to only one of the two groups (control or test group), and therefore cannot act as a 
“control” for herself, so only an average causal effect can be estimated. What this implies for 
causal inference in psychology is that when a causal relationship is discovered through an RCT, 
we cannot infer that this relationships holds for any specific individual in the population (see also
Illari & Russo 2014, ch. 5). 
This does not mean that the population-level findings based on RCTs are uninformative or 
useless. The point is rather that we currently have no understanding of when, to what extent and 
under what circumstances they also apply to the individuals in the population. This of course 
applies also to other fields where RCTs are used, such the biomedical sciences. Indeed, 
especially in the context of personalized medicine, the fact that RCTs are as such not enough to 
establish individual-level causal relationships has recently become a matter of discussion (e.g., 
de Leon 2012).
It might be tempting to simply look at the data more closely and find those individuals for whom 
the intervention on X actually corresponded with a change in Y. However, it would be a mistake 
to conclude that in those individuals the change in Y was caused by X. It might very well have 
been caused by some other cause of Y, as possible confounders were only held fixed at the group
level, not at the individual level.8 Thus, in RCTs possible confounders can only be held fixed at 
8 Would it be possible for a causal relationship to hold at the population level, but not for any individual in the 
population? Probably not, if the relationship is genuine: Weinberger (2015) has argued that there has to be at least 
one individual in the population for whom the relationships holds. However, in the context of discovery, it is 
13
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the group level, and this does not warrant causal inferences that apply to specific individuals. 
This is further limitation to interventionist causal inference in psychology. 
5. Finding psychological causes without interventions
One possible response to the concerns raised in the previous two sections is that interventionism 
does not require that interventions are actually performed: As briefly mentioned in section 2, 
what is necessary is to know what would happen if we were to perform the right kinds of 
interventions. In other words, in order to establish that X is a cause of Y, it is enough to know 
that if we were to intervene on X with respect to Y (while holding off-path variables fixed), then 
Y would change. For example, it is beyond doubt that the gravitation of the moon causes the 
tides, even though no one has ever intervened on the gravitation of the moon to see what happens
to the tides, and such an intervention would be practically impossible (Woodward 2003). 
Similarly, it could be argued that even though it is practically impossible to do (ideal) 
interventions on psychological variables, the knowledge on the effects of interventions could be 
derived in some other way. Let us thus consider to what extent this could be possible.
The state-of-the-art method for deriving (interventionist) causal knowledge when data on 
interventions is not available is Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), which were briefly mentioned 
in the introduction (see also Malinsky & Danks 2018, Pearl 2000, Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines
2000, Spirtes & Zhang 2016). Causal discovery algorithms based on DAGs take purely 
possible that a causal finding at the population level is just an artefact of heterogeneous causal structures at the 
individual level, and therefore does not apply to any individual in the population.
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observational data as input, and based on conditional independence relations, find the causal 
graph that best fits the data. In principle, these algorithms can be used for psychological data, 
with the aim of discovering causal relationships between psychological variables. 
However, even though these algorithms do not require experimental data, they do require data 
from which conditional independence relations can be reliably drawn, and they (implicitly) 
assume that the variables that are modelled are independently and surgically manipulable 
(Malinsky & Danks 2018). In contrast, as should be clear from the above discussion, 
measurements of psychological variables typically come with a great deal of uncertainly, and it 
is not clear to what extent they can be independently manipulated. Moreover, causal discovery 
algorithms standardly assume causal sufficiency, that is, that there are no unmeasured common 
causes that could affect the causal structure (Malinsky & Danks 2018; Spirtes & Zhang 2016). 
The reason for this is that if two or more variables in the variable set have unmeasured common 
causes, then the inferences concerning the causal relationships between those variables will be 
either incorrect or inconclusive. However, missing common causes is likely the norm rather than
the exception when it comes to psychological variables. For example, if the variable set consists 
of, say, 16 emotion variables, how likely is it that all relevant emotion variables have been 
included? And even if all emotion variables that are common causes to other emotion variables 
are included, is it plausible to assume that there are no further cognitive or biological variables 
that could be common causes to some of the emotion variables? As similar questions can be 
asked for any context involving psychological variables, causal sufficiency is a very unrealistic 
assumption for psychological variable sets.  
15
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For these reasons, psychological data sets are rather ill-suited for causal discovery algorithms, 
and these algorithms cannot be treated as reliable guides to interventionist causal knowledge in 
psychology. It is likely that the problems of psychological interventions discussed in the previous
sections are not just practical problems in carrying out interventions, but reflect the immense 
complexity of the system under study (the human mind-brain), and therefore cannot be 
circumvented by just using non-experimental data (see, however, section 7 for a different 
approach).
6. Psychological interventions: A summary
To summarize, what I have argued so far is that interventionist causal inference in psychology 
faces several obstacles: (1) Psychological interventions are typically both fat-handed and soft: 
They change several variables simultaneously, and do not completely determine the value(s) of 
the variable(s) intervened upon. It is not known to what extent such interventions give leverage 
for causal inference. (2) Due to the nature psychological measurement, the degree to which a 
psychological intervention was soft and fat-handed, or more generally, what the intervention in 
fact did, is difficult to reliably estimate. (3) Holding fixed possible confounders is only possible 
at the population level, not at the individual level, and it is not known under what conditions 
population-level causal relationships also apply to individuals. (4) Causal inference based on 
data without interventions requires assumptions that are unrealistic for psychological variable 
sets. Taken together, these issues amount to a formidable challenge for finding psychological 
causes.9 
9 Baumgarteer (2009, 2012, 2018) has argued that meetal-to-physical superveeieece makes it impossible to satisfy 
the Woodwardiae coeditioes oe ieterveetioes, aed that if ieterveetioeism is modifed to accommodate 
superveeieece relatioeships (as ie Woodward 2015), the result is that aey causal structure with a psychological 
16
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7. Discussion
Although various metaphysical and conceptual issues related to psychological causation have 
been extensively discussed in philosophy of science, little attention has been paid to the 
discovery of psychological causes. In this paper, I have contributed to filling this lacuna, by 
discussing the search for psychological causes in the framework of the interventionist theory of 
causation. The upshot is that finding individual psychological causes faces daunting challenges. 
The problems in holding fixed confounders and performing interventions need to be taken into 
account when trying to establish a psychological causal relationship, or when making claims 
about psychological causes. 
However, I do not want to argue that finding psychological causes is impossible, or that 
researchers should stop looking for psychological causes. Rather, my aim is to contribute to 
getting a better understanding of the limits of finding causes in psychology, and the challenges 
involved. This can also lead to positive insights regarding causal inference in psychology. One 
such insight is that more attention should be paid to robust inference or triangulation. Often 
when individual methods or sources of evidence are insufficient or unreliable, as is the case here,
what is needed is a more holistic approach. A widespread (though not uncontroversial) idea in 
philosophy of science is that evidence from several independent sources can lead to a degree of 
confidence even if the sources are individually fallible and insufficient (Eronen 2015, Kuorikoski
cause becomes empiricaly indistinguishable from a coresponding structure where the psychological variable is 
epiphenomenal. If this reasoning is corect, it leads to a further (albeit more theoretical) problem for interventionist 
causal inference: Any empirical evidence for a causal relationships with a psychological cause is equaly strong 
evidence for a coresponding epiphenomenal structure, and it is not clear which structure should be preferred and on
what grounds. 
17
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& Marchionni 2017, Munafo & Smith 2017, Wimsatt 1981, 1994/2007). For example, there is no
single method or source of evidence that would be individually sufficient to establish that the 
anthropogenic increase in carbon dioxide is the cause for the rise in global temperature, but there
is so much converging evidence from many independent sources that scientists are confident that
this causal relationship exists. Similarly, evidence for a psychological causal relationship could 
be gathered from many independent sources: Several different (soft and fat-handed) 
interventions involving different variables, multilevel models based on time-series data, single-
case observational studies, and so on.10 If they all point towards the same causal relationships, 
this may lead to a degree of confidence in the reality of that relationship. However, how this 
integration of evidence would exactly work, and whether it can actually lead to sufficient 
evidence for psychological causal relationships, are open questions. 
A related point is that psychological research can also make substantive progress without 
establishing causal relationships. Often important discoveries in psychology have not been 
discoveries of causal relationships, but rather discoveries of robust patterns or phenomena (Haig 
2012, Rozin 2001, Tabb and Schaffner 2017). Consider, for example, the celebrated discovery 
that people often do not reason logically when making statistical predictions, but rely on 
shortcuts, for example, grossly overestimating the likelihood of dying in an earthquake or terror 
attack (Kahneman & Tversky 1973). In other words, when we reason statistically, we often rely 
on heuristics that lead to biases. The discovery of this phenomenon had nothing to with methods 
of causal inference (Kahneman and Tversky 1973), and its significance is not captured by 
describing causal relationships between variables. In fact, the causal mechanisms underlying the 
10 See also Peters, Bühlmaee, & Meieshausee (2016), who preseet a formal model for ieferieg causal relatioeships 
based oe their stability ueder difereet kieds of (eoe-ideal) ieterveetioes. 
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heuristics and biases of reasoning are still unknown. Similar examples abound in psychology: 
Consider, for example, groupthink or inattentional blindness. Of course, there are likely to be 
causal mechanisms that give rise to these phenomena, but the phenomena are highly relevant for 
theory and practice even when we know little or nothing about those underlying mechanisms 
(which is the current situation). This, in combination with the challenges discussed in this paper, 
suggests that (philosophy of) psychology might benefit from reconsidering the idea that 
discovering causal relationships is central for making progress in psychology.
Finally, one might wonder whether the problems I have discussed here are restricted to just 
psychology. Indeed, I believe that the arguments I have presented are more general, and apply to 
any other fields where there are similar problems with soft and fat-handed interventions and 
controlling for confounders. There is probably a continuum, where psychology is close to one 
end of the continuum, and at the other end we have fields where ideal interventions can be 
straightforwardly performed and variables can be easily held fixed, such as engineering science. 
Fields such as economics and political science are probably close to where psychology is, as they
also face deep problems in making (ideal) interventions and measuring their effects. Same holds 
for neuroscience, at least cognitive neuroscience: The problems of soft and fat-handed 
interventions and holding variables fixed apply just as well to brain areas as to psychological 
variables (see also Northcott forthcoming). Thus, appreciating the challenges I have discussed 
here and considering possible reactions to them could also benefit many other fields besides 
psychology. 
19
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To conclude, I have argued in this paper that there are several serious obstacles to the discovery 
of psychological causes. As it is widely assumed in both psychology and its philosophy that the 
discovery of causes is a central goal, these obstacles need to be explicitly discussed, taken into 
account, and studied further.
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Why Replication is Overrated 
 
Current debates about the replication crisis in psychology take it for granted that direct 
replication is valuable and focus their attention on questionable research practices in 
regard to statistical analyses. This paper takes a broader look at the notion of replication 
as such. It is argued that all experimentation/replication involves individuation 
judgments and that research in experimental psychology frequently turns on probing 
the adequacy of such judgments. In this vein, I highlight the ubiquity of conceptual and 
material questions in research, and I argue that replication is not as central to 
psychological research as it is sometimes taken to be. 
 
1. Introduction: The “Replication Crisis” 
In the current debate about replicability in psychology, we can distinguish between (1) the question of 
why not more replication studies are done (e.g., Romero 2017) and (2) the question of why a significant 
portion (more than 60%) of studies, when they are done, fail  to replicate (I take this number from the 
Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Debates about these questions have been dominated by two 
assumptions, namely, first, that it is in general desirable that scientists conduct replication studies that 
come as close as possible to the original, and second, that the low replication rate can often be 
attributed to statistical problems with many initial studies, sometimes referred to as “p-hacking” and 
“data-massaging.”1 
                                                          
1 An important player in this regard is the statistician Andrew Gelman who has been using his blog as a 
public platform to debate methodological problems with mainstream social psychology 
(http://andrewgelman.com/). 
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I do not wish to question that close (or “direct”) replications can sometimes be epistemically 
fruitful. Nor do I wish to question the finding that are severe problems in the statistical analyses of many 
psychological experiments. However, I contend that the focus on formal problems in data analyses has 
come at the expense of questions about the notion of replication as such. In this paper I hope to remedy 
this situation, highlighting in particular the implications of the fact that psychological experiments in 
general are infused with conceptual and material presuppositions. I will argue that once we gain a better 
understanding of what this entails with respect to replication, we get a deeper appreciation of 
philosophical issues that arise in the investigative practices of psychology. Among other things, I will 
show that replication is not as central to these practices as it is often made out to be. 
The paper has three parts. In part 1 I will briefly review some philosophical arguments as to why 
there can be no exact replications and, hence, why attempts to replicate always involve individuation 
judgments. Part 2 will address a distinction that is currently being debated in the literature, i.e., that 
between direct and conceptual replication, highlighting problems and limitations of both. Part 3, finally, 
will argue that a significant part of experimental research in psychology is geared toward exploring the 
shape of specific phenomena or effects, and that the type of experimentation we encounter there is not 
well described as either direct or conceptual replication. 
 
2. The Replication Crisis and the Ineliminability of Concepts 
When scientists and philosophers talk about successfully replicating an experiment, they typically mean 
that they performed the same experimental operations/interventions. But what does it mean to 
perform “the same” operations as the ones performed by a previous experiment? With regard to this 
question, I take it to be trivially true that two experiments cannot be identical: At the very least, the 
time variable will differ. Replication can therefore at best aim for similarity (Shavit & Ellison 2017), as is 
also recognized by some authors in psychology. In this vein, Lynch et al (2015) write that “[e]xact 
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replication is impossible” (Lynch et al 2015, 2), arguing that at most advocates of direct replication can 
aim for is to get “as close as possible,” i.e., to conduct an experiment that is similar to the previous one. 
In the literature, such experiments are also referred to as “direct replications.” (e.g., Pashler & Harris 
2912).2 
The notion of similarity is, of course, also notoriously problematic (e.g., Goodman 1955), since 
any assertion of similarity between A and B has to specify with regard to what they are similar. In the 
context of experimentation, the relevant kinds of specifications already presuppose conceptual and 
material assumptions, many of which are not explicated, about the kinds of factors one is going to treat 
as relevant to the subject matter (see also Collins 1985, chapter 2). Such conceptual decisions will 
inform what one takes to be the “experimental result” down the line (Feest 2016). For example, If I am 
interested in whether listening to Mozart has a positive effect on children’s IQ, I will design an 
experiment, which involves a piece by Mozart as the independent variable and the result of a 
standardized IQ-test at a later point. Now if I get an effect, and if I call it a Mozart effect, I am thereby 
assuming that the piece of music I used was causally responsible qua being a piece by Mozart. 
Moreover, when I claim that it’s an effect on intelligence, I am assuming that the test I used at the end 
of the experiment in fact measured intelligence. These judgments rely on conceptual assumptions 
already built into the experiment qua choice of independent and dependent variables. In addition, I 
need material assumptions to the effect that potentially confounding variables have been controlled for.
I take this example to show that whenever we investigate an effect under a description, we cannot avoid 
making conceptual assumptions when determining whether an experiment has succeeded or failed. This 
goes for original experiments as well as for replications. 
                                                          
2 Both advocates and critics of direct replication sometimes contrast such replications with “conceptual” 
replications” (Lynch et al 2015). We will return to this distinction below. 
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One obvious rejoinder to this claim might be to say that replication attempts need not 
investigate effects under a description. They might simply imitate what the original experiment did, with
no particular commitment to what is being manipulated or measured. But even if direct replications 
need not explicitly replicate effects under a description, I argue that they nonetheless have to make 
what Lena Soler calls “individuation judgments” (Soler 2011). For example, the judgment that 
experiment 2 is relevantly similar to experiment 1 involves the judgment that experiment 2 does not 
introduce any confounding factors that were absent in experiment 1. However, such judgments have to 
rely on some assumptions about what is relevant and what is irrelevant to the experiment, where these 
assumptions are often unstated auxiliaries. For example, I may (correctly or incorrectly) tacitly assume 
that temperature in the lab is irrelevant and hence ignore this variable in my replication attempt. 
It is important to recognize that the individuation judgments made in experiments have a high 
degree of epistemic uncertainty. Specifically, I want to highlight what I call the problem of “conceptual 
scope,” which arises from the question of how the respective independent and dependent variables are 
described. Take, for example, the above case where I play a specific piece by Mozart in a major key at a 
fast pace. A lot hangs on what I take to be the relevant feature of this stimulus: the fact that it’s a piece 
by Mozart, the fact that it’s in a major key, the fact that it’s fast? etc. Depending on how I describe the 
stimulus, I might have different intuitions about possible confounders to pay attention to. For example, 
if I take the fact that a piece is by Mozart as the relevant feature of the independent variable, I might 
control for familiarity with Mozart. If I take the relevant feature to be the key, I might control for mood.  
Crucially, even though scientists make decisions on the basis of (implicit or explicit) assumptions about 
conceptual scope, their epistemic situation is typically such that they don’t know what is the “correct” 
scope. This highlights a feature of psychological experiments that is rarely discussed in the literature 
about the replication crisis, i.e., the deep epistemic uncertainty and conceptual openness of much 
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research. This concerns both the initial and the replication study. Thus, concepts are ineliminable in 
experimental research, while at the same time being highly indeterminate. 
 
3. Is the dichotomy between direct and less direct replication pragmatically useful? 
One way of paraphrasing what was said above is that all experiments involve individuation judgments 
and that this concerns both original and replication studies. While this serves as a warning against a 
naïve reliance on direct (qua non-conceptual) replication, it might be objected that direct replications 
nonetheless make unique epistemic contributions. This is indeed claimed by advocates of both direct 
and less direct (=”conceptual”) replication alike. I will now evaluate claims that have aligned the 
distinction between direct and “conceptual” with some relevant distinctions in scientific practice, such 
as that between the aim of establishing the existence of a phenomenon and that of generalizing from 
such an existence claim on the one and that between reliability and validity on the other. I will argue 
that while these distinctions are heuristically useful, but on closer inspection bring to the fore exactly 
the epistemological issues just discussed. 
 
3.1 Existence vs. Generalizability 
Many scientists take it as given that there cannot be two identical experiments, but nonetheless argue 
that there is significant epistemic merit in trying to get close enough., i.e., to conduct direct replications. 
In turn, the notion of a direct replication is frequently contrasted with that of a “conceptual” replication. 
In a nutshell, direct replications essentially try to redo “the same” experiment (or at least something 
very close), whereas the conceptual replications try to operationalize the same question or 
concept/effect in a different way. The advantage of direct replications, as viewed by its advocates, is 
that by being able to redo an experiment faithfully and to create the same effect, one can show that the 
effect was real: “Exact and very close replications establish the basic existence and stability of a 
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phenomenon by falsifying the (null) hypothesis that observations simply reflect random noise” (LeBel et 
al, forthcoming, 7). 
Advocates of conceptual replication don’t deny this advantage of close replications, but hold 
that we want more than to establish that a given effect – created under very specific experimental 
conditions – is real. We want to know whether our findings about it can be generalized to: “When the 
goal is generalization, we argue that ‘imperfect’ conceptual replications that stretch the domain of 
research may be more useful” (Lynch et al 2015, 2). From a strictly Popperian perspective, the idea that 
non-falsification of the hypothesis of random error can provide proof of stability and existence is 
questionable , of course. But even if we abandon Popperian ideology here and take the falsification of 
H0 (that the initial effect was due to random error) to point to the truth of H1 (that there is a stable 
effect), the question is how to describe the effect. In other words, when claiming to have confirmed an 
effect, we have to say what kind of effect it is. And there we face the following dilemma: 
a) Either we describe the effect as highly specific to very local experimental circumstances, 
involving the choice of a specific independent variable, delivered in a specific way etc. 
b) Or we describe it in slightly broader terms, e.g., as a Mozart effect. 
Advocates of direct replication might indeed endorse something like a), thereby exhibiting the kind of 
caution that motivated early operationists, in that no claim is made beyond the confines of a specific 
experiment. If, on the other hand, psychologists endorsed a description such as b), they would 
immediately run into the question of conceptual scope, i.e., the question under what description the 
independent variable can be said to have caused an effect. I argue that no amount of direct replication 
can answer this question, and hence, even if direct replication can confirm the existence of an effect, it 
cannot say what kind of effect. By asserting this, I am not saying that it’s never useful to do a direct 
replication. My claim is merely that it will tell us relatively little. More pointedly: Direct replication can 
(perhaps) provide evidence for the existence of something, but it cannot say existence of what. Rolf 
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Zwaan makes a similar point when he states that “replication studies “tell us about the reliability of 
those findings. They don’t tell us much about their validity.” (Zwaan 2013). 
In a similar vein, I argue that direct replication, with its narrow focus on ruling out random error,
is epistemically unproductive, because it has nothing to say about systematic error. Systematic error 
arises if one erroneously attributes an effect to a specific feature of the experiment, when it is in fact 
due to another feature of the experiment. This can include, but is not limited to, the above-mentioned 
problem of conceptual scope. Fiedler et al. (2012) make a similar point when they argue that a narrow 
focus on falsification (with the aim of avoiding false positives) can be detrimental to the research 
process. Differently put, by privileging direct replication, we are not in a position to inquire about the 
kind of effect in question. This question, I argue, is best addressed by paying close attention to the 
possibility of systematic error, and hence by doing conceptual work. In other words, experimentally 
probing into systematic errors of conceptual scope is a valuable and productive part of the research 
process as it enables scientists to gradually explore what kind of effect (if any) they are looking at.3 
 
3.2 Generality 
I have argued that (a) scientists typically produce effects under a description and (b) that it can be 
epistemically productive to probe the scope of the description and to investigate the possibility of 
systematic error with regard to experiments that draw on such descriptions. It is epistemically 
productive, because it forces scientists to explore the nature and boundaries of the effect they are 
investigating. With this I have argued against a narrow focus on direct replication and I have cautioned 
against overstating the epistemic merits of such replication. But when we are concerned with effects 
                                                          
3 I take this to be a contribution to arguments that philosophers of experimentation have made for a 
long time; e.g., Mayo 1996. 
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under a description, we are confronted with questions about the adequacy of the description. It is this 
question that advocates of “conceptual replication” claim to be able to address when they emphasize 
that their approach can deliver generality (over mere existence). 
We have to distinguish between two notions of generality, namely (a) what kinds of descriptions 
one can generalize or infer to within the experiment, and (b) does the effect in question hold outside the 
lab (see Feest & Steinle 2016). These types of generality are also sometimes referred to as internal vs. 
external validity, respectively (Campbell & Stanley 1966; Guala 2012), where the former refers to the 
quality of inferences within an experiment and the latter refers to the quality of inferences from a lab to 
the world. The notion of generalizability raises questions about two kinds of validity. My focus here will 
be on internal validity, i.e., with the question of whether the effect generated in an experiment really 
exists as described by the scientist.4  
Internal validity can fail to hold because of epistemic uncertainties regarding confounding 
variables both internal and external to experimental subjects. For example, prior musical training might 
make a difference to how one responds to Mozart music, but the experimenter may not have taken this 
into consideration in their design. But internal validity can also fail to hold is by virtue of what I have 
referred to as the problem of conceptual scope (for example, we may refer to the effect as a Mozart 
effect when it is in fact a Major-key effect). Effectively, when I treat a major-key effect as a Mozart 
effect, I have misidentified the relevant causal feature of the stimulus. In turn, this means that I will 
neglect to control for major/minor key as I will regard this as irrelevant, which can result in systematic 
errors. In both cases, scientists can go wrong in their individuation judgment. What is at stake is not 
whether there is an effect, but what kind of effect it is. Now, given that those kinds of problems can 
                                                          
4 In this respect I differ from some advocates of conceptual replication, who have highlighted external 
validity as a desideratum (E.g., Lynch 1982, 3/4). 
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occur, we turn to the question of whether “conceptual replication” has an answer. I will now argue that 
it does not. 
To explain this, let me return to the above characterization of conceptual replication, according 
to which such replication consists in repeating an experiment, using different operationalizations of the 
same construct. For example, a conceptual replication of an experiment about the Mozart effect might 
operationalize the concept Mozart effect differently by using a different piece of Mozart music and/or a 
different measure of spatial reasoning. But there is a major caveat here: If I want to compare the results 
of two experiments that operationalized the same construct differently, I already have to presuppose 
that both operationalizations in fact have the same conceptual scope, i.e., that they in fact individuate 
the same effect. But this would be begging the question, since after all – given the epistemic uncertainty 
and conceptual openness highlighted above – that’s precisely what’s at issue. Differently put, 
experiment 2 might or might not achieve the same result as experiment 1, but the reason for this would 
be underdetermined by the experimental data. Thus, the problem of conceptual scope prevents us from 
being able to say whether we have succeeded in our conceptual replication. 
Given the uncertainties as to whether one has in fact succeeded in conceptually replicating a 
given experiment, I am weary of the language of replication here. If anything, I would argue that the 
method in question should be regarded as a research strategy that is aimed at helping to demarcate and 
explore the very subject matter under investigation. But as I will argue now, this is perhaps better 
described as exploration, not as replication. 
 
4. Putting Replication in its Proper Place 
The conclusion of the previous paragraphs seems pretty bleak: Direct replication is either extremely 
narrow in what it can deliver or it runs into the joint problems of confounders and conceptual scope. 
Conceptual replication, on the other hand, cannot come to the rescue, because it also runs into the 
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exact same problems. Should we then throw up our hands and conclude that since ultimately neither 
direct nor conceptual replication are possible the crisis of replication is much more severe than we 
previously thought? This would be the wrong conclusion, however. This would only follow if replication 
was in fact as central to research as it is sometimes taken to be. I claim that it is not. My argument for 
these claims has three parts. The first part holds that exploring (the possibility of) systematic errors is an 
important part of the investigative process, which is not well described as replication. Second, if we take 
seriously this process of exploring and delineating the relevant phenomena, we find that there is indeed 
a great deal of uncertainty in psychological research, but this, in and of itself, does not necessarily 
constitute a crisis. Lastly, while it is fair to say that there is a crisis of confidence in current psychology, it 
is not well described as a replication crisis. 
Let me begin with the first point. I have argued that direct replication (even where it is 
successful) is of limited value, because it can at most rule out random error, but completely fails to be 
able to address systematic error. But if we appreciate (as I have argued we should) that direct 
replication inevitably involves individuation judgments, it is obvious that there is always a danger of 
systematic error, because I have to assume that all confounding variables have been controlled for. One 
important class of confounders follows from what I have referred to as the problem of conceptual 
scope, i.e., the difficulty of correctly describing both the independent variable responsible for a given 
effect and the dependent variable.5 Epistemically productive experimental work, I claim, therefore 
needs to focus on systematic errors, specifically those brought about by unstated auxiliary assumptions. 
Indeed, if we look at the story of the Mozart effect, we find that this is exactly what happened. 
This example also nicely illustrates my claim about the conceptual openness and epistemic uncertainty 
                                                          
5 My focus here has been mainly on the former. But of course the problem of conceptual scope concerns 
both. 
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in many areas of experimental psychology. The Mozart effect was first posited by Rauscher and 
colleagues (Rauscher et a. 1993). It can now be regarded as largely debunked. While it is true that 
several people tried (and failed) to replicate the effect (e.g., Newman et al. 1995; Steele 1997), it is 
important to look at the details here. It is not the case that the effect was simply abandoned for lack of 
replicability. Rather, when we look at the back and forth between Rauscher and her critics, we find that 
the discussion turned on the choices and interpretations of independent and dependent variables. In 
this vein, Newman et al (1995) and Steele (1997) used different dependent variables, prompting 
Rauscher to argue that her effect was more narrowly confined to the kind of spatial reasoning measured
by the Stanford-Binet. I suggest that we interpret this case as one where Rauscher was forced to 
confront (and retract) an unstated auxiliary assumption of her initial study, namely that the spatial 
reasoning subtest of the Stanford-Binet (which she had used as her dependent variable), was 
representative of spatial reasoning more generally. Likewise, her choice of the Mozart’s Sonata for Two 
Pianos in D-major as the independent variable was put under considerable pressure by critics, who 
suggested that the relevant feature of the independent variable was not that it was a piece by Mozart, 
but that it was up-beat and put subjects in a good mood (Chabris 1999). My point here is that the 
debates surrounding the Mozart effect are best described as conceptual work, exploring consequences 
of possible errors that might have arisen from the problem of conceptual scope. At issue, I claim, was 
not primarily whether Rauscher really found an effect, but rather what was the scope of the effect. 
I argue that this is a typical case. Rather than, or in addition to, attempting to conduct direct 
replications of previous experiments, researchers critically probed some hidden assumptions built into 
the design and interpretation of the initial experiment. My point here is both descriptive and normative. 
Thus, I argue that this is a productive way to proceed. However, I claim that it is not well described as 
replication, let alone conceptual replication. Rather, what we see here is a case in which scientists 
explore the empirical contours of a purported effect in the face of a high degree of epistemic 
PSA 2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -230-
Uljana Feest. Paper to be presented at PSA2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science 
Association, Nov. 1-4, 2018, Seattle 
 
 
12 
 
uncertainty and conceptual openness, and this is precisely why the case is not well described as 
employing conceptual replication. The reason for this is quite simple: For a conceptual replication to 
occur, one needs to already be in the possession of some well-formed concepts, such that they can be 
operationalized in different ways. It also presupposes that in general the domain is well-understood, 
such that operationalizations can be implemented and confounding variables can be controlled. But this 
completely misses the point that researchers often investigate effects precisely because they don’t have 
a good understanding (and hence concept) of what it is. 
Therefore I argue that while direct replication can only contribute a very small part to the 
research process, conceptual replication cannot make up for the shortcomings of direct replication. 
Instead, productive research should (and frequently does) proceed by exploring, and experimentally 
testing, hypotheses about possible systematic errors in experiment. Such research, I suggest, can 
contribute to conceptual development by helping to explore and fine-tune the shape and scope of 
proposed or existing concepts. The fact that this is riddled with problems does not in and of itself 
constitute a crisis, let alone a replication crisis. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The upshot of the above is that when we talk about the importance of replication, we need to be clear 
on what we mean by replication and why it is so important, precisely. 
In this paper I have argued that if by replication we mean either “direct” or “conceptual” 
replication, we need to first of all be clear that direct replications are not non-conceptual. I then turned 
to some alleged epistemic merits of direct replication, for example that they can establish the existence 
of effects or the reliability of procedures that detect effects. I argued that insofar as such replications 
involve concepts, they run (among other things) into the problem of conceptual scope, i.e., the difficulty 
of determining, on the basis of independent and dependent variables of experiments what precisely is 
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the scope of the effect one is trying to replicate. I highlighted that this is a real and pernicious problem 
in experimental research in psychology, due to the high degree of epistemic uncertainty and conceptual 
openness of many fields of research. 
While my emphasis of the conceptual nature of replication may suggest that I would be more 
favorably inclined toward conceptual replication, I have argued that conceptual replication runs into the 
same problems, and for similar reasons: The very judgement that one has successfully performed a 
conceptual replication of a previous experiment presupposes what is ultimately the aim of the research, 
namely to arrive at a robust understanding of the relevant area of research. This, I argue that since 
conceptual replication presupposes a relatively good grasp of the relevant concepts, it is begging the 
question, and I suggested instead that researchers (should) engage in a process of specifically 
investigating possible systematic errors in original studies as a means to develop the relevant concepts. 
This process is not best described as one of replication, however. Summing up, then, I conclude that in 
general, replications are less useful and important than is widely assumed – at least in the kind of 
psychological research I have focused on in this paper. 
Now, in conclusion let me return to the notion of a crisis in psychology as it is currently 
discussed in the literature. Obviously, I do not mean to deny that there is a crisis of confidence in (social) 
psychology (Earp & Trafimov 2015) as well as in other areas of study. However, based on the analysis 
provided in this paper, I argue that this crisis is not well described as a crisis of replication. Rather, it 
seems to be to a large degree a crisis that turns on questionable research practices with regard to the 
use of statistical methods in psychology (see Gelman & Loken 2014). While acknowledging the valuable 
philosophical and scientific work that is being done in this area, I suggest that a broader focus on the 
notion of replication provides us with a deeper appreciation of the conceptual dynamics characteristic of 
experimental practice. 
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1. Introduction 
Hasok Chang “[complains] about…our [i.e., philosophers of science] habit of focusing on 
descriptive statements that are either products or presuppositions of scientific work, and our 
commitment to solving problems by investigating the logical relationships between these 
statements” (2014, 67–8). He argues philosophers of science should adopt “a change of focus 
from propositions to actions” (67). Chang suggests, “When we do pay attention to words, it 
would be better to remember to think of ‘how to do things with words’, to recall J. L. Austin’s 
(1962) famous phrase” (68).  
In this paper, I take Chang’s suggestion and argue that attending to Austin’s account 
of the things we do with words can help us understand the multiple goals of scientific 
practices, the speech acts appropriate to those goals, and the roles of nonepistemic values in 
evaluating speech acts made relative to those aims. In §2, I give an overview of a few 
philosophers of science working on explanation who have shifted focus from propositions 
to explaining.1 I also briefly relate this work to a few themes in speech act theory. In §3, I 
give more details of Austin’s framework to highlight ways of evaluating speech acts beyond 
truth and falsity. In §4, I explore the multiple goals of scientific practice, especially goals 
related to conveying understanding to the general public and policymakers, and the speech 
acts appropriate to those goals. 
 
2. The things scientists do with words 
2.1 Explaining 
Consider some recent and not-so-recent work on scientific explanation. Andrea Woody’s 
defense of a functional perspective on explanation aims to motivate “a shift in focus away 
from explanations, as achievements, toward explaining, as a coordinated activity of 
communities” (2015, 80). In a similar spirit, Angela Potochnik argues that when looking at 
explanation, “sidelining the communicative purposes to which explanations are put is a 
mistake” (2016, 724). She emphasizes that explaining is a communicative act involving a 
speaker and audience made against a background that shapes the explanations offered. In so 
                                                        
1 I make no claims Chang influenced the work I canvas. 
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arguing, Potochnik deliberately recalls Peter Achinstein’s claim, “Explaining is an 
illocutionary act,” i.e., a speech act uttered by a speaker with a certain force and for a certain 
point (1977, 1). 
 These accounts share in common an emphasis on the importance of the aims of the 
speaker and audience, and thus the context of utterance in evaluating, to borrow terminology 
from Austin, the felicity conditions of explanatory speech acts. In particular, we might focus 
on the aims of the speaker and their audience in requesting and giving explanations, the time 
and location of an explaining speech act, and, following Woody, “what role(s) [explanations] 
might play in practice” (2015, 81). In focusing on the explaining act rather than the 
supposedly stable propositional content of an act of explanation, our attention is drawn to 
dimensions of evaluation beyond truth and falsity.  
On this last point, Nancy Cartwright argues that the functions of a scientific theory 
to “tell us…what is true in nature, and how we are to explain it…are entirely different 
functions” (1980, 159). Ceteris paribus laws used in scientific theories are literally false, but 
still do explanatory work. One way to understand Cartwright’s claim is that the speech act 
of describing the world truly and the speech act of explaining come apart from one another. 
In coming apart from one another and fulfilling different aims within scientific practice, 
descriptive and explanatory speech acts have different felicity conditions. For example, 
Potochnik (2016) examines the ways in which explaining increases understanding. But, 
Potochnik argues, what gets explained depends on a speaker’s and audience’s interests, and 
an explaining act’s success in generating understanding depends on the cognitive resources 
of the audience. As such, to evaluate any given communicative act of explaining requires 
attending to the epistemic and nonepistemic interests of speakers and audiences that form 
the background against which explanations are offered. This means evaluating explanatory 
speech acts solely in terms of truth or falsity is inapt. 
 
2.2 Multiple aims and the true/false fetish 
I do not think this focus on acts and away from the truth or falsity of descriptive statements 
is unique to philosophers of science interested in explanation. We see a similar shift in work 
on the so-called aims approach to values in science (e.g., Elliott and McKaughan 2014; 
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Intemann 2015). The aims approach shares in common with work on explaining a 
recognition that scientific practice aims at more than describing the world truly or falsely. 
Further, if some of those aims include things like making timely policy recommendations 
for decision makers or increasing public understanding of science, there is a role for 
nonepistemic values in parts of scientific practice. As Kevin Elliott and Daniel McKaughan 
put this point, “representations can be evaluated not only on the basis of the relations that 
they bear to the world but also in connection with the various uses to which they are put” 
(2014, 3). 
Why look to speech act theory to flesh out this picture about the multiple aims of 
scientific practice and their relationship to nonepistemic values? In part because speech act 
theory makes sense of the different uses to which one and the same sentence might be put 
depending on the aims of the speaker and audience and the context of utterance. In doing so, 
I think Austin is right that we can “play Old Harry with two fetishes…(1) the true/false 
fetish, (2) the value/fact fetish” (1962, 150). Austin was mainly content to play Old Harry 
with these fetishes to free philosophers from the grip of the so-called descriptive fallacy: the 
view "that the sole business, the sole interesting business, of any utterance…is to be true or 
at least false” (1970, 233). But I also think that in combating the descriptive fallacy and the 
true/false and fact/value fetishes, speech act theory motivates a constructive shift from the 
truth or falsity of descriptive statements to the things we do with words. 
Take Austin’s claim that evaluating apparently descriptive speech acts like “‘France 
is hexagonal,’” involves nonepistemic questions about who is uttering the statement, in what 
context, and with what “intents and purposes” (1962, 142). Rather than concluding the 
sentence is false and leaving it at that, Austin points out the different speech acts one can 
use such a sentence to perform, e.g., stating or interpreting or estimating. In determining the 
use the sentence is put to—with the help of context and by inquiring after the interests of the 
speaker and their audience—we might realize, irrespective of the sentence’s literal truth or 
falsity, “It is good enough for a top-ranking general, perhaps, but not for a geographer” (142). 
In other words, it serves the aims of the general, which, unlike the aims of the geographer, 
do not necessarily require a descriptively literal account of France’s shape. The statement 
might not aim to assert or describe literally, but do something else entirely. As such, 
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evaluating it along the lines of truth or falsity will miss something important about the aims 
of a speaker in uttering it.  
To expand on this picture, I turn to explicating Austin’s speech act theory. 
 
3. Austin’s speech act theory 
3.1 Performatives and constatives 
Austin first drew our attention to the things we do with words by discussing performative 
utterances. Austin says of these, “if a person makes an utterance of this sort we should say 
that he is doing something rather than merely saying something” (1970, 235). Imagine a 
speaker utters ‘I promise to return my referee report in two weeks’ during the peer review 
process. In making this speech act, Austin claims the speaker does not describe an internal 
act she has concurrent to her utterance. Instead, in making that utterance, the speaker just is 
performing the act of promising thereby committing herself to actions related to the timely 
review of papers. 
 While promising has no special connection to truth and falsity, it still must meet what 
Austin calls felicity conditions to be happy or unhappy. In order to promise to return their 
referee report in two weeks successfully, the speaker must meet the sincerity condition of 
forming an intention to do so, even if they are not describing “some inward spiritual act of 
promising” (236). The speaker must also be in a position to follow through on their intention. 
Thus, there is unhappiness in the speech act if the speaker promises knowing full well other 
commitments will prevent her from returning the report in two weeks. The speaker must also 
have the authority to make a promise; unless authorized, an editor cannot promise on behalf 
of a reviewer. There should also exist a convention for making a promise in peer review 
contexts. Such conventions might allow the speaker to promise without uttering, ‘I promise,’ 
e.g., by accepting a request that reads, ‘In accepting this review assignment you commit to 
returning the referee report within such-and-such a time.’ 
 Austin first contrasts performatives with constatives, e.g., descriptive statements or 
assertions that aim to state something truly or falsely about the world, but which do not seem 
to perform an action. However, Austin claims describing or asserting is as much an action 
as promising, even if the felicity conditions for asserting are more closely connected to truth 
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or falsity. Consider an editor saying of a reviewer, ‘They review quickly, and I expect that 
they will return their review within two weeks.’ In saying this, the editor commits herself to 
providing evidence for her description of the reviewer as quick, and perhaps justifying her 
expectation that the reviewer’s past behavior provides good evidence for future behavior. As 
Robert Brandom puts this point, “In asserting a claim one not only authorizes further 
assertions, but commits oneself to vindicate the original claim, showing that one is entitled 
to make it” (1983, 641). That is, the utterer must be in a position of authority—here in an 
epistemic sense—with regards to the claim and be ready to perform further speech acts if so 
prompted. Other felicity conditions of assertions or descriptions include a sincerity 
condition: an editor uttering our example sentence should believe what they say. Finally, the 
context of an assertion also shapes its felicity conditions: an editor should utter the sentence 
in the appropriate circumstances, e.g., as a response to a worry about the speed of the review 
process. Should these conditions not be met, the speech act might be unhappy even if true. 
 
3.2 Locution and illocution 
Austin develops speech act theory to capture the similarities between performatives and 
constatives. Speech acts like promising and describing have three dimensions: the 
locutionary content, which is the conventional sense and reference of the uttered sentence; 
the illocutionary force, which is the use the utterance is put to; and the perlocutionary effects, 
which are intended and unintended “effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the 
audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons” (1962, 101).  
Austin’s points about the illocutionary dimension of a speech act most clearly capture 
how one and the same representation might be put to different uses depending on our goals, 
and how different uses have different felicity conditions despite sharing locutionary content. 
Consider the sentence, ‘This product contains chemicals known to the state of California to 
cause cancer.’ The locutionary content would just consist in the proposition expressed by 
the sentence as determined by the conventional sense and reference of the words. This 
content can be common to different illocutionary acts. Someone uttering the sentence could 
be describing a product, issuing a warning, or explaining why they do not use this particular 
product but another. Uttering the sentence with the force of a description, the force of a 
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warning, and the force of an explanation will have similar felicity conditions related to truth 
and falsity. Namely, the locutionary content should be true or approximately true for an 
utterance to count as a good description, a good warning, or a good explanation.  
However, a warning might be infelicitous in ways a description might not. For 
example, warnings might be issued only in the case in which some pre-determined level of 
significant risk at a certain level of exposure is met. In cases where such levels are not met, 
issuing a warning might be infelicitous. Consider also that uttering such a sentence with the 
force of an explanation might be called for only if, e.g., someone is prompted to justify their 
choice of a product that does not contain cancer-causing chemicals over a more easily 
available and cheaper product that does contain those chemicals. In these last two cases, 
nonepistemic reasons related to risk, cost-effectiveness, and so on can enter into the 
evaluation of the happiness of a warning or explanation.2   
Austin thinks attending to these points combats a form of abstraction that distorts our 
thinking about the felicity conditions of descriptive statements. He thinks that when 
examining statements, “we abstract from the illocutionary…aspects of the speech act, and 
we concentrate on the locutionary” (1962, 144–5). In so doing, “we use an over-simplified 
notion of correspondence with the facts—over-simplified because essentially it brings in the 
illocutionary aspect” (145). Such an approach focuses on “the ideal of what would be right 
to say in all circumstances, for any purpose, to any audience, &c.” (145). But, as Austin 
claims, questions concerning correspondence with the facts brings with it the illocutionary 
aspect since truth or falsity does not attach to sentences or locutionary content. Instead, truth 
or falsity is related to particular things speakers do with sentences. Descriptions might be, 
strictly speaking, true or false, but not recommendations or explanations. In order to know, 
then, if evaluating a speech act along the true-false dimension is apt, we need to know the 
illocutionary force of that act. But to know the illocutionary force of the act requires we 
attend to context, including the aims of both speaker and audience, time and place of 
utterance, and conventions governing the specific speech situation. In this way, Austin 
                                                        
2 Any speech act will also have perlocutionary effects, and we might follow Heather Douglas (2009) 
and Paul Franco (2017) in focusing on the nonepistemic consequences of making false descriptions, 
giving bad warnings, or explaining unclearly. 
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argues context and aims are central to determining the illocutionary force of a speech act, 
and hence to evaluating its felicity or infelicity.  
 
4. Aims-approaches and speech act theory 
4.1 Explaining and understanding 
Scientific practice might seem to deal in paradigmatically constative speech acts, e.g., 
descriptions. Such speech acts are, to varying degrees, evaluable along dimensions of truth 
or falsity in ways we might question the relevance of speech act theory to philosophy of 
science. That is, we might say that scientific practice just is a case in which abstracting away 
from the illocutionary force of an utterance to focus on locutionary content is appropriate. 
For example, Austin says that “perhaps with mathematical formulas in physics books…we 
approximate in real life to finding” speech acts where focusing on the locutionary content is 
appropriate (1962, 145). If scientific practice aims at timeless truths holding across all 
contexts independent of the sorts of aims and interests of speakers and audiences necessary 
to evaluating the felicity or infelicity of speech acts, then it seems speech act theory is 
irrelevant to philosophy of science. 
 Yet, as Austin points out, “When a constative is confronted with facts, we in fact 
appraise it in ways involving the employment of a vast array of terms which overlap with 
those that we use in the appraisal of performatives. In real life, as opposed to the simple 
situations envisaged in logical theory, one cannot always answer in a simple manner whether 
it is true or false” (141–2). Consider again ‘France is hexagonal.’ Austin asks, “How can one 
answer…whether it is true or false that France is hexagonal? It is just rough, and that is the 
right and final answer to the question of the relation of ‘France is hexagonal’ to France. It is 
a rough description; it is not a true or false one” (142). Though rough, it is still open to 
evaluation. We can ask if it is in accord with conventions governing estimations and if this 
estimation serves the purposes and interests of the speaker and their audience at the time of 
utterance. ‘France is hexagonal’ can count as felicitous even if rough and not literally true 
because it aims at something other than truth. 
Austin claims that many of our apparently constative speech acts are evaluable along 
similar dimensions given that they also confront facts in similarly rough ways. McKaughan 
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makes a related point about scientific speech acts. He argues that certain speech acts central 
to scientific practice like “conjecturing, hypothesizing, guessing and the like often play a 
role in scientific discourse that serves neither to assert that an hypothesis is true nor to 
express such a belief” (2012, 89). Moreover, as mentioned in §2, the picture of scientific 
practice as concerned solely with the truth is challenged, among other places, in work on 
explanation, and also in values in science. For example, when looking at the role particular 
acts or patterns of explaining play in scientific discourse we might focus not on the 
locutionary content of an explanatory speech act, but on the ways “explanatory 
discourse…functions to sculpt and subsequently perpetuate communal norms of 
intelligibility” (Woody 2015, 81). In focusing on this aspect of explaining, we might find, 
for example, that “the ideal gas law’s role in practice is not essentially descriptive, but rather 
prescriptive; by providing selective attention to, and simplified treatment of, certain gas 
properties (and their relations) and ignoring other aspects of actual gas phenomena, the ideal 
gas law effectively instructs chemists in how to think about gases as they are characterized 
within chemistry” (82). In other words, the ideal gas law, in practice, does not have the force 
of a descriptive speech act, but lays down a rule of sorts guiding the investigation of gases.3 
The success of acts of explaining from this perspective will have less to do with accurately 
describing actual gases, but the way they facilitate, say, the education of new scientists or 
increase understanding of related phenomena, e.g., “by laying foundation for the concept of 
‘temperature’” beyond “the subjective, inherently comparative quality of human perception” 
(82). An act of explaining that fails to achieve pedagogical aims or fails to increase 
understanding of related phenomena might be infelicitous even if the locutionary content of 
that act confronts the facts in the right way to count as approximately true. 
On this point about the ways explanations might increase understanding without 
describing, Potochnik claims “that what best facilitates understanding is not determined 
solely by the relationship between a representation and the world” (2015, 74). An idealized 
explanation like the ideal gas law is not defective because it fails to fully describe all the 
                                                        
3 About universal generalizations Austin writes, “many have claimed, with much justice, that 
utterances such as those beginning ‘All…’ are prescriptive definitions or advice to adopt a rule” 
(1962, 143). Austin does not fully endorse this suggestion. 
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possible causal factors at play in the behavior of actual gases. Though literally false, an 
idealization might be successful insofar as it “secure[s] computational tractability” or 
successfully isolates “all but the most significant causal influences on a phenomenon” (71). 
In so doing, we increase our understanding by facilitating “successful mastery, in some 
sense, of the target of understanding” or “by revealing patterns and enabling insights that 
would otherwise be inaccessible” (72). Indeed, pointing out all the ways in which the ideal 
gas law fails to hold for actual gases or is literally false as a description might hinder the use 
of explanations in scientific discourse to provide “shared exemplars that function as norms 
of intelligibility” (Woody 2015, 84).  
In a related vein, Potochnik argues, “Because understanding is a cognitive state, its 
achievement depends in part on the characteristics of those who seek to understand,” 
including both the speaker and the audience (2015, 74). In evaluating an act of explaining, 
we should look at how the speaker’s interest has shaped the focus of their explanation and 
also how the explanation increases an audience’s understanding, where this involves 
considering the audience’s interests in seeking an explanation. An explanation that fails to 
be relevant to the audience or fails to increase their understanding or guide their thinking 
about related phenomena, but that nonetheless has locutionary content that is approximately 
true, might count as infelicitous.  
 
4.2 Values and science 
On the views of explaining canvassed, the aims of generating literally true descriptions of 
the world come apart from, say, explaining and understanding the most important causal 
factors at play for a given phenomenon. Now, as the aims approach to the proper role for 
nonepistemic values in scientific practice emphasizes, explaining and describing do not 
exhaust the goals of scientific practice. The aims approach focuses on the ways “scientific 
decision-making, including methodological choices, selection of data, and choice of theories 
or models, are...a function of the aims that constitute the research context” (Intemann 2015, 
218). Given that the research context includes social, political, and moral considerations, the 
aims of science can just as well be understood in nonepistemic ways as it can be understood 
in epistemic ways. 
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 Consider, for example, the American Geophysical Union’s position statement on 
human-induced climate change. At the end of their statement, they claim, “The community 
of scientists has responsibilities to improve overall understanding of climate change and its 
impacts. Improvements will come from pursuing the research needed to understand climate 
change, working with stakeholders to identify relevant information, and conveying 
understanding clearly and accurately, both to decision makers and to the general public” 
(American Geophysical Union 2013). Here, I focus on the claim that scientists have 
responsibilities to improve the understanding of policymakers and the general public, and 
drawing upon the aforementioned work on explaining, think about how adopting this aim 
shapes the felicity conditions of explanatory speech acts directed at the audiences mentioned. 
 Notice that the position statement distinguishes the research necessary to understand 
climate change from conveying that understanding to policymakers and the general public. 
The sense in which these different activities come apart from one another and have different 
success conditions can be made sense of, in part, by focusing on the audience to whom 
scientists are speaking. We saw that for Potochnik (2016) understanding is a cognitive state 
that depends on the abilities and interests of those who are explaining and those to whom 
explanations are directed. In communicating to policymakers and the general public, 
scientists should consider the interests of the speaker in asking for an explanation as well as 
their level of knowledge regarding the phenomenon in question, in this case, climate change. 
In so doing, scientists might find that a description that aims to describe climate change in 
all its complexity might not serve these aims well. Instead, scientists might aim for an 
explanation that, though omitting descriptive complexity, draws upon models that represent 
those causal factors related to the audience’s interests in a way that is cognitively accessible 
and helps guide the public in thinking more generally about climate change.  
 On this point, the American Geophysical Union’s position statement maintains 
scientists ought to enlist the help of stakeholders in identifying potentially relevant 
information to their research. This is a point Intemann makes in developing the aims 
approach. She says of climate science, “[T]he aim is not only to produce accurate beliefs 
about the atmosphere, but to do so in a way that allows us to generate useful predictions for 
protecting a variety of social, economic and environmental goods that we care about” (2015, 
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219). In the view of the American Geophysical Union, in order to do this well, scientists 
ought to consult with relevant stakeholders and policymakers regarding what they value. 
Thus, for example, if stakeholders and policymakers communicate worries about extreme 
weather events and “how to adapt to ‘worst case scenarios,’ then models able to capture 
extreme weather events should be preferred” to those models that “anticipate slow gradual 
changes” (Intemann 2015, 220). Notice that in making such a decision, the grounds for 
choosing models able to represent aspects of climate change relevant to stakeholders’ 
interests are nonepistemic rather than epistemic, e.g., generating predictions useful for 
protecting goods the general public cares about. Insofar as the representations or 
explanations generated do not meet these goals because they are unrelated to stakeholders’ 
interests, the attendant speech acts might very well be infelicitous even if they describe some 
related phenomenon more or less accurately. 
 Both points about pitching explanations at a level that is cognitively accessible and 
choosing models for representing climate change phenomena in ways sensitive to 
stakeholders’ interests illustrate a point Austin makes about the importance of uptake to 
successfully performing a speech act. Austin claims, “Unless a certain effect is achieved, the 
illocutionary act will not have been happily, successfully performed….I cannot be said to 
have warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain 
sense….Generally the effect amounts to bringing about the understanding of the meaning 
and force of the locution” (1962, 116). In aiming to convey understanding through 
explaining relevant aspects of climate change to decision makers and the general public, a 
speaker should consider the interests, background knowledge, and cognitive resources of 
their audience. Insofar as scientists fail to do so in explaining to the general public, even if 
the locutionary content that comprises their speech act approximates truth, they will not 
secure uptake in the sense of generating understanding in their audience. As such, their 
speech act will be infelicitous.   
 Of course, a scientist’s explaining something to their audience will also be 
infelicitous if it is based on inaccurate information or extrapolates from what is known to 
their audience’s interests in unjustified ways. However, this does not mean that if scientists 
aim to convey understanding to the public they should stick solely to descriptive claims. As 
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Elliott emphasizes in discussing how scientists should best communicate uncertainty to the 
public, “It does little good to expect scientists to provide unbiased information to the public 
if their pronouncements are completely misinterpreted or misused by those who receive 
them” (2017, 89). Similarly, “members of the public might not be able to ‘connect the dots’” 
between scientists’ descriptive speech acts and the ways those are relevant to their interests; 
insofar as scientists do not explain with the aims of conveying understanding—which as 
Potochnik argues, comes apart from describing the world truly in all its complexity—the 
public “would be left wondering what [the descriptions] might mean” (88). Thus, if scientists 
are to meet responsibilities the American Geophysical Union claims they have with regard 
to conveying understanding to the general public, those scientists should communicate using 
speech acts best able to secure uptake in the general public. This involves considering the 
interests and cognitive resources of the general public in ways that shape the felicity 
conditions of the speech acts beyond truth and falsity. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I argued speech act theory can tie together a few threads in recent work on explaining and 
values in science that share in common a shift in focus from descriptive propositions to 
things scientists do with words. Some of those things, like explaining, also seem the sorts of 
speech acts appropriate for fulfilling aims scientists have other than describing the world 
literally, like conveying understanding to the public and policymakers. Insofar as 
successfully fulfilling these aims involves explaining, and insofar as acts of explaining that 
secure uptake require attention to the nonepistemic interests and cognitive resources of 
speaker and audience, our attention is drawn towards ways explanatory speech acts can be 
happy or unhappy beyond describing truly or falsely. Future work will aim to delineate these 
felicity conditions in greater detail with an eye towards revealing further nonepistemic 
dimensions of evaluation. 
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Abstract
The universality of critical phenomena is best explained by ap-
peal to the Renormalisation Group (RG). Batterman and Morrison,
among others, have claimed that this explanation is irreducible. I ar-
gue that the RG account is reducible, but that the higher-level expla-
nation ought not to be eliminated. I demonstrate that the key assump-
tion on which the explanation relies – the scale invariance of critical
systems – can be explained in lower-level terms; however, we should
not replace the RG explanation with a bottom-up account, rather we
should acknowledge that the explanation appeals to dependencies
which may be traced down to lower levels.
1 Introduction
While universality is best explained with reference to the Renormalisation
Group (RG), that explanation is nonetheless reducible. The argument in de-
fence of this claim is of philosophical interest for two reasons: first, the RG
explanation of universality has been touted by Batterman (2000, 2017) and
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Morrison (2012, 2014) as a significant impediment to reduction. Second,
universality is a paradigm instance of multiple realisability (MR) in the
philosophy of physics; as such it is regarded as irreducible by those who
accept the multiple realisability argument against reduction. My account
charts a middle course: I deny claims that RG explanations are irreducible,
and I deny that universality is best explained from the bottom up.
The view of reduction advocated here is non-eliminativist; the best ex-
planations are often higher-level explanations: such explanations are more
parsimonious, more robust, and have broader applicability than lower-
level explanations. In general, such higher-level explanations ought not
to be replaced by lower-level explanations, rather the parts of theories on
which such explanations rely may be understood in lower-level terms; re-
ducible explanations satisfy the following two conditions: (a) each higher-
level explanatory dependency is explained by or derived from a lower-level
dependency, and (b) the abstractions involved in constructing the higher-
level explanations are justified from the bottom up.1
In §2 I outline the RG explanation of universality. Although my reduc-
tive claims may generalise, I focus exclusively on the field-theoretic ap-
proach to the RG.2 I claim that this explanation follows a general formula
for explaining multiply realised phenomena. §3 considers the arguments
of Batterman and Morrison, and analyses their force against any putative
reduction.
In §4 I note that the RG explanation is a higher-level explanation. As
it is less contentious that the common features of each universality class
are reducible, I simply assume that that’s the case in this paper. The nub
of the debate rests on the RG: I show that the RG arguments rely on the
assumption of scale invariance and the abstractions engendered by that
assumption. I argue that the applicability of this assumption may be ex-
plained from the bottom up. Thus, I claim, that my reduction satisfies (a)
and (b) above.
1While I expect the claims in this paper to be compatible with many different accounts
of explanation, they are most straightforwardly cashed out on an interventionist approach
– see Woodward (2003).
2See Franklin (2018) and Mainwood (2006) for arguments that only this approach pro-
vides an adequate explanation of universality.
2
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2 The RG Explanation of Universality
‘Universality’ refers to the phenomenon whereby diverse systems exhibit
similar scaling behaviour on the approach to a continuous phase transition.
Continuous phase transitions occur at the critical temperature, a point be-
yond which systems no longer undergo first-order phase transitions.3 The
approach to this phase transition can be very well described by power laws
of the form ai(t) ∝ t
α where t is proportional to the temperature deviation
from the critical temperature and α is the critical exponent – a fixed number
which leads to a characteristic curve on temperature-density plots.4
Different physical systems can be categorised into universality classes:
members of the same class have identical critical behaviour – the same
set of critical exponents {α, β, ...} for several power laws – while their be-
haviour away from the critical point and microscopic organisation may be
radically different. For example, fluids andmagnets are in the same univer-
sality class despite otherwise having totally different chemical and physical
properties.
Each physical system which exhibits critical phenomena may be de-
scribed at the critical point by the same mathematical object – the Landau-
Ginzburg-Wilson (LGW) Hamiltonian. That Hamiltonian will include the
features – the symmetry and dimensionality – which sort these systems
into their universality classes. The RG argument demonstrates that the
LGW Hamiltonian applies to a wide range of systems at the critical point
by showing that any additional operators which may be appended to that
Hamiltonian will fall away on approach to criticality, where only the cen-
tral LGW operators will remain. The following steps are essential to the
explanation thus on offer:5
1. Define the effective Hamiltonian for your system of interest:
(i) Specify the order parameter with symmetry and dimensionality.
(ii) Specify the central operators of the LGW Hamiltonian.
3Note that not all continuous phase transitions are associatedwith first-order phase tran-
sitions in this way.
4E.g. the specific heat (in zero magnetic field) c scales as c ∼ (t−α)/α as t → 0 where
t = T−Tc
Tc
.
5 To see a full account of the physics of universality and details of the RG see Binney et
al. (1992) and Fisher (1998); the philosophical aspects of such an explanation are discussed
in detail in Batterman (2016) and Franklin (2018).
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(iii) Specify operators in addition to the terms in the LGW Hamilto-
nian.
2. Apply the RG transformations to that Hamiltonian.
3. Examine the flow towards fixed points in the critical region and note
that some operators are irrelevant to the critical behaviour.
4. Thus divide the set of operators into subsets: ‘relevant’, ‘irrelevant’
and ‘marginally relevant’.
5. Repeat for other systems of interest.
In order to explain universality we must identify commonalities be-
tween the different systems in the same universality class – 1(i) and 1(ii)
above – and show that such commonalities are sufficient for the common
behaviour – 2-4 above. Although 1(iii) can’t, in general, be done explic-
itly, the explanation only depends on the RG demonstration that all dis-
tinguishing features are irrelevant – it’s not necessary to say exactly which
those distinguishing features are. As discussed below, the infinities which
are central to some of the anti-reductionist arguments feature in steps 3 and
4.
Overall the explanation takes the following form: consider a univer-
sality class composed of four different physical systems A-D. Each of A-D
is described in step 1 by an effective Hamiltonian; effective Hamiltonians
are ascribed to systems on the basis of various theoretical and empirical
data. The RG explanation of universality, by virtue of steps 2-4, tells us that
all the details which distinguish A-D, i.e. their irrelevant operators, are, in
fact, irrelevant to the critical phenomena. Thus we have an explanation for
how otherwise different systems exhibit the same phenomena at the critical
point. This explanation relies, of course, on the RG transformations which
allow for the categorisation of certain operators as irrelevant.
Importantly, this explanation takes the form of a general explanation
of multiply realised phenomena: such phenomena are explained if com-
monalities are identified among the realisers and these are shown to be
sufficient for the multiply realised phenomena to occur. Note that such ex-
planations may be higher level and nothing written so far establishes their
reducibility.
4
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3 Anti-reductionist Arguments
Batterman (2000, 2017) and Morrison (2012, 2014) offer two arguments in
defence of the view that the explanation just outlined is irreducible. The
more general argument is that universality, qua instance of multiple realis-
ability, is irreducible because multiple realisability requires abstracted ex-
planations of a particular form.
However, one goal of this paper is to demonstrate that just such ab-
stracted explanations may be reducible. Insofar as my reduction of the RG
explanation goes through, we are thus faced with a dilemma: either some
instances of MR are, in principle, reducible, or universality is not a case of
MR. While I would opt for the former horn, nothing in the rest of the paper
hangs on that choice.
The second anti-reductionist argument is muchmore specific to the case
at hand and involves various demonstrations that the RG explanation re-
quires infinities which are inexplicable from the bottom up. As noted by
Palacios (2017), two different limits are invoked in the case of continuous
phase transitions – the thermodynamic limit and the limit of scale invari-
ance. There is an extensive literature on the thermodynamic limit as it ap-
pears in first order phase transitions; as I see no salient differences between
appeal to this limit in the two contexts, I do not discuss this further here
– see e.g. Butterfield and Bouatta (2012) for a reductionist account of that
limit.6
The second limit is discussed by Butterfield and Bouatta (2012), Callen-
der and Menon (2013), Palacios (2017), and Saatsi and Reutlinger (2018),
among others, and these papers undermine claims that continuous phase
transitions are irreducible. However, they pay insufficient attention to the
specific role played by the RG (and by the limit of scale invariance) in estab-
lishing the irrelevance of certain details, and it is this role which is crucial
to the anti-reductionist arguments.7
For Batterman, the RG is required because it allows us to answer the
following question:
6The reductionist claims made here are conditional on a successful resolution of such
issues.
7For example, Saatsi and Reutlinger (2018, p. 473) do not consider a counterfactual of
the form ‘if a physical system S did not exhibit effective scale invariance at criticality, then
S would not exhibit the critical phenomena of any universality class’ in their list of counter-
factuals which the RG account is supposed to underwrite.
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MR: How can systems that are heterogeneous at some (typ-
ically) micro-scale exhibit the same pattern of behavior at the
macro-scale? . . .
if one thinks (MR) is a legitimate scientific question, one
needs to consider different explanatory strategies. The renor-
malization group and the theory of homogenization are just
such strategies. They are inherently multi-scale. They are not
bottom-up derivational explanations.
[Batterman (2017, pp. 4, 14-15)]
As further elaborated below, the RG seems to Batterman to preclude
“bottom-up derivational explanation” because it requires the following in-
finitary assumption:
This [fixed point] is a point in the parameter space which,
under τ [the RG transformation], is its own trajectory. That
is, it represents a state of a system which is invariant under
the renormalization group transformation. Of necessity, such
a fixed point has an infinite correlation length and so lies on the
critical surface S∞. The singularity/divergence of the correla-
tion length ξ is necessary.
[Batterman (2011, p. 1045), original emphasis]
I accept that the RG formalism makes use of infinite limits. The salient
question, to borrow Norton’s (2012) distinction, is whether such infinities
are approximations which allow one to use the more tractable infinitary
mathematics to approximate features of the finite systems, or, alternatively,
idealisations which describe a distinct infinite system. Claiming that the in-
finities are idealisations would preclude reduction because themacroscopic
system with infinite properties has features which may not be reductively
explained.
As Batterman demonstrates, the RG argument rests on the assumption
of the infinite correlation length which generates absolute scale invariance.
In §4 I claim that the physical systems under consideration are not abso-
lutely scale invariant: in fact, one may abstract from the details of the un-
derlying system insofar as such systems are effectively scale invariant; thus
the infinitary assumption is best viewed as an approximation.
6
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While Morrison (2014, p. 1155) likewise focusses on explanations of MR
phenomena, she claims that RG explanations are irreducible for a differ-
ent, but related, reason: the “RG functions not only as a calculational tool
but as the source of physical information as well”. Morrison (2012) makes
a similar argument in relation to symmetry breaking in the physics of su-
perconductors. She argues that, in both cases, top-down constraints play
an essential role in the physical descriptions which thus rules out reduc-
tion. In the present context, Morrison’s views may be understood as taking
the RG invocation of scale symmetry to be a necessary physical assump-
tion which cannot be understood from the bottom up. Below I argue that
the effective scale invariance on which the RG rests is, in fact, reductively
explicable. As such, no top-down organising principles are required and
Morrison’s claims are deflated.
4 Reducing the RG Explanation
Arguments for the reducibility of the explanation of universality have pri-
marily been targeted at Batterman’s claims that infinities are essential to
the models used to describe continuous phase transitions. I do not have
space to consider these arguments in any detail. Suffice it to say that, in my
view, none succeeds in reducing the principal feature of the renormalisa-
tion group – the assumption of scale invariance. Thus I focus on that aspect
of the RG, and claim that it, too, is reducible.
Furthermore, with the notable exception of Saatsi and Reutlinger (2018),
not much attention has been paid to the explanation of universality per se.
This, of course, makes a difference for MR-based objections to reduction,
which raise doubts that a reductionist account could explain why the same
phenomenon is exhibited in multiple different systems.
As far as the physics is currently developed, the RG plays an inelim-
inable role in the explanation of universality: it is the only mathematical
framework available to predict the precise extent of observed universality
of critical phenomena. If its application were truly mysterious, if we had
no idea why it worked, then, infinity or no infinity, this would provide ex-
actly the right kind of failure of explanation on which the anti-reductionist
could hang their arguments.
I argue in the following that the applicability of the RG to systems un-
7
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dergoing continuous phase transitions is not mysterious. The RG exploits
effective scale invariance to set up equations which tell us how certain
properties vary with respect to the variation of other properties. It is a
piece of mathematics whose applicability is deeply physical – where the
assumptions invoked in applying the RG do not hold, the RG’s predictions
go wrong.
In order fully to reduce the RG explanation, one also must consider the
common features shared by each member of the same universality class,
and argue that these, too, are reducible to aspects of the microphysical de-
scription. Such arguments have been given by the reductionists mentioned
above. The innovation of this paper lies in reducing the RG framework, and
the assumptions on which it relies; thus, given space constraints, I do not
consider the reduction of the symmetry, dimensionality and representation
by common Hamiltonians.
4.1 Reducing the Renormalisation Group
The RG argument rests on the assumption of scale invariance, and this is
crucial to the demonstration that a class of operators are irrelevant at crit-
icality. I claim that we can provide a bottom-up explanation of this scale
invariance and that, as such, the RG arguments provide a mathematical
apparatus for relating scale invariance to the irrelevance of certain details.
One can see, heuristically, how scale invariance relates to universality: if the
system at criticality is effectively scale invariant then many of that systems’
features – those which are scale dependent – will turn out to be irrelevant
at criticality, and all that will remain are those shared features such as the
symmetry and dimensionality.
To argue that the RG explanation is reducible, I first give a more general
characterisation of an RG flow. The calculation of each system’s dynamics
involves integration over a range of scales and energies. The highest en-
ergy (smallest scale) cutoff (denoted Λ) corresponds to the impossibility of
fluctuations on a scale smaller than the distance between the particles in
the physical system. The RG transformation involves decreasing the cutoff
thereby increasing the minimum scale of fluctuations considered. Iterating
this transformation generates a flow through parameter space designed to
maintain the Hamiltonian form and qualitative properties of the system in
question.
8
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The RG transformation R transforms a set of (coupling) parameters
{K} to another set {K ′} such thatR{K} = {K ′}. {K∗} is the set of param-
eters which corresponds to a fixed point, defined such thatR{K∗} = {K∗}.
This fixed point corresponds to the critical point defined physically. At the
fixed point, the RG transformation (which changes the scale of fluctuations)
makes no difference. Thus the fixed point encodes the property of scale in-
variance.
Given the Hamiltonian of one of our models, one can define an RG
transformationwhich generates a flow that allows one to: (i) classify certain
of the coupling parameters of the system in question as (ir)relevant to its
behaviour near the fixed point, (ii) extract the critical exponents from the
scaling behaviour near the fixed point.
The RG may be understood as a mathematical framework for explor-
ing how certain properties vary with changing energy, length-scale, or, by
proxy, temperature, on approach to the scale invariant critical point. Philo-
sophical discussions of the RG are occasionally prone to mysterianism, but
the RG should be considered to be no different from, for example, the cal-
culus. As Wilson (1975, p. 674) notes: “the renormalization group . . . is the
tool that one uses to study the statistical continuum limit [the point of scale
invariance] in the same way that the derivative is the basic procedure for
studying the ordinary continuum limit”.
The Hamiltonian which represents the system at the critical point, from
which the critical exponents are extracted, is scale invariant at the fixed
point – all the scale dependent contributions have gone to zero. SuchHamil-
tonians are known as ‘renormalisable’. As such, the explanation provided
below for the effective scale invariance of physical systems at criticality
underlies the fact that such systems are well-described by renormalisable
Hamiltonians at fixed points.
My argument has two steps: I demonstrate that scale invariance is im-
plicit in the power law behaviour which is intrinsic to universality; then I
provide a bottom-up explanation of the effective scale invariance for liquid-
gas systems, a story somewhat motivated by the observation of critical
opalescence. Thus, I show how scale invariance features in the mathemat-
ics – the Hamiltonian’s renormalisability and the power laws, and how it
features in the observed physics – the critical opalescence is a direct conse-
quence of the bottom-up story.
The universality of critical phenomena lies in the sharing of power laws,
9
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and hence critical exponents, between members of the same universality
class. In what sense are such power laws scale-free? As Binney et al. (1992,
p. 20) explain, a phenomenon obeying a power law is independent of scale
because one could multiply its characteristic scale length by some factor
and the ratio of values will remain constant. For example, consider the
power law f1 = (r/r0)
η, and its measurement in the range (0.5r0, 2r0). The
ratio of largest to smallest value will be identical for measurements centred
on r0, 10r0, 100r0 – it will always be 4
|η|, thus one may superimpose all the
power laws by a simple change of scale. By contrast, for f2 = exp(r/r0) the
ratio of values will change on scale changes.
Such systems are therefore described as scale-free; the RG is used to pre-
dict that at the point of scale invariance the heterogeneous features will be
irrelevant. So, in order to work out when this framework is applicable, and
why it works, we ought to look at each individual system, (for our pur-
poses let’s reserve inquiry to liquid-gas and ferromagnetic-paramagnetic
systems) and identify the underlying processes which lead to effective scale
invariance at the critical point. The following two caveats apply to this pro-
posal for reduction:
First, it might be objected that universality may only be explained if
the same processes are identified across all the systems exhibiting the uni-
versal behaviour; if that were so, the strategy employed here would be
inadequate. However, universality may be explained by demonstrating
that two conditions are fulfilled: that all the systems share common fea-
tures, and that their heterogeneous details are irrelevant. While it’s essen-
tial that the common features are shared by all the systems, the mechanism
by which the heterogeneities are irrelevant may differ, so long as all the
heterogeneities in fact end up as irrelevant.
Second, although the power laws and renormalisable Hamiltonians at
the fixed point are absolutely scale invariant, the physical systems will, at
best, be effectively scale invariant – that is, scale invariant within a certain
range of length-scales. That should be acceptable because we know that
scale invariance is never exactly true of a system: any real system will be
finite and thus violate the assumption at some scale. Moreover, this will
not generate empirical problems because the power laws are observed for
systems approaching criticality – they are predictions about T → Tc, not
T = Tc. Thus one should only assume that critical exponents asymptoti-
cally approach those predicted at the fixed point. While infinite assump-
tions are required in order to impose the full scale invariance for RG analy-
10
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sis, I claim that we can explain effective scale invariance for finite systems,
and that absolute scale invariance is an approximation invoked to make the
mathematics tractable.
Scale invariance, as it manifests in systems at criticality, is known as
‘self-similarity’: as scales change the system resembles itself. How do we
account for such self-similarity? The critical point, at which a continuous
phase transition occurs, corresponds (for liquid-gas systems) to the highest
temperature and pressure at which liquid and gas phases can be distin-
guished.
As is well known, there is a plateau in pressure-volume diagrams, which
corresponds to the latent heat (or enthalpy) of vapourisation. This, roughly,
is the extra energy needed to break the intermolecular bonds which distin-
guish liquids from gases and vapours. At the critical point this plateau,
and the latent heat of vapourisation vanishes. Now it’s difficult precisely
to work out the binding energies of the intermolecular bonds. The values
for this will be material dependent, and surface tension dependent, and
will change at different pressures. But the heuristic argument tells us that
the reason the plateau vanishes is because the system has enough temper-
ature, and thus the molecules have sufficient energy to equal the binding
energy. The point at which binding energy is exactly matched by kinetic
energy will be the critical point.
The isothermal compressibility (κ) is defined as κT =
−1
V
(
∂V
∂p
)
T
. This
corresponds to how much the volume will change (∂V ) with a given pres-
sure change (∂p) at fixed temperature (T ). As supercritical fluids have
far higher compressibility than liquids, and both are present at the criti-
cal point, the compressibility diverges. Given, in addition, that the latent
heat is zero at criticality, there’s nothing to prevent a given bubble expand-
ing arbitrarily. Thus we ought to expect the system to have bubbles of all
sizes: this is what is meant by the claim that the system is dominated by
fluctuations and has no characteristic scale.8
Negligible energy cost for transitions and infinite compressibility leads
to self-similarity, and, in certain fluids, the bubbles at all scales lead to a
high refraction of visible light. Thus otherwise transparent fluid may be-
come opaque and milky-white. This is known as ‘critical opalescence’ – see
figure 1(a) – and is a visible correlate of a system at criticality.
8Note that, for first order phase transitions, the compressibility also diverges; this
doesn’t lead to scale invariance because latent heat is finite.
11
PSA 2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -260-
(a) (b)
Figure 1: From Binney et al. (1992, pp. 10,19). (a) Critical opalescence is visible when arbi-
trarily large bubbles form in liquid at criticality. (b) Increasing loss of characteristic scale as
T → Tc in simulations of the Ising model.
Such self-similarity is conceptually crucial to the applicability of the
renormalisation group: in order to extract critical exponents from RG equa-
tions one identifies a renormalisable Hamiltonian which is scale invariant
at the fixed point. Without fluctuations across all scales, systems would fail
to be well modelled by such Hamiltonians. The physical argument for di-
verging fluctuation size justifies the use of a scale invariant mathematical
model to represent such systems. Thus, for critical phenomena, the appli-
cability of the RG depends on scale invariance, where this assumption is
explicable from the bottom up.
Demonstrating these claims quantitatively is difficult, but the heuristic
argument is convincing. Kathmann (2006) reviews theories of the nucle-
ation of gas bubbles in water which generate accurate predictions concern-
ing the rate of bubble growth and the threshold for stability over a range
of temperatures; although these models do not reach the critical point,
progress is being made.9
9Constructing exact models is especially difficult because of the fluctuations at a wide
range of length scales – precisely the reason that the RG is employed.
12
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Of course, further work could be done to develop these arguments and
make them more precise. But there seems to be, in the above, a sound
qualitative argument and no in-principle barriers to full derivation. This
‘in-principle’ ought not to be problematic: we know the relevant physical
principles, even if quantitative models are still unavailable.
Moreover, as discussed below, and depicted in figure 1(b), the Ising
model allows us quantitatively to predict analogues of the results for liquid-
gas systems. While well short of a full explanation, the following discus-
sion illustrates how self-similarity may be reduced for magnetic systems.
By treating the Ising model as a stand-in for such systems, a similar kind of
reasoning to that given above will go through.
Below the critical point, energy fluctuations will lead to random iso-
lated spin flips. Such flips will be energetically costly and tend to be re-
versed. The higher the energy, the more likely these are to occur, and if suf-
ficiently many occur then a patch will form, and other spins will have some
tendency to align themselves with this patch. However, below the critical
point, such patches beyond a certain size will be too costly and spins will
overall remain aligned (there is some small probability of net magnetisation
flipping, but this is increasingly unlikely further below the critical point).
At the critical point, the energy of the atoms in the lattice is greater than
the energetic cost of violating spin alignment, and patches can become ar-
bitrarily large. This results from the latent heat’s vanishing and the diver-
gence of the magnetic susceptibility (χ) on approach to the critical point.
χT =
(
∂m
∂B
)
T
where m is the magnetisation and B represents an external
magnetic field. Universality is manifested by the fact that the susceptibil-
ity and the compressibility both diverge according to identical power laws
with the same critical exponent γ: χT , κT ∼ (T −Tc)
−γ . Thus, we have self-
similarity and effective scale invariance with bubbles or patches arbitrarily
large up to the size of the system.
My aim is to establish the reducibility of the RG relevance and irrele-
vance arguments. I have demonstrated that the RG is a mathematical pro-
cedure that extracts information based on the empirically and theoretically
justified assumption of effective scale invariance; this has been shown to
be a property shared by different systems at criticality. The key ingredients
for effective scale invariance are features of the interactions of neighbouring
sub-systems, and the particulate constitution of the materials. While that
suggests that these materials are not so different after all, it’s worth empha-
13
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sising that the systems which exhibit universal behaviour are nonetheless
dissimilar away from the critical point – it’s clear that magnets and liquids
have many distinct chemical and physical properties.
The assumption of scale invariance plays a crucial role for the RG – it
licences the discarding of scale dependent details; it is precisely this dis-
carding of details which ensures that all systems are commonly described
at the critical point. Moreover, discarding such details is what gives the
higher-level explanation its stability and parsimony. It is thus incumbent
on the reductionist to explain how the higher-level RG account is success-
ful despite its leaving out such details. So, the reductionist should identify
physical processes at the lower level which ensure the irrelevance of the
discarded details.
As argued above, the physical processes in question are exactly those
which lead to effective scale invariance. The fluctuations at all scales make
it such that the scale-dependent properties which distinguish systems away
from criticality are irrelevant at criticality, when the system is effectively
scale invariant. We have identified, at the molecular level, the physical
mechanisms which prevent variations in the discarded details from lead-
ing to changes in the higher-level description of the system. As such, we
are assured that the explanatory value of the higher-level explanation is a
consequence of features of the lower-level system.
One upshot of this reductionist account is that we may specify the con-
ditions under which the higher-level description remains a good one. The
discarded details are irrelevant while the large scale fluctuations – the bub-
bles or patches – dominate the physics. As we move to systems which are
less scale invariant, as the bubbles die down, the critical point becomes
a less accurate description and each system in the class will start to ex-
hibit distinct behaviour. This is reflected in the fact that the macroscale RG
description only derives the shared behaviour at the fixed point of scale
invariance and predicts distinct behaviour away from the fixed point.
I end this section with the following intuitive physical gloss on the RG
explanation: “[b]ecause the fluctuations extend over regions containing
very many particles, the details of the particle interactions are irrelevant,
and a great deal of similarity is found in the critical behavior of diverse
systems” (A. L. Sengers, Hocken, and J. V. Sengers (1977, p.42)). Since we
can explain the wide-ranging fluctuations from the bottom-up, the RG ex-
planation of universality is reducible.
14
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5 Conclusion
The field-theoretic RG framework, together with the common features of
physical systems in the same universality class, explains how those sys-
tems all display the same critical phenomena when undergoing continuous
phase transitions. That explanation is a higher-level explanation.
That higher-level RG explanation is nonetheless reducible. That is, we
may explain in terms of the microstructure of each system how it is that
each aspect of the higher-level explanation is explanatory. We may, in par-
ticular, show why the RG categorisation of operators as relevant and irrel-
evant works. That division depends on the assumption of scale invariance,
and the assumption of scale invariance is justifiable when systems are ef-
fectively scale invariant at criticality.
The anti-reductionist claim that universality is MR, and MR is essen-
tially irreducible has been undermined by demonstrating that we may ar-
rive at a bottom-up understanding of the common features and of what
makes such features sufficient for the common behaviour.
The further argument that the use of the infinite limit imposes an irre-
ducible divide between the higher-level and lower-level models has simi-
larly been countered: while we move to the infinite limit in order to make
the mathematics simpler, the effective scale invariance can be shown to fol-
low fromdetails of the particle interactions at criticality – that’s what identi-
fies the critical point and allows us to make the corresponding abstractions
from scale dependent details. Provided with this bottom-up explanation,
there is no further reason to claim that the infinite limit is an idealisation
rather than an approximation: for we have explained from the bottom up
how the system is approximately self-similar.
One upshot of this discussion is that the RG is not to be regarded as
mysterious, or, somehow, as the source of physical information. It is appli-
cable only insofar as the systems to which it is applied have the relevant
properties, and their having such properties may be reductively explained.
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1. Introduction 
 
Theories of function are conventionally divided up into two main categories, historical 
and ahistorical (or backwards-looking and forwards-looking). The selected effects theory 
(Neander 1983, 1991; Millikan 1984) is an example of a historical theory, but there are 
other historical theories, including some versions of the organizational theory 
(McLaughlin 2001), and the weak etiological theory (Buller 1998). Ahistorical theories 
include Boorse’s goal-contribution account (1976; 1977; 2002), the propensity theory 
(Bigelow and Pargetter 1987), and the causal role theory (Cummins 1975; Hardcastle 
2002; Craver 2001; 2013). In the 1970s and 1980s, it was common to see these two sorts 
of theories as competing with each other, though more recently, philosophers of biology 
have generally adopted a pluralistic stance, and see them as capturing different aspects of 
real biological usage (OMITTED). Still, the validity of the basic distinction has never 
been seriously challenged.  
 
Many proponents of ahistorical theories have argued that we should accept their theories 
precisely on account of their being ahistorical. In other words, their alleged ahistoriticity 
is often held up as a significant virtue of their theories, and a strong reason to prefer them 
to historical theories (or at least a strong reason to think they capture a significant strand 
of ordinary biological usage). There are two arguments along these lines. The first 
argument appeals to bald intuition, and says that it’s just obvious that functions don’t 
always need history. One fanciful variant of this argument appeals to science fiction 
cases, like swamp creatures, instant lions, and randomly-generated worlds (e.g, Boorse 
1976, 74; Bigelow and Pargetter 1987, 188). But one doesn’t have to go as far as science 
fiction to find plausible cases of ahistorical functions in biology. Many philosophers have 
a strong intuition that, the very first time a new biological trait emerges and begins to 
benefit the organism, it has a function even if it was never selected for (e.g., Boorse 2002, 
66; Bigelow and Pargetter 1987, 195; Walsh and Ariew 1996, 498). The second 
argument, which is closely related, appeals to ordinary biological usage, not intuition. It 
says that historical theories run against the way biologists ordinarily think and talk about 
functions. At least sometimes, when biologists attribute functions to traits, they do not 
cite or refer to or think about history or evolution (e.g., Godfrey-Smith 1993, 200; 
Amundson and Lauder 1994, 451; Walsh 1996, 558; Boorse 2002, 73). Hence, ahistorical 
theories capture important strands of real biology.  
 
In light of the above, my thesis might come as a bit of a shock. I claim that there are no 
ahistorical theories of function – or, to put it more precisely, the mainstream versions of 
the allegedly ahistorical theories on the market are not actually ahistorical. If we poke 
and prod at those theories a bit, a historical element falls out, like contraband stashed 
away in a suitcase. In Boorse’s version of the goal-contribution account, history is 
explicitly embedded in his notion of a statistically-typical contribution to fitness. In the 
propensity account, history is embedded, a little less explicitly, in the idea of a species’ 
natural habitat. Finally, I claim that the only way the causal-role theorist can hope to 
make sense of dysfunction is to appeal to history.  
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If this thesis is correct – that there are no ahistorical theories of function – three 
consequences immediately follow. First, we need to jettison this whole way of dividing 
up theories of function. The distinction between etiological and non-etiological theories 
serves us much better, as I’ll describe in the conclusion. The distinction between 
etiological and non-etiological theories doesn’t map onto the distinction between 
historical and ahistorical theories; rather, these are two ways of being historical. Second, 
given that there are no ahistorical views, a good portion of the arguments that have been 
put forward to date for these theories (those I mentioned above) are unsound. A third 
consequence is that one popular way of thinking about function pluralism must fail. This 
sort of pluralist wishes to sort all biological usage under two main umbrella theories, the 
selected effects theory and the causal role theory. An argument for this sort of pluralism 
is that it mirrors the two main uses of “function” in biology, the historical sense and the 
ahistorical sense. If I’m right, this incarnation of the pluralist project can’t possibly work.  
 
Before I move on, there is one big qualification I must get out of the way. One could, just 
for fun, invent a purely ahistorical theory of function. One could assert, for example, that 
all of a trait’s effects are its functions. This theory (pan-functionalism?) would be 
ahistorical, to be sure, since even if the world were created two seconds ago in pretty 
much its present form, things would still have effects, and so they’d still have functions. 
In fact, sometimes scientists actually do use the word “function” synonymously with 
“effect.” They say things like, “climate change is a function of deforestation,” or “poor 
academic performance is a function of malnutrition.” Clearly, there are some ahistorical 
uses of “function.” But this isn’t the ordinary biological use, which the theories I cite 
above are trying to capture.  
 
So, I need to amend my thesis slightly. Instead of saying that there are no ahistorical 
theories of function, I want to say that any theory of function that satisfies two very 
minimal, very traditional, and largely uncontroversial, adequacy conditions, is also a 
historical theory. First, the theory should capture some distinction between functions and 
accidents (the function of the nose is to help us breathe but not hold up glasses). Second, 
the theory should capture the possibility of malfunctioning or dysfunction. If my heart 
seizes up due to cardiac arrest, it’s failing to perform its function or it’s dysfunctional. All 
of the theorists I engage with in this paper purport to satisfy these two adequacy criteria, 
or something like them, so I’m not begging any questions by insisting on these 
conditions.  
 
Here’s the plan for the rest of the paper. There are five sections. After the introduction, 
I’ll turn to Boorse’s version of the goal-contribution theory, and show how it explicitly 
contains a historical element (Section 2). Then I’ll turn to the propensity theory and show 
how it contains a reference to history, buried inside the idea of a trait’s natural habitat 
(Section 3). I will then show how the causal-role theory, if it is to make any sense of 
dysfunction, must include a reference to history (Section 4). In the conclusion (Section 
5), I’ll reiterate the big consequences for thinking about functions and suggest a better 
way of dividing up theories of function.   
 
2. Boorse’s Goal-Contribution Account 
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Boorse’s view (1976; 1977; 2002), at the most general level, is a goal-contribution 
account. It holds that a trait’s function is just its contribution to a goal. The plausibility of 
this view stems from its ability to reconcile artifact and biological functions in a single 
theory: the function of an artifact depends on its contribution to the goal of its user; the 
function of a biological trait depends on its contribution to the goal of the organism or the 
lineage. Here, I’ll focus on the subclass of functions he calls physiological functions. 
 
For Boorse, the physiological function of a trait is its species-typical contribution to the 
survival and reproductive prospects of an organism (1977, 555; 2002, 72). (To be more 
precise, Boorse carves up species into subgroups based on age and sex; the function of a 
trait is its typical contribution to fitness within the members of that subgroup.) Though he 
doesn’t define a corresponding notion of dysfunction, he defines a closely related notion 
of disease: a disease is simply a state that “reduces one or more functional abilities below 
typical efficacy.” 
 
One of Boorse’s arguments for the superiority of his theory over Wright’s (1973) 
etiological approach, and the selected effects theory of Millikan (1984) and Neander 
(1983), is that his approach makes no reference to history. He advances two arguments 
for the value of this ahistorical approach; one appeals to ordinary biological usage, and 
the other appeals to intuition. First, he says, the goal-contribution account fits ordinary 
biological usage: “in talking of physiological functions, they [that is, pre-Darwinian 
biologists] did not mean to be making historical claims at all. They were simply 
describing the organization of a species as they found it” (1976, 74). The same is true of 
current physiologists, who have “no thought of explaining [a trait’s] history” when they 
assign functions to them (Boorse 2002, 73, emphasis mine). All historical theories of 
function simply miss how physiologists have always used the word “function.” His 
second argument appeals to intuition. He says that intuition revolts against putting history 
into functions, as attested to by his instant lions case. If the lion species sprang into 
existence by “unparalleled saltation,” one would not say that the parts of lions don’t have 
functions (ibid.; also see Boorse 2002, 75). Again, functions can’t be historical.  
 
Neander (1991, 182) raised a now-famous objection against Boorse; she pointed out that 
Boorse’s view, as it stands, can’t make sense of pandemic disease: “dysfunction can 
become widespread within a population…A statistical definition of biological norms 
implies that when a trait standardly fails to perform its function, its function ceases to be 
its function; so that if enough of us are stricken with disease (roughly, are dysfunctional) 
we cease to be diseased, which is nonsense.” Pandemic diseases, moreover, don’t just 
occupy the realm of science fiction, as in P. D. James’ The Children of Men. UV 
radiation poisoning in anurans is a good example of pandemic dysfunction. Sadly, 
climate change might create many more pandemic dysfunctions very soon. A good theory 
of function should at least allow for the conceptual possibility that all, or most, tokens of 
a certain trait in a certain species are dysfunctional (or as Boorse prefers, “diseased”).  
 
Intriguingly, Boorse doesn’t deny the possibility of pandemic disease. Instead, he says 
that in order to make sense of pandemic disease, one has to appreciate function’s 
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historical depth. Specifically, he says that when we consider what is “statistically typical” 
for a trait, we cannot just look at what is typical right now. Rather, we have to consider 
what is typical within a long slice of time that extends far back into the past: “Obviously, 
some of the species’ history must be included in what is species-typical. If the whole 
earth went dark for two days and most human beings could not see anything, it would be 
absurd to say that vision ceased to be a normal function of the human eye (2002, 99).” He 
tells us that this time-slice should be longer than “a lifetime or two,” and might include 
“millennia.”   
 
This is an extraordinary admission, given that much of Boorse’s core argument for his 
view was propped up on the claim that both biology and intuition need purely ahistorical 
functions, uncluttered by history. His admission implies that two of his key arguments for 
the view (cited above), are unsound. First, by his own admission, it’s not the case that 
biologists don’t refer to history; implicitly, when they talk about what’s statistically-
typical, they are talking about history. Second, regardless of whether or not intuition 
supports ahistorical functions, Boorse’s theory doesn’t. It’s just not true, on Boorse’s 
account, that if lions popped into being from an unparalleled saltation, their parts and 
processes would have functions. They wouldn’t, since they don’t have the right history 
(or to be more precise, they have no history at all). True, Boorse’s history isn’t the same 
kind of history that features in the selected effects theory, since it doesn’t refer 
specifically to etiology, but it’s still history, and so his arguments that appeal to the 
ahistoricity of his theory don’t work.  
 
 
3. The Propensity Theory 
 
Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) also developed an influential “ahistorical” theory of 
function, the propensity theory. They reject the selected effects theory (and etiological 
accounts more generally) because the selected effects theory gets the modality of 
functions wrong. In other words, the statement, “functions are selected effects,” if true, is 
contingently true; it might be true on the actual world, but there are possible worlds at 
which it’s false. To illustrate the point, they ask us to consider a world that is pretty much 
the same as ours except that it randomly popped into being five minutes ago. On that 
world, they claim, there would still be functions, just no selected effects (188): “we have 
the intuition that the concept of biological function…[is] not thus contingent upon the 
acceptance of the theory of evolution by natural selection.” This consideration prompts 
the need for an ahistorical theory.  
 
For Bigelow and Pargetter, functions are propensities, or probabilistic dispositions. We 
might quibble over what exactly dispositions are, but any good definition will cite three 
parts: structure, environment, and behavior. Consider the solubility of salt. There is a 
structure, namely, the polar molecular structure composed of sodium and chloride; there 
is an environment, namely, water; there is a behavior, namely, dissolving. When we say 
that salt is disposed to dissolve in water, we’re saying that, if you were to take this 
structure, and put it in this environment, it would perform this behavior.  
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Functions, too, are dispositions. Consider “the function of the heart is to circulate blood.” 
For this statement to be true, there must be a structure (the heart, embedded the right way 
in the circulatory system), an environment (which they call the creature’s natural 
habitat), and a behavior (conferring a fitness boost on the organism). If one were to put 
the structure in its natural habitat, it would increase the fitness of the organism (relative, I 
suppose, to creatures without hearts). The crucial distinction between their view and 
Boorse’s is that in their view, a trait’s function doesn’t depend on actual frequencies of 
performance. A trait needn’t have an actual track record of boosting fitness to have a 
function; a mere propensity will do.  
 
This raises the thorny question of what a creature’s natural habitat is. For they’re clear 
that a creature’s natural habitat isn’t just any environment the creature happens to find 
itself in. Unfortunately, they refuse to define this crucial notion; instead, they brush it off 
as vague, but unproblematically so: “there may be room for disagreement about what 
counts as a creature’s ‘natural habitat;’ but this sort of variable parameter is a common 
feature of many useful scientific concepts” (192). But one could at least form the 
suspicion that if one analyzed this unproblematically vague notion, one would find some 
reference to history tucked away inside of it.  
 
This suspicion is confirmed in the very next paragraph. There, they tell us that, if a 
creature’s environment were to change very suddenly, then “natural habitat” will still 
refer to the old environment, and not the new one (ibid). There’s a time lag built into the 
very idea of a natural habitat. So, for example, if climate change melts enough Arctic ice, 
then, at least for a time, the polar bear’s natural habitat (and by extension, the natural 
habitat of the trait itself, namely, their thick, water-repellant fur) is the icy habitat of yore 
and not the contemporary, denuded one. They take that as given, and I agree.  
 
But why would this be? What makes it the case that this is true, namely, that in cases of 
rapid habitat change, “natural habitat,” at least for a time, refers to the old environment 
and not the new one? What makes it true, I suspect, is that the idea of a natural habitat is 
an intrinsically historical notion. It’s something like the environment within which the 
organism recently survived and thrived. And if that’s not what a natural habitat is, I 
would like to know what it is such that, if a creature’s actual habitat shifts suddenly, the 
natural habitat is still the old one. Just because a concept is vague around the edges, that 
doesn’t exempt one from the obligation to give some sort of analysis.  
 
Hence, I conclude that, contrary to rumor, the propensity theory is not an ahistorical 
theory, or not demonstrably so. But if that’s right, they lose one of the main virtues of the 
view, which is to get the modality of functions right. To be fair, there’s still a sense in 
which their view is ahistorical. What they can do, that the selected effects theorist can’t, 
is to attribute functions to novel traits – so long as that novel trait belongs to the members 
of a species that has been around long enough to have a natural habitat. Suppose a gene 
mutation confers a benefit on an organism, say, pesticide resistance on a flour beetle. I 
suppose they can say that, at the very moment at which it first confers that benefit, the 
gene mutation has a function, namely, to make the beetle withstand a certain pesticide. 
This result, they claim, is “intuitively comfortable” (195). But they can say that only 
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because flour beetles themselves have a history, and so we can talk meaningfully about 
their natural habitats. Moreover, I think they’ll still have a very hard time dealing with 
dysfunction (Neander 1991, 183), as I hope to show in the next section. Finally, I think 
there are good theory-neutral reasons for saying that beneficial traits, on their very first 
appearance, don’t have functions, but rather, whatever benefit they bring is an accident. 
But I won’t argue for that here (see OMITTED).  
 
4. The Causal Role Theory 
 
What about the causal role theory of function? This appears to be a purely ahistorical 
view. The causal role theory says, roughly, that the function of a component of a system 
consists in its contribution, in tandem with the other components, to a system-level 
capacity of interest (Cummins 1975; Craver 2001; Hardcastle 2002). Craver (2001; 2013) 
helpfully elaborates this view by specifying that the part in question must be a component 
of a mechanism. All of the basic ingredients of this theory are ahistorical: capacities, 
components, organization, hierarchy, interests. Even if the world were created five 
minutes ago, in pretty much its present form, things would still have causal role 
functions.  
 
The problem enters when we think about dysfunction. Cummins (1975, 758) insisted that 
functions are dispositions, or capacities: “…to attribute a function to something is, in 
part, to attribute a disposition to it.” The function of a trait token, then, consists in its 
capacity to contribute to a system-level effect. But what if the token in question, through 
defect or disease, loses the capacity, and so can’t contribute to the system-level effect? 
Then, by Cummins’ analysis, it doesn’t have the relevant function – so it can’t 
dysfunction either.  
 
Causal role theorists have, by and large, been silent about how to make sense of 
dysfunctions from this perspective. Almost everything they’ve had to say on that score, 
however, is consistent with the following theme: a trait token dysfunctions when it can’t 
do what other trait tokens generally, or typically, do to contribute to the system-level 
effect of interest. Consider Godfrey-Smith (1993, 200): “Although it is not always 
appreciated, the distinction between function and malfunction can be made within 
Cummins’ framework…If a token of a component of a system is not able to do whatever 
it is that other tokens do, that plays a distinguished role in the explanation of the 
capacities of the broader system, then that token component is malfunctional.” Craver 
(2001, 72), offers the same general line: “…the ascription of a function to a malformed or 
broken part is derivative upon a description of how that type of part (X) fits into a type of 
higher-level mechanism (S). The malformed and broken part can be identified as an X by 
the typical properties and activities of Xs....” This is, at root, to rely on a statistical norm 
for making sense of dysfunction.  
 
This account of dysfunction, like Boorse’s, stumbles when it encounters the problem of 
pandemic dysfunction (Neander 1991). For the modification suggested above implies 
that, if everyone’s heart seized up at once, nobody’s heart would have a function 
anymore, so nobody’s heart would be dysfunctional. The best way to solve this problem, 
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and perhaps the only way, is the way Boorse took, namely, to say that the function of a 
trait is its typical contribution to some system effect, when what’s typical is assessed over 
a chunk of time that stretches back into the past, for at least “a lifetime or two,” and 
perhaps “millennia.” But if causal role theorists take that line, they’d have a historical 
theory.  
 
Craver (2001) and Hardcastle (2002) suggest, all too fleetingly, a different way of 
thinking about dysfunction, one that depends not on statistics, but on our values and 
goals, that is, the values and goals of people who make function attributions. Craver 
(2001, 72) suggests that traits dysfunction when they cannot do what people want them to 
do: “the mechanistic role of the broken part only appears against the fixed backdrop of 
shared assumptions about a type of mechanism within which parts of this type generally 
(or preferably) make important contributions.” The parenthetical remark alludes to a 
substantially new doctrine, one that demands our full concentration. It suggests that 
dysfunction is a mirror of human preferences and goals, of our wishing and wanting. If 
my heart seizes up, it’s dysfunctional, since it’s not doing what I want it to do.  
 
Hardcastle (2002) makes remarks along similar lines. She first says that the function of a 
trait - what it’s “supposed to do,” as she puts it - depends on the goals of the scientific 
discipline that makes the investigation: “The teleological goal for some trait…depends 
upon the discipline generating the inquiry” (153). The palmomental reflex causes a chin 
twitch when you stroke an infant’s palm; it’s just an accident of cortical wiring with no 
deep evolutionary rationale. Still, she says, it has the function of indicating the state of 
brain development in infants, because that’s how biomedical researches use it. She then 
says that something malfunctions just when it cannot do what it’s supposed to do (152). 
The palmomental reflex malfunctions when it can’t indicate the state of brain 
development. Simply put, dysfunction happens when a trait can’t do what we want.    
 
But dysfunctions cannot be reduced to preferences in any straightforward way; this is a 
point that’s been taken for decades (e.g., Boorse 1977, 544; Wakefield 1992, 372), for 
reasons that scarcely need to be rehearsed. I’d prefer not to need sleep and water; I’d 
prefer if nobody had to go through the pain of childbirth or teething, either. But none of 
those things are diseases or dysfunctions. For that matter, I’d prefer if my hands were 
equipped with retractable adamantium claws. The fact that my hands can’t do what I 
want them to do doesn’t make them dysfunctional. If one really wanted to run with this 
value-centered line about dysfunction, one would at least have to add that, in order for a 
trait to dysfunction, it’s not enough that it doesn’t do what I prefer, but I must also have a 
reasonable expectation that it should act in the way that I prefer. But what could possibly 
ground a reasonable expectation that my hand (say) work in a certain way? Only this: 
that hands usually do work in the preferred way. But then we’re back to statistical norms, 
and long historical slices of time. This value analysis of dysfunction isn’t a contender to a 
statistical analysis; instead, the former presupposes the latter.   
 
I’ve walked through three allegedly ahistorical theories of function, and shown that none 
of them are purely ahistorical; they’re tainted with history. The conclusion will say what 
we should do next.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
There are no ahistorical theories of function, at least among those that are usually put 
forward as ahistorical. The first, Boorse’s goal-contribution theory, explicitly refers to 
what is statistically typical for a trait, where what’s typical is assessed over a long 
historical period of time. The second, the propensity theory, refers to the creature’s 
natural habitat, which is implicitly historical. And the third, the causal role theory, can’t 
hope to make sense of dysfunction (or so I argue) without appealing to a statistical norm, 
and thereby (following Boorse) to history. No theory of function will give functions to 
the parts of swamp creatures, instant lions, or anything on worlds that are similar to ours 
except for being randomly generated five minutes ago. The propensity theory, at least, 
can give functions to novel traits as soon as those traits begin benefiting their bearers, as 
long as the population in which the traits emerge has been around for long enough to 
have something like a natural habitat. But even that theory will probably encounter 
problems when it comes to making sense of dysfunction, though I haven’t pushed that 
line in any detail here.   
 
Three immediate consequences follow from this fact. The first is that we should stop 
dividing up theories of function in terms of historical and ahistorical. The second is that 
many of the main arguments for the allegedly ahistorical theories are unsound. Third, one 
popular form of pluralism, which says that there are two main theories of function, 
corresponding to historical and ahistorical uses of “function” in biology, is untenable.  
 
But if we can’t rely on the historical/ahistorical distinction as a way of dividing up 
functions, how should we talk about them? I think it’s best to divide them up into 
etiological and non-etiological (as theorists are sometimes wont to do anyway). But 
there’s a crucial clarification in order: to say a theory is etiological isn’t just to say it’s 
historical. It’s to say that the theory deals specifically with causal history. The theory 
purports to capture the sense in which, when we attribute a function to a trait, we’re 
trying to give a causal explanation for why the trait exists. Most other theories of function 
are non-etiological, in that they do not purport to explain, in a causal sense of “explain,” 
why the trait exists. But they’re still historical.  
 
There’s a twist to this story. I think there are ahistorical theories of function. Consider 
that climate change is a function of deforestation, poor academic performance is a 
function of malnutrition, and wildlife habitat is a function of soil. These notions are 
ahistorical through and through. “Function,” in this context, means little more than 
“effect,” and perhaps (as in the last of the three examples) “helpful effect.” But this tepid 
sense of function isn’t going to sustain a distinction between function and accident, nor 
will it give us any sense of dysfunction. This is the sort of “function” that Bock and von 
Wahlert (1965, 274) were getting at when they equated functions with “all physical and 
chemical properties arising from [the trait’s] form.” It’s also the sort of “function” that 
Neander (2017) describes in her recent discussion of “minimal functions.” But the 
proponents of the allegedly ahistorical theories want functions to do much more than that. 
They are trying to capture the ordinary biological sense (or an ordinary biological sense) 
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of “function,” where functions differ from accidents and sometimes things dysfunction. 
Unfortunately, they can’t have what they want.  
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Abstract
‘Structure’ and ‘function’ are both ambiguous terms. Discriminating different
meanings of these terms sheds light on research and explanatory practice in
molecular biology, as well as clarifying central theoretical concepts in the life
sciences like the sequence–structure–function relationship and its corresponding
scientific “dogmas”.
The overall project is to answer three questions, primarily with respect to
proteins: (1) What is structure? (2) What is function? (3) What is the relation
between structure and function?
The results of addressing these questions lead to an answer to the title
question, what the statement ‘structure determines function’ means.
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1 Introduction
‘Structure’ and ‘function’ are abundantly used terms in biological findings. Frequently,
the conjunct phrase ‘structure and function’ or the directional phrase ‘from structure to
function’ is to be found, indicating that there is a special relation connecting these two
concepts. The strongest form of this relation is found in the frequent statement that
‘structure determines function’. One could easily list several hundreds of references
containing such phrases. However, in order not to blow up the references section, I will
refrain from doing so. Suffice it to say that biologists make highly prominent use of these
concepts in describing their research—molecular biologists, in particular. In this paper, I
attempt to clarify these concepts, address their relation, and discuss the role they play in
molecular biology’s explanatory practice. While these issues can be addressed for many
different biological entities on different levels of organization, I restrict the discussion
primarily to proteins.
What do biologists refer to when they use this phrase? Is there a particular scientific
program or strategy behind the slogan ‘structure determines function’? Despite the
frequent use of this phrase and the concepts to which it refers, a rigorous analysis is
missing. Thus, a philosophical clarification would be a valuable contribution to the
conceptual foundations of biology. One such fundamental concept is the
sequence–structure–function relationship. “The relationships between sequence,
structure, biochemical function and biological role are extremely ill-defined and scant
2
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high quality data are available to allow us to analyse them.” (Sadowski and Jones, 2009,
360)
In this paper, I attempt to close this gap by developing an explication of both
concepts of structure and function as they are used in biological practice and discussing
which relation holds between them. The third component in this “trinity of molecular
biology”—sequence—is the least in need of explication. The standard textbook view
holds that sequence determines structure, and structure determines function. I will focus
on the second relation.
Without reviewing the rich history of these concepts throughout biology at this
point, it is worth noting that functionality and form or structure were thought to be
intimately linked from early on. In the early days of biology at the macroscale, the
structures had to be observed with the naked eye. Thus, the first examples about the
form of bodies or their parts and their functions can be found in physiology and
anatomy, for example Harvey’s notion of the heart’s function to pump blood. From the
scale of physiology to the molecular scale, structure and function are closely related.
What exactly links these two concepts? Is it a determination relation? And if so, which
one is determining the other?
With the invention of microscopes and later the emergence of molecular biology, the
structures and functions under consideration shifted from macroscopic entities to
individual molecules. In fact, molecular biology put the three-dimensional shape of
molecules center stage for explaining biological phenomena. This is the focus of this
paper. In particular, the discussion will be confined to the structure and function of
proteins—with special emphasis on the question whether the former determines the
latter.
3
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2 The ambiguity of ‘structure’
In a first approximation, ‘structure’ and ‘function’ could be interpreted as the most
general or neutral way of describing what molecular biologists are doing in their research
and what their findings are about. These include mainly the three-dimensional shapes of
molecules (or larger cellular structures) and the activities (functions) theses molecules
perform in living cells, biochemical pathways, chemical reactions, or just individual steps
in such mechanisms. The ultimate aim is to explain biological phenomena with
molecular mechanisms, whose entities can be described in physical and chemical terms.
The structure of molecules can be described in terms of physics and chemistry—function,
however, is a concept that does not appear in physics or chemistry. Let’s start by taking
a closer look at the notion of structure.
‘Structure’ is an ambiguous term. Applied to proteins, there is the usual
nomenclature of primary structure (i.e., a protein’s amino acid sequence), secondary
structure (i.e., common structural motifs like α-helices and β-sheets), tertiary structure
(i.e., the three-dimensional shape of a single folded amino acid chain), and quaternary
structure (i.e., the final assembly of a protein if it consists of more than one amino acid
chain). Other structurally important components are post-translational modifications
and prosthetic groups which are not part of its amino acid composition. All these
notions of structure have in common that they are about the molecular composition and
shape of a molecule. One meaning of ‘structure’ denotes the sequence of a polymer, the
other meaning is about the three-dimensional shape of a molecule. As will be discussed
below, another important ambiguity of ‘structure’ allows to denote the organization of
an interaction network. That leaves us with three different meanings of ‘structure’:
4
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(1) the sequence of a polymer, (2) the three-dimensional shape of a molecule, and (3) the
network organization of several biological entities.
While meanings (2) and (3) are candidates for being functional entities, structure as
sequence (1) rather relates the sequences of different polymers (DNA, RNA, and
proteins) and also plays a central role in determining the three-dimensional shape of a
molecule, structure (2). The primary structure of a protein is just the sequence of amino
acids that are put together to form a polypeptide. This amino acid sequence is
determined by the corresponding protein-coding gene, which is first transcribed into
mRNA and then translated into protein by the ribosome. This scheme is known as the
“central dogma of molecular biology”:
DNA → RNA → protein
The arrows might be interpreted as determination relations. The textbook view of
protein structure and function proceeds as follows:
nucleotide sequence → amino acid sequence → protein structure → protein function
Strong evidence supporting the claim that the three-dimensional shape of a protein is
determined by the sequence of amino acids alone was provided by the experiments of
Christian Anfinsen, showing that ribonuclease could, after treatment with denaturing
conditions, regain its form and function (Anfinsen et al., 1961). Later, Merrifield showed
that an in vitro synthesized sequence of amino acids can carry out the enzymatic activity
of ribonuclease, thus gaining its functional form without the aid of any other cellular
component (Gutte and Merrifield, 1971). From this and similar experiments, Anfinsen
5
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built general rules of protein folding as a global energy minimum which depends solely on
the sequence of amino acids (Anfinsen, 1973). This view is known as “Anfinsen’s dogma”.
In 1958, John Kendrew’s lab determined the first actual three-dimensional form of a
protein, myoglobin (Kendrew et al., 1958). The predominant technique to determine
protein structures is still X-ray crystallography (Mitchell and Gronenborn, 2017). Other
techniques include nuclear magnetic resonance, cryogenic electron microscopy, and
atomic force microscopy. X-ray structures in particular have been supporting the view
that there is a unique rigid shape—the protein’s native, functional state—which would
be necessary and sufficient for a protein to carry out its biological function.
To make a long story short, the relation between nucleotide sequence and amino acid
sequence has been generally confirmed (although there are much more complicated
mechanisms to it, e.g., splicing). However, the part concerning the protein shape and
function proves to be much more problematic. That poses a challenge to what Michel
Morange calls “the protein side of the central dogma” (Morange, 2006).
To get from amino acid sequence to three-dimensional structure is known as the
protein folding problem. As the term ‘problem’ suggests, it poses a serious challenge and
remains unsolved to this day. Even though knowledge-based techniques to predict
protein structures from their sequence have become impressively sophisticated,
successful, and reliable, there are good reasons to suspect that the protein problem
might remain unsolved in principle—if the aim is to predict protein folding based on
chemical and physical principles only.
Every two years the best prediction tools are tested in a contest, the Critical
Assessment of protein Structure Prediction (CASP). Based on experimentally
determined structures which are only published after the participants of the contest have
6
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submitted their predictions, the predictions are then compared to the experimental
structure. A similar contest for predicting the functions of proteins exists (Critical
Assessment of Functional Annotation, CAFA), although it is much less developed. But
what is function in the first place?
3 The ambiguity of ‘function’
‘Function’ is also an ambiguous term (Millikan, 1989)—even more so than ‘structure’.
There is a rich history of debates surrounding different notions of function. The term
‘function’ has a long tradition in biology and its philosophy (Allen, 2009). Starting with
Aristotle, activities in biology were interpreted to have a purpose, to be goal-directed
(teleological). The standard example is that the heart’s function is to pump blood. That
the heart also produces noise is not considered to be functional. Classic accounts of
function have been predominantly trying to capture the teleological aspect, for example
(Wright, 1973). However, intentionality is a problematic notion in biology. In another
important account, Robert Cummins (1975) stressed the importance of a component’s
contribution to the system in which it is contained, rather than why natural selection
has favored a certain trait. Although it makes sense in evolutionary biology to have an
account of function that captures the evolutionary developments, molecular biology and
protein science operate with a different notion of function, i.e., mainly biochemical
activity. There seem to be two entirely different questions: What is a structure doing?
And how did this structure evolve to do what it does?
Arno Wouters distinguishes four notions of biological function (Wouters, 2003):
(1) (mere) activity, (2) biological role, (3) biological advantage, and (4) selected effect.
7
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The last two are issues of evolutionary biology, whereas the former two fall within the
molecular biologist’s domain. If function is to be determined by a molecule’s
three-dimensional shape or organization network, only (1) and (2) seem to be the proper
reading of ‘function’ in this context.
Which entities have functions within living organisms? Depending on the level of
organization at which one is operating, one could give a different answer: molecules,
organelles, cells, tissues, organisms, individuals, populations, ecosystems. The most
prevalent candidates in molecular biology are certainly DNA and proteins, although
lipids and other biomolecules play important roles in life processes, too.
Traditionally, functions have been attributed to entire genes (“one gene—one enzyme
hypothesis”). These views are related to the genetic determinsim view of having a gene
for every trait, in which every gene has a function. However, the primary functional
units inside a cell are arguably its proteins. Their biochemical activities and biological
roles depend crucially on their three-dimensional shapes and network organization,
respectively.
One has also to take into account more abstract functional entities, i.e., network
modules. These are also called ‘structures’ but do not refer to the shape of molecules. Its
functions ought to be considered as Wouter’s second notion (biological role), rather than
biochemical activity. “Current ‘systems’ thinking attributes primary functional
significance to the collective properties of molecular networks rather than to the
individual properties of component molecules” (Shapiro, 2011, 129). “[A] discrete
biological function can only rarely be attributed to an individual molecule [. . . ]. In
contrast, most biological functions arise from interactions among many components.”
(Hartwell et al., 1999, C47). Thus, we can attribute functions as biochemical activities to
8
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individual molecules, wheres systems functions (biological roles) are attributed to
organizational structures:
“Finding a sequence motif (e.g., a kinase domain) in a new protein sheds
light on its biochemical function; similarly, finding a network motif in a new
network may help explain what systems-level function the network performs,
and how it performs it.” (Alon, 2003, 1867)
4 Does structure determine function?
Having distinguished between three notions of ‘structure’ and two notions of ‘function’,
what about the statement ‘structure determines function’? Is—in any of its different
readings—a certain structure necessary or sufficient for a certain function?
The common textbook view according to Anfinsen has a clear answer: “the central
dogma of structural biology is that a folded protein structure is necessary for biological
function” (Wright and Dyson, 1999, 322). On first glance, it might appear plausible to
assume that a particular structure (understood as molecular shape) is a necessary
condition for the proper function of a biological structure (i.e., its biochemical activity).
Loss of function is often associated with a loss of the three-dimensional shape of
individual proteins. On the other hand, to go for the “sufficient” direction, changes in
structures often lead to a decrease in functionality, up to a complete loss. Many diseases
for which there are known molecular causes give support to this view. Often it is
alterations in the sequence of DNA that result in changed protein shapes that lead to a
functionality defect of the organism, which is the definition of a “molecular disease”.
Alterations of a protein’s three-dimensional shape, however, do not necessarily lead to
9
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loss of function. In many cases, changes are “silent”, i.e., they don’t cause any alteration
in phenotype. In rare events, changes might even turn out to be “improvements”, which
is the driving force of evolutionary development.
However, evidence has been found in the recent years that a significant portion of
proteins are intrinsically unstructured in order to be functional, see for example
(Forman-Kay and Mittag, 2013). Does the discovery of intrinsically unstructured
proteins challenge the relation between structure and function? “[D]isorder aficionados
are calling for a complete reassessment of the structure-function paradigm” (Chouard,
2011, 151). Some protein domains fold only upon binding to a suitable target. Others,
however, seem to never have an ordered state at all—they remain unstructured even in
their functional state.
That a high similarity in sequence does not guarantee a similarity in structure or
function has been shown by the Paracelsus Challenge: “a one-time prize of $1000, to be
awarded to the first individual or group that successfully transforms one globular
protein’s conformation into another by changing no more than half the sequence” (Rose
and Creamer, 1994, 3). One recent answer to this challenge resulted in the synthesis of
two proteins which have 88% sequence identity but a different structure and a different
function (Alexander et al., 2007).
Contrary to the view described above, the generalization that a stable
three-dimensional structure is necessary or sufficient for a particular function does not
hold. It remains true, however, that there is an intimate correlation between structure
and function. Prediction tools based on this view are a powerful tool. An attempt to
systematically predict the structure and function of proteins based on their amino acid
sequence can be found, for example, in (Roy et al., 2010).
10
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To complicate the picture, codon usage is also important: Zhou et al. (2013) have
shown that the FRQ protein, which is involved in the circadian clock, is using
non-optimal codons, thus translation speed is not optimal. After experimentally
optimizing codon usage, the resulting protein—which has the exact same amino acid
sequence—folds differently and is no longer functional. This shows that amino acid
sequence by itself is not sufficient to determine the three-dimensional structure, let alone
its function. In addition to the correct sequence, the folding process has to take place in
a certain way which is influenced by the usage of codons and thus the availability of
tRNAs, which influences the speed at which the ribosome can proceed translation. Usage
of non-optimal codons gives the nascent polypeptide chain some time for the segments
that have already been translated to fold in a certain conformation. If translation is too
fast, certain intermediate folds which are necessary to reach the final functional
conformation can be lost.
Another idea to keep in mind is that evolution operates pragmatically: structures are
not the target of selection, functions are. Structures are being re-used for novel
functions—there are many biological examples.
If structure does not determine function, if a particular structure (in any of its three
meanings) is neither necessary nor sufficient for a particular function (in any of its two
meanings), may there be another way in which structure and function are related?
Perhaps there is a less stringent relationship? I will argue for a supervenience relation
(McLaughlin and Bennett, 2018). But before developing this account, we need to clarify
which notions of ‘structure’ and ‘function’ to use to capture actual scientific practice in
molecular biology.
In order to speak about biological functions, a reglemented vocabulary is needed.
11
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The most successful of these is gene ontology (GO) (Ashburner et al., 2000). Fascinating
correlation analysis between three-dimensional protein structures from the Protein Data
Bank (PDB) and GO terms can be found, for example, in (Hvidsten et al., 2009) and
(Pal and Eisenberg, 2005).
According to the textbook picture, there is a linear chain of determination, leading
from nucleotide sequences in the DNA via transcription to the nucleotide sequence of
RNA, which leads via translation to the amino acid sequence of proteins. The sequence
of amino acids, in turn, determines the three-dimensional structure of the protein, whose
function, again, is determined by its structure. Given transitivity of this determination
relation, one would only need to know the genomic sequence in order to have a complete
picture (“blue print”) of the functional organism. That is the “holy grail of molecular
biology”. And like the quest for the holy grail, it is doomed to fail. A strict
determination relation does not even hold between the individual pairs.
The reason why the simplified scheme above is still part of the current research
“paradigm” lies, on the one hand, in its scientific success: genomics and proteomics have
provided unimaginable insights. On the other hand, it fits the mechanistic, reductionistic
narrative that has been fashionable in molecular biology. Today, systems biology claims
to provide a “holistic” alternative (Green, 2017).
But even without such a strict determination relation between structure and function,
both concepts are central to explaining molecular mechanisms in research practice.
In order to understand why molecular biologists explain mechanisms with reference
to structure and function, we need to understand what these concepts denote. In a first
approximation, molecular biologists analyze a phenomenon by identifying its components
that are responsible for the phenomenon in question. These components are the
12
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structures that perform certain biochemical activities, which collectively bring about the
phenomenon (biological role). The way in which these entities and their activities are
organized is a different meaning of ‘structure’ which is as important in a mechanistic
explanation as individual molecular structures are.
“Despite the lack of an overarching theory, a Newtonian or quantum
mechanics of its very own, molecular biology has become a unifying discipline
in virtue of the powers of its techniques, its ability to extrapolate from the
molecular to higher levels, and its synthesis of problems of form and function
at the molecular level. This synthesis of form and function is a central,
ill-understood, and historically important feature of molecular biology.”
(Burian, 1996, 68)
The ambiguity of the terms ‘structure’ and ‘function’ might be useful, for it can be
applied to a broad variety of biological research strategies and activities. But, on the
other hand, using the term same for different things causes confusion, and the use of
metaphorical language might be obscuring certain features and difficulties with this
approach.
More recent and thriving approaches in the life sciences have moved beyond the idea
that there is a determination relation between structure and function and that by
knowing the structure of a protein one could predict its biological function. Today’s
research in molecular biology is more centered around the organizational structure of
biological mechanisms. In this way, the ambiguity of the term ‘structure’ suits to uphold
the research slogan, since it can also be applied in a broader sense here than just
molecular shapes. The organization of biological systems is the domain of the relatively
13
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new discipline systems biology.
The three-dimensional shape is often a detail that does not contribute to the
understanding of a mechanism, but to the contrary would only confuse the mechanistic
picture which requires a certain level of abstraction in order to be comprehensive.
But still, how exactly do we get from molecular structures and their (structured)
activities to biochemical activities and biological functions? That there might not exist a
straightforward mapping from molecular shapes to their biochemical and biological
function had been anticipated in the early days of molecular biology:
“It [molecular biology] is concerned particularly with the forms of biological
molecules, and with the evolution, exploitation and ramification of these
forms in the ascent to higher and higher levels of organization. Molecular
biology is predominantly three-dimensional and structural—which does not
mean, however, that it is merely a refinement of morphology. It must of
necessity enquire at the same time into genesis and function.” (Astbury,
1952, 3, original emphasis)
Taking up Francis Crick’s remark that “folding is simply a function of the order of
the amino acids” (Crick 1958, 144), Morange comments that it is “obviously not a simple
function” (Morange, 2006, 522). And he observes a semantic change in the meaning of
‘function’:
“For Francis Crick, function meant the application of simple rules and
principles. For specialists today, function is the result of a complex evolution
[. . . ] This shift in the meaning of a word is more than anecdotal. It reflects
an active ongoing transformation of biology [. . . ] The mechanistic models of
14
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molecular biology are no longer considered sufficient to explain the structures
and functions of organisms. They have to be complemented and allied with
evolutionary explanations” (Morange, 2006, 522).
In order to explain biological phenomena, there is no determination relation that
would allow us to track everything down to the chemical and physical properties of
proteins, let alone the nucleotide sequences of DNA. Of course, all these issues are
relevant to the topic of reduction:
“if [. . . ] regulatory networks turn out to be crucial to explaining development
(and evolution [. . . ]), the reductionist interpretation may be in trouble. If
network-based explanations are ubiquitous, it is quite likely that what will
often bear the explanatory weight in such explanations is the topology of the
network rather than the specific entities of which it is composed. [. . . ] How
topological an explanation is becomes a matter of degree: the more an
explanation depends on individual properties of a vertex, the closer an
explanation comes to traditional reduction. The components matter more
than the structure. Conversely, the more an explanation is independent of
individual properties of a vertex, the less reductionist it becomes.” (Sarkar,
2008, 68, original emphasis)
5 Conclusion
Both terms, ‘structure’ and ‘function’, are highly ambiguous. So is the widely used
conjunct phrase of ‘structure and function’ that is ubiquitous in biology, as well as the
15
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even stonger claim ‘structure determines function’. Perhaps this is why it can be used in
many different contexts and for many different explanatory aims in biology. Although
providing a certain framework of generality, I argue that a clarification of these concepts
is beneficial—for conceptual and philosophical considerations, as well as for the way
biologists think about the grand schemes like the “central dogma”. Ideally, such an
account would also have practical implications and benefit current biological research.
To sum up the results of my analysis, in molecular biology’s explanatory practice,
‘structure’ may refer to:
1. the sequence of polymers,
2. the three-dimensional shape of molecules (or their parts), and
3. the way biological entities are organized.
Of course, different aspects of this distinction play different roles in the explanatory
practice with respect to molecular mechanisms. The detailed shape of the interacting
molecules is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding its activities (although
correlations are valuable prediction tools before doing experiments in the lab).
The ambiguity of the term ‘function’ depends on whether the explanation aims at
answering the question how a mechanism works or how it came to work that way. Even
in the first case one has to distinguish between:
1. the biochemical activity of individual components, and
2. the biological role of network structures.
Whereas biochemical activities of proteins can often be successfully predicted by
homology modeling from known molecular shapes, the biological role is rarely an
16
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intrinsic property of an isolated molecule. Rather, the biological role is the mechanistic
result of an interaction network of several dynamically interacting molecules.
By comparing the combinatorial possibilities of the different meanings of ‘structure’
and ‘function’, a determination relation does not hold between any of them. Instead, I
propose a supervenience relation: between the three-dimensional shapes of protein
domains and their biochemical activities, and between interaction networks and their
biological role. According to my analysis, this is what molecular biologist mean when
they say ‘structure determines function’.
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Abstract
Pre-publication peer review should be abolished. We consider the
effects that such a change will have on the social structure of science,
paying particular attention to the changed incentive structure and the
likely effects on the behavior of individual scientists. We evaluate these
changes from the perspective of epistemic consequentialism. We find
that where the effects of abolishing pre-publication peer review can
be evaluated with a reasonable level of confidence based on presently
available evidence, they are either positive or neutral. We conclude
that on present evidence abolishing peer review weakly dominates the
status quo.
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1 Introduction
Peer review plays a central role in contemporary academic life. It sits at the
critical juncture where scientific work is accepted for publication or rejected.
This is particularly clear when the results of scientific work are communicated
to non-scientists, e.g., by journalists. The question “Has this been peer
reviewed?” is commonly asked, and a positive answer is frequently taken to
be a necessary and sufficient condition for the results to be considered serious
science.
Given these circumstances, one might expect peer review to be an impor-
tant topic in the philosophy of science as well. Peer review should arguably
play a more prominent role in the debate about demarcation criteria (what
separates science from other human pursuits?), as it seems to be used in
practice exactly to differentiate scientific knowledge from other claims to
knowledge, at least by journalists. Yet as far as we know, social-procedural
accounts of science, like the one found in Longino (1990), remain in the
minority and usually do not place great emphasis on peer review in particu-
lar. Aside from this particular debate, there are normative questions about
the proper epistemic role of peer review and more practical questions about
the extent to which it manages to fulfill them, all of which should interest
philosophers of science.
But there has been surprisingly little work on peer review by philoso-
phers of science. Most of what exists has focused on the role of biases in
peer review, see for example Saul (2013, §2.1), Lee et al. (2013), Jukola
(2017), Katzav and Vaesen (2017), and Heesen (2018). We are not aware of
any philosophical discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of peer review
as such (the above examples presuppose its overall legitimacy by discussing
its implementation). Some work along these lines does exist outside of phi-
losophy, either in the form of opinion pieces (Gowers 2017) or occasionally
full-length articles (Smith 2006). Such work tends to be vague about the
normative standard against which peer review or its alternatives are to be
2
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evaluated, something we aim to remedy in section 2.
Here we bring together the work of philosophers of science (especially
social epistemologists of science) who have written about the strengths and
weaknesses of various aspects of the social structure of science and empirical
work about the effects of peer review. We argue that where philosophers of
science have claimed the social structure of science works well, their argu-
ments tend to rely on things other than peer review, and that where specific
benefits have been claimed for peer review, empirical research has so far
failed to bear these out. Comparing this to the downsides of peer review,
most prominently the massive amount of time and resources tied up in it, we
conclude that we might be better off abolishing peer review.
Some brief clarifications. Our target is pre-publication peer review, that
is the review of a manuscript intended for publication, where publication is
withheld until one or more editors deem the manuscript to have successfully
passed peer review. We set aside other uses of peer review (e.g., of grant
proposals or conference abstracts) and we explicitly leave room for post-
publication peer review, where manuscripts are published before review. Be-
cause of this last point, some readers may think that our terminology (‘abol-
ishing pre-publication peer review’) suggests a more dramatic change than
what we actually advocate. We invite such readers to substitute in their
preferred terminology. We should also clarify that we use ‘science’ in a broad
sense to include the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities.
The overall structure of our argument is as follows. We think there are
a number of clear benefits to abolishing pre-publication peer review. In con-
trast, while various benefits of the existing system (downsides of abolishing
peer review) have been suggested, we do not think there exist any that have
clear empirical support. Insofar as empirical research exists, it is ambiguous
in some cases, and speaks relatively clearly against the claimed benefit of the
existing system in others. While we admit to a number of cases where the
evidence is ambiguous or simply lacking (see especially section 5), we claim
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that the present state of the evidence suggests that abolishing pre-publication
peer review would lead to a Pareto improvement: each factor considered is
either neutral or favors our proposal.
Our primary aim here is to evaluate the current system, but we believe
that is only really possible by comparing it to an alternative. We are not
claiming that the proposal we put forward is the best of all possible alter-
natives. It has been constructed to be a system which could constitute a
Pareto improvement over the current system. Given that it has not actually
been implemented yet, we cannot guarantee it would work as advertised or
what empirical properties it would have. But in offering a relatively specific
alternative, we hope to get people thinking about real change, which pointing
out problems with the present system has so far failed to do.
Even despite this proviso, we realize that ours is a strong claim, and our
proposal a large change to the social structure of science. It is therefore im-
portant to highlight that our central claim concerns the balance of presently
available evidence. We are not further claiming that the matter is so con-
clusively settled as to render further research superfluous or wasteful. On
the contrary, we think there are a number of points in our argument where
the presently available evidence is severely limited, and we take the calls for
further empirical research we make in those places to be just as important a
part of the upshot of our paper as our positive proposal. We hope, therefore,
that even a skeptical reader will read on; if not to be convinced of the need
of abolishing pre-publication peer review, then at least to see where in our
view their future research efforts should concentrate if they are to shore up
pre-publication peer review’s claims to good epistemic standing.
2 Setting the Stage
The purpose of peer review is usually construed in terms of quality control.
For example, Katzav and Vaesen (2017, 6) write “The epistemic role of peer
4
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review is assessing the quality of research”, and this seems to be a common
sentiment per, e.g., Eisenhart (2002, 241) and Jukola (2017, 125). But how
well does peer review succeed in its purpose of quality control? The empirical
evidence (reviewed below) is mixed at best. As one prominent critic puts it,
“we have little evidence on the effectiveness of peer review, but we have
considerable evidence on its defects” (Smith 2006, 179).
Peer review’s limited effectiveness would perhaps not be a problem if it
required little time and effort from scientists. But in fact the opposite is
true. Going from a manuscript to a published paper involves many hours of
reviewing work by the assigned peer reviewers and a significant time invest-
ment from the editor handling the submission. The editor and reviewers are
all scientists themselves, so the epistemic opportunity cost of their reviewing
work is significant: instead of reviewing, they could be doing more science.
Given these two facts—high (epistemic) costs and unclear benefits—we
raise the question whether it might be better to abolish pre-publication peer
review. In the following we provide our own survey and assessment of the
evidence that bears on this question. Our conclusions are not sympathetic to
peer review. However, we encourage any proponents of peer review to give
their own assessment. We only ask that any benefits claimed for peer review
are backed up by empirical research, and that they are epistemic benefits,
i.e., we ask for empirical evidence that peer review makes for better science
on science’s own terms.
We take the status quo to be as follows. The vast majority of scientific
work is shared through journal publications, and the vast majority of journals
uses some form of pre-publication peer review. Ordinarily this means that
an editor assigns one to three peers (scientists whose expertise intersects
the topic of the submission), who provide a report and/or verdict on the
submission’s suitability for publication. The peer reviews feed into the final
judgment: the submission is accepted or rejected with or without revisions.
Our proposal is to abolish pre-publication peer review. Scientists them-
5
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selves will decide when their work is ready for sharing. When this happens,
they publish their work online on something that looks like a preprint archive
(although the term “preprint” would not be appropriate under our proposal).
Authors can subsequently publish updated versions that reply to questions
and comments from other scientists, which may have been provided publicly
or privately. Most journals will probably cease to exist, but the business of
those that continue will be to create curated collections of previously pub-
lished articles. Their process for creating these collections will presumably
still involve peer review, but now of the post-publication variety.
Our proposal is in line with how certain parts of mathematics and physics
already work: uploading a paper to arXiv is considered publishing it for
most purposes, with journal peer review and publication happening almost
as an afterthought (Gowers 2017). Indeed, journal publication can function
as something like a prize, accruing glory to the scientist who achieves it but
doing little to actually help spread or diffuse the idea beyond calling attention
to something that has already been made public elsewhere. We are not aware
of any detailed comparative studies of the effects these changes have had in
those fields, so we will not rest any significant part of our argument on this
case. But for those who worry that science will immediately and irrevocably
fall apart without peer review, we point out that this does not appear to
have happened in the relevant parts of mathematics and physics.
In the remainder of this paper we break down the consequences of our
proposal. Our strategy here is to focus on a large number (hopefully all)
aspects of the social structure of science that will be affected. In particular,
the reader may already have a particular objection against our proposal in
mind. We encourage such a reader to skip ahead to the section where this
objection is discussed before reading the rest of the paper.
For example, one reader may think that peer review as currently prac-
ticed is important because it forces scientists to read and review each other’s
work, and without peer review they will spend less time on such tasks. This
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is discussed in section 3.2. Another reader may worry that without peer
review and the journal publications that go with them it will be more diffi-
cult to evaluate scientists for hiring or promotion (section 3.5). Yet another
reader may be concerned about losing peer review’s ability to prevent work
of little merit from being published, or at least to sort papers into journals
by epistemic merit so scientists can easily find good work (section 4.1). A
fourth reader might think peer review plays an important role in detecting
fraud or other scientific malpractice (section 4.2). A fifth reader may think
the guarantee provided to outsiders when something has been peer reviewed
is an important reason to preserve the status quo (section 5.1). And a sixth
reader may want to point out that anonymized peer review gives relatively
unknown scientists a chance at an audience by publishing in a prestigious
journal, whereas on our proposal perhaps only antecedently prominent sci-
entists will have their work read and engaged with (section 5.2).
Other aspects of the social structure of science that will be considered:
whether and when scientists share their work (section 3.1), how many papers
are published by women or men (section 3.3), library resources (section 3.4),
the power of editors as gatekeepers (section 3.6), science’s susceptibility to
fads and fashions (section 4.3), and ways to get credit for scientific work other
than through journal publications (section 4.4). In each case we evaluate
whether the net effects of our proposal on that aspect can be expected to be
positive. To tip our hand: aspects where we will claim a benefit are gathered
in section 3, aspects where we expect little or no change are in section 4,
and aspects that we consider neutral due to a present lack of evidence are in
section 5.
In making these evaluations, we commit to a kind of epistemic consequen-
tialism (cf. Goldman 1999). One may think of what we are doing as roughly
analogous to the utilitarian principle, where for each issue our yardstick is
whether pre-publication peer review shall generate the greatest amount of
knowledge produced in the least amount of time. More specifically, we con-
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sider changes in the incentive structure and expected behaviour of scientists,
as well as other changes that would result from abolishing pre-publication
peer review. We evaluate these changes in terms of their expected effect on
the ability of the scientific community to produce scientific knowledge in an
efficient manner. Working out in detail what such an epistemic consequen-
tialism would look like would be very complicated, and we do not attempt
the task here. For most of the issues we consider, we think that the calculus
is sufficiently clear that fine details do not matter. Where it is unclear (the
issues discussed in section 5) we think this results from ignorance of empirical
facts about the likely effect of policies, rather than conceptual unclarity in
the evaluative metric. So we do not need to use our consequentialist yard-
stick to settle any difficult tradeoffs. All we need for our purposes is to make
it clear that we are evaluating the peer review system by how well it does in
incentivizing efficient knowledge production.
What do we mean by the incentive structure of science, mentioned in the
previous paragraph? This addresses the motivations of scientists. Scientists
are rewarded for their contributions with credit, i.e., with recognition from
their peers as expressed through such things as awards, citations, and presti-
gious publications (Merton 1957, Hull 1988, Zollman 2018). Scientific careers
are largely built on the reputations scientists acquire in this way (Latour and
Woolgar 1986, chapter 5). As a result, scientists engage in behaviors that
improve their chances of credit (Merton 1969, Dasgupta and David 1994,
Zollman 2018).
While individual scientists may be motivated by credit to different degrees
(curiosity, the thrill of discovery, and philanthropic goals are important moti-
vations for many as well), the effect on careers means that credit-maximizing
behavior is to some extent selected for. Thus we think it important to ensure
that our proposal does not negatively affect the incentives currently in place
for scientists to work effectively and efficiently.
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3 Benefits of Abolishing Peer Review
3.1 Sharing Scientific Results
An important feature of (academic) science is that there is a norm of sharing
one’s findings with the scientific community. This has been referred to as the
communist norm (Merton 1942). In recent surveys, scientists by and large
confirm both the normative force of the communist norm and their actual
compliance (Louis et al. 2002, Macfarlane and Cheng 2008, Anderson et al.
2010). This norm is epistemically beneficial to the scientific community, as
it prevents scientists from needlessly duplicating each other’s work.
Will abolishing peer review affect this practice? In order to answer this
question, we need to know what motivates scientists to comply with the
communist norm, that is to share their work. On the one hand there is the
feeling that they ought to share generated by the existence of the norm itself.
There is no reason to expect this to be changed by abolishing peer review.
On the other hand there is the motivation generated by the desire for
credit. According to the priority rule, the first scientist to publish a particular
discovery gets the credit for it (Merton 1957, Dasgupta and David 1994,
Strevens 2003). So a scientist who wants to get credit for her discoveries has
an incentive to publish them as quickly as possible, in order to maximize her
chances of being first. Recent work suggests that this applies even in the
case of smaller, intermediate discoveries (Boyer 2014, Strevens 2017, Heesen
2017b). All of this helps motivate scientists to share their work.
If peer review were to be abolished, the communist norm and the priority
rule would still be in effect, so scientists would still be motivated to share
their work as quickly as possible. However, the following change would occur.
In the absence of pre-publication peer review, scientists would be able to
share their discoveries more quickly. In the current system, peer review can
hold up publication for significant amounts of time, especially in the case of
fields with high rejection rates or long turnaround times. During this time,
9
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other scientists cannot build on the work and may spend their time needlessly
duplicating the work. Cutting out this lag by letting scientists publish their
own work when they think it is ready will speed up scientific progress. While
being faster is not always better (it may increase the risk of error, cf. Heesen
2017c), in this case delays in publication are reduced without any reduction
in the time spent on the scientific work itself.
To some extent this already occurs. Scientists, especially well-connected
scientists, already share preprints that make the community aware of their
work in advance of publication. For people who regularly do this, practi-
cally speaking little would change upon adopting the system we advocate.
However, our proposal turns pre-journal-publication dispersal of work from
a privilege of a well-connected few into the norm for everyone.
On this point, then, abolishing peer review is a net positive, as scientists
will still be incentivized to share their work as soon as possible, but the delays
associated with pre-publication peer review are removed.
3.2 Time Allocation
The current system restricts the way scientists are allowed to spend their
time. For each paper submitted to a journal, a number of scientists are
conscripted into reviewing it, and at least one editor has to spend time on
that paper as well.
On our proposal, scientists would be free to choose how much of their time
to spend reading and reviewing others’ work as compared to other scientific
activities. Some scientists would spend less time reviewing, some scientists
would spend more, and some would spend exactly as much as under the
current system.
For scientists in the latter category our proposal makes no difference,
while for scientists in the other two categories our proposal represents a net
improvement of how they spend their time, at least in their own judgments.
We think people are the best judges of how to use their own time and labor.
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We thus trust scientists’ decisions in these regards, and welcome changes that
would render many scientists’ choices about how to allocate their own labor
independent of the preferences of the relatively small number of editorial
gatekeepers.
So we assume that scientists are well-placed to judge how best to use their
own abilities to meet the community’s epistemic needs. We claim, moreover,
that the reward structure of science is set up so as to make it in their interest
to do so: the credit economy incentivizes scientists to spend their time on
pursuits the epistemic value of which will be recognized by the community
(Zollman 2018). Hence freeing up the way scientists allocate their time leads
to net epistemic benefits to the scientific community.
One might object that journals perform a useful epistemic sorting role,
telling scientists what is worth spending their time on. We will address these
concerns in section 4.1.
One might think that this would lead scientists to spend significantly less
time reading and reviewing others’ work. If this is right, we still think it
would be an overall improvement for the reasons mentioned above. But we
also want to point out that this is not as obvious a consequence as it may
seem. Here are two reasons to expect scientists to spend as much time or more
reading and reviewing on our proposal. First, for many scientists reading and
reviewing are intrinsically valuable and can help their own research. Second,
the current system provides no particular incentive to read and review either:
scientists agree to review only because they independently want to or because
they feel an obligation to the research community. While no one scientist is
conscripted, at the group level editors are going to keep going until they
find someone. This can amount to picking whomever is most weak-willed or
under some extra-epistemic social pressure. It is not obvious that this way
of deciding who does the reviewing has much to recommend it. Any rewards
that exist for reviewing will still exist on our proposal, and may be amplified
by the possibility of making post-publication reviews public.
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3.3 Gender Skew in Publications
Male scientists publish more, on average, than female scientists, a phe-
nomenon known as the productivity puzzle or productivity gap (Zuckerman
and Cole 1975, Valian 1999, Prpić 2002, Etzkowitz et al. 2008). Several ex-
planations have been suggested, none of which are entirely satisfactory (see
especially Etzkowitz et al. 2008, 409–412). Two of these explanations that
are relevant to our concerns here are the direct effects of gender bias and the
indirect effects of the expectation of gender bias.
There is some evidence of gender bias in peer review, although this is
not unambiguous (see Lee et al. 2013, 7–8, Lee 2016, and references therein).
Insofar as there is gender bias—in the sense of women’s work being judged
more negatively by peer reviewers—abolishing peer review will remove this
and help level the playing field for men and women. We expect positive epis-
temic consequences from the removal of these arbitrarily different standards.
While the evidence of gender bias in peer review is not entirely clear-cut,
there is good evidence that women expect to face gender bias in peer review
(see Lee 2016, Bright 2017b, Hengel 2018, and references therein). In an effort
to overcome this perceived bias, women tend to hold their own work to higher
standards. Hengel (2018) provides evidence that women spend more time
correcting stylistic aspects of their paper during peer review, presumably due
to higher expectations of scrutiny on such apparently superficial elements of
their work. On the plausible assumption that if women have higher standards
for each paper they will produce fewer papers overall, this means that the
mere expectation of gender bias can contribute to the productivity gap.
After abolishing peer review both women and men will hold their work
primarily to their own individual standards of quality, and secondarily to
their expectations of the response of the entire scientific community, but not
to their expectations of the opinion of a small arbitrary group of gatekeepers.
We do not know whether this will lead the women to behave more like the
men (producing more papers) or the men to behave more like the women
12
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(holding individual papers to a higher standard of quality). However, in line
with our view above that scientists are well-placed to judge how best to spend
their own time, we take it that any resulting change in behavior will be a net
epistemic positive.
3.4 Library Resources
Journal subscription fees currently take up a large amount of library re-
sources (RIN 2008, Van Noorden 2013). To summarize some key figures
from the 2008 report: research libraries in the UK spent between £208,000
and £1,386,000 on journal subscriptions annually (and that was a decade ago,
with subscriptions having risen substantially since). The cost for publishing
and distributing a paper was estimated to be about £4,000, or about £6.4
billion per year in total. Savings from moving to author-paid open access
were estimated at £561 million, about half of which would directly benefit
libraries.
On our proposal, this is replaced by the cost of maintaining one or more
online archives of scientific publications. The example of existing large
preprint archives like arXiv and bioRxiv suggests that maintaining such
archives can be done at a fraction of the cost currently spent on journal
subscription fees. As a rough guideline, Van Noorden (2013) estimates main-
tenance costs of arXiv at just $10 per article. So our proposal involves
significant savings on library resources, which could be used to expand col-
lections, retain more or better trained staff, or other purposes that would be
of epistemic benefit to the scientific community.
Two additional effects should be considered in relation to this. First,
the fact that the online archive will be open access means that scientific
publications will be available to everyone, not just to those with a library
subscription or some other form of access to for-profit scientific journals.
Second, the fact that any value added by for-profit journals would be
taken away. The two tasks currently carried out by journals that could
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plausibly be supposed to add value to scientific publications are peer review
and copy-editing (Van Noorden 2013). It is the purpose of all other sections
of this paper to argue that peer review does not in fact (provably) add value,
so we set that aside. This leaves copy-editing. We propose that libraries use
some of the funds freed up from journal subscriptions to employ some copy-
editors. Each university library would make copy-editing services available to
the scientists employed at that university. We contend that, after paying for
the maintenance of an online archive and a team of copy-editors, under our
proposal libraries would still end up with more resources for other pursuits
than under the current system.
We note that this particular advantage of our proposal is a bit more
historically contingent than the others. There seems to be no particular
reason why pre-publication peer review has to be implemented through for-
profit journals, and if the open access movement has its way we might be
able to free up these library resources without abolishing pre-publication peer
review. But our proposal also achieves this goal, and so we count it as an
advantage relative to the system as it is currently actually implemented.
3.5 Scientific Careers
The ‘publish or perish’ culture in science has been widely noted (e.g., Fanelli
2010). Universities judge the research productivity of scientists through their
publications in (peer reviewed) journals, with some focusing more on ‘quan-
tity’ (counting publications) and others on ‘quality’ (publishing in prestigious
journals). Scientific journals and the system of pre-publication peer review
thus play an important role in shaping scientific careers. What will become
of this if peer review is abolished?
We note first that the ‘publish or perish’ culture is a subset of a larger
system which we discussed above: the credit economy. Publishing in a jour-
nal is one way to receive credit for one’s work, but there are others, most
prominently citations and awards. Scientific careers depend on all of these,
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with different institutions weighting quantity of publications, quality of pub-
lications, citation metrics, and awards and other honors differently.
Any of these types of credit represents some kind of recognition of the
scholarly contributions of the scientist by her peers. But here we distinguish
two types of credit, which we will call short-run credit and long-run credit.
Getting a paper through peer review yields a certain amount of credit: more
for more prestigious journals, less for less prestigious ones. But this is short-
run credit in the following sense. The editor and the peer reviewers judge
the technical adequacy and the potential impact of the paper, shortly after
it is written. Their judgment is essentially a prediction of how much uptake
the paper is likely to receive in the scientific community.
In contrast, citations (as well as awards, prizes, inclusion in anthologies
or textbooks, etc.) represent long-run credit. They are the uptake the paper
receives in the scientific community. Long-run credit is both a more consid-
ered opinion of the scientific importance of the paper and a more democratic
one (citations can be made by anyone, and awards usually reflect a consen-
sus in the scientific community, whereas peer review is normally done by up
to three individuals). So long-run credit reflects a more direct and better
estimate of the real epistemic value of a contribution to science.
So what would the effect of our proposal be? For better or worse, our
proposal does not make it impossible for universities to use metrics to judge
research productivity. While journal rankings and impact factors would dis-
appear, citation metrics for individual scientists and papers would still be
available. This may mean that universities stop judging their scientists based
on the impact factors of the journals they publish in and start judging them
on the actual citation impact of their papers. More generally, our proposal
will decrease or remove the role of short-run credit in shaping career out-
comes and increase the role of long-run credit, which we take to be a better
measure of scientific importance. So we think this is an improvement on the
status quo.
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What about junior hires and related career decisions, where long-run
credit may be absent or minimal? If abolishing peer review means com-
pletely getting rid of journals and the associated prestige rankings, this robs
hiring departments of some information regarding the scientific importance
of candidates’ work. If this means those on the hiring side need to read and
form an opinion of candidates’ work for themselves, we do not think that is
a bad thing. This would of course take time, but if journals and peer review
are completely abolished, that just means the time spent reviewing the paper
is transferred to the people considering hiring the scientist, which again, we
do not think is a bad thing. In fact, since very few academics are on a hiring
committee year after year, whereas referee requests are a constant feature
while one is in the community, we think that even this added burden when
hiring might still be a net time-saver for academics.
But it does not have to be that way. We never said journals and peer
review have to be completely abolished—our proposal in section 2 explicitly
suggests journal issues may still appear, but as curated collections of articles
based on post-publication peer review. So short-run credit based on jour-
nal prestige need not disappear. It need not even be slower as there is no
particular reason post-publication peer review needs to take longer than pre-
publication peer review. But there is the added advantage that the paper
is already published while it undergoes peer review, so the wider commu-
nity outside the assigned reviewers also has a chance to respond before it is
included in a journal.
3.6 The Power of Gatekeepers
The discussion immediately above touched on another effect, one that we
think is worth bringing out as a benefit of our proposal in its own right. As
mentioned our proposal suggests that in evaluating the importance of scien-
tific work we decrease our reliance on short-run credit (journal prestige), with
a corresponding increase in long-run credit (citations, among other things).
16
Seattle, WA; 1-4 November 2018 -315-
This means that the overall credit associated with a particular paper depends
less on the judgments made by an editor and a small number of reviewers,
and more on its actual uptake in the larger scientific community.
Editors in particular currently play a large role in determining which
scientific work is worthy of attention, as they are a relatively small group
of people with a deciding vote in the peer review process of a large number
of papers. They are often referred to as gatekeepers for this reason (Crane
1967). Our proposal entails significantly decreasing both the prevalence and
importance of this role. By replacing some of this importance with long-run
credit, which comes from the scientific community as a whole, it makes the
evaluation of scientific work a more democratic process. Not only is there
some reason to think that democratic evaluation of scientific claims is more
in line with general communal norms accepted within science (Bright et al.
2018), but general arguments from democratic theory and social epistemology
of science give epistemic reason to welcome the increased independence of
judgment and evaluation this would introduce (List and Goodin 2001, Heesen
et al. forthcoming, Perović et al. 2016, 103–104).
4 Where Peer Review Makes No Difference
In this section we consider a number of aspects of the scientific incentive
structure for which we think a case can be made that abolishing peer review
will leave them basically unaffected. This serves partially to forestall objec-
tions to our proposal that we anticipate from defenders of the peer review
system, and partially to avoid overstating our case—in some of what follows
we argue that abolishing peer review will likely have no effect in cases where
one might have expected it to be beneficial.
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4.1 Epistemic Sorting
Given the stated purpose of peer review mentioned in section 2 the first
and most apparent disadvantage of our proposal is that it would remove
the epistemic filter on what enters into the scientific literature. One might
worry that the scientific community would lose the ability to maintain its
own epistemic standards, and thus the general quality of scientific research
would be reduced. We argue here that despite the intuitive support this idea
might have, the present state of the literature on scientific peer review does
not support it.
Separate out two kind of epistemic standards one may hope that the
peer review system maintains. First, that peer review allows us to identify
especially meritorious work and place it in high profile journals, while ensur-
ing that especially shoddy work is kept from being published. Call this the
‘epistemic sorting’ function of peer review. Second, that peer review allows
for the early detection of fraudulent work or work that otherwise involves
research misconduct. Call this the ‘malpractice detection’ function of peer
review. We deal with each of these in turn.
Let us step back and ask why, from the point of view of epistemic conse-
quentialism, one would want peer review to do any sort of epistemic sorting.
We take the answer to be that epistemic sorting helps scientists fruitfully
direct their time and energy by selecting the best work and bringing it to
scientists’ attention through publication in journals. They read and respond
to that which is most likely to help them advance knowledge in their field.
How could peer review achieve this? One might hope that peer review
functions by keeping bad manuscripts out of the published literature and
letting good manuscripts in. This, however, is a non-starter. There are
far too many journals publishing far too many things, with standards of
publication varying far too wildly between them, for the sheer fact of having
passed peer review somewhere to be all that informative as to the quality of
a manuscript.
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Instead, if peer review is to serve anything like this purpose it must be
because reviewers are able (even if imperfectly) to discern the relative degree
of scientific merit of a work, and sort it into an appropriately prestigious
journal. Epistemic sorting happens not via the binary act of granting or
withholding publication, but rather through sorting manuscripts into journals
located on a prestige hierarchy that tracks scientific merit.
A necessary condition for epistemic sorting to work as advertised is that
reviewers be reliable guides to the merit of the scientific work they review.
Our first critique is that this necessary condition does not seem to be met.
Investigation into reviewing practices has not generally found much inter-
reviewer reliability in their evaluations (Peters and Ceci 1982, Ernst et al.
1993, Lee et al. 2013, 5–6). What this means is that one generally cannot
predict what one reviewer will think of a manuscript by seeing what another
reviewer thought. If there was some underlying epistemic merit scientists
were accurately (even if falteringly) discerning by means of their reviews,
one would expect there to be correlations in reviewers evaluations. However,
this is not what we find. Indeed, one study of a top medical journal even
found that “reviewers. . . agreed on the disposition of manuscripts at a rate
barely exceeding what would be expected by chance” (Kravitz et al. 2010, 3).
Findings like these are typical in the literature that looks at inter-reviewer
reliability (for a review of the literature see Bornmann 2011, 207). The avail-
able evidence does not provide much support for the idea that pre-publication
peer review detects the presence of some underlying quality.
Our second critique of the epistemic sorting idea speaks more directly
to the ideal it tracks. We are not persuaded that the best way to direct
scientists’ attention is to continually alert them to the best pieces of indi-
vidual work, and have them proportion their attention according to position
on a prestige hierarchy. We take it the intuition behind this is a broadly
meritocratic one. This intuition has been challenged by some modeling work
(Zollman 2009). While Zollman retained some role for peer review, his model
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still found that striving to select the best work for publication is not necessar-
ily best from the perspective of an epistemic community; his model favored
a greater degree of randomization.
We do not wish to rest our case on the results of one model which in
any case does not fully align with our argument, but it highlights that the
ideal of meritocracy stands in need of more defense than it is typically given.
We take it that scientists most fruitfully direct their attention to that pack-
age of previous work and results which, when combined, provides them with
the sort of information and perspectives they need to best advance their own
epistemically valuable projects. It is a presently undefended assumption that
this package of work should be composed of works which are themselves indi-
vidually the most meritorious work, or that paying attention to the prestige
hierarchy of journals and proportioning one’s attention accordingly will be
useful in constructing such a package. Hence, even if it did turn out that the
peer review system could sort according to scientific merit, it is an under-
appreciated but important fact that this is not the end of the argument.
Further defense of the purpose of this kind of epistemic sorting is needed
from the point of view of epistemic consequentialism.
Before moving on we note a potential objection. Even if one did not think
that peer review was detecting some underlying quality or interestingness,
one might think that the process of feedback and revision which forms part
of the peer review system would be beneficial to the epistemic quality of
the scientific literature. In this way epistemic sorting may have a positive
epistemic effect even if it fails in its primary task.
However, this returns us to the points regarding gatekeepers and time
allocation from section 3. We are not opposed to scientists reading each
other’s work, offering feedback, and updating their work in light of that.
This can indeed lead to improvements (Bornmann 2011, 203), though in this
context it is worth noting the results of an experiment in the biomedical
sciences, which found that attempting to attach the allure of greater prestige
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to more epistemically high caliber work did little to actually improve the
quality of published literature (Lee 2013). Fully interpreting these results
would require discussion of the measures of quality used in such literature.
We do not intend to do that here, since we do not intend to dispute the point
that it is desirable for scientists to give feedback and respond to it.
We would expect this sort of peer-to-peer feedback to continue under a
system without pre-publication peer review. Curiosity, informal networking,
collegial responsibilities, and the credit incentives to engage with others’ work
and make use of new knowledge before others do; these would all be retained
even without pre-publication peer review. What would be eliminated is the
assignment of reviewing duties to papers that scientists did not independently
decide were worth their time and attention, and the necessity of giving uptake
to criticism (in order to publish) independently of an author’s own assessment
of the value of that feedback.
We thus conclude that, from the point of view of epistemic consequen-
tialism, there is presently little reason to believe that a loss of the epistemic
sorting function of pre-publication peer review would be a loss to science.
Inclusion in the literature does not do much to vouch for the quality of a pa-
per; the evidence does not favor the hypothesis that reviewers are selecting
for some latent epistemic quality in order to sort into appropriate journals;
and the ideal underlying the claimed benefits of epistemic sorting is dubious.
While peer reviewers do give potentially valuable feedback, there is no partic-
ular reason to think that changes in how scientists decide to spend their time
would make things worse in this regard, and (per our arguments in section 3)
some reason to think that they would make things better.
4.2 Malpractice Detection
The other way peer review might uphold epistemic standards is through
malpractice detection. However, once again, the literature does not support
this. A number of prominent cases of fraudulent research managed to sail
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through peer review. Upon investigation into the behavior of those involved
it was found there was no reason to think that peer reviewers or editors were
especially negligent in their duties (Grant 2002, 3). Peer reviewers report
unwillingness to challenge something as fraudulent even where they have
some suspicion that this is so, and avoid the charge (Francis 1989, 11–12).
A criminologist who looked into fraudulent behavior in science reported that
“virtually no fraudulent procedures have been detected by referees because
reading a paper is neither a replication nor a lie-detecting device” (Ben-
Yehuda 1986, 6). A more recent survey of the evidence found, at the least,
no consistent pattern in journals’ self-reported ability to detect and weed out
fraudulent results (Anderson et al. 2013, 235).
Even if the prospect of peer review puts some people off committing
fraud, the fact that it is so unreliable at detecting fraud suggests that this is
a very fragile deterrence system indeed. Even this psychological deterrence
would be rapidly undermined by more adventurous souls, or those pushed by
desperation, since many would quickly learn that pre-publication peer review
is a paper tiger.
Conversely, there are various ways for malpractice detection to operate in
the absence of peer review. These include motive modification (Nosek et al.
2012, Bright 2017a), encouraging post-publication replication and scrutiny
(Bruner 2013, Romero 2017), and the sterner inculcation of the norms of sci-
ence coupled with greater expectation of oversight among coworkers (Braxton
1990). All of these methods of deterring fraud or meliorating its effects would
still be available under our proposal.
What evidence we now have gives little reason to suppose that abolishing
pre-publication peer review is any great loss to malpractice detection. Thus
in this regard our proposal would make no great difference to the epistemic
health of science. Combining this with the discussion of epistemic sorting, we
conclude there is presently no reason to believe pre-publication peer review
is adding much value to science by upholding epistemic standards.
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4.3 Herding Behavior
Where above we argued that pre-publication peer review is not making a
positive difference often claimed for it, in this section we downplay a po-
tential benefit of our proposal. A consistent worry about scientific behavior
is that it is subject to fads or, in any case, some sort of undesirable herd-
ing behavior (see, e.g. Chargaff 1976, Abrahamson 2009, Strevens 2013). A
natural thought is that pre-publication peer review encourages this, since by
its nature it means that to get new ideas out there one must convince one’s
peers that the work is impressive and interesting. It has thus been claimed
that pre-publication peer review encourages unambitious within-paradigm
work that unduly limits the range of scientific activity (Francis 1989, 12).
Reducing the incentive to herd might thus be claimed as a potential benefit
of our proposal. However, we are not convinced that it is pre-publication
peer review that is doing the harmful work here.
As mentioned above, our proposal eliminates or significantly reduces the
importance of short-run credit, the credit that accrues to one in virtue of
publishing in a (more or less prestigious) scientific journal. Long-run credit,
on the other hand, is left untouched. Under any sort of credit system, a
scientist needs to do work that the community will pay attention to, build
upon, and recognize her for. The mere fact that (she believes that) her peers
are interested in a topic and liable to respond to it is thus still positive reason
to adopt a topic. This is true even if the scientist would not judge that topic
to be the best use of her time if she were (hypothetically) free from the social
pressures and constraints of the scientific credit system.
The best that could be said about our proposal in this regard is that
scientists would not specifically have to pass a jury of peers before getting
their work out there. But given that we anticipate continued competition for
the attention of scientific coworkers, it is hard to say what the net effect in
encouraging more experimental or less conformist scientific work would be.
Whatever conformist effects the credit incentive has (see also the discus-
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sion immediately below) do not depend on whether it is short- or long-run
credit one seeks. The conformism comes from the fact that credit incentives
focus scientists’ attention on the predicted reaction of their fellow scientists
to their work. Pre-publication peer review might make this fact especially
salient by bringing manuscripts before a jury of peers before they may be
entered into the literature. But even without pre-publication peer review the
credit-seeking scientist must be focused on her peers’ opinions. So there is
no particular reason to think that removing the pre-publication scrutiny of
manuscripts will free scientists from their own anticipations of the fads and
fashions of their day.
4.4 Long-Run Credit
We end this section by noting that many of the effects of the credit economy of
science studied by social epistemologists really concern long-run credit rather
than the short-run credit affected by retaining or eliminating pre-publication
peer review. This point is not restricted to herding behavior.
For instance, social epistemologists have studied both the incentive to
collaborate, and various iniquities that can arise when scientists do not start
with equal power when deciding who shall do what work and how they
shall be credited (Harding 1995, Boyer-Kassem and Imbert 2015, Bruner
and O’Connor 2017, O’Connor and Bruner forthcoming). Whether or not
manuscripts would have to pass pre-publication peer review in order to enter
the scientific literature, there would still be benefits in the long run to col-
laboration, and (alas) there would still be social inequalities that allow for
iniquities to manifest in the scientific prestige hierarchy.
For another example, social epistemologists have studied the ways in
which the credit incentive encourages different strategies for developing a
research profile or molding one’s scientific personality to be more or less risk-
taking (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009, Alexander et al. 2015, Thoma 2015).
Once again, pre-publication peer review plays no particular role in the analy-
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sis. The incentives to differentiate oneself from one’s peers (without straying
too far from the beaten path) and to mold one’s personality accordingly exist
independently of pre-publication peer review.
Two especially influential streams of work in the social epistemology of
science have been the study of the division of cognitive labor (Kitcher 1990,
Strevens 2003), and the role of credit in providing a spur to work in situations
with a risk of under-production (Dasgupta and David 1994, Stephan 1996).
These two streams have directed the focus of the field, and have formed some
of the chief defenses of the credit economy of science as it now stands (but
see Zollman 2018, for a more critical take).
We mention them here because pre-publication peer review or short-run
credit again plays no particular role in the analyses offered by these papers.
What drives their results is scientists’ expectation that genuine scientific
achievement will be recognized with credit. As we have argued above, it
is long-run credit that best tracks genuine scientific achievement, and so it
is long-run rather than short-run credit that grounds scientists’ expectation
in this regard. So in social epistemologists’ most prominent defenses of the
credit economy of science, long-run credit (while not named such) is the
mechanism underlying the claimed epistemic benefits of the credit economy.
5 Difficulties For Our Proposal
We have discussed some benefits that would predictably accrue from abol-
ishing peer review and some ways in which its apparent benefits are either
under-evidenced or better attributed to the effects of long-run credit, which
our proposal leaves untouched. We now discuss some cases which we take to
be more problematic for our proposal—but by this point we hope to have at
least convinced the reader that pre-publication peer review rests on shakier
theoretical grounds than its widespread acceptance may lead one to suppose.
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5.1 A Guarantee For Outsiders
One purpose pre-publication peer review serves is providing a guarantee to in-
terested but non-expert parties. Science journalists, policy makers, scientists
from outside the field the manuscript is aimed at, or interested non-scientists
can take the fact that something has passed peer review as a stamp of ap-
proval from the field. At a minimum, peer review guarantees that outsiders
are focusing on work that has convinced at least one relatively disinterested
expert that the manuscript is worthy of public viewing. Given that there are
real dangers to irresponsible science journalism or public action that is seen to
be based on science that is not itself trustworthy (Bright 2018, §4), and that
it is hard for non-experts to make the relevant judgment calls themselves,
having a social mechanism to provide this kind of guarantee for outsiders is
useful.
It is difficult to predict in advance what norms would come to exist for
science journalists in the absence of pre-publication peer review. We thus first
and foremost call for empirical research on this issue, possibly by studying
what has happened in parts of mathematics and physics that already operate
broadly along the lines we suggest (Gowers 2017).
However, against the presumption that things would be worse, we have
two points to make. As the recent replication crisis has made clear, the
value of peer review as a stamp of approval should not be overstated. There
are reasons to doubt that peer review reliably succeeds in filtering out false
results. We give three of them. First, peer reviewers face difficulties in
actually assessing manuscripts—and just about anything can pass peer re-
view eventually—as discussed under the heading of ‘epistemic sorting’ in sec-
tion 4.1. Second, there are problems with the standards we presently use to
evaluate manuscripts, in particular with the infamous threshold for statistical
significance used in many fields (Ioannidis 2005, Benjamin et al. 2018). And
third, deeper features of the incentive structure of science make replicabil-
ity problems endemic (Smaldino and McElreath 2016, Heesen 2017c). Using
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peer review as a stamp of approval may just be generating expert overcon-
fidence (Angner 2006), without the epistemic benefits of greater reliability
that would back this confidence up.
For the second part of our reply, recall that it is only pre-publication
peer review that we seek to eliminate. We do not object to post-publication
peer review resulting in papers being selected for inclusion in journals which
mark the community’s approval of such work, ideally after due and broad-
based evaluation. If some such system were implemented then outsiders could
use inclusion in such a journal as their marker of whether work is soundly
grounded in the relevant science.
If such a stamp of approval from a journal or other communally recog-
nized institution only comes a number of months or years after something is
first published then we would expect it to represent a more well-considered
judgment. Note that this would not necessarily slow the diffusion of knowl-
edge as under the present system the same paper would have spent time
hidden from view going through pre-publication peer review. The end re-
sult might not even be all that different from what happens in the present
system, except that post-publication peer review would take into account
more of the response or uptake from the wider scientific community. Thus it
would more closely approximate the considered judgment of the community,
as ultimately reflected in the long-run credit accorded to the paper.
5.2 A Runaway Matthew Effect
The second problem we are less confident we can deal with is that of ex-
acerbating the Matthew effect. This is the phenomenon, first identified by
Merton (1968), of antecedently more famous authors being credited more for
work done simultaneously or collaboratively, even if the relative size or skill
of their contribution does not warrant a larger share of the reward. Arguably
the present system helps put a damper on the Matthew effect, allowing a ju-
nior or less prestigious author to secure attention for their work by publishing
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in a high profile journal. Without such a mechanism to grab the attention of
the field, perhaps scientists would just decide what to pay attention to based
on their prior knowledge of the author or recommendation from others. This
would strengthen the effects of networks of patronage and prestige bias fa-
voring fancy universities. Thus squandering valuable opportunities to learn
from those who were not initially lucky in securing a prestigious position or
patronage from the already established.
While some have defended the Matthew effect (Strevens 2006), we will not
go that route in defending our proposal for two reasons. First, the Matthew
effect can perpetuate iniquities that themselves harm the generation and
dissemination of knowledge (Bruner and O’Connor 2017). Second, even if it
could be justified at the level of individual publications, its long-term effects
are epistemically harmful. The scientific community allocates the resources
necessary for future work on the basis of its recognition of past performance.
So if there is excess reward for some and unfair passing over of others at
the present stage of inquiry, this will ramify through to future rounds of
inquiry, misallocating resources to people whose accomplishments do not
fully justify their renown (Heesen 2017a). Hence on grounds of epistemic
consequentialism we take seriously the problem of a runaway Matthew effect.
As mentioned, due to the pressures of credit-seeking and their own cu-
riosity, scientists would still have incentive to read others’ work and adapt it
to suit their own projects. There is always a chance that valuable knowledge
may be gathered from the work of one who has been ignored, which could
provide an innovative edge. To some extent this creates opportunities for ar-
bitrage: if the Matthew effect ever became especially severe there would be a
credit incentive to specialize in seeking out the work of scientists who are not
getting much attention. The lesson here is that the Matthew effect can only
ever be so severe, before the credit incentive starts providing counter-veiling
motivations.
However, this does not fully solve our problem. Moreover, so long as
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resource allocation is tied to recognition of past performance the differences
in recognition generated by the Matthew effect can and often do become
self-fulfilling prophesies, as those with more gain the resources to do better
in the future, and those without are starved of the resources necessary to
show their worth.
It is not clear where to go from here. From the above it may seem like
a solution would be to pair our proposal with a call to loosen the connec-
tion between recognition of a scientist’s greatness based on their past per-
formance and resource allocation. Indeed, this may well be independently
motivated (Avin forthcoming, Heesen 2017a, §6). However, even short of this
far-reaching change, we feel at present that this matter deserves more study
rather than any definitive course of action.
Our present thought is that this is a very speculative objection, and there
is no empirical evidence to back up the claim that eliminating pre-publication
peer review will have dire consequences in this regard. In particular, while
the present system may (rarely) allow a relative outsider to make a big splash,
the common accusation of prestige bias in peer review (Lee et al. 2013, 7)
suggests that on the whole pre-publication peer review may contribute to the
Matthew effect rather than curtailing it.
More specifically, the Matthew effect can be made worse by peer review
when anonymity breaks down in ways that systematically favor antecedently
famous scientists. If this gives famous scientists more opportunities to publish
papers, then our system may provide welcome relief, since it allows more
people to get their papers out there. Hence whether our proposal makes the
Matthew effect worse or better depends on whether the stronger influence
would be who gets into the conversation (for which pre-publication peer
review can exacerbate the Matthew effect), or who gets listened to once the
conversation has begun (for which our proposal looks more problematic).
Presently we cannot say which is the more significant effect. So, while we
grant that a runaway Matthew effect may occur under our system, we prefer
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to stress that at this point it is just not known whether the Matthew effect
will be worse with or without pre-publication peer review.
What we propose is a large change, involving freeing up a lot of time and
opening it up to more self-direction on the part of scientists, and it is not clear
what sort of institutional changes it would be paired with. With more study
of epistemic mechanisms designed especially to promote the work of junior
or less prestigious scientists there might be found some way of surmounting
the problem of a runaway Matthew effect, should it arise. Ultimately, only
empirical evidence can settle these questions. Given the clear benefits and
the unclear downsides of our proposal, we hope at minimum to inspire a more
experimental attitude towards peer review.
6 Conclusion
Pre-publication peer review is an enormous sink of scientists’ time, effort,
and resources. Adopting the perspective of epistemic consequentialism and
reviewing the literature on the philosophy, sociology, and social epistemology
of science, we have argued that we can be confident that there would be
benefits from eliminating this system, but have no strong reasons to think
there will be disadvantages. There is hence a kind of weak dominance or
Pareto argument in favor of our proposal.
To simplify things, imagine forming a decision matrix, with rows cor-
responding to ‘Keeping pre-publication peer review’ and ‘Eliminating pre-
publication peer review’. The columns would each be labeled with an issue
studied by science scholars which we have surveyed here: gender bias in the
literature, speed of dissemination of knowledge, efficient allocation of scien-
tists’ time and attention, etc. For each column, if there is a clear reason to
think that either keeping or eliminating pre-publication scientific peer review
does better according to the standards of epistemic consequentialism, place
a 1 in the row of that option, and a 0 in the other. If there is no reason to
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favor either according to present evidence, put a 0 in both rows.
Our present argument could then be summarized with: as it stands,
the only 1s in such a table would appear in the row for eliminating pre-
publication peer review. We thus advocate eliminating pre-publication peer
review. Journals could still exist as a forum for recognizing and promoting
work that the community as a whole perceives as especially meritorious and
wishes to recommend to outsiders. Scientists would still have every reason
to read, respond to, and consider the work of their peers; pre-publication
peer review is not the primary drive behind either the intellect’s curiosity or
the will’s desire for recognition, and either of those suffice to motivate such
behaviors.
The overall moral to be drawn mirrors that of our invocation of the im-
portance of long-run over short-run credit. The best guarantor of the long
run epistemic health of science is science: the organic engagement with each
others’ ideas and work that arises from scientists deciding for themselves how
to allocate their cognitive labor, and doing the hard work of replicating and
considering from new angles those ideas that have been opened up to the
scrutiny of the community. All this would continue without pre-publication
peer review, and the best you can say for the system that currently uses up
so much of our time and resources is that it often fails to get in the way.
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Epistemic	Loops	and	Measurement	Realism	
Alistair	M.	C.	Isaac	
	
Abstract	
Recent	philosophy	of	measurement	has	emphasized	the	existence	of	both	
diachronic	and	synchronic	“loops,”	or	feedback	processes,	in	the	epistemic	
achievements	of	measurement.		A	widespread	response	has	been	to	conclude	
that	measurement	outcomes	do	not	convey	interest-independent	facts	about	
the	world,	and	that	only	a	coherentist	epistemology	of	measurement	is	viable.		
In	contrast,	I	argue	that	a	form	of	measurement	realism	is	consistent	with	
these	results.		The	insight	is	that	antecedent	structure	in	measuring	spaces	
constrains	our	empirical	procedures	such	that	successful	measurement	
conveys	a	limited,	but	veridical	knowledge	of	“fixed	points,”	or	stable,	interest-
independent	features	of	the	world.	
	
	
§1		Introduction	
	
Recent	philosophy	of	measurement	has	employed	detailed	case	studies	to	
highlight	the	complex,	iterative	process	by	which	measurement	practices	are	
refined.		Typically,	these	examples	are	taken	to	support	some	form	of	epistemic	
coherentism,	on	which	the	validation	of	measurement	procedures,	and	thus	their	
epistemic	import,	is	irreducibly	infected	by	the	contingent	history	of	their	
development	in	aid	of	human	interests.		This	coherentism	in	turn	undermines	
measurement	realism,	the	view	that	outcomes	of	successful	measurement	
practices	veridically	represent	objective	(i.e.	interest-independent)	features	of	
the	world.		For	instance,	van	Fraassen	(2008)	takes	the	historical	contingency	of	
measurement	practice	to	support	empiricism,	and	Chang	(2012)	argues	that	only	
a	pragmatic,	interest-relative	“realism”	about	measurement	outcomes	is	
plausible,	not	one	which	interprets	them	as	corresponding	to	objective	features	
in	the	world.		More	generally,	Tal	(2013)	identifies	coherentism	as	a	major	trend	
within	contemporary	philosophy	of	measurement.	
	 I	argue	that	the	iterative	and	coherentist	features	of	measurement	
practice	these	authors	rightly	emphasize	are	nevertheless	consistent	with	
realism	about	measurement	outcomes.		Nevertheless,	my	position	contrasts	
significantly	with	that	of	other	measurement	realists,	such	as	Byerly	and	Lazara	
(1973)	or	Michell	(2005),	who	take	measurement	realism	to	be	continuous	with		
global	scientific	realism.		On	their	view,	measurement	realism	is	a	stronger	
position	than	traditional	realism,	imputing	reality	not	only	to	theoretical	objects	
and	laws,	but	also	to	their	quantitative	character.		The	view	defended	here	
reverses	this	priority,	articulating	a	realism	about	measurement	outcomes	
weaker	than	traditional	realism.		In	particular,	I	argue	that	the	convergent	
assignment	of	increasingly	precise	values	that	constitutes	successful	
measurement	serves	as	incontrovertible	evidence	for	fixed	points	in	the	world	—	
features	or	events	standing	in	stable	quantitative	relationships	—	even	though	
the	evidence	it	provides	for	any	non-numerical	theoretical	description	of	these	
points	is	defeasible.		The	insight	here	is	that	measurement	is	more	evidentially	
demanding	than	traditional	confirmation,	i.e.	it	requires	a	greater	contribution	
from	the	interest-independent	world	to	succeed	than	mere	qualitative	
experiments.		I	argue	that	this	greater	evidential	demand	is	a	consequence	of	the	
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antecedent	numerical	structure	in	which	measurement	outcomes	are	
represented.		This	antecedent	structure	blocks	the	possibility	of	gerrymandered	
categories	that	crosscut	the	joints	of	nature.		Consequently,	successful	
measurement	constitutes	a	substantive	enough	epistemic	achievement	that	we	
may	legitimately	“factor	out”	the	contribution	to	success	made	by	human	
interests,	and	accept	the	outcome	as	representing	an	objective	feature	of	the	
world.			
	 After	surveying	the	motivations	for	measurement	coherentism,	I	
elaborate	on	the	notion	of	“successful”	measurement,	and	why	it	poses	a	
challenge	to	coherentism.		The	paper	concludes	with	a	more	careful	articulation	
of	the	distinctive	features	of	fixed	point	realism.	
	
§2	Epistemic	Loops	in	Measurement	Practice	
	
	 Contemporary	measurement	coherentism	is	motivated	by	two	types	of	
case	study,	each	identifying	a	different	kind	of	epistemic	“loop,”	or	feedback	
process	driving	knowledge	formation.		Chang	and	van	Fraassen	emphasize	
diachronic	examples	of	epistemic	iteration,	where	the	feedback	process	extends	
over	several	stages	of	mutual	influence	between	theory	change	and	refinement	
of	measurement	practice.		A	different	kind	of	epistemic	loop	has	been	discussed	
by	Tal	and	metrologist	Mari,	who	highlight	the	role	of	models	in	the	calibration	
of	measurement	instruments	and	the	assignment	of	quantity	values,	illustrating	
a	synchronic	epistemic	interdependence	between	theory	and	measurement.	
	
§2.1	Epistemic	Iteration	
	
	 Chang	(2004)	defines	epistemic	iteration	as	“a	process	in	which	successive	
stages	of	knowledge,	each	building	on	the	preceding	one,	are	created	in	order	to	
enhance	the	achievement	of	certain	epistemic	goals”	(45).		He	takes	this	process	
to	support	a	“progressive	coherentism”:	on	the	one	hand,	the	criteria	for	
measurement	success	are	internal	to	a	practice,	so	scientific	knowledge	does	not	
rest	on	an	independent	foundation;	on	the	other	hand,	these	internal	criteria	
may	be	used	to	evaluate	new	practices	as	improvements	or	refinements	on	their	
predecessors,	thereby	allowing	for	scientific	progress	(in	contrast	to	traditional	
coherentism,	Chang	2007).		In	the	context	of	measurement,	this	means	that	later	
measurement	practices	may	be	understood	as	in	some	sense	“better”	than	earlier	
ones,	yet	these	“epistemic	achievements”	should	not	be	cashed	out	as	greater	
degree	of	correspondence	to	quantities	in	the	world.		
	 For	instance,	thermometry	as	a	practice	begins	with	subjective	
assignments	of	relative	heat	on	the	basis	of	our	bodily	experiences.		Noticing	that	
fluids	appear	to	change	volume	in	rough	correspondence	with	these	subjective	
sensations,	one	may	construct	a	thermoscope,	or	device	allowing	comparison	of	
relative	fluid	volumes	in	different	circumstances.		Already	a	theoretical	leap	is	
required	to	identify	the	cause	of	these	changes	in	relative	volume	with	the	cause	
of	our	differing	subjective	sensations,	especially	given	the	discrepancies	between	
these	sensations	and	our	thermoscopic	readings	(e.g.	contrary	to	experience,	
caves	are	warmer	in	summer	than	they	are	in	winter).		Nevertheless,	the	move	to	
the	thermoscope	constitutes	an	epistemic	achievement,	in	the	sense	that	it	
allows	for	greater	regularity	in	the	assignment	of	relative	temperatures,	both	
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across	contexts	and	across	observers.		A	similar	pattern	is	seen	in	the	move	from	
thermoscope	to	thermometer,	which	enables	assignment	of	numbers	to	
temperatures.		Numerical	representation	constitutes	a	yet	greater	epistemic	
achievement,	insofar	as	it	allows	comparison	of	temperature	assignments	across	
devices.		Nevertheless,	this	practice	does	not	itself	guarantee	greater	veracity	of	
temperature	assignments,	since	it	rests	on	the	assumption	that	temperature	
varies	linearly	with	changes	in	the	height	of	thermometric	fluid.		But	this	
assumption	cannot	itself	be	verified,	as	that	would	require	access	to	temperature	
in	the	world	by	some	means	independent	of	thermometry.		Similar	
achievements,	(seemingly)	inextricably	entangled	with	theory,	may	be	seen	at	
each	further	stage	in	the	development	of	thermometric	practice.	
	 The	moral	of	this	case	study	is	the	historical	contingency	of	thermometry,	
and	thus	of	its	results.		At	each	stage	in	the	development	of	thermometry,	an	
advance	in	theory	was	required	to	extend	measurement	practice.		Internal	
criteria	of	consistency	and	increased	precision	in	the	assignment	of	numerical	
values	establish	the	new	practice	as	an	advance	over	the	previous	one.		Yet,	the	
application	of	these	criteria	is	not	empirically	constrained.		When	one	assumes	
that	“temperature”	(whatever	it	may	be)	varies	linearly	with	changes	in	the	
height	of	the	indicator	column	in	an	air	thermometer,	one	is	making	an	
assumption	both	necessary	for	measurement	progress	and	in	principle	non-
empirical,	since	no	independent	access	to	“temperature,”	outside	the	behavior	of	
the	very	devices	and	procedures	under	investigation,	is	possible:	“Prior	to	the	
construction	of	a	thermometer,	there	is	no	thermometer	to	settle	that	question!”	
(van	Fraassen	2008,	126,	emphasis	in	original).		Chang	(2004)	argues	that,	in	
order	to	make	sense	of	the	“progress”	exemplified	by	cases	like	these,	we	have	to	
“look	away	from	truth,”	and	appeal	only	to	historically	contingent	criteria	for	
success	(227)—“scientific	progress	…	cannot	mean	closer	approach	to	the	truth”	
(228);	“Truth,	in	the	sense	of	correspondence	to	reality,	is	beyond	our	reach”	
(Chang	2007,	20).		The	delusion	that	one	may	evaluate	the	correspondence	
between	our	assignment	of	temperatures	and	the	objective	state	of	the	world	
rests	on	the	mistaken	and	“impossible	god-like	view	in	which	nature	and	theory	
and	measurement	practice	are	all	accessed	independently	of	each	other”	(van	
Fraassen	2008,	139).		Rather,	the	only	relevant	notion	of	“truth”	for	assessing	the	
success	of	thermometry	“rests	first	and	foremost	on	coherence	with	the	rest	of	
the	system”	(Chang	2012,	242).	
	 	
§2.2	Models	and	Calibration	
	 		
	 Another	kind	of	epistemic	loop	is	found	in	synchronic	measurement	
practice,	where	models	play	a	constitutive	role	in	determining	measurement	
outcomes.		The	crucial	concept	here	is	calibration,	the	process	of	correcting	a	
measurement	device	for	inferred	discrepancies	between	its	readout	and	the	
target	value.		Calibration	is	a	necessary	feature	of	all	sophisticated	measurement,	
yet	the	process	of	calibration	illustrates	the	ineliminable	role	of	theoretical	
posits	in	the	very	assignment	of	quantity	values	in	an	act	of	measurement.		When	
measuring,	scientists	do	not	(as	one	might	naively	suppose)	read	values	directly	
from	nature,	rather	they	employ	models	of	the	interaction	between	
measurement	device	and	target	system	in	order	to	“correct”	the	readout	value	to	
a	final	assigned	value	(Mari	and	Giordani	2014).			
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	 Tal	(2014)	illustrates	this	point	through	the	example	of	the	measurement	
of	time,	in	particular	coordinated	universal	time	(UTC).	The	second	is	presently	
defined	as	9,192,631,770	periods	of	the	hyperfine	transition	between	the	two	
ground	states	of	a	caesium-133	atom	at	zero	degrees	Kelvin.1		Models	feature	at	
every	step	of	the	process	leading	from	devices	that	interact	directly	with	caesium	
atoms	to	the	UTC.		First,	it	is	impossible	to	probe	caesium	atoms	at	absolute	zero,	
so	the	enumeration	of	hyperfine	transitions	output	by	a	caesium	clock	must	be	
corrected	for	this	discrepancy.		This,	as	well	as	other	corrections,	rely	on	models	
of	the	physical	interaction	between	the	device	and	the	atom	in	order	to	infer	the	
discrepancy	between	the	actual	state	of	the	system	and	the	idealized	state	
referred	to	in	the	definition.		Caesium	clocks	are	too	complex	to	run	
continuously,	so	their	output	is	used	to	calibrate	more	mundane	atomic	clocks	
(301).		Furthermore,	the	UTC	itself	is	not	identified	with	the	output	of	any	one	
clock;	rather,	it	is	calculated	retrospectively	by	a	weighted	average	over	all	
participating	atomic	clocks,	with	weights	determined	by	the	degree	of	past	fit	
between	each	clock	and	previous	calculations	of	UTC	(302–3).			
	 The	lessons	of	this	example	are	analogous	to	those	of	epistemic	iteration:	
measurement	improvement	appears	to	rest	on	internal	standards	of	coherence	
rather	than	on	correspondence	with	external	quantities.		The	weighting	
procedure	that	leads	to	UTC,	for	instance,	“promotes	clocks	that	are	stable	
relative	to	each	other”	(304).		Success	at	achieving	this	stability	indeed	
demonstrates	“genuine	empirical	knowledge,”	but	not	knowledge	in	the	first	
instance	about	a	regularity	in	the	objective	world,	but	rather	a	regularity	“in	the	
behaviour	of	instruments”	(327).		Consequently,	it	is	a	“conceptual	mistake”	to	
think	that	“the	stability	of	measurement	standards	can	be	analysed	into	distinct	
contributions	by	humans	and	nature”	(328).		On	an	extreme	interpretation	of	
this	view,	even	computer	simulation	constitutes	a	form	of	measurement	
(Morrison	2009).		The	basic	idea	is	that,	once	we	grant	the	ineliminable	role	of	
models	in	measurement,	it	is	a	small	conceptual	step	to	accept	that	the	aspect	of	
measurement	involving	empirical	contact	with	the	world	may	be	arbitrarily	
distant	from	that	involving	modeling	(Parker	2017).	
	
§3	Achieving	Successful	Measurement	
	
For	the	remainder	of	this	paper,	I	wish	to	grant	the	basic	descriptive	features	of	
this	account:	both	diachronically	and	synchronically,	successful	measurement	
involves	epistemic	loops.		Nevertheless,	I	will	argue,	there	is	a	form	of	
measurement	realism	consistent	with	these	loops;	one	on	which	the	contingent,	
interest-relative,	and	theory-laden	aspects	of	measurement	may	indeed	be	
factored	out,	leaving	the	bare,	objective	facts	about	the	world	conveyed	by	
successful	measurement.	
																																																								
1	Arguably,	the	process	of	establishing	UTC	is	not	measurement	at	all	—	since	the	length	of	the	
second	is	defined	by	caesium-133	transitions,	it	is	not	subject	to	empirical	determination.		The	
purpose	of	the	project	Tal	examines	is	not	to	establish	a	value,	as	in	paradigmatic	cases	of	
measurement,	but	rather	to	coordinate	time-relevant	activities	across	the	globe	with	maximal	
precision.		I	set	this	concern	aside	for	the	discussion	here,	since	Tal’s	analysis	has	been	so	
influential	in	philosophy	of	measurement,	and	his	conclusions	concerning	the	model-mediation	
of	measurement	incontrovertibly	reflect	the	practices	of	metrologists.	
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	 But	what	is	“successful	measurement”?		For	the	purposes	of	discussion	
here,	I	take	measurement	to	be	any	empirical	procedure	for	assigning	points	(or	
regions)	in	a	metric	space	to	states	of	the	world,	where	a	metric	space	is	any	set	
of	elements	with	a	distance	metric	defined	over	it.		This	means,	on	the	one	hand,	
that	I	rule	out	degenerative	forms	of	“measurement”	that	simply	assign	objects	
to	categories,	or	place	them	in	an	order	(the	nominal	and	ordinal	scales	of	
Stevens	1946).		On	the	other	hand,	I	include	measurement	procedures	that	map	
states	of	the	world	into	any	geometrical	space,	not	just	the	real	line,	so	long	as	
they	have	an	assigned	distance	metric	(siding	with	Suppes,	et	al.	1989,	against	
Díez	1997);	nevertheless,	in	the	interests	of	simplicity,	I	will	refer	to	these	
outcomes	as	“numerical”	assignments,	since	they	may	be	represented	by	vectors	
of	real	numbers.		In	line	with	Krantz	et	al.	(1971),	I	take	it	that	one	can	determine	
whether	or	not	an	empirical	procedure	constitutively	requires	the	metric	
features	of	a	geometrical	space	by	analyzing	whether	these	remain	invariant	
across	permissible	transformations	over	the	mapping	into	that	space.2	
	 I	take	successful	measurement	to	exhibit	two	key	features:	convergence	
and	precision.		These	features	pose	a	significant	challenge	to	the	thoroughgoing	
coherentist.	
	 	
§3.1	Convergence	
	
Coherentists	have	emphasized	the	theory-ladenness	of	both	diachronic	and	
synchronic	aspects	of	measurement	refinement.		However,	a	hallmark	of	
sophisticated	scientific	measurement	is	its	attempt	to	factor	out	the	role	of	
theory	in	measurement	by	employing	different	theoretical	commitments	to	
measure	the	same	quantity.		A	measurement	practice	converges	when	
procedures	employing	different	theoretical	commitments	arrive	at	the	same	
outcome.	
	 For	instance,	in	the	early	20th	century,	a	wide	variety	of	phenomena	were	
investigated,	employing	distinct	methods	and	theoretical	commitments,	in	the	
attempt	to	measure	Avogadro’s	constant	NA,	the	number	of	particles	in	a	mole	of	
substance.		Perhaps	most	well-known	are	Perrin’s	experiments	on	Brownian	
motion,	which,	in	combination	with	Einstein’s	theoretical	analysis,	allowed	an	
assignment	of	value	to	NA.		However,	similar	values	were	achieved	by	radically	
different	means.		For	instance,	Millikan	was	able	to	determine	NA	by	measuring	
charge	of	the	electron	through	his	oil	drop	experiments	and	dividing	the	Faraday	
constant	(charge	of	a	mole	of	electrons)	by	his	result.		Millikan’s	measurement	
relied	on	Stokes’	theoretical	analysis	of	the	movement	of	spheres	through	a	
viscous	fluid	—	insofar	as	Brownian	motion	was	a	factor,	it	was	as	a	source	of	
noise,	not	(as	for	Perrin)	a	source	of	evidence.		Black	body	radiation	and	the	blue	
																																																								
2	For	instance,	consider	two	procedures	for	assigning	real	numbers	to	my	students.		On	the	first,	I	
assign	a	number	to	each	letter-type	with	which	a	student’s	name	begins	(e.g.	A=1,	B=3,…);	on	the	
second,	I	hold	a	meter	stick	up	to	each	student	and	note	their	height.		The	former	procedure	is	
indifferent	to	the	algebraic	structure	of	the	real	line	(letters	do	not	add	or	subtract	from	each	
other	systematically),	and	thus	metric	features	of	the	real	line	are	not	invariant	across	
alternative,	equally	permissible	assignments	of	numbers	(e.g.	A=7,	B=15,…).		The	second	does	
make	use	of	algebraic	structure	(as	heights	do	“add”	through	concatenation),	and	thus	metric	
features	remain	invariant	across	alternative	assignments	(Jamal	is	twice	the	height	of	Leslie,	
whether	their	heights	are	represented	in	inches	or	centimeters).		So,	on	the	present	definition,	
the	latter	procedure	is	measurement,	but	the	former	is	not.	
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of	the	sky	are	examples	of	other	phenomena	that,	when	combined	with	
theoretical	models	of	photon	emission	and	diffraction	respectively,	allow	
alternate	means	of	measuring	NA.		Insofar	as	these	procedures	assign	the	same	
value	to	NA,	they	converge.	
	 I	want	to	stress	that	the	point	being	made	here	is	not	the	traditional	
realist	one,	that	these	practices	provide	converging	evidence	for	the	particulate	
nature	of	matter,	whether	as	“common	cause”	(Salmon	1984)	or	most	likely	
hypothesis	(Psillos	2011).		Those	arguments	are	instances	of	abduction,	while	I	
am	interested	in	whether	a	stronger,	non-abductive	conclusion	may	be	drawn	
from	convergence.		A	better	analogy	is	with	the	discussion	of	robustness	in	the	
modeling	literature:	a	result	is	robust	if	it	is	obtained	by	a	plurality	of	models	
that	each	make	different	simplifying	assumptions	(Weisberg	2006).		The	
particulate	nature	of	matter	is	not	robust	in	this	sense	across	different	
measurement	practices,	since	it	is	assumed	by	all	of	them.		However,	the	value	of	
NA	is	robust,	since	that	value	is	not	itself	assumed,	and	is	obtained	with	a	great	
degree	of	agreement	despite	differences	in	the	assumptions	made	by	each	
measurement	practice	(and	its	supporting	models).		I	claim	that	convergence	
toward	this	value	provides	robust,	non-abductive	evidence	for	an	objective	
feature	of	the	world.	
	 This	example	is	in	no	way	exceptional:	convergent	measurement	
practices	are	rife	across	the	sciences.		Smith	and	Miyake,	for	instance,	have	
investigated	a	number	of	examples.		Thomson’s	convergent	measurements	of	the	
charge	of	the	electron	employed	a	variety	of	different	methods	and	assumptions	
(Smith	2001).		Early	attempts	to	measure	the	density	of	the	interior	of	the	earth	
likewise	assumed	a	variety	of	different	theoretical	models	(Miyake	2018).		In	
more	recent	research,	measurements	of	the	constants	that	govern	molecular	
vibration	converge	across	spectroscopy,	chemistry,	thermodynamics,	and	
femtochemistry	(Smith	and	Miyake,	manuscript).		To	pick	an	example	from	an	
entirely	different	area	of	science,	measurements	of	the	spectral	sensitivity	of	
mammalian	retinal	receptors	employing	psychophysical	methods	(extracting	
sensitivity	curves	from	behavioral	color	matching	experiments,	as	performed	by	
Helmholtz	in	the	late	19th	century)	converge	closely	with	20th	century	
physiological	methods	(detecting	rate	of	nerve	firing	in	(e.g.)	cow	retinal	tissue	
in	response	to	single	wavelength	lights,	Wandell	1995).		In	all	of	these	cases,	
“What	is	being	shown	through	the	convergence	of	these	measurements	is	that	
the	discrepancies	between	the	different	measurements	…	are	due	to	the	
particularities	of	the	models	being	used”	(Miyake,	2018,	336).		In	other	words,	
convergence	factors	out	model-sensitive	features	of	measurement;	in	order	for	it	
to	occur,	“the	empirical	world	has	to	cooperate”	(Smith	2001,	26).	
	
§3.2	Precision	
	
Traditionally,	measurement	success	was	evaluated	with	respect	to	two	features:	
accuracy	and	precision.		Accuracy	was	degree	of	approach	to	true	value,	while	
precision	was	degree	of	specificity	in	the	value	provided.		The	considerations	in	
§2	undermine	the	criterion	of	accuracy,	since	they	show	we	have	no	independent	
access	to	“true	values”	and	thus	cannot	use	them	as	standards	for	evaluating	
measurement	(Mari	2003).		Nevertheless,	we	can	still	assess	measurements	for	
precision,	since	it	may	be	defined	operationally:	a	measurement	is	precise	to	the	
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extent	that	it	returns	the	same	result	when	performed	repeatedly.		The	number	
of	significant	figures	in	a	numerical	assignment	indicates	the	degree	of	
measurement	precision,	since	these	characterize	the	size	of	the	region	within	
which	repeated	measurements	fall.	
	 Coherentists	stress	the	fact	that	increased	precision	is	a	purely	internal	
criterion	for	improving	measurement.		Here,	however,	I	want	to	stress	the	way	in	
which	increased	precision	constitutes	a	qualitatively	different,	and	more	
impressive,	epistemic	achievement	than	other	forms	of	empirical	success,	such	
as	qualitative	prediction	or	improved	coherence	of	classification.		These	
qualitative	achievements	are	subject	to	worries	about	semantic	and	theoretical	
holism:	one	may	always	succeed	in	classification,	or	correct	qualitative	
prediction,	by	suitably	redrawing	the	boundaries	of	one’s	theoretical	concepts.		
As	LaPorte	(2004)	argues,	when	faced	with	anomalies	in	the	relationship	
between	guinea	pigs	and	prototypical	rodents,	or	birds	and	dinosaurs,	scientists	
face	a	choice	whether	to	expand	or	contract	their	previous	categories	to	include	
or	exclude	perceived	outliers	(a	similar	case	is	made	by	Slater	2017	for	Pluto	and	
planethood).		Nothing	about	the	prior	conceptual	framework	itself	forces	this	
choice	one	way	or	another,	nor	do	demands	for	internal	consistency.	
	 Measurement	is	different	from	mere	categorization	precisely	because	it	
maps	states	into	a	metric	space.		The	crucial	point	to	note	here	is	that	a	metric	
space	has	antecedent	structure:	the	distances	between	points	on	the	real	line,	and	
the	algebraic	relationships	between	them,	are	fixed	before	we	employ	it	to	
represent	height	or	temperature	or	electric	charge.		This	antecedent	structure	
constrains	the	relationship	between	measurement	outcomes,	independently	
restricting	our	assessment	of	them	as	same	or	different,	or	converging	or	not,	in	
a	manner	impervious	to	ad	hoc	revision.		Increase	in	precision	occurs	when	
successive	measurement	practices	are	able	to	shrink	distances	(between	
repeated	measurements	within	each	practice)	determined	by	the	metric	of	the	
representing	space.		Thus,	the	metric	of	this	space	serves	two	functions:	(i)	it	
represents	the	distances	between	different	measured	quantities,	but	(ii)	it	also	
provides	a	directed	metric	for	improving	measurement	of	a	single	quantity,	since	
it	determines	the	distances	between	repeated	measurements	that	characterizes	
their	precision.		Consequently,	pace	van	Fraassen,	attempts	to	increase	precision	
are	empirically	constrained,	since	this	directed	metric	for	improvement	can	only	
be	satisfied	through	the	cooperation	of	nature:	if	nature	is	not	sufficiently	stable	
where	we	probe	it,	no	choice,	convention,	or	increased	coherence	can	reduce	the	
distances	between	our	repeated	attempts	to	measure	it.		Some	examples	will	
illustrate	this	point.	
	 Consider,	for	instance,	determinations	of	the	boiling	point	of	water.		
Chang	(2004,	Ch.	1)	surveys	the	sequence	of	choice	points	in	the	early	practice	of	
thermometry	leading	to	relative	stability	in	the	measurement	of	this	
temperature:	what	are	the	visual	indicators	of	boiling,	where	should	the	
thermometer	be	positioned,	what	should	be	the	shape	of	the	vessel	holding	the	
water,	its	material,	etc.3		Decisions	on	each	of	these	points	affect	the	relative	
stability	in	the	thermometric	reading,	illustrating	the	naivety	of	a	view	on	which	
																																																								
3	The	issue	here	is	the	phenomenon	of	“superheating,”	whereby	water	with	relatively	little	
dissolved	gas,	or	in	a	flask	with	very	small	surface	area,	may	be	heated	to	a	higher	temperature	
without	bubbling.	
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boiling	point	is	a	simple	phenomena	merely	waiting	to	be	observed.		
Nevertheless,	in	committing	to	represent	the	boiling	point	numerically,	
investigators	subjected	themselves	to	a	criterion	for	success	distinct	from	
coherence.		If	the	numbers	assigned	by	thermometers	within	this-shaped	vessels	
and	that-shaped	ones	differ	during	phenomenologically	similar	bubblings,	then	
the	distance	between	those	numbers	provides	a	criterion	of	difference	that	must	
be	respected	if	thermometric	practice	is	to	count	as	measurement.		Restricting	
attention	to	those	vessels	that	minimize	distances	between	numerical	outcomes	
is	thus	not	a	mere	choice,	or	gerrymandering	of	the	category	“boiling,”	since	it	is	
forced	upon	the	investigator	by	an	antecedent	metric	for	success.		
	 Likewise,	consider	again	the	determination	of	UTC	through	the	
retrospective	weighting	of	the	comparison	set	of	atomic	clocks.		For	Tal,	the	
success	of	this	procedure	is	evidence	for	stability	in	our	clocks,	but	not	for	any	
human-independent	feature	of	the	world.		Nevertheless,	UTC	is	constrained	by	
the	world	in	two	distinct	ways.		First,	through	empirical	contact	with	caesium	
atoms.		While	this	contact	is	mediated	by	models,	these	models	themselves	are	
the	result	of	convergent	measurements	of	atomic	phenomena	through	a	wide	
variety	of	means,	employing	distinct	theoretical	assumptions.		Second,	the	
distance	metric	of	the	real	line	constrains	the	assessment	of	fit	between	clocks	in	
the	set.		While	the	algorithm	that	weights	them	takes	degree	of	internal	
agreement	as	the	standard	for	higher	weighting,	the	metrical	structure	of	the	
space	in	which	relative	rates	of	the	clocks	are	assessed	ensures	relative	
agreement	cannot	be	stipulated,	fudged,	or	gerrymandered.		The	clocks	need	to	
cooperate	by	performing	stably	enough	that	they	may	be	compared	with	a	high	
degree	of	precision,	and	this	stable	point	remains	tethered	to	a	robust	regularity	
in	the	world	through	checks	with	the	convergent	behavior	of	caesium.	
	 While	UTC	is	in	some	respects	atypical	(see	footnote	1),	these	three	
features	—	internal	coordination	of	outcomes,	empirical	checks,	and	directed	
improvement	constrained	by	the	real	line	—	are	features	of	scientific	
measurement	in	general.		What	Tal’s	discussion	of	the	UTC	obscures	is	the	sheer	
number	of	empirical	checks	typically	involved,	and	the	strictness	of	the	demands	
placed	by	conformity	to	the	metric	of	improvement	the	measuring	space	
provides.		In	official	determinations	of	fundamental	physical	constants,	
convergence	is	demanded	across	all	measurement	procedures,	as	assessed	by	
the	law-governed	interrelationship	between	physical	quantities,	and	the	degree	
of	precision	achieved	illustrates	the	strictness	of	this	demand.		For	instance,	in	
late	19th	century	measurements	of	NA	by	Perrin	and	e	(charge	of	electron)	by	
Thomson,	only	2	to	3	significant	figures	were	typically	obtained	within	method,	
and	convergence	across	methods	often	only	agreed	as	to	order	of	magnitude.		By	
1911,	Millikan	was	measuring	both	e	and	NA	to	4	significant	figures,	and	
demonstrating	that	the	models	employed	to	calibrate	the	oil	drop	method	
converged	closely	with	other	aspects	of	physical	theory	(1911).		As	of	2014,	NA	
was	being	measured	at	upwards	of	9	significant	figures,	and	e	upwards	of	11	
(Mohr	et	al.	2016).4		In	each	case,	the	increase	in	precision	has	been	constrained	
by	the	antecedent	structure	of	the	real	line,	and	thus	is	not	itself	a	matter	of	mere	
convention	or	coherence.		Rather,	the	world	must	cooperate	by	remaining	
																																																								
4	It	is	expected	that	after	the	2018	26th	General	Conference	on	Weights	and	Measures,	NA	and	e	
will	be	fixed	as	constants	to	which	other	quantities	may	be	referred	during	measurement.		
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sufficiently	stable	if	such	precision	is	to	be	possible;	consequently,	precise	values	
constitute	robust	evidence	for	points	of	objective	fixity	in	the	world	revealed	
through	measurement.	
	
§4	Conclusion:	Fixed-Point	Realism	
	
Traditional	scientific	realism	rests	on	an	abductive	inference	from	observed	
empirical	success	to	presumed	underlying	causes.		Successful	measurement	may	
certainly	be	used	in	such	an	inference,	but	I	claim	here	that	it	non-abductively	
supports	a	more	modest	realism:			
	
Fixed	Point	Realism	–	values	obtained	through	successful	measurement	
veridically	represent	objective	fixed	points	in	the	world,	which	may	be	
exhaustively	characterized	by	the	pattern	of	distances	that	obtain	
between	them	in	a	metric	space.	
	
FPR	is	a	form	of	epistemic	structural	realism.		It	differs	from	traditional	realism	
insofar	as	it	claims	a	veridical	characterization	of	the	world	is	possible	
independent	of	any	particular	theoretical	description.		Our	theory	of	the	nature	
of	temperature	or	of	state	changes	may	change	radically,	yet	the	points	of	
relative	stability	characterizing,	e.g.,	boiling	point	of	water,	“absolute	zero,”	
freezing	point	of	oxygen,	etc.,	will	stay	robust	across	any	such	change,	and	that	
robustness	may	be	represented	by	their	relative	positions	within	a	numerical	
scale.			
	 FPR	differs	from	other	flavors	of	structural	realism	in	the	type	of	
structure	to	which	it	is	committed.		Structural	realists	typically	focus	on	the	rich	
mathematical	structure	of	physical	theory,	and	derivation	or	limit	relations	that	
hold	between	successive	theories,	e.g.	Newton’s	laws	are	a	limit	case	of	
relativistic	mechanics	(Worrall	1989).		FPR	commits	itself	only	to	geometric	
structure,	i.e.	the	pattern	of	relative	distances	that	obtain	between	points	of	
stability	as	represented	in	a	metric	space.		Just	as	our	theoretical	description	of	
these	stable	points	may	change,	so	may	our	mathematical	account	of	their	
relationship	—	if	new	mathematical	physics	fails	to	derive	old	equations	as	limit	
cases,	this	in	no	way	jeopardizes	the	veridicality	of	this	geometric	structure.	
	 Finally,	FPR	disagrees	with	coherentism,	insofar	as	it	asserts	that	the	
geometrical	structure	uncovered	through	acts	of	successive	measurement	
obtains	in	the	world	independent	of	our	practices.		It	does	not	deny	the	
importance	of	epistemic	loops	for	understanding	the	process	of	measurement.		
Nevertheless,	it	takes	convergence	in	measured	values	to	indicate	that	the	points	
of	stability	they	represent	obtain	independent	of	the	theoretical	commitments	
encapsulated	in	the	models	used	for	calibration.		Likewise,	it	takes	increased	
precision	to	constitute	a	criterion	for	measurement	success	over	and	above	that	
of	coherence,	one	that	is	only	realized	when	the	interest-independent	world	
cooperates	with	us	by	remaining	stable	when	we	probe	it.	
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The relationship between intervention and representation is currently resurfacing 
in philosophy of science. Analytical treatments of the specific intersections between 
representation and intervention have recently been explored in Hacking (1983), Radder 
(2003), Heidelberger (2003), van Fraassen (2008), and Keyser (2017). These accounts 
analyze intervention-based experimental and measurement practice and the consequences 
for representing and model-building. Of particular interest in my discussion is that some 
of these accounts explicitly differentiate between representational and productive roles in 
scientific practice. For example, Heidelberger (2003) and van Fraassen (2008) discuss the 
representational and productive roles of instruments in experiment and measurement. In 
the former role, relations in a natural phenomenon are represented in an instrument (van 
Fraassen 2008, 94). In the latter role, instruments create new phenomena or mimetic 
phenomena, which resemble natural phenomena. Keyser (2017) takes the distinction 
between representation and production a step further to differentiate two types of 
experimental/measurement methodologies:  
When scientists measure/experiment they can take measurements, in which 
case the primary aim is to represent natural phenomena. Scientists can 
also make measurements, in which case the aim is to intervene in order 
to produce experimental objects and processes—characterized as ‘effects’. 
(Keyser 2017, 2) 
On Keyser’s account ‘taking a measurement’ involves a scientist using a result in the 
context of theory to represent a given phenomenon (2017, 9-15). In contrast, ‘making a 
measurement’ involves setting up experimental conditions to produce a phenomenon—
where that phenomenon can be realized in nature but it can also be a brand new 
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phenomenon (Keyser 2017, 10). The difference between these two methodologies 
seems to be a matter of passive representation of a phenomenon vs. active intervention 
to produce a phenomenon. While the distinction between representation and 
intervention has been useful in classifying methodology in well-documented contexts 
like thermometry, microscopy, and cellular measurement, I argue that it falls apart in 
contexts where taking and making are entangled—such as in the context of biomarker 
measurement in the biomedical sciences.  
In this discussion, I aim to show that in complex methodological contexts, 
representational and intervention-based roles require re-conceptualization. I analyze the 
relations between representation and intervention by focusing on the role of 
intervention in mediating representations. In Section 2, I show how applied scientific 
practice challenges the simple distinction between representational and intervention-
based roles of experiment/measurement. In Section 3, I discuss the complex interaction 
between representation and intervention applied to methodology in biomarker 
measurement.  
 
2. Methodology at the Intersection between Intervention and Representation 
In order to understand why the distinction between representation and 
intervention needs a multifaceted approach, it is important to be explicit about what it 
means to represent and intervene in scientific practice. In Section 2.1, I draw on van 
Fraassen (2008) to discuss representation and both van Fraassen (2008) and Keyser 
(2017) to discuss intervention. Then in Section 2.2, I show how applied scientific practice 
challenges the simplistic distinction between representational and intervention-based 
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roles of experiment/measurement. I argue that the distinction between intervention and 
representation is less about specific types of methodologies in measurement/experiment 
and more about where one philosophically partitions the measurement process. 
 
2.1. Representation and intervention 
In experimental and measurement practice, representation has at least three 
important components: First, instruments or experimental contexts yield measurement 
values; Second, those values can only be interpreted within the context of a well-
developed theory; and third, the relation between the measurement values and the 
phenomenon is determined by a user (e.g., experimenter). Van Fraassen (2008) provides 
a rich characterization of representation in measurement and experiment, which requires 
careful analysis. Worth noting is that van Fraassen takes measurements to be a “special 
elements of the experimental procedure” (2008, 93-94). For my discussion the 
embeddedness of measurement in experiment is not important. I will focus on the roles 
or processes within measurement and experimental practice. But to do this, I will 
sometimes refer to ‘measurement’ and other times to ‘experiment’. Van Fraassen’s 
characterization focuses on interaction and representation in measurement: 
A measurement is a physical interaction, set up by agents, in a way that allows 
them to gather information. The outcome of a measurement provides a 
representation of the entity (object, event, process) measured, selectively, by 
displaying values of some physical parameters that—according to the theory 
governing this context—characterize that object. (2008, 179-180) 
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For van Fraassen, measurement interaction between an object of measurement and 
apparatus generates a physical outcome—the “measurement outcome” or “physical 
correlate of the measurement outcome”—, which provides information content about the 
target of measurement (2008, 143). The contents of measurement outcomes convey 
information about what is measured through the mediation of theory. Van Fraassen posits 
that theoretical characterization of measurement interaction requires ‘coherence’: 
The theoretical characterization of the measurement situations is required to be 
coherent with the claims about the existence of measurement outcomes, their 
relation to what is measured, and their function as sources of information. (2008, 
145)  
In short, the theory tells a coherence story about “how its outcomes provide 
information about what is being measured” (145). Furthermore, the information content 
is representational. Van Fraassen says, “The outcome provides a representation of the 
measured item, but also represents it as thus or so” (2008, 180). To understand how the 
representational relation works, it is important to refer to van Fraassen’s ‘representation 
criterion’:  
The criterion for what sorts of interactions can be measurements will be, roughly 
speaking, that the outcome must represent the target in a certain fashion—, 
selectively resembling it at a certain level of abstraction, according to the theory—
it is a representation criterion. (van Fraassen 2008, 141).  
Two aspects of the representation criterion require explanation: First, the 
distinction between “target” and “outcome”; and second, the role of theory in the 
operation of measurement. I begin with the former. Van Fraassen makes a technical 
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distinction between the target of measurement (‘phenomena’) and the outcome of 
measurement (‘appearances’): 
Phenomena are observable, but their appearance, that is to say, what they look like 
in given measurement or observation set-ups, is to be distinguished from them as 
much as any person’s appearance is to be distinguished from that person. (2008, 
285)  
For van Fraassen, phenomena are observable objects, events, and processes (2008, 283). 
He emphasizes that phenomena include all observable entities—whether observed or not 
(2008, 307). A given phenomenon can be measured in many different ways. The outcome 
of each measurement provides a perspective on a given phenomenon—meaning that the 
content of measurement tells us what things look like, not what they are like (2008, 176, 
182). The content of the measurement outcome is an appearance.  
An important qualification is that for van Fraassen, a representation does not 
represent on its own. The scientist selects the aspects/respects and degrees to which a 
representation represents a target. This relation can be expressed as: Z uses X to represent 
Y as F, for purposes P.  
Now that the target and outcome of measurement have been characterized, we can 
specify van Fraassen’s role of theory in measurement. According to van Fraassen, 
“Measurement is an operation that locates an item (already classified as in the domain of 
a given theory) in a logical space, provided by the theory to represent a range of possible 
states or characteristics of such items (164). Three things are worth noting about van 
Fraassen’s discussion of logical spaces. First, a logical space provides a multidimensional 
mathematical space that locates potential objects of measurement (2008, 164). By 
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measuring we assign the item a location in a logical space. However, according to van 
Fraassen, it does not have to be on a real number continuum. As van Fraassen points out, 
items may be classified (by theory) on a range that is “an algebra”, “lattice”, or a 
“rudimentary poset” (2008, 172). Second, theoretical location depends on a “family of 
models” and not just an individual model (2008, 164). Third, an item is located in a 
“region” of logical space rather than at an exact point (2008, 165). Simply put, theory 
provides a classificatory system for what is measured. Importantly, theory is necessary 
for this type of classification. Van Fraassen says, “A claim of the form “This is an X-
measurement of quantity M pertaining to S” makes sense only in a context where the 
object measured is already classified as a system characterized by quantity M” (2008, 144 
my emphasis).  
We can summarize the above discussion into four conditions for van Fraassen’s 
account of representation in measurement/experiment practice: 
 
i. Physical Interaction Condition: The interaction between apparatus an object 
produces a physical correlate of the measurement outcome. 
 
ii. Theoretical Characterization Condition: The content of the measurement outcome 
is given a location in a logical space, which is governed by a family of theoretical 
models. An item’s location within a logical space can change in content and truth 
conditions as accepted theories change.  
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iii. Representational Content Condition: The content of a measurement outcome 
provides a selective representation of a given target of measurement (phenomenon). 
Because representations do not represent on their own, users and pragmatic 
considerations set the representational relation such that: Z uses X to represent Y as 
F, for purposes P. 
 
iv. Perspectival Information Condition: Measurement generates appearances, which 
are public, intersubjective, contents of measurement outcomes. Appearances provide 
selective information about phenomena. Thus information from measurement tells us 
what something looks like and not what something is like.  
 
Van Fraassen notes that measurement and experiment are not only limited to a 
representational role, they can take on at least two productive roles. First, instruments 
can produce phenomena that “imitate” natural phenomena. That is, carefully controlled 
conditions give rise to mimetic effects that are used by scientists in the context of 
theory to resemble natural phenomena (2008, 94-95). It is important to note that van 
Fraassen emphasizes that natural phenomena are phenomena that exist independent of 
human intervention (2008, 95). The second productive role of instruments is that they 
are used as “engines of creation” to produce or manufacture new phenomena. Van 
Fraassen is not explicit about whether or not the representational roles can smear with 
the productive roles. There is no reason to assume that these roles cannot be combined; 
but that requires explicit philosophical work to see how, which I develop in Section 3. 
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Keyser (2017) is explicit about the relationship between the representational and 
intervention-based roles in science. He discusses the use of intervention for developing 
causal representations. Scientists intervene, thereby manipulating causal conditions 
within a given measurement or experimental system, which he calls ‘intervention 
systems’, to produce some sort of “effect” (Keyser 2017, 9-10). According to Keyser, 
“Intervention systems consist of organized experimental conditions and as such the 
effects that emerge are often sensitive to changes in conditions” (Keyser 2017, 10). 
Once a given effect is produced it can be used in order to be informative about causal 
relations for theoretical model building.  
Keyser (2017) also differentiates between the methodologies of taking 
measurements vs. making measurements. I interpret that taking measurements involves 
three components: First, some instrument or experimental arrangement yields a 
qualitative or quantitative value; second, a ‘theoretical representational framework’—
which is just a body of models—is necessary in order to characterize that value 
according to parameters and relations between parameters; and third, a scientist sets up 
the resemblance relation between the measurement/experiment value and some 
aspect(s) of a phenomenon (Keyser 2017, 14-15). In contrast, when scientists make 
measurements they manipulate causal conditions—such as, preparatory, instrument, and 
background conditions—within an intervention system. This manipulation gives rise to 
some effect (Keyser 2017, 3-12).  
There is something puzzling about Keyser’s distinction between making vs. 
taking, if we apply the aforementioned conditions (i-iv): i. Physical Interaction 
Condition; ii. Theoretical Characterization Condition; iii. Representational Content 
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Condition; and iv. Perspectival Information Condition. Namely, it seems that ‘making 
measurements’ is compatible with conditions i-iv, so it is not clear why there is a need for 
a distinction in methodological type, but rather just a difference in details for each 
condition. For example, when a measurement is made, there is a (i) physical interaction 
that occurs, but it is broader than just the instrument and object. The interaction can 
include “experimental conditions” (Keyser 2017, 3-5). The product of a made 
measurement is also amenable to (ii) theoretical characterization. Keyser emphasizes 
that theoretical characterization is necessary for experiment/measurement (Keyser 2017, 
14); but he does not make the additional move to say that theoretical characterization is 
part of the process of making a measurement. That is, in order to make a measurement 
about an effect, one needs to also characterize that effect. Without the final 
characterization, one is only dealing with the material conditions, which is an incomplete 
part of the measurement process. Keyser can accept that theoretical characterization is a 
necessary component of making a measurement. Otherwise, he risks offering a limited 
concept of ‘making a measurement’ that only applies to arranging the material 
components of the measurement process and nothing further.  
The same challenge goes for (iii) representational content and (iv) perspectival 
information. An important component of the measurement process is to represent the 
relation between the produced effect and some aspect(s) of a phenomenon. For example, 
is this given effect a limited mimetic representation of a natural phenomenon or is it a 
brand new phenomenon? Without claims about what the effect is and its relation to 
objects, events, and processes in the world, ‘making a measurement’ is uninformative 
about part of the measurement process: the final value of the measurement outcome.  
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The aforementioned considerations question the need for a distinction between 
‘making’ vs. ‘taking’. One conclusion is that making uses the same components (i-iv), 
just with slightly different detail. But the other conclusion is a bit unsatisfying: making is 
really only about organizing the material components, which is an initial step in the 
measurement process, and it does not apply to later steps in measurement.   
 
2.2. Dynamic relations between intervention and representation 
I argue that the distinction between intervention vs. representation is less about 
specific types of methodologies in measurement/experiment and more about where to 
philosophically partition the measurement process. To make this point clear, I make 
two sub-points: 1) Measurement in the biological sciences offers complex and sometimes 
blurred relations between instrument and object of measurement such that representation 
and production take on dynamic roles; 2) There is a difference between the act of 
measurement and the total process of measurement. I briefly describe (1) and (2).  
On van Fraassen’s (2008) and Keyser’s (2017) characterizations of representation 
in measurement, the role of the instrument/apparatus seems to have an important 
mediating function. It may be the case that philosophical focus on case studies (e.g., 
thermometry, microscopy, cellular bio, and bacteria) that are instrument-intensive 
provide a certain support for an instrument-centric account of representation in 
measurement. Whether or not the necessary mediating role of instruments is an explicit 
part of both accounts, there is room to develop a richer philosophical view of the role of 
representation in the total measurement process. Without such philosophical 
development, we risk missing complex cases of measurement where intervention occurs 
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side-by-side with representation. For example, in some cases of biological measurement, 
scientists use the organism to measure processes in that same organism but also to 
represent larger phenomena (Prasolova et al. 2006). For example, mouse diets are 
manipulated in order to measure chromatin pattern changes. I characterize this as the 
mouse constituting experimental conditions that are being manipulated in order to 
measure some sort of process. The manipulation of conditions indicates an interventionist 
approach (or ‘making’ a measurement). Moreover, without manipulating the mouse’s diet 
scientists would not be able to make a reliable measurement on chromatin structure at all. 
So the organism is not only being manipulated as part of the experimental/measurement 
set-up, it is a crucial part of that set-up. That is, without intervention, there is no reliable 
result. In addition to the organism being used as part of the measurement set-up, it also 
serves as a physical representation of the dynamics of chromatin pattern change. That is, 
a given model organism can serve as a data model for a specific phenomenon of study—
e.g., chromatin pattern in organism X. So, in this case the organism serves a dual 
function: it constitutes a set of experimental conditions to be manipulated and it serves as 
a physical representation of a phenomenon. Because of the dual function, this seems to be 
a case of both ‘making’ and ‘taking’ a measurement.  
This brings me to sub-point (2). The total process of measurement is often 
complex in the biological sciences and requires multiple stages of intervening and 
representing. As mentioned in the model organism example representation and 
intervention are often entangled. Measurement is not merely putting an instrument up to 
something and waiting for a reading, which can be classified as an act of measurement. 
Measurement is also not merely creating effects out of material conditions. Measurement 
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requires manipulation of conditions that is used in order to generate a representation. For 
example, identifying a mysterious fungus that is entangled with other fungus in a sample 
is an active process that requires both intervention and representation. One method is to 
take a sample and scrape it over a petri dish. What grows are spores that are passively 
deposited. But if common fungi were commingled with the mysterious fungi in the 
sample, and the common fungi grew faster, it would be impossible to identify the 
mysterious fungus. That is, coming back in a couple of weeks and seeing the petri dish 
covered with familiar species would lead to a false conclusion. Another way to perform 
the measurement (i.e. culture samples) is as follows. Take the samples and grind them up. 
Then sprinkle them into a petri dish. Put the dish under the microscope and, using a fine 
needle, pick out fragments of the mysterious fungus and transplant them to their own 
dishes (Scott 2010). Once the fragments have been transplanted through this fine-grained 
intervention, each dish can be left to grow the colonies. The final dishes will offer visual 
representations that serve as data on the nature of the mysterious fungus. Notice here that 
intervention is a precursor to reliable representation.  
Representation is not only reserved for the final instrument reading. It can also 
occur at other stages in the measurement process. Likewise, manipulation does not have 
to occur only at the earlier stages. For instance, organic matter can function as an 
instrument, like in the case of FourU thermometers, which are RNA molecules that act as 
thermometers in Salmonella (see Waldminghaus et al. 2007). Suppose that a scientist sets 
up an experiment to iteratively measure to what extent modifying RNA factors in FourU 
thermometers changes thermometer readings in Salmonella. In such a case the scientist 
could modify molecular factors and use the organic thermometers as temperature 
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measures over many iterations, which would culminate in some sort of data model that 
organizes the relationship between molecular factors and FourU function. In such a case, 
there are multiple layers of intervention and representation.  
The complex layering of intervention and representation is apparent in biomarker 
measurement in the biomedical sciences, where biological components serve as 
representations of disease conditions, but are also intervened on in order to make more 
reliable representations. I turn to this case study in the subsequent section. 
  
3. Intervening in Representations and Representing Interventions 
Biomarkers are used in biomedical measurement to reliably predict causal 
information about patient outcomes while minimizing the complexity of measurement, 
resources, and invasiveness. A biomarker is an assayable metric—or simply, an 
indicator—that is used by scientists to draw conclusions about a biological process (De 
Gruttola et al. 2001). The greatest utility from biomarker measurement comes from their 
ability to help clinicians and researchers make conclusions with limited invasiveness. The 
reliance on biomarkers to make causal conclusions has prompted the use of ‘surrogate 
markers’. These biomarkers are used to substitute for a clinically meaningful endpoint 
such as a disease condition. A major scientific methodological issue is that the use of 
multiple biomarkers will produce disagreeing results—and this is true even in the context 
of biomarkers that use similar biological pathways. To make methodological matters 
worse, theoretical representation is often not equipped to fill in the causal detail for each 
biomarker measurement. This amounts to an unfolding methodological puzzle about how 
to use intervention and representation in biomarkers to produce reliable measurements. 
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My interest in this case study is not in solving the methodological puzzle, but rather in 
showing the relations between intervention and representation in such a complex case 
study. In this section, I discuss the complexity of intervention and representation in 
biomarker measurement to illustrate how intervention mediates the measurement process.  
To understand the complex methodology in biomarker measurement it is 
important to detail the use and limitations of biomarkers. Some biomarkers are used as a 
substitute for some clinical endpoint. For instance, LDL cholesterol (LDL-C) is a 
biomarker that clinicians and physicians use to correspond to a clinical endpoint—e.g., 
heart attack. Moreover, the biomarker is associated with risk factors such as coronary 
artery stenosis, atherosclerosis, and angina pectoris. Katz (2004) argues that all 
biomarkers are candidates for ‘surrogate markers’, which can serve as substitutes for 
clinical endpoints. That is, surrogate markers are reliable biomarkers that have a one-to-
one correspondence with the disease condition such that they can be used to provide 
reliable predictive and causal information about a given clinical endpoint. There are a 
couple of points worth noting. First, notice that biomarkers and surrogate markers are 
being used as representations of a clinical endpoint. That is, to figure out the likelihood of 
developing a disease condition and to understand the risk factors associated with that 
disease condition, scientists use biomarkers that indicate information about the endpoint. 
This means that these physiological components can be used by clinicians and physicians 
to represent disease conditions to respects and degrees. The second point worth noting is 
that there are many biomarkers but limited surrogate markers and even more limited 
validated surrogate markers (‘surrogate endpoints’)—which are surrogate markers that 
are reliable in multiple contexts of interventions. The importance of this will be relevant 
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shortly when I discuss the complexity of biomarker measurement. For our purposes, this 
means that most biomarkers in biomedical practice provide very limited representational 
information.  
Surrogate markers are not passively used as physical representations of disease 
conditions. Their use is often more effective for representational purposes if there is a 
mediating intervention. For instance, surrogate markers can constitute “response 
variables”. This is where a surrogate marker is manipulated in order to produce an effect 
that is relevantly similar to the effect with the same manipulation on the clinical endpoint. 
This means that an adequate surrogate must be “tightly correlated” with the true clinical 
endpoint; but it also means that any intervention on a surrogate marker must be tightly 
correlated with the intervention on the true clinical endpoint (Buyse et al. 2000). I 
interpret this as a dual role for a reliable surrogate marker. It is to act as an 
epidemiological marker that represents some clinical endpoint but also to act as a 
responding variable that can be used in an intervention to causally influence the clinical 
endpoint. An example of the dual role of the surrogate marker is that high concentrations 
of LDL cholesterol (LDL-C) correspond to cardiovascular risk (Gofman and Lindgren 
1950). But if a therapeutic interventions is used—such as, 3-hydroxy-3-methylglutaryl 
coenzyme A (HMG CoA) reductase inhibitors (statins)—that intervention can lower LDL 
levels, which in turn reduces cardiovascular disease (LaRosa et al. 2005). 
So far I have presented the representational and intervention-based role of 
biomarkers. It is not straightforward to say that surrogate markers are ‘made’ like an 
effect. But it is also not straightforward to say that surrogate markers constitute a 
measurement outcome that is the final reading on an instrument. These markers provide 
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useful representational information in the context of an intervention. To add to the 
complexity of the relation between representation and intervention, biomarkers in the 
context of Alzheimer’s measurement have added methodological steps. In Alzheimer’s 
measurement there are different biomarkers, which are not correlated with each other and 
change with independent dynamics in the progression of Alzheimer’s disease. So each of 
these biomarkers do not provide the same type of representation about the progression of 
Alzheimer’s disease. Furthermore, scientists only understand the disagreement between 
each of these biomarkers in the presence of different interventions.
1
 The different 
interventions are in the form of drugs (e.g., bapineuzumab and solanezumab) and these 
interventions produce disagreeing representational results for the biomarkers. That is, the 
biomarkers respond differently to different interventions, which is methodologically 
problematic because it indicates that all of these biomarkers cannot be reliably tracking 
Alzheimer’s progression in the same way. Interestingly, scientists systematically compare 
these disagreeing results to make reliable claims about Alzheimer’s progression and 
treatment (Toyn 2015).
2
 To simplify the method used, scientists track how interventions 
																																																								
1
 There has been much work recently on clinical biomarkers like: cerebrospinal fluid 
(CSF) tau, which is the primary component of neurofibrillary tangles; CSF 42-amino acid 
amyloid-β (CSF Aβ), which is the protein cleavage product believed to precipitate 
disease by forming neuron-damaging plaques; and amyloid plaques from PET scans. 
While the methodological story is beyond the scope of this discussion, there is a complex 
methodological point that is noteworthy for this discussion (Toyn 2015). 
2
 To give a brief picture: The intervention of Bapineuzumab reduces levels of plaque 
assayed by Aβ PET and CSF tau, but not CSF Aβ; but Solanezumab does not alter levels 
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change properties of biomarkers and then they compare these amalgamated results with 
how interventions change behavioral/cognitive properties. This type of cross comparison 
allows scientists to eliminate biomarkers that do not track behavioral/cognitive 
improvement.  
The structure of the methodological complexity in biomarker measurement can be 
partitioned as follows: 1) For a particular clinical endpoint, there are limited physical 
representations in the form biomarkers (or surrogate markers) which can be used to make 
representational and perspectival conclusions about the endpoint or risk factors associated 
with it; 2) Scientists intervene in a process from each of the biomarkers in order to track 
the relations between biomarkers and clinical endpoints; and 3) Such interventions 
prompt disagreeing results between the biomarkers, which can 4) be amalgamated by 
researchers into further representations of the relations between biomarkers and their 
clinical endpoints. The above structural breakdown is merely a type of complex 
methodological process that can occur in biomedical measurement. It shows how 
interventions on physical representations (biomarkers) can produce other reliable 
representations. What is important to note about this analysis is the role of intervention in 
mediating further representations. In the case of biomarkers, intervention is necessary to 
test how close biomarkers are in their representations of clinical endpoints and also to 
other biomarkers. These representations not only represent the relation between the 
original biomarker and the clinical endpoint, but they also represent how a given 
																																																																																																																																																																					
of plaque assayed by Aβ PET and CSF tau but leads to a reduction in CSF Aβ. Cross 
comparison of the intervention mechanisms allows scientists to begin to make causal 
claims about which biomarkers are more reliable than others (Toyn 2015). 
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intervention affects a given biomarker. As such, intervention paves the way for iterations 
of representations.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this discussion, I have analyzed the role of intervention in mediating 
representations by using examples from the biological and biomedical sciences. 
Characterizing intervention as a mediating factor in a larger methodological operation 
provides an important point about scientific practice. Representation and intervention are 
not neatly partitioned into contrasting methodologies. In fact, applied science often 
dictates the complex, and often smeared, philosophical concepts and methodologies. For 
this reason, I am proposing a process view of intervention and representation. This view 
opens up the diversity of relations between representation and intervention in a given 
experimental/measurement practice. While I have emphasized how intervention mediates 
representation, there is more territory to explore about the mediating role of 
representation for intervention.  
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Abstract: According to psychological constructivism, emotions result from projecting 
folk emotion concepts onto felt affective episodes (e.g., Barrett 2017, LeDoux 2015, 
Russell 2004). Moreover, while constructivists acknowledge there’s a biological 
dimension to emotion, they deny that emotions are (or involve) affect programs. So 
they also deny that emotions are natural kinds. However, the essential role 
constructivism gives to felt experience and folk concepts leads to an account that’s 
extensionally inadequate and functionally inaccurate. Moreover, biologically-oriented 
proposals that reject these commitments are not similarly encumbered. Recognizing 
this has two implications: biological mechanisms are more central to emotion than 
constructivism allows, and the conclusion that emotions aren’t natural kinds is 
premature.  
 
This paper challenges the psychological constructivist account of emotions that is gaining prominence 
among neuroscientists and psychologists (e.g., Barrett 2017, 2012, 2009; LeDoux 2015; Russell 2004). 
According to constructivism, emotions result from projecting culturally-fashioned concepts onto felt 
affective episodes. Fear, for instance, just is a feeling of negative arousal as viewed through the lens 
of one’s folk concept FEAR. This proposal is novel in taking felt experience and cognitive projection 
to be essential elements of what emotions are. Moreover, while constructivists acknowledge that 
there’s a biological dimension to emotions (e.g., neural mechanisms are responsible for generating the 
conscious feelings that we project our emotion concepts on to), they deny that emotions are, or 
necessarily involve, anything like an affect program. Thus, constructivism is philosophically significant 
in two ways. First, in denying an essential role for biological mechanisms, it challenges influential, 
affect-program-oriented accounts of emotion (e.g., Scarantino & Griffiths 2011; Ekman & Cordaro 
2011). Second, in understanding emotions as projections of folk emotion concepts, it takes emotions 
to be social-psychological constructions, not natural kinds. 
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But despite constructivism’s appeal among cognitive scientists, the role that it gives to felt 
experience and folk concepts leads to an account of emotion that’s both extensionally inadequate and 
functionally inaccurate. Moreover, biologically-oriented proposals that reject constructivism’s 
problematic commitments are not similarly encumbered. Recognizing all this reveals that an adequate 
account needs to give greater place to the biological mechanisms that underlie emotions than 
constructivism allows. This, in turn, suggests that the constructivists’ conclusion that emotions are not 
natural kinds is premature. 
1. Psychological Constructivism and Its Appeal 
Constructivism sees emotions as having two elements: a felt affective experience and a cognitive 
projection or labeling. Taking these in turn, the felt experience component—or “core affect” as it’s 
often called—is a neurophysiological state that manifests as a consciously experienced combination 
of valence (i.e., feeling good or bad) and arousal (i.e., feeling activated or deactivated) (Barret 2006: 
48; Russell 2004; LeDoux 2015: 226-232). Importantly, constructivism’s focus on core affect looks 
just to the amalgamated experience of these two components—valence and arousal. What causes this felt 
experience is irrelevant to the nature and individuation of emotions. In fact, and as we will see, allowing 
that particular sensations (instances of core affect) can be produced by a range of distinct neural 
circuits or somatic events is taken to be a point in favor of the constructivist proposal. 
Given this account of the felt dimension, constructivism maintains that “discrete emotions 
emerge from a conceptual analysis of core affect. Specifically, the experience of feeling an 
emotion…occurs when conceptual knowledge about emotion is brought to bear to categorize a 
momentary state of core affect. … [These] [c]ategorization processes enact the rules, [that guide] the 
emergence of an emotional episode” (Barrett 2006: 49; also LeDoux 2015: 225-232). This talk of 
“conceptual analysis,” “conceptual knowledge,” and “categorization” should be understood thinly. 
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The underlying process needn’t involve some full-fledged, conscious judgment. Rather, all that’s 
necessary is an unconscious or implicit recognition that one’s sense of one’s situation, and one’s felt 
physiological state, fall under a particular folk emotion concept.  
These emotions concepts, in turn, should be understood as folk theories or culturally-shaped 
behavioral scripts that detail the nature and function of the particular mental states picked out by 
specific emotion labels (‘fear,’ ‘joy,’ ‘anger,’ etc.). Moreover, the fact that folk emotion concepts engage 
these folk theories and behavioral scripts entails that the projecting of a particular label onto an 
instance of core affect not only imbues one’s situation with the associated, emotionally-colored 
meaning, but also shapes one’s subsequent thoughts, physiological responses, and behaviors (Barrett 
2012; LeDoux 2015). 
Formalizing this a bit, we can see psychological constructivism as committed to four theses: 
(PC1) Each emotion type/category is constituted by the projecting of a specific folk 
emotion concept (e.g., FEAR, JOY) onto a felt affective experience. 
(PC2) Token emotion episodes (e.g., a given instance of fear) are cognitive acts where one 
(implicitly) labels an occurrent conscious feeling with a particular folk emotion concept 
and so comes to see the feeling through the lens of that concept. 
(PC3) There is no unique (set of) neural circuit(s) or psychological mechanism(s) 
responsible for the conscious feelings that get categorized with particular folk emotion 
concepts. 
(PC4) The act of labeling a feeling with a particular folk emotion concept affects one’s 
subsequent thoughts, physiological responses, and behaviors. 
 
According to its advocates, much of constructivism’s appeal lies in its explanatory power. In 
comparison to more biologically-oriented theories, it provides a better explanation of empirical 
research on the biological mechanisms and correlates associated with emotions (e.g., neural circuits, 
patterns of physiological change, and expressive behavior). Since the discussion that follows will build 
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from the contrast between constructivism and competing biologically-oriented theories (BTs), it will 
be useful to briefly sketch the BT approach and the constructivists’ case against it. 
As a generalization, BTs maintain that emotions are, or necessarily engage, affect programs—
that is, largely encapsulated systems that automatically prompt stereotyped patterns of physiological 
changes, expressive behavior, motor routines, attentional shifts, and forms of higher-cognitive 
processing in response to (evolutionarily-relevant) threats and opportunities. So, for example, fear is 
(or essentially involves) an affect state that consists of automatically engaged tendencies for inter alia 
increases in arousal, narrowing of attention, and the cueing of fight/flight/freeze behavior in response 
to the perception of some danger. 
But since BTs take affect programs to be essential (even identical) to emotions, constructivists 
argue they cannot explain two well-documented sets of findings.1  
(F1) One can feel a given emotion without engaging what science suggests is the best 
candidate for its underlying biological drivers (or their correlates)—e.g., activation of 
particular neural circuits, a distinctive physiological response, characteristic expressive 
behavior.  
(F2) The relevant biological drivers/correlates can be engaged though one does not report 
feeling the associated emotion. 
 
So, for instance, though the central nucleus of the amygdala (CeA) is thought to be central to fear, 
research shows both that individuals will report being afraid when the CeA is not engaged (F1), and 
that the CeA can be active though individuals report not feeling fear (F2). 
BT proponents have sought to address these explanatory limitations by insisting that we must 
narrow our understanding of what, say, FEAR is. More specifically, they maintain that the folk emotion 
concepts that the above research relies on (in, e.g., the self-reports of emotions (not) felt) are too 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Barrett 2012 for a review of the relevant empirical work. 
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coarsely grained for scientific investigations like these. The BT advocates’ expectation is that a more 
refined account of what ‘fear’ refers to will reduce, even eliminate, dissociations of the sort noted 
above (e.g., Scarantino & Griffiths 2011; Kurth 2018). But constructivists respond that any effort to 
narrow or otherwise refine our emotion concepts along these lines will result in an account of (e.g.) 
fear that is troublingly stipulative or excessively revisionary with regard to our ordinary understanding 
of these emotions (Barrett 2012: 415-6; LeDoux 2015: 234). 
Two aspects of this debates are particularly important for our purposes. First, central to the 
constructivist complaint is the move to take a failure to accommodate our ordinary emotion talk as the 
standard for what counts as stipulative or excessively revisionary account. Second, given our ordinary 
emotion talk as the standard, the above four theses appear to give constructivism the resources and 
flexibility it needs to explain not just (F1)-(F2), but also the richness and cultural variation of emotional 
life more generally (e.g., Barrett 2012, 2009). However, I will argue that investigating the extensional 
adequacy and functional accuracy of constructivism’s core theses provides us with reason to doubt 
each of (PC1)-(PC4).  
2. Is Constructivism Extensionally Adequate? 
As we’ve seen, a central feature of the debate between constructivism and BTs is the charge that BTs 
cannot accommodate dissociation data without committing to a stipulative or excessively revisionary 
account of what emotions are. In what follows, I give three examples that suggest constructivism faces 
a similar problem. More specifically, a closer look at the constructivists’ dual claim that emotions are 
cognitive labelings of felt experiences reveals that the account is both under- and over-inclusive with regard 
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to our ordinary understanding of things like: what emotions are, when we experience them, and how 
they differ from moods, feelings, and other categories of affect.2 
First consider the constructivist’s commitment to understanding emotions as felt 
experiences—that is, changes in core affect that we’re consciously aware of. An implication of taking 
felt affective experience as essential to being an emotion is that it rules out the possibility of 
unconscious emotions. Some constructivists appear to embrace this result. For instance, Joseph 
LeDoux maintains that claims about unconscious emotions are “oxymoronic” (2015: 234; also, 19). 
But LeDoux’s acceptance of this implication aside, the thought that there cannot be unconscious 
emotions fits poorly with our everyday experiences and our ordinary emotion talk.  
For instance, if there aren’t unconscious emotions, then how do we explain situations where 
we don’t realize that we were (say) afraid until after the danger has passed? Pressing further, notice that 
we not only regularly speak of unconscious emotions, but also appeal to them in order to explain our 
behavior. For example, we say things like, “Bill won’t discuss the book he is working on. He says it’s 
not ready yet—but he doesn’t realize that he’s really just afraid about getting negative feedback.” While 
ordinary talk like this is easy to make sense of on the assumption that Bill is unconsciously fearful, 
such an explanation isn’t available to a constructivist like LeDoux—our ordinary talk to the contrary, 
Bill isn’t unconsciously afraid, but rather experiencing some other psychological blockage.  
But the constructivists’ trouble with unconscious emotions runs deeper—the case for their 
existence also has empirical support. For instance, recent experimental work has shown that 
subliminally presented emotion faces can produce affective responses that bring emotion-specific 
behaviors even though the subject denies feeling an emotion. In particular, subliminally presented happy 
                                                 
2 Thus the strategy I employ here—one that grants constructivists’ their criterion for assessing when 
an account is excessively revisionary—is distinct from standard defenses of BTs noted in §1. 
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faces bring increased “liking” behavior (e.g., greater consumption of a novel beverage), while 
subliminally presented angry faces have the opposite result (Winkielman et al. 2003; also, Kihlstrom 
1999). Since these patterns of behavior mesh with our understanding of both joy as an emotion that 
tends to increase interest/engagement, and anger as an emotion that brings avoidance/rejection 
tendencies, these results are taken as evidence of unconscious emotions. 
While the constructivist might try to pass these findings off as cases where unconscious 
changes in core affect (not emotion) produce the behaviors, the plausibility of the proposal is undercut 
by the fit we find between the subliminally presented happy (angry) face, the resulting liking 
(avoidance) behavior, and our ordinary understanding what happiness (anger) involves (Winkielman et al. 
2005). The upshot, then, is that constructivism’s insistence that felt changes in core affect are essential 
to what emotions are has revisionary implications with regard to our ordinary (and scientific) 
understanding of emotional life. 
But even if we’re willing to grant that our talk of unconscious emotions is merely 
metaphorical—an elliptical way of talking about some non-emotion form of (unconscious) affect—
the constructivist’s second core commitment brings additional problems. In particular, the claim that 
emotions are the product of our cognitive labelings/projections makes facts about when we are 
experiencing an emotion—and what emotion it is—too sensitive to random situational features and 
framing effects. To draw this out, consider the following case. 
Coffee. I order a cup of decaf coffee and sit down to read a magazine cover story about 
Trump’s latest foreign policy provocations. But unbeknownst to me, the barista confuses my 
order and I get a cup of regular coffee. As the caffeine works its way into my system, it brings 
a (consciously experienced) change in my arousal. As a result, I start reading the article with 
jittery attentiveness. 
Given the scenario, it seems my jittery, attentive reading is best understood as a bout of caffeine-
induced hyperactivity. But notice: there’s nothing in the constructivist account to rule out the 
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possibility that I’m actually having an emotional experience—I’m afraid. After all, on the constructivist 
account, this experience could be a change in core affect that I’ve (implicitly) labeled ‘fear.’ While that 
possibility alone seems odd (to my ear, at least, the case is best understood as emotionless 
hyperactivity, not fear), there’s more trouble. 
To draw this out, consider the constructivist’s likely response to the case. Given the setup, she 
would likely maintain that whether this is an instance of fear depends on whether I see it that way—
what sort of meaning do I attribute to my situation (e.g., Barrett 2017: 126; 2012: 419-420; 2009: 1293)? 
For instance, if I assent to the barista’s remark that I seem really uneasy about the article that I’m 
reading, then—by (implicitly) labeling my behavior through my assent—I imbue my situation with the 
meaning carried by my FEAR concept. I am, therefore, feeling fear. While this move might seem to 
allow the constructivist a way to account for the case, it comes at a high cost. For notice, had the 
barista instead said something like, “Whoops, I messed up and gave you regular, not decaf—no 
wonder you’re so hyper,” I’d likely assent to that too. And so I wouldn’t be afraid—just hyperactively 
aroused.  
But that’s odd. Our ordinary thinking about emotions suggests that whether I’m experiencing 
a particular emotion, and what emotion I’m experiencing, should not be so sensitive to random 
situational features like what questions the barista—or anyone for that matter—just happen to ask 
me. To be clear, the claim here is not that emotions are immune to situational and contextual factors. 
Rather, the point is that on the constructivists’ account emotions turn out to be too sensitive to them. 
The radical situational sensitivity entailed by constructivism makes it not only too easy to experience 
an emotion, but also ties facts about what emotion we’re experiencing to irrelevant situational factors. 
Together, the difficulties raised by unconscious emotions and incidental situational features 
call the extensional adequacy of the constructivist account into question and do so in a way that 
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pinpoints the commitments of (PC1) and (PC2) as the source of the trouble—after all, these claims 
posit feelings of core affect and projections of folk concepts as essential to what emotions are. Of 
equal note is the fact that biological theories are less vulnerable to these difficulties. For one, irrelevant 
situational features should have less influence on what emotion one happens to experience since, 
according to BTs, emotions are (or are principally driven by) affect programs, not contextualized 
cognitive labelings. Moreover, since affect programs are things that can operate below that level of 
conscious awareness (Kurth 2018), taking emotions to be driven by affect programs provides BTs 
with the resources needed to explain unconscious emotions. 
While the above discussion raises worries about the first two constructivist theses (PC1-PC2), 
it also provides the makings for worries about the third. In particular, because constructivism denies 
(via PC3) that emotions are underwritten by affect programs, it has trouble making plausible 
distinctions between emotions and similar states like moods. To draw this out, notice that the coffee 
case from above can be easily extended to show that constructivism makes it too easy to flip between 
moods and emotions. All we need to do is substitute “being in a worried mood” for “hyperactive” in 
the presentation of the case. Once we do this, we see that mere changes in the question the barista 
asks me can change whether I’m worried (a mood) or afraid (an emotion).  
So we again see that constructivism has problematic explanatory limitations—this time with 
regard to preserving the thought that there’s a substantive difference between moods and emotions. 
On the constructivist account, this distinction is just a matter of how we happen to label our felt 
experiences. While some constructivists appear willing to accept this conclusion (e.g., Barrett 2017, 
2009), it highlights another place where the constructivist proposal has revisionary implications—after 
all, moods and emotions are generally thought to be distinct forms of affect (e.g., Ben-Ze'ev 2000: 
Chap. 4). Moreover, here too we have a difficulty that’s easily avoided by biological accounts. Since 
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BTs take emotions to be (driven by) affect programs, they can appeal to the engagement of these 
mechanisms as the basis for the emotion/mood distinction (e.g., Kurth 2018; Wong 2017). 
Stepping back, then, although constructivism purports to be less stipulative with regard to 
capturing our ordinary understanding of emotions, the above examples call this into question. For 
starters, the constructivists’ commitment to (PC1)-(PC3) has revisionary implications for our ordinary 
understanding of what emotions are, when we experience them, and how they differ from moods. 
Moreover, we have also seen that biologically-oriented accounts—in eschewing this trio of 
problematic theses—are better equipped to provide a plausible account of these features of our 
everyday emotion talk. 
3. Is Constructivism Functionally Accurate? 
The challenges to the constructivist picture extend beyond concerns about its extensional adequacy. 
The account also makes predictions about how projecting emotion concepts onto felt experience 
should shape subsequent behavior that are poorly supported by the empirical record. Two examples 
will draw this out. 
First consider emotion misattribution research. In this work, a feeling that is typically 
associated with a particular emotion (e.g., feelings of unease and anxiety) is subtly induced, but the 
individual is lead to believe they are not, in fact, experiencing that emotion but rather something else 
(e.g., the effects of caffeine). Constructivism predicts (via PC4) that individuals in these experiments 
should display different behaviors depending on whether they are in the control or misattribution 
conditions. For instance, individuals led to believe that the unease they’re feeling is not anxiety, but 
something else (caffeine) should display diminished anxiety-related behaviors in comparison to 
controls who were not misled about their unease. But on this score, the experimental findings are 
decidedly mixed. 
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First, while there is a sizable body of findings showing misattribution manipulations attenuate 
subsequent emotion-related behavior, there is also a sufficiently large set of non-confirmations to raise 
concerns. For instance, while some research on public speaking anxiety suggests that attributing 
unease to a pill you just took rather than anxiety about a public talk you must give leads to a reduction 
in anxiety-related behaviors—stuttering, apprehension, and the like (Olson 1988), other studies have 
failed to find any differences in these behaviors (Slivkin & Buss 1984; Singerman, Borkovec & Baron 
1976).  
Moreover, even in cases where emotion-related behavior is reduced in the manipulation 
condition, it’s not clear how much support this brings to the constructivist. This is because it’s often 
unclear whether the reductions in emotion-specific behavior are (i) the result of the misattribution or 
(ii) a consequence of directing subjects’ attention away from the emotion eliciting stimuli (for a review, 
see, e.g., Reisenzein 1983). This potential confound is problematic for constructivists since only 
possibility (i) provides direct support for the claim of (PC4)—namely, that the act of labeling itself 
affects subsequent behavior. 
The second problematic set of results comes from work in political science. This research 
investigates how negative emotions shape public policy decision making among voters (e.g., MacKuen 
et al. 2010; Brader et al. 2008; Valentino et al. 2008). The core hypothesis of this research is that 
negative emotions (especially, anger and anxiety) affect subsequent behavior in different ways. In 
particular, anger—as a response to challenges to what one values—should tend to bring behavior 
geared toward defending the threatened values. By contrast, since anxiety is a response to uncertainty, 
it should tend to bring caution and information gathering aimed helping one work through the 
uncertainty one faces. 
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To test these predictions, the experimental set up works as follows. First, individuals are asked 
to read a (fake) news story designed to provoke anger or anxiety by challenging the individuals’ pre-
existing views about contentious policy issues like immigration, affirmative action, and economic 
policy. After reading the story, the participants are given the opportunity to use a website containing 
links to additional information, both for and against, the policy issue at hand. They are also asked how 
the original news story they read made them feel (e.g., angry, anxious). So by tracking what kinds of 
information the participants looked at through the website, experimenters can identify differences in 
how the anger and anxiety provoked by the story shaped subsequent behavior. 
In the present context, these experiments allow us to test a pair of predictions that follow from 
the constructivist theses (PC1) and (PC4): 
(P1) Labeling felt experiences with distinct folk emotion concepts should bring different 
patterns of behavior. 
(P2) The behaviors that result from labeling a felt experience with a particular concept 
should map to our folk understanding of the emotion in question.3 
 
More specifically, given (P1) and (P2), we should see different behaviors based on whether the 
participants in the experiment label their emotion ‘anger’ or ‘anxiety’ (P1). Moreover, the different 
behaviors should map to the above, ordinary understanding of these emotions—e.g., angry individuals 
should look for information that helps them defend their preferred policy position, while anxious 
individuals should engage less in motivated inquiry and more in open-minded forms of investigation 
(P2). 
                                                 
3 As evidence of constructivism’s commitment to these predictions, consider Lisa Feldman Barrett’s 
comment that “when a person is feeling angry…she has categorized sensations from the body and 
the world using conceptual knowledge of the category ‘anger’. As a result, that person will 
experience an unpleasant, high arousal state as evidence that someone is offensive. In fear…she will 
experience the same state as evidence that the world is threatening. And, either way, the person will 
behave accordingly” (2009: 1293, emphasis added). 
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However, whether we find support for these predictions turns—surprisingly—on what the 
policy issue used in the experiment was. More specifically, in experiments where the policy question 
that was challenged by the fake news story concerned immigration, the results fit poorly with 
constructivism’s predictions. That is, participants behaved in the same angry way regardless of whether 
they reported feeling anger or anxiety (Brader et al. 2008). By contrast, if the policy issue at hand 
concerned affirmative action or economic policy, the results are more in line with (P1)-(P2): anger and 
anxiety provoked by the news stories not only brought different patterns of behavior, but the resulting 
behaviors mesh with our ordinary conception of how these emotions function (MacKuen et al. 2010; 
Valentino 2008). 
While this second set of results might appear to be good news for constructivists, the trouble 
lies in explaining why we get the different results between the immigration and affirmative 
action/economic policy experiments. After all, other than the content of the issue at hand, the 
experimental designs were identical. In response, the constructivist might argue that content and 
context matter (e.g., Barrett 2012, 2009): the similar behaviors that subjects display in the immigration 
version of the study suggest that the cultural scripts associated with ‘anger’ and ‘anxiety’ are highly 
sensitive to negative stereotypes about minorities. More specifically, the thought would be that there’s 
something about the combination of immigration debates and racial stereotypes that changes the 
standard behavioral scripts associated with ‘anger’ and ‘anxiety’ so that, while they typically generate 
different behaviors, they now bring the same ones. 
But setting aside concerns about the ad hoc nature of this proposal, without more of a 
backstory, it’s unconvincing. After all, affirmative action debates are also framed in racial stereotype 
provoking ways. So here too we should see anger and anxiety generating similar patterns of behavior. 
But we don’t. 
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Moreover, notice that, on this front, biological accounts have an easier time explaining the 
experimental findings. For instance, as one possibility, the BT advocate could argue that only 
participants in the immigration study are likely to be experiencing both anger and anxiety: anger about 
the harms immigrants will bring and anxiety given their uncertainty about the likelihood of these 
harms. Given this, the BT advocate could then add two claims about what happens when both these 
emotions are engaged. First, since anger is a more powerful emotion than anxiety, it tends to win out 
with regard to shaping individuals’ subsequent behavior. Second, given the high degree of overlap in 
the felt experiences produced by the anger and anxiety affect programs (e.g., both bring increased, 
negatively valenced arousal), when prompted to state what emotion they are feeling, some subjects 
happen to interpret their feelings as anger, while others see it as anxiety. Thus, the BT advocate can 
explain both why we get mixed results when subjects are prompted to state what emotion they are 
feeling and why, despite these differences in self-reports, the individuals nonetheless respond with 
behavior characteristic of anger, not anxiety. Moreover, because this proposal allows anger to drive 
behavior regardless of how subjects happen to label it, the explanation is unavailable to constructivists. 
All told, we have two independent sets of experimental findings showing (at best) equivocal 
support for constructivism’s predictions about how projecting emotion concepts onto felt experience 
should shape subsequent behavior. Moreover, we’ve also learned that more biologically-oriented 
accounts are better able to handle the experimental findings we’ve reviewed. 
4. Conclusion: Emotions, Biology, and Natural Kinds 
As we’ve seen, constructivism’s purported advantage over more biologically-oriented theories lies is 
its ability to better explain the richness and diversity of emotional life (§1). But we have also seen that 
a crucial premise in this argument is the move to take accommodating our ordinary emotion talk as 
the standard for assessing a theory’s explanatory power. Not only are there familiar problems for 
PSA 2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -386-
15 
 
adopting such a standard (e.g., Scarantino & Griffiths 2011, Kurth 2018), but—even if we accept it—
we’ve learned that there’s trouble for constructivism. In particular, the explanatory “success” 
constructivism secures come by way of a highly revisionary account of what emotions are, when we 
experience them, how they differ from moods, and the way that they shape behavior (§§2-3). 
Moreover, our critical observations also implicate the four constructivist theses (PC1-PC4) as the 
source of these difficulties. Thus it’s not surprising that more biologically oriented proposals—
accounts that reject these commitments—do not face similar explanatory limitations. 
Taken together, then, the arguments of this paper suggest a pair of larger lessons. First, even 
if we agree that constructivists are correct about what the relevant standard for assessing a theory of 
emotion is, we’ve learned that an adequate account must give greater place to the biological 
mechanisms that underlie emotions than constructivism allows. This, in turn, indicates that the 
constructivists’ conclusion that emotions are not natural kinds is premature. After all, if we must posit 
something like an affect program in order to (i) explain everyday talk and empirical findings about 
unconscious emotions, (ii) capture the thought that emotional experience is not radically sensitive to 
random situational features, and (iii) accommodate research regarding how emotions shape behavior, 
then we have evidence that (at least some) emotions are underwritten by mechanisms that make them 
plausible candidates for being natural kinds. 
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How trustworthy and authoritative is scientific input into public policy deliberations?i
Hugh Lacey
Swarthmore College / University of São Paulo 
Abstract: Appraising public policies about using technoscientific innovations requires attending to the values reflected in the in-
terests expected to be served by them. It also requires addressing questions about the efficacy of using the innovations, and about 
whether or not using them may occasion harmful effects (risks); moreover, judgments about these matters should be soundly 
backed by empirical evidence. Clearly, then, scientists have an important role to play in formulating and appraising these public 
policies. 
However, ethical and social values affect decisions made about the criteria (1) for identifying the range of risks, and of 
relevant empirical data needed for making judgments about them, that should be considered in public policy deliberations, and 
(2) for determining how well claims concerning risks should be supported by the available data in order to warrant that they have 
a decisive role in the deliberations. Consider the case of public policies about using GMOs. Concerning the range of data: is it 
sufficient for risk assessment only to be informed by data relevant to investigating the risks of using GMOs that may be occa-
sioned by way of physical/chemical/biological mechanisms directly triggered by events within their modified genomes? Or: 
should data pertaining to the full range of ecological and socioeconomic effects of using them, in the environments in which they 
are used and under the socioeconomic conditions of their use, also inform this assessment? Those interested in producing and us-
ing GMOs, in the light of their adhering to values of capital and the market, are likely to give a positive answer to the first ques-
tion; those holding competing values, e.g., connected with respect for human rights and environmental sustainability, to the sec-
ond. And, concerning the degree of support: the former – citing the ethical gravity of  losses (both economic and, allegedly, for 
food security) that would be incurred by failing to use GMOs on a wide scale – are likely to require less stringent standards of ev-
idential appraisal than the latter.
Scientists, qua scientists, however, do not have special authority in the realm of values. Thus, their judgments, about 
the evidential support that claims about risks (and some other matters) have, may sometimes be reasonably (although not deci-
sively) contested partly on value-laden grounds – as they have been in the GMO case, where the contestation has generated con-
siderable controversy, and continues to do so. It follows that, in the context of deliberations about public policy, unless scientists 
engage with representatives of all stakeholders in the outcomes of the policies (as, for the most part, has not happened in the 
GMO case) – taking into account that their competing values may lead to making different decisions about what are the relevant 
data, as well as about the degree of support required for their claims about risks to gain the required credibility to inform the de-
liberations; and respecting "tempered equality" of participants in the dialogue (Longino) – their trustworthiness is put into ques-
tion and their authority diminished.
1.
In a letter, dated June 29th, 2016, 135 Nobel laureates made the following claims, among others,ii
related to using GMOs (genetically modified organisms) in agriculture:
 (i) "Scientific and regulatory agencies around the world have repeatedly and consistently found 
crops and foods improved through biotechnology to be as safe as, if not safer than those derived 
from any other method of production."
 (ii) "There has never been a single confirmed case of a negative health outcome for humans or 
animals from their consumption."
 (iii) "Their environmental impacts have been shown repeatedly to be less damaging to the envi-
ronment, and a boon to global biodiversity" (Laureates Letter, 2016). 
Reflecting the authority and esteem that tends to be accorded to Nobel laureates, the dec-
laration was widely reported and taken to bolster the allegation that there is a scientific consen-
sus that cultivating and harvesting genetically engineered crops, and consuming their products, is
safe.iii The scientists who signed it aimed to assure the public that the three claims are well con-
1
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firmed, and that public policy and regulatory deliberations should reflect them. The claims do not
derive from outcomes of the research conducted by these scientists, for at most one or two of 
them (so far as I can tell, none) have themselves engaged in biosafety research. They were 
putting their authority behind the research and judgments of others, whom presumably they 
trusted. Even so, one might reasonable assume that they had, before signing the declaration, ex-
amined the relevant research and concurred with its outcomes, and had found good reason to tell 
us, as they do, (presumably based on a thorough examination of its writings and actions) that the 
opposition is "based on emotion and dogma contradicted by data" and that it "must be stopped." 
At the end of the paper, I will argue that the declaration misuses scientific authority and contrib-
utes to doubts about the trustworthiness of leading scientific authorities. My larger purpose, how-
ever, is to suggest some necessary conditions for re-establishing trust in scientific communities –
bridging the gap between scientists and the public, and ( the concern of de Martín-Melo & Inte-
mann, 2018) – so that both the authority and integrity of science, and the conditions for strength-
ening democratic societies, are enhanced 
2.
First, some more general remarks. I maintain that the deliberations out of which arise public po-
lices having to do with introducing, using and regulating technoscientific innovations (I only 
have time to discuss GEOs) should consider:
 (1) questions about the efficacy of the proposed uses are addressed – and about their safety, 
specifically about how well available empirical evidence confirms that the proposed uses do not 
occasion harmful effects (or risks of causing harmful effects); 
 (2) the values reflected in the interests expected to be served by the proposed uses, as well as 
questions about whether interests expected to be served by competing values may be disadvan-
taged by them, and priorities among the competing interests; 
 (3) identified potential alternatives to using these innovations – including fundamentally differ-
ent kinds of practices – as well as how using them compares to the proposed uses with respect to 
efficacy and safety (and other potential benefits).iv 
Of these conditions only (1) is uncontroversial and generally followed (although there are
disagreements about how it ought to be followed) in public policy deliberations.v Clearly satis-
factory answers to the questions about efficacy and safety depend on trustworthy and reliable sci-
entific input. I will not question that scientific research has reliably established the efficacy of the
GEOs that have already been approved by regulatory bodies for agricultural use, for the most 
part GEOs with herbicide-resistant and insecticidal properties.vi Efficacy does not imply safety, 
however, and the research approaches (in molecular biology, biotechnology, etc) within which 
efficacy is established do not suffice for engaging in research dealing with safety. However, 
many regulatory practices presuppose that scientific input, pertaining to deliberations about 
safety – like that about efficacy – is obtained prior to consideration of (2) and (3), and to entan-
glement with value questions. Hence, the currency of the terms "scientific risk assessments" and 
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"scientific safety studies", areas of research in which scientific/technical "experts" should be 
granted authority.
One needs to be wary here, for "safe" and "risk" are 'thick ethical terms'. Scientific safety 
studies cannot be fully separate from entanglement with values and obligations. Thus, e.g. (sim-
plifying a little), 'using X is unsafe' implies (ceteris paribus) 'X should not be used, unless appro-
priate precautions are taken.' And, when scientists conclude, on the basis of their investigations, 
that 'using X is safe', they intend it to follow (and to have impact at step (2)), that ceteris paribus 
'it is improper to impede using X'.vii This does not mean that, in the course of empirical research 
in scientific safety studies, value-laden terms are used in articulating hypotheses and reporting 
empirical data. The link between the results of the empirical research and the subsequent value 
judgments depends on a step (call it step (0)), casually made prior to the empirical investigations.
At step (0), the set of possible unintended collateral effects of using X is scrutinized, and those 
that are identified as harmful (as risks)viii – obviously value judgments are made here – are then 
investigated for such matters as the probability and magnitude of their possible occurrence, and 
its being countered by introducing scientifically informed regulations. In the investigation, the 
possible collateral effects are characterized, not with thick ethical terms, but with theoretical and 
observational terms deployed in relevant scientific fields, like molecular biology, chemistry, soil 
sciences and physiology (whose terms have no value connotations). Then, 'using X is safe' may 
be concluded,ix – usually qualified by 'provided that it is used in accordance with stipulated regu-
lations' – if the investigations confirm that none of the investigated effects would occur with sig-
nificant magnitude and probability when X is used in accordance with the regulations. This ac-
count is consistent with the picture of scientific safety studies that has step (1) preceding steps 
(2) and (3); but it clarifies that the move from empirically confirmed results at (1) to the claim 
the value-implicated  'X is safe' and to value judgments of relevance at (2) rests upon value judg-
ments made at step (0). It follows that the conclusion, 'X is safe', might appropriately be chal-
lenged – without thereby challenging the scientists' judgments about each of the particular possi-
ble effects investigated – on the basis of the value judgment that not all the harmful possible ef-
fects of using X were identified at (0). 
The outcomes of "scientific" safety studies usually constitute the only input to the delib-
erations of the 'technical' commissions that participate in public policy deliberations about using 
and regulating technoscientific objects. In these studies (in the GEO case), at step (0), the possi-
ble effects identified as harmful are a subset of those that may be occasioned by way of physical/
chemical/biological mechanisms directly triggered by events within the modified genomes of 
plants. One can identify two ways in which the adequacy of these studies might be challenged.x
 First: Conclusions drawn about the safety of using V (a genetically engineered plant va-
riety) could be challenged on the ground that the subset chosen for investigation does not include
some possible effects, with similar mechanisms, that are of of special salience for those who up-
hold a particular value-outlook.xi For them, even well conducted  studies on the the items of the 
subset chosen will be insufficient to confirm that using V is safe.xii Challenges of this type can be
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resolved (in principle) by conducting more scientific studies of the same kind after having identi-
fied a larger relevant subset.xiii 
Second: Their adequacy could be challenged by those, who object that the set from which
the subsets are chosen for "scientific safety studies" is not sufficiently encompassing. For them, 
deliberations about the safety of using GE-plants should be informed by appropriate empirical 
investigations, not only of potential effects occasioned by way of physical/chemical/biological 
mechanisms directly triggered by events within their modified genomes, but also the full range 
of potential ecological and socioeconomic effects occasioned by using them in the environments 
(agroecosystems) of their actual or intended use, and under the socioeconomic conditions of their
use, taking fully into account that the potential effects vary from variety to variety and species to 
plant species. Upholding values of respect for human rights, democratic participation and envi-
ronmental sustainability, which are opposed to those of capital and the market, often motivates 
challenges of this kind. These potential effects cannot all be investigated in "scientific safety 
studies," for they require utilizing ecological, human and social categories that have no place in 
research in such areas as physics, chemistry, and molecular biology, and that may include thick 
ethical terms (e.g., food security, being poisoned).xiv To investigate them empirically, therefore, 
requires adopting methodological approaches that are not reducible to those used in the indicated
scientific areas, and that are generally outside of the expertise of scientists trained in the method-
ologies appropriate to them. The expertise required to engage in research that leads to the devel-
opment of GEOs is quite different from that required for studies about the safety of using them.
At issue here are not only concerns about risks (potential harmful effects). Farmers (and 
their communities) in many areas of the world have suffered serious health problems because of 
having been exposed to glyphosate (the principal active ingredient in the widely used herbicide, 
RoundUp) sprayed on fields planted with glyphosate-resistant GEOs.xv They are unimpressed 
when told that the varieties of GEOs planted in these fields had undergone and passed "scientific 
safety tests." They know from their experience (even if it is not well recorded in peer reviewed 
studies) that, regardless of what was the case in the conditions of the tests, it is not safe to culti-
vate these GEOs (which require the accompanying use of glyphosate) in the ways and under the 
conditions in which they are used in their locales. And, they continue to be unimpressed when 
the manufactures and regulators of the GEOs insist that the problem was not with cultivating the 
GEOs, but with using glyphosate without heed to stipulated regulations for safe use,xvi for they 
have good reason to believe that the sellers of GEOs and glyphosate know that they will in fact 
not be used in accordance with these regulations.xvii 
3.
Summing up, ethical and social values properly affect decisions (at step 0)) made about the crite-
ria to be deployed for identifying the range of risks that should be considered in public policy de-
liberations, and of the relevant kinds of empirical data needed for making judgments about them.
They also – consistent with maintaining that judgments about safety (step (1)) can be settled 
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prior to steps (2) and (3) – also affect the standards deployed for determining how well claims 
about risks should be supported (by the available empirical data) – in order to ensure that risks 
are dealt with properly in public policy deliberations. 
Those who uphold values of capital and the market (agribusiness corporations, govern-
ments that prioritize economic growth, etc) are likely to cite the ethical gravity of losses (both 
economic and, allegedly, for food security) that would be incurred by failing to use GEOs on a 
wide scale; and consequently to require less stringent standards of evidential appraisal than those
who uphold values of respect for human rights, democratic participation and environmental sus-
tainability, who are likely to adopt precautionary stances that permit time for research incorporat-
ing more stringent standards to be met.xviii Similarly, those who uphold the latter values are likely
to emphasize the importance of step (3): investigating alternatives to the food/agricultural sys-
tem, in which using GEOs and the use of agrotoxics are acquiring ever larger roles, alternatives 
such as agroecology, a scientifically-informed approach to agriculture that attends simultane-
ously to production, sustainability, social health, strengthening the values and cultures of local 
communities, and to furthering the practices needed to implement policies of food sovereignty – 
and to urge the public support of research, in which are adopted strategies appropriate for dealing
with the human, ecological and social dimensions of agroecosystems.xix   
Scientists, qua scientists, however, do not have authority in the realm of ethical and so-
cial values. The values they uphold, even when widely shared, do not trump those upheld by 
other groups in democratic public policy deliberations. Thus, their judgments, about the eviden-
tial support that claims about the safety of planting GEO crops and consuming their products 
have, may sometimes be reasonably contested partly on value-laden grounds (cf. de Melo-Martín
& Intemann, 2017, p. 131). That contestation cannot be rebutted by appeal to the alleged "scien-
tific consensus" that GEOs (or, particular varieties of them) are safe. Apart from the fact that ac-
tually there is no such consensus, manifestly so among experts in biosafety investigations,xx if 
there were, it would likely secrete the scientists’ shared value commitments, a matter on which 
they have no authority. Appeal to such an alleged consensus covers up the role of upholding the 
values of capital and the market in affirming it.  
It follows that, in the context of deliberations about public policy, the trustworthiness of 
scientists is put into question and their authority unmerited, 
 - unless they engage with representatives of all stakeholders in the outcomes of the policies (as, 
for the most part, has not happened in the GEO case); 
 - unless, moreover, in doing so – respecting what Longino (2002, p. 129–135) calls "tempered 
equality" of participants in the deliberations – , they take into account that upholding competing 
values (e.g., of company-employed scientists and family farmers) may lead to making different 
judgments concerning relevant data, hypotheses to investigate, and approaches to farming, as 
well as concerning the degree of support required for claims about safety to merit credibility.
4.
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Let us now return to the three claims (introduced at the outset) that the 135 Nobel laureates en-
dorsed:xxi 
These claims are ambiguous, misleading, in some instances false, and apparently made 
without acquaintance with the relevant studies and arguments of their critics. (i) is false: I am not
aware of any agency that has compared the safety of GEO crops and their food products with 
that of agroecological (or organic farming) methods of production – the agencies have not sought
out the results of research dealing with that comparison (and very little of it has been conducted).
At most, they have found GEO crops and products to be at least as safe as conventional high-      
input crops and their products, but that doesn’t respond to the critics who endorse agroecological 
methods of production. (ii) is probably true – but misleading: it does not mention that epidemio-
logical studies of consumption of GEOs have not been conducted,xxii to a large extent because le-
gal prohibition of labelling GEO products poses probably an insurmountable impediment to con-
ducting them; and that it is well documented that cultivating GEOs has occasioned health prob-
lems for numerous farmers who have been exposed to the agrotoxics, whose use is integral to the
cultivation of certain varieties of GEOs. (iii) is ambiguous: the environmental impacts may in-
deed be less damaging than those of conventional high-input agriculture; but they are incompara-
bly more damaging to the environment than agroecological farming that has environmental sus-
tainability built into its fundamental objectives.
By dismissing criticisms like these "based on emotion and dogma contradicted by data," 
and not attempting to rebut them in a context where something like Longino’s conditions are in 
place, the scientists undermine the authority that science should be able to demand to be recog-
nized; and they weaken the contribution that science could make to democratic policy delibera-
tions. 
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Appendix
The central concern of the letter signed by the Nobel laureates is to support the program of research on Golden Rice 
[a variety of genetically engineered rice] and to denounce opposition to it, especially that of the NGO, Greenpeace. 
In a longer work, I would also discuss critically the way in which the letter misleads both about the state of research 
on Golden Rice and about that character of criticisms that question the importance of this research. 
 (a) The letter states that Greenpeace "has spearheaded opposition to Golden Rice, which has the potential 
to reduce or eliminate much of the death and disease caused by a vitamin A deficiency, which has the greatest im-
pact on the poorest people in Africa and Southeast Asia". It called upon "governments of the world to reject Green-
peace's campaign against Golden Rice specifically, and crops and foods improved through biotechnology in general;
and to do everything in their power to oppose Greenpeace's actions and accelerate the access of farmers to all the 
tools of modern biology, especially seeds improved through biotechnology"; and concluded with the warning: "Op-
position based on emotion and dogma contradicted by data must be stopped," accompanied by the rhetorical ques-
tion: "How many poor people in the world must die before we consider this a 'crime against humanity'?"
7
Seattle, WA; 1-4 November 2018 -395-
 (b) Around the same time, the US National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (2017) 
pointed out that the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) had stated reported: "Golden Rice will only be 
made available broadly to farmers and consumers if it is successfully developed into rice varieties suitable for Asia, 
approved by national regulators, and shown to improve vitamin A status in community conditions. If Golden Rice is 
found to be safe and efficacious, a sustainable delivery program will ensure that Golden Rice is acceptable and ac-
cessible to those most in need" (p. 228). As of July 2016, IRRI was continuing research on developing varieties of 
Golden Rice for use in SE Asia, and (according to it) none of the conditions it stated had yet been met - it is for this 
reason that Golden Rice has not been introduced. 
 (c) Two years later, earlier this year (2018), IRRI asked the USFDA for an opinion regarding the safety of 
a variety of Golden Rice (called GR2E - the only variety yet submitted for regulatory approval - but not yet ap-
proved in any Asian country). FDA (May 24, 2018) endorsed the evaluation of IRRI (and the Australian regulatory 
body) that GR2E is safe for consumption, while pointing out that it is not intended for food or animal uses in USA. 
However, it added: "the concentration Beta-carotene in GR2E rice is too low to warrant a nutrient content claim." 
GR2E is safe but not nutritionally relevant.
(d) The signers of the letter, thus, were remarkably uninformed about the state of research on Golden Rice 
– and also about the views and stances of Greenpeace (I am not associated with Greenpeace). On its website Green-
peace states that its objective is to "ensure the ability of Earth to nurture life in all its diversity." It fits into the body 
of critics of using GMOs, who maintain that the dominant food-agricultural system (in which using GEOs has be-
come for the time being a fundamental component) cannot respond adequately to the food and nutrition needs of the 
world’s impoverished peoples (and the right to food security for everyone), and that these needs can best be amelio-
rated by the programs of agroecology and food sovereignty (Lacey, 2015a; 2015b) – and that programs for develop-
ing GEOs (like Golden Rice) are taking resources away from developing effective and lasting solutions to death and 
disease caused by vitamin A deficiency.  Greenpeace has a respected place among these critics (and its "direct ac-
tions" and contributions to legal challenges are often appreciated by them). Of course, it would be legitimate to rebut
the critics with argument and evidence. One wonders why the laureates did not attempt to do so.
  (e) The credibility of pronouncements made by scientists of outstanding achievement is weakened when 
they sign letters like this one, accompanied by inflated, emotionally charged rhetoric, that has has a slender basis in 
fact. It would be enhanced if they entered into the type of dialogue, advocated by Helen Longino, in which scientists
would "listen to" the evidence provided by relevant parties, attempt to understand critics, and not tar them without a 
hearing. Science has an indispensable contribution to make in policy deliberations; but it is not the determiner of 
policy. Science will be enhanced, and its role in democratic societies consolidated, if it claims only to have authority
where it is actually warranted.
          
Notes
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i DRAFT (not for citation outside of the PSA meeting in Seattle) – October 15, 2018. The text is a draft of the presentation 
I’m planning to make. The notes contain details that will be incorporated into an eventual completed paper.
i See Appendix.
ii E.g., Mark Lynas (Cornell Alliance for Science), A plea to Greenpeace, <http://www.marklynas.org/2016/06/a-plea-to-
greenpeace/>.
In this paper I only consider GEOs used in agriculture. I take for granted that claims to the effect that using GEOs is safe re-
fer to GEOs that have passed safety tests, including those currently available on the market. (Obviously an unsafe GEO 
could be developed. Some varieties of GEOs have been developed that, after failing to pass safety tests, were not released 
for use.)
iv More fully developed and defended in Lacey (2005), Part 2.
v Deliberations concerning (2) and (3) cannot be settled in scientific inquiry (sound empirical inquiry), but there are sound 
empirically-based inputs that are (or could be) relevant to them. The deliberations will not be satisfactory if they do not 
draw upon these inputs. (See Lacey, 2005.)
vi Claims about efficacy need to be stated in a more qualified and nuanced way. I also will not contest that the claim that 
scientific research has not provided compelling evidence that consuming GEO products is unsafe health-wise. (The absence 
of compelling evidence that GEO products are unsafe to consume does not mean that there is compelling evidence that they 
are safe to consume – it depends on whether or not the necessary research has been conducted.)
vi The ceteris paribus qualification is needed to take into account that sometimes considerations, not reducible to safety 
ones, may properly be appealed to. 
vii I will not discuss here how this set is generated – e.g., from considering past investigations, role of values in it, stake-
holders’ concerns, etc) – and who (holding what values?) makes (and should make) the identification of what should be 
considered harmful? following what kinds of deliberations? and who should be represented in the deliberations?. 
ix To conclude on the basis of empirical investigation that 'X is safe' requires showing one-by-one that each member of the 
set of anticipated effect (judged to be harmful) is unlikely to occur at sufficient magnitude under the conditions imposed by 
proposed regulations. This presupposes: (a) an inductive move to unanticipated effects; and (b) that representative cases of 
all the effects, that should be labelled potentially harmful, are members of the set.
x I have argued elsewhere that here methodological and value considerations mutually reinforce each other (Lacey, 2017). 
Proponents of using GEOs often say that these safety studies investigate the risks occasioned by the GEOs themselves, and 
not those occasioned by the accompaniments of using them in agroecosystems or by socioeconomic mechanisms.
xi E.g., effects on soil microorganisms, a matter especially salient for those who regard maintaining soil fertility as indis-
pensable for sustainable agriculture.
xi The studies, which have produced many of the results that have actually informed public policy and regulatory decisions,
have been criticized for having a number of kinds of shortcomings (e.g., connected with conflicts of interest, and the use of 
intellectual property rights to maintain studies secret and so unavailable for replication and independent confirmation). 
Value judgments pervade these criticisms and their rebuttals. I will not attend to the questions that arise here.
xii Such challenges might be deemed irrelevant by those who reject the value-outlook for which the possible effects have 
special salience, and so who reject the need for the further studies. Those adhering to the values of capital and the market 
sometimes take such a stand. How reasonable that might be depends on the arguments offered against holding the value-out-
look in question. 
xiv For elaboration see Lacey (2016; 2017).
xv For documentation, see, e.g., Bombardi (2017); Paganelli, et al. (2010); Human Rights Watch (2018).
xvi After a jury in California recently ruled that Monsanto was responsible for a man’s being afflicted with cancer, and im-
posed a huge fine on it because it – for it was deemed that Monsanto had “acted with malice” in not providing warning on 
its label of the risks to health occasioned by using Roundup – the President of Bayer (that has now incorporated Monsanto) 
responded: "The correct use of Roundup doesn’t present a risk to health" (reference to be added). [Monsanto has appealed 
the ruling.] 
xvi Three years ago, when representatives of farmers – who had been poisoned in this way – came to present their tes-
timony at a meeting of the "technical" commission in Brazil (CTNBio) that had appraised a particular variety of GEOs as 
safe, they were not granted a hearing since (most members of the commission maintained) they were bearers only of anec-
dotal (not scientific) evidence that had no relevance to the conclusions of scientific safety studies. When they then disrupted
the meeting (and others of their group prevented the planting of a new variety of GEOs by invading a nursery and pulling up
all the seedlings), they were denounced by major scientific organizations as having no respect for science, and acting on the 
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basis of "emotion and dogma." For criticisms of this stance taken by the majority of members of CTNBio, and a response to
a rebuttal of the criticism, see Lacey, et al. (2015a; 2015b), articles published in JC Notícias, a daily e-newsletter of Jornal 
da Ciência, a publication of SBPC (Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science).
The narrow scope of "scientific safety studies" is sometimes justified on the ground that the investigations of the 
social impact of using GEOs is not "scientific," for the methodologies adopted in them are not reducible to those adopted in 
the mainstream areas of science mentioned above. Be that as it may: I won’t quibble about how to use the term "scientific" 
(a thick ethical term); the investigations in question are (when properly conducted) systematic empirical investigations. If 
they don’t count as "scientific", that would imply that the results of "scientific" investigations cannot provide sufficient in-
put into deliberations concerning public policies about safety, and would need to be supplemented with input from other 
kinds of empirical investigations. 
xvii See Lacey (2017).
xix For details, see Lacey (2005; 2015a; 2015b).
xx See, e.g., Hilbeck, et al. (2015); Krimsky (2015); Traavik & Ching (2007).
xxi See Appendix.
xxi Unless all the relevant research has been conducted (and it has not been in this case), the absence of compelling evi-
dence that GEO products are unsafe to consume does not imply that there is compelling evidence that they are safe to con-
sume – and it has nothing to do with harms that may be caused by, e.g., contact with an agrotoxic, rather than by consump-
tion. 
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The Reference Class Problem for Credit Valuation in Science 
Carole J. Lee (c3@uw.edu) 
 
Abstract: Scholars belong to multiple communities of credit simultaneously.  
When these communities disagree about how much credit to assign to a scholarly 
achievement, this raises a puzzle for decision theory models of credit-seeking in 
science.  The reference class problem for credit valuation in science is the 
problem of determining to which of an agent’s communities – which reference 
class – credit determinations should be indexed for any given act under any given 
state of nature.  I will identify strategies and desiderata for resolving ambiguity in 
credit valuation due to this problem and explain how pursuing its solution could, 
ironically, lead to its dissolution. 
 
1. Introduction 
Within the scientific community, there is a common understanding that its reward system 
drives problematic behavior linked to publication patterns, pipeline retention, hypercompetitive 
scientific cultures, and reproducibility. Conversely, there is also a shared sentiment that, in order 
to change these cultures and behaviors in ways that would improve science, the scientific 
community must coordinate across institutions to change how credit is assigned at the level of 
the individual scientist (Alberts et al. 2014, Nosek et al. 2015, Aalbersberg et al. 2017, National 
Academies of Sciences 2018, National Science Foundation 2015, Blank et al. 2017).  The hope is 
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that increasing individual researchers’ incentives towards increased transparency and openness 
will improve the integrity, reproducibility, and accuracy of the published record.1 
Analogously, philosophers working in the “credit economy” tradition adopt the working 
assumption that there is some amount of credit that agents can accrue for different acts under 
different states of nature.  This assumption allows them to use decision theory to model how 
credit-seeking among individual scientists can give rise to behavior and norms that support or 
thwart the achievement of community-wide goals.  When, in the aggregate, individual credit-
seeking cuts against collective ends, their approach can explore how changes to individuals’ 
incentive structures can nudge and redirect individual behavior (Bruner and O’Connor 2017, 
Rubin and O’Connor 2018, Bright 2017, Heesen 2017, Kitcher 1990, Strevens 2003, Zollman 
2018).  Different philosophers make different assumptions about the norms by which credit gets 
allotted – for example, whether credit is best thought of as all-or-nothing (Strevens 2003, Bright 
2017, Heesen 2017) or as something that may come in degrees (Bruner and O’Connor 2017, 
Rubin and O’Connor 2018, Zollman 2018).  However, the general approach assumes that there is 
some precise way to assign credit to different acts under different states of nature – an 
assumption that allows these philosophers to model credit-seeking behavior and the emergence 
of scientific norms in formally tractable ways. 
But, how much credit gets assigned to any given act under any given state of nature?  Just 
as each of us simultaneously belongs to multiple social categories each of which is tied to 
implied social hierarchies (Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne 1995, Crenshaw 1989), each 
                                                        
1 Institutions can also experience incentives that promote or thwart scientific ends (Lee and 
Moher 2017). 
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scholar simultaneously belongs to multiple communities of value with implied social hierarchies 
for assigning credit.  To which of an agent’s communities – which reference class – should credit 
determinations be indexed and why?   
In this paper, I will use examples from the current context of science’s complex and 
dynamic culture to motivate and illuminate what I will call the reference class problem for credit 
valuation in science.  I will identify a few strategies and desiderata for solving ambiguity in 
credit assignments due to the reference class problem.  And, I will say a bit about how 
developing the resources needed to solve it could ultimately sow the seeds for its own 
dissolution. 
 
2. The Reference Class Problem for Credit Valuation in Science 
The contours of this puzzle about the “coin of recognition” (Merton 1968, 56) become 
visible when one moves beyond thinking about credit in generic, abstractions of scientific 
communities towards the heterogeneous communities we find today.  I start from this slightly 
more concrete perspective because prestige requires recognition by individuals and forums that 
are themselves valued by credit-seeking scholars (Zuckerman and Merton 1971, Lee 2013): 
credit worthiness in science is a function of the individuals and systems designed to assess, 
allocate, dispute, and enforce it.  Although some aspects of Zuckerman and Merton’s narrative 
about the origins of the normative structure of science have been contested by historians (Csiszar 
2015, Biagioli 2002), we see the social dynamics Zuckerman and Merton proposed clearly at 
play in contemporary science.  For example, Nature Publishing Group recently found that – for 
the 18,354 authors in science, engineering, and medicine surveyed – the reputation of a journal is 
the primary factor driving choices about where to submit their work, where reputation is 
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primarily determined by the journal’s impact factor and whether it is “seen as the place to 
publish the best research” (Nature Publishing Group 2015).  Factors associated with a journal’s 
ability to archive and disseminate research – things like a journal’s time from acceptance to 
publication, indexing services, or Open Access options – were much less important.2 
Within academia, each of us simultaneously belongs to multiple communities of value.  
The reference class problem arises when these different communities of value disagree about the 
amount of credit an agent accrues for choosing some act under some state of nature.  Although I 
take this problem is be general, for the sake of clarity and simplicity in presentation, I will focus 
my examples on communities that can be described as having a nesting structure: for example, 
individual scholars belong to specific sub-disciplines, which are nested within disciplines, which 
are nested within a more general population of scholars.  A sub-population that is nested within a 
population can have a credit sub-culture whose valuations differ from that of the population, 
whose valuations can differ from that of the super-population.  In these cases, changing how 
narrowly or broadly one draws the boundaries of an agent’s community of valuation can change 
the amount of credit assigned to a scholarly accomplishment.  This gives rise to the reference 
class problem for credit valuation in science: to which of the agent’s communities – which 
reference class – should credit valuations be indexed when determining the amount of credit the 
agent accrues for different acts under different states of nature? 
                                                        
2 I recognize that some decision theorists, especially those working outside of philosophy, may 
reject or remain agnostic about attributing mental states such as beliefs to agents (Okasha 2016).  
However, because I understand credit and credit-seeking as sociological phenomena involving 
status beliefs such as these, I am committed to attributing beliefs to agents. 
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There are many examples across academia where nesting community structures can give 
rise to paradoxes and pathologies in credit assignments.  For example, scholars’ individual sense 
of what counts as quality work – their individual credit assignments – may deviate from what is 
endorsed in a sub-discipline or discipline’s status hierarchy (Correll et al. 2017, Centola, Willer, 
and Macy 2005, Willer, Kuwabara, and Macy 2009).  A puzzle that has cachet in a sub-discipline 
may be of peripheral importance within that discipline: for example, a more accurate technique 
for measuring how temperature cools with elevation considered critical in mountain meteorology 
and mountain ecology (Mindner, Mote, and Lundquist 2010) may have less visibility, despite its 
relevance, to the larger discipline of hydrology (Livneh et al. 2013).  A question or technique 
that is thought to have high impact across fields (e.g., machine learning) may have little 
prominence within some of those fields. 
Hypothetically speaking, one could imagine differences in valuations giving rise to a 
Simpson’s paradox in credit valuation.  Simpson’s paradox is a phenomenon whereby a trend 
that appears in a population reverses or disappears when it is disaggregated into sub-populations 
(Blyth 1972).  For example, a classic study found that, when looking at aggregate graduate 
school admissions data at UC Berkeley, women were, on the whole, less likely than men to be 
accepted; however, when the data was disaggregated into admitting departments, women were 
more likely than men to be admitted (Bickel, Hammel, and O’Connell 1975).  Analogously, a 
Simpson’s paradox in credit valuation in science would occur in cases where a population-level 
preference for scholarly product a versus b reverses when the population is disaggregated into its 
component sub-populations.  In Simpson’s Paradox cases, thinking more carefully about the 
context of evaluation usually leads to using a reference class that is finer-grained than the 
population-level.  However, it’s not clear whether this would always be the case in evaluations of 
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scientific credit.  Hypothetically speaking, consider a hypothetical scenario in which an 
interdisciplinary project is not preferred by the individual disciplines represented by its authors 
or content, but is preferred when those disciplines are aggregated together.  And, imagine that 
this project gets published in a journal, valued by those disciplines, that seeks papers of interest 
across and beyond disciplines (not just within disciplines): this is one way to interpret, for 
example, Science’s mission to publish papers that “merit recognition by the wider scientific 
community and general public. . . beyond that provided by specialty journals” (Science).  Which 
reference class would be most relevant in evaluating the value of this project? 
There are other ways of dividing scholarly communities into nesting structures that create 
tensions in credit assignments.  The pressures a scholar may feel from the incentive structure 
impacting her department/school may be slightly different from the incentive structure impacting 
her university.  A coarse but concrete way to see this is to think about the prestige structure 
reified and reinforced by ranking systems (Espeland and Sauder 2012, 2016, Sauder and 
Espeland 2006), which transform “the ways professional opportunities are distributed” (Espeland 
and Sauder 2016, 7).  An untenured business school professor with a potentially high impact 
manuscript needs to burnish her prestige in the eyes of both her dean and her provost, since both 
will evaluate her tenure case.  If her provost is working to gain stature on the Academic 
Rankings of World Universities [ARWU], the professor should submit her manuscript to Science 
or Nature, since the ARWU ranks universities by their publications in these journals (Academic 
Ranking of World Universities 2018).  However, if her dean is trying to gain stature on the 
Financial Times International ranking of MBA programs, she should submit to one of the fifty 
business, economics, or psychology journals by which the FT ranking system evaluates Business 
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school prestige – notably, the journal list does not include Science or Nature (Ormans 2016).  
What should the business school professor do? 
Finally, credit assignments can vary depending on how long a time window a scholar 
keeps in view.  A coarse but concrete way to think about this is by looking at how metrics for 
evaluating scholarship change over time.  Journal impact factors are becoming less useful 
measures for evaluating an individual’s scholarly contribution: since the advent of the digital 
age, the most elite journals (including Science and Nature) are publishing a decreasing 
percentage of the top cited papers (Larivière, Lozano, and Gingras 2013); the relationship 
between journal impact factor and paper citations has declined over time (Lozano, Larivière, and 
Gingras 2012); and, the citation distributions between journals “overlap extensively” (Larivière 
et al. 2016).  The current wisdom is that if quantitative indicators are to be used to evaluate 
research, it is more useful to use article-level metrics such as citations as well as alternative 
metrics such as downloads and views (San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment 2013, 
Hicks and Wouters 2015, Wilsdon et al. 2017).  On the horizon, there are now calls for creating 
new metrics that can encourage researchers and journals to be transparent and open in their 
reporting practices (National Academies of Sciences 2018, Wilsdon et al. 2017, Aalbersberg et 
al. 2017).  Note that, the rise of such metrics – as well as the growing meta-research literature 
that ranks journals by the replicability (Schimmack 2015) or sample size and statistical power of 
their published results (Fraley and Vazire 2014) – makes it possible for a journal’s impact factor 
and epistemic credibility to come apart (Fang and Casadevall 2011). 
Decision theorists capture the risky nature of individual choices by allowing for 
uncertainty about which states of the world will come to be; and, when the probabilities attached 
to different outcomes are understood subjectively, these models permit a kind of subjectivity in 
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estimates of expected credit for different acts.  However, I hope the examples throughout this 
section animate genuine ambiguity in credit due to the reference class problem for credit 
valuation in science. 
 
3. Strategies and Desiderata for Solving the Reference Class Problem 
How might decision theorists try to solve the reference class problem for assigning credit 
in science?  One possible approach argues for the “correctness” of using one community rather 
than another.  For example, it might be tempting to argue that all prestige is discipline-based 
since many scholarly prizes are distributed for excellence in particular disciplines (e.g., Nobel 
prize, Fields prize, academic society prizes); and, even when research is funded or published in 
interdisciplinary contexts, it may be primarily evaluated on the basis of its disciplinary 
excellence (Lamont 2009, but see Lee et al. 2013).  Indexing credit valuation to a particular 
community need not prevent scholars from outside that community from understanding the 
relative value of that contribution: for example, if one were to adopt the old-fashioned and 
problematic assumption that an article’s impact can be measured by the impact factor of the 
journal in which it is published,3 and one recognizes that citations rates vary across disciplines, 
one could use field-normalized percentiles to understand a paper’s impact in a metric that is 
legible across fields (Hicks and Wouters 2015).  Because this strategy for addressing the 
                                                        
3 The citation distributions within journals are so skewed that it is statistically improper to infer 
the impact of an individual article on the basis of the impact factor of the journal in which it is 
published (San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment 2013, Hicks and Wouters 2015, 
Wilsdon et al. 2017, Larivière et al. 2016, Wilsdon et al. 2015). 
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reference class problem relies heavily on identifying the “right” community, defending the 
centrality of the chosen community as opposed to others is critical.  For example, some may 
challenge the idea that disciplines should be the sole arbiter of credit: note that the awarding of 
some scientific prizes reach across disciplinary conceptions of excellence (e.g., consider winners 
of the MacArthur Genius Prize and the psychologists who have won the Nobel Prize in 
Economics). 
Another possible approach creates an algorithm that calculates the credit value of a 
scholarly contribution by summing the credit valuation of multiple communities.  This approach 
would need to identify exactly how much to weight each community’s valuation – with a 
rationale for why – since different weightings could lead to different overall credit valuations.4  
Note that some scholars take this style of approach when trying to measure the relative prestige 
of journals: in particular, the Eigenfactor score rates journals according to the number of its 
incoming citations, where the “relative importance” of each incoming citation is contextualized 
by the frequency with which the citing journal is itself cited (West, Bergstrom, and Bergstrom 
2010). 
Those who may wish to model the implications of different approaches for solving the 
reference class problem may try to do so by setting up hypothetical communities that assign 
                                                        
4 On the face of it, this may seem like a form of commensuration because it involves summing 
values to calculate an overall score (Espeland and Stevens 1998).  However, the process of 
commensuration requires combining values across qualitatively different domains of value.  For 
clearer examples of commensuration in scholarly evaluation, see Lee (2015). 
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community boundaries and credit assignments in de facto ways to see what kinds of behaviors 
and norms emerge.   
However, to solve the underlying conceptual problem, one must provide theories of 
community and credit that address two fundamental but vexing questions.  How should one 
define and gerrymander the boundaries of the relevant communities invoked in the proposed 
solution?  And, how does one determine the amount of credit those communities would assign to 
different acts under different states of nature?  These questions may not be independently 
answerable.  The boundaries of a community may need to be defined in terms of patterns of 
shared lore among its members about how credit is accrued – shared beliefs that coordinate 
credit-seeking and enforcement behavior in cases where status beliefs are internalized as norms 
(Merton 1973) and in cases where they are not (Willer, Kuwabara, and Macy 2009, Ridgeway 
and Correll 2006).  Conversely, in recognition that some community members can have more 
influence than others on the content of reigning status beliefs, a community’s credit assignments 
may need to be defined with some reference to the causal patterns of interaction among specific 
individuals and clusters of individuals – including status judges who wield “social control 
through their evaluation of role-performance and their allocation of rewards for that 
performance” (Zuckerman and Merton 1971, 66).  Note, however, that answers to these 
questions should not exclusively inform each other.  Notably, we must be careful not allow the 
size of a scholarly population and/or the power of its status judges to fully determine the 
intellectual value of the questions pursued by any particular partition of the scholarly universe. 
 
4. Conclusion 
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Scientific credit – the “coin of recognition” (Merton 1968, 56) – is assessed, allocated, 
disputed, and enforced by many different communities and institutions within science that 
support and sustain a multiplicity of status hierarchies.  This gives rise to what I have called the 
reference class problem for credit valuation in science.  Solving this problem requires developing 
rich theories of community and credit that are based on fine-grained information about the 
structure and status systems of complex scholarly networks.  The irony of this assessment is that 
such investigation towards solving the reference class problem could ultimately sow the seeds 
for its own dissolution.   
In particular, such study can render friable a critical assumption for both the reference 
class problem and for decision theory models: namely, that communities, once defined, assign 
determinate amounts of monistic credit for different acts under different states of nature – that 
credit “can vary quantitatively but not qualitatively” (Anderson 1993, xii).5  Contrary to this, 
recent policy papers call for moving away from narrowly conceived measurements of research 
excellence towards broader ones that are sensitive to the diversity of individual researchers’, 
programs’, and academic institutions’ research missions (Hicks and Wouters 2015, Wilsdon et 
al. 2015).  Such work can include community-engaged scholarship that creates, disseminates, 
and implements knowledge in coordination with the public to identify social interventions, 
change social practice, and influence policy (Hicks and Wouters 2015, San Francisco 
Declaration on Research Assessment 2013, Boyer 1990, Escrigas et al. 2014).  From the 
                                                        
5 Note too that, for formal reasons, the assumption that individual credit assessments could be 
aggregated into a collective one is questionable given the challenges of combining individual 
preferences into collective ones (Arrow 1950). 
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perspective of these efforts, plurality in our notions of scholarly excellence and credit – and 
differences in valuation and prioritization practices between individuals and communities – may 
be best conceived, not as a logical problem to solve, but as a starting point for theorizing. 
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Pragmatism	and	the	content	of	quantum	mechanics	
Peter	J.	Lewis	
Draft	–	please	don’t	quote	
	
Abstract	
Pragmatism	about	quantum	mechanics	provides	an	attractive	approach	to	the	question	of	what	
quantum	mechanics	says.	However,	the	conclusions	reached	by	pragmatists	concerning	the	
content	of	quantum	mechanics	cannot	be	squared	with	the	way	that	physicists	use	quantum	
mechanics	to	describe	physical	systems.	In	particular,	attention	to	actual	use	results	in	ascribing	
content	to	claims	about	physical	systems	over	a	much	wider	range	of	contexts	than	
countenanced	by	recent	pragmatists.	The	resulting	account	of	the	content	of	quantum	
mechanics	is	much	closer	to	quantum	logic,	and	threatens	the	pragmatist	conclusion	that	
quantum	mechanics	requires	no	supplementation.	
	
1.	Introduction	
Quantum	mechanics	is,	notoriously,	a	theory	in	need	of	interpretation.	But	there	is	very	little	
agreement	on	what	kind	of	interpretation	it	needs.	That	is,	there	is	very	little	agreement	
concerning	what	the	foundational	problems	of	quantum	mechanics	are,	and	without	such	
agreement,	there	is	little	hope	for	a	consensus	concerning	what	an	acceptable	solution	to	the	
problems	might	look	like.	
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Here	is	a	way	to	divide	up	the	territory.	We	can	distinguish	between	descriptive	and	
normative	questions	concerning	quantum	mechanics.	Descriptive	questions	concern	what	
quantum	mechanics	says—the	content	of	the	theory,	as	expressed	in	textbooks	and	used	in	
labs.	Normative	questions	concern	what	quantum	mechanics	should	say—and	in	particular,	
whether	it	should	say	something	different	from	what	it	actually	does	say.	
	 All	parties	to	the	debates	over	the	foundations	of	quantum	mechanics	would	agree,	I	
think,	that	there	is	a	legitimate	descriptive	question	concerning	the	content	of	quantum	
mechanics.	Even	those	philosophers	and	physicists	who	think	that	quantum	mechanics	wears	
its	interpretation	on	its	sleeve	at	least	feel	the	need	to	correct	the	mistaken	impressions	of	
other	philosophers	and	physicists	concerning	what	quantum	mechanics	says.	The	normative	
question	presupposes	an	answer	to	the	descriptive	one:	some	think	quantum	mechanics	is	just	
fine	the	way	it	is,	others	contend	that	it	needs	to	be	replaced	or	supplemented	with	something	
radically	different,	and	in	large	part	this	difference	in	attitude	depends	on	prior	differences	
concerning	the	answer	to	the	descriptive	question.		
	 As	an	illustration,	consider	a	fairly	standard	narrative	concerning	the	descriptive	and	
normative	questions.	Descriptively	speaking,	quantum	mechanics	depends	on	a	distinction	
between	measurements	and	non-measurements:	measurements	follow	one	dynamical	law,	the	
collapse	dynamics,	and	non-measurements	follow	a	different	dynamical	law,	the	Schrödinger	
dynamics.	Since	these	two	dynamical	processes	are	incompatible,	a	precise	formulation	of	
quantum	mechanics	requires	a	precise	dividing	line	between	measurements	and	non-
measurements.	Quantum	mechanics	nowhere	provides	such	a	thing—and	indeed,	it	seems	
highly	unlikely	that	a	term	like	“measurement”	could	be	given	a	physically	precise	definition.	So	
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descriptively	speaking,	quantum	mechanics	is	inadequate	as	a	physical	theory.	On	the	basis	of	
this	measurement	problem,	Bell	(2004,	213–231)	recommends	replacing	quantum	mechanics	
with	either	a	pilot-wave	theory	or	a	spontaneous	collapse	theory.	For	similar	reasons,	Wallace	
(2012,	35)	recommends	replacing	quantum	mechanics	with	a	many-worlds	theory.
1
	
	 But	not	everybody	concurs.	There	are	alternative	narratives	according	to	which	
quantum	mechanics,	descriptively	speaking,	is	just	fine	as	it	is,	and	hence	there	is	no	normative	
pressure	to	supplement	or	replace	it.	One	prominent	version	proceeds	from	the	quantum	logic	
of	von	Neumann	(1936)	and	Putnam	(1975)	through	to	the	quantum	information	theory	of	Bub	
(2016).	According	to	this	approach,	quantum	mechanics	describes	a	non-classical	event	space—
in	terms	of	truth	values,	a	non-Boolean	algebra,	and	in	terms	of	probability	ascriptions,	a	non-
simplex	distribution.	No-go	theorems	(arguably)	show	that	it	is	impossible	to	construct	a	set	of	
events	obeying	classical	Boolean	logic	or	classical	Kolmogorov	probability	that	reproduces	the	
empirical	predictions	of	quantum	mechanics.	The	implication	is	that	in	quantum	mechanics	we	
have	discovered	something	important	about	the	fundamental	event	structure	of	the	world.	
Seeking	to	replace	or	supplement	quantum	mechanics	with	a	theory	obeying	classical	logic	and	
classical	probability	theory	amounts	to	a	quixotic	attempt	to	impose	a	structure	on	the	world	
that	it	manifestly	does	not	have	(Bub	2016,	222).	The	measurement	problem,	on	this	account,	
results	from	a	mistaken	demand	for	a	dynamical	explanation	of	the	individual	events	in	the	
quantum	structure,	when	no	such	explanation	is	available	(Bub	2016,	223)	
																																																						
1
	Wallace	takes	the	many-worlds	theory	to	be	a	precise	statement	of	the	content	of	quantum	
mechanics,	rather	than	a	replacement	for	it.	I	take	up	the	question	of	whether	the	many-worlds	
structure	is	present	in	quantum	mechanics	as	it	stands	in	section	2.			
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	 This	fundamental	difference	of	opinion—between	those	who	take	the	measurement	
problem	seriously	and	those	who	regard	it	as	a	pseudo-problem—continues	to	divide	the	
foundations	of	physics	community	today.	Hence	the	descriptive	question—the	question	of	what	
quantum	mechanics	actually	says—remains	a	pressing	one.	In	this	paper,	I	argue	for	a	particular	
way	of	approaching	the	descriptive	question.	The	methodology	is	the	pragmatist	one	of	Healey	
(2012;	2017)	and	Friederich	(2015),	but	the	answer	to	the	descriptive	question	that	results	from	
following	this	methodology,	I	argue,	differs	in	an	important	way	from	the	answers	that	Healey	
and	Friederich	give.	I	conclude	by	assessing	the	consequences	of	this	answer	to	the	descriptive	
question	for	the	normative	question.	
	
2.	The	descriptive	question	
So	how	should	we	approach	the	descriptive	question?	Consider	a	straightforward	realist	
approach	to	the	content	of	scientific	theories.	A	theory,	at	least	in	physics,	is	typically	expressed	
using	a	particular	mathematical	structure.	The	state	of	a	physical	system	is	generally	identified	
with	a	mathematical	entity	that	resides	in	a	particular	abstract	space,	and	the	dynamics	of	the	
theory	tell	us	how	that	state	evolves	over	time.	So,	for	example,	in	many	applications	of	
classical	mechanics,	the	state	of	a	physical	system	can	be	represented	by	a	set	of	vectors	in	a	
three-dimensional	Euclidean	space,	and	the	dynamical	laws	of	Newtonian	mechanics	tell	us	
how	the	set	of	vectors	evolves	over	time.	The	interpretation	of	the	mathematics	is	fairly	
straightforward:	the	vectors	represent	the	positions	and	momenta	of	point-like	particles,	and	
classical	mechanics	tells	us	how	the	properties	of	the	particles	change.	
Seattle, WA; 1-4 November 2018 -421-
	 5	
Such	an	approach	can	equally	be	applied	to	quantum	mechanics	(Albert	1996).	
According	to	quantum	mechanics,	the	state	of	a	physical	system	is	identified	with	a	complex-
valued	function	defined	on	a	configuration	space—a	space	with	three	dimensions	for	each	
particle	in	the	system.	A	dynamical	law,	the	Schrödinger	equation,	tells	us	how	this	function,	
the	wave-function,	changes	over	time.	Then	by	analogy	with	classical	mechanics,	the	wave-
function	must	be	a	representation	of	the	physical	properties	of	the	quantum	system	as	they	
change	over	time.	
The	continuity	with	classical	mechanics	in	the	above	account	is	attractive,	but	there	are	
surprising	consequences.	For	an	N-particle	system,	the	wave-function	is	defined	over	a	3N-
dimensional	configuration	space,	and	it	cannot	be	represented	without	loss	in	a	three-
dimensional	space.	This	has	led	some	to	conclude	that	a	straightforward	realist	reading	of	
quantum	mechanics	shows	that	the	three-dimensionality	of	our	physical	world	is	illusory	(Albert	
1996).	Furthermore,	if	we	model	a	measurement	using	quantum	mechanics,	the	wave-function	
ends	up	with	components	corresponding	to	each	possible	outcome	of	the	measurement—not	
just	one	outcome,	as	is	the	case	classically.	This	leads	Everettians	like	Wallace	(2012)	to	
conclude	that	a	straightforward	realist	reading	of	quantum	mechanics	shows	that	every	
possible	outcome	of	a	measurement	actually	occurs.	
These	conclusions	might	be	right,	but	do	they	simply	follow	from	close	attention	to	the	
structure	of	quantum	mechanics?	There	are	reasons	to	be	suspicious.	As	Healey	(2017,	116)	
notes,	conclusions	of	this	kind	depend	on	the	assumption	that	the	wave-function	plays	the	
same	descriptive	role	in	quantum	mechanics	as	the	position-momentum	vectors	play	in	
classical	mechanics.	If	this	assumption	is	itself	up	for	grabs	in	the	interpretation	of	quantum	
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mechanics,	then	neither	of	these	conclusions	is	warranted.	But	how	do	we	adjudicate	the	
question	of	whether	the	wave-function	describes	physical	systems	or	whether	it	has	some	
other,	non-descriptive	role?	Is	there	a	metaphysically	neutral	methodology	that	could	be	used	
to	answer	this	question?	Healey	(2012;	2017)	and	Friederich	(2015)	think	that	there	is.	
	
3.	Pragmatism	
Consider	an	analogy.	“Stealing	is	bad”	has	the	same	grammatical	structure	as	“Cherries	are	
red”.	But	it	is	far	from	clear	that	both	sentences	should	be	taken	as	descriptive.	In	particular,	
badness,	taken	as	a	property	of	actions,	seems	like	a	queer	kind	of	property,	imperceptible	and	
disconnected	from	the	other	properties	of	the	action.	Expressivists	seek	to	dissolve	the	problem	
of	the	nature	of	badness	by	claiming	that	a	sentence	like	“Stealing	is	bad”	should	be	taken	as	
expressive	rather	than	descriptive—as	expressing	our	attitude	towards	stealing.	Pragmatists	
further	coopt	expressivism	as	a	variety	of	pragmatism	(Price	2011,	9).	Pragmatists	stress	the	
variety	of	uses	of	language,	noting	that	sentences	with	superficially	similar	form	can	be	used	in	
radically	different	ways.	“Cherries	are	red”	is	used	to	describe	a	class	of	objects,	whereas	
“Stealing	is	bad”	is	used	to	express	our	attitude	towards	a	class	of	actions.	
	 Pragmatism,	then,	enjoins	us	to	pay	close	attention	to	how	a	sentence	is	used	in	order	
to	find	out	what	it	means.	Healey	(2012;	2017)	and	Friederich	(2015)	each	suggest	that	the	
pragmatist	approach	provides	us	with	a	metaphysically	neutral	methodology	for	probing	the	
content	of	quantum	mechanics.	That	is,	we	can	look	at	how	various	quantum	mechanical	claims	
are	used	by	physicists	in	order	to	determine	what	those	claims	mean.	This	strikes	me	as	a	
welcome	suggestion.	In	the	rest	of	this	section	I	present	the	conclusions	of	their	pragmatist	
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inquiries;	in	the	next,	I	consider	whether	the	language	use	of	physicists	actually	supports	those	
conclusions.	
	 Healey	(2012)	distinguishes	between	quantum	claims	and	non-quantum	magnitude	
claims.	The	former	explicitly	mention	quantum	states,	quantum	probabilities,	or	other	novel	
elements	of	the	theory	of	quantum	mechanics.	The	latter	are	claims	about	the	magnitude	of	a	
physical	quantity	that	do	not	involve	quantum	states,	quantum	probabilities	etc.	In	keeping	
with	the	pragmatist	methodology,	Healey	bases	this	distinction	on	the	way	the	two	kinds	of	
claims	are	used.	Non-quantum	magnitude	claims	are	used	in	a	straightforwardly	descriptive	
way.	But	quantum	claims	are	used	in	a	different	way:	they	are	used,	not	to	describe	a	system,	
but	to	prescribe	a	user’s	degrees	of	belief	in	various	non-quantum	magnitude	claims.	
	 As	an	example,	Healey	appeals	to	the	Interference	experiments	of	Juffmann	et	al.	
(2009),	in	which	C60	molecules	are	passed	through	an	array	of	slits	and	then	deposited	on	a	
silicon	surface.	To	derive	quantum	mechanical	predictions	for	this	experimental	arrangement,	
quantum	states	are	ascribed	to	C60	molecules.	That	is,	quantum	claims	of	the	form	“The	
molecule	has	state	|yñ”	are	used,	via	the	Born	rule,	to	ascribe	probabilities	to	claims	concerning	
the	various	possible	locations	of	the	molecules	on	the	silicon	surface.	These	latter	claims—of	
the	form	“The	molecule	is	located	in	region	R”—are	non-quantum	magnitude	claims.	The	job	of	
the	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	is	to	describe	the	physical	system,	but	the	job	of	the	
quantum	claims	is	to	prescribe	degrees	of	belief	in	the	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	for	an	
appropriately	situated	observer.	In	this	respect	Healey’s	approach	is	like	the	expressivist’s	in	
ethics:	claims	that	have	superficially	similar	grammatical	forms	have	very	different	functions.	
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Another	important	strand	in	the	pragmatist	approach	concerns	the	role	of	decoherence.	
After	the	C60	molecule	hits	the	silicon	surface,	complicated	interactions	with	the	surface	mean	
that	the	state	of	the	molecule-environment	system	becomes	approximately	diagonal	when	
written	as	a	density	matrix	in	the	position	basis.	This	in	turn	insures	that	the	probabilities	
ascribed	by	the	Born	rule	to	various	claims	about	the	molecule’s	position	closely	obey	the	
probability	axioms.	But	before	the	molecule	encounters	the	silicon	surface,	its	state	is	a	
coherent	superposition—a	state	that	is	not	even	approximately	diagonal,	and	for	which	the	
Born	rule	does	not	ascribe	probabilities	to	location	claims	that	closely	obey	the	probability	
axioms.	For	such	a	state,	the	Born	rule	does	not	prescribe	appropriate	degrees	of	belief	in	the	
non-quantum	location	claims,	and	so	assertion	of	such	claims	prior	to	decoherence	is	not	
licensed	by	quantum	mechanics.	Decoherence,	then	provides	a	demarcation	between	situations	
in	which	it	is	appropriate	to	have	a	well-defined	degree	of	belief	in	a	non-quantum	magnitude	
claim,	and	situations	in	which	it	is	not.	
The	central	finding	of	the	Healey-Friederich	pragmatist	approach	is	that	attention	to	the	
use	of	quantum	mechanical	language	shows	that	claims	about	the	quantum	state	of	a	system	
are	not	used	to	describe	that	system.	Hence,	we	should	not	think	of	the	wave-function	as	a	
representation	of	the	physical	properties	of	the	quantum	system	as	they	change	over	time.	This	
perspective	has	the	advantage	that	the	measurement	problem	does	not	arise:	if	the	wave-
function	doesn’t	represent	the	system,	then	we	don’t	have	to	worry	that	the	dynamical	laws	for	
wave-function	evolution	are	different	for	measurements	and	non-measurements.	In	fact,	if	the	
quantum	state	is	prescriptive,	then	the	difference	between	measurements	and	non-
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measurements	arises	quite	naturally:	the	results	of	measurements	have	a	direct	and	obvious	
influence	on	what	you	should	believe.	
Hence	the	pragmatist	approach	provides	a	clear	answer	to	the	descriptive	question:	
quantum	mechanics,	in	itself,	says	nothing	about	the	world.	As	Healey	(2017,	12)	puts	it,	
“quantum	theory	has	no	physical	ontology”.	Rather,	quantum	mechanics	tells	us	what	to	
believe	about	non-quantum	ontology—about	particles,	or	in	the	case	of	quantum	field	theory,	
about	fields.	Furthermore,	this	answer	to	the	descriptive	question	suggests	an	answer	to	the	
normative	question:	since	the	measurement	problem	doesn’t	arise,	there	is	no	motivation	for	
supplementing	or	replacing	quantum	mechanics	with	something	else.	
	
4.	Actual	use,	counterfactual	content	
Thus	far,	I	have	said	little	about	the	evidence	that	backs	up	Healey’s	claims	about	how	quantum	
claims	and	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	are	used.	Indeed,	direct	evidence	from	the	language	
use	of	physicists	is	likely	to	be	unenlightening:	that	a	claim	is	asserted	in	a	given	context	
provides	no	direct	evidence	concerning	whether	its	content	is	descriptive	or	prescriptive.	
	 To	fill	this	gap,	Healey	appeals	to	an	inferentialist	account	of	the	link	between	use	and	
meaning	derived	from	the	work	of	Robert	Brandom	(2000):	the	meaning	of	a	claim	is	identified	
with	the	set	of	material	inferences	it	licenses.	So	by	looking	at	the	way	a	claim	is	used	in	
licensing	inferences,	we	can	gain	evidence	about	what	it	means.	And	here	the	distinction	
between	prescriptive	quantum	claims	and	descriptive	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	seems	to	
be	well	motivated.	In	the	practice	of	physics,	a	claim	about	the	quantum	state	of	a	system	is	
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used	to	infer	Born	probabilities,	and	nothing	more.	If	Born	probabilities	are	taken	to	be	rational	
degrees	of	belief,	then	the	prescriptive	content	of	a	quantum	claim	exhausts	its	meaning.	
A	non-quantum	magnitude	claim,	on	the	other	hand,	can	license	a	wide	variety	of	
inferences.	From	the	claim	that	a	C60	molecule	is	located	in	a	particular	region	of	the	silicon	
surface,	we	can	infer	that	an	electron	microscope	will	produce	an	image	of	the	molecule	if	
directed	at	that	region	(Juffmann	et	al.	2009,	2).	We	can	infer	that	if	the	silicon	surface	is	left	
untouched	for	two	weeks,	the	C60	molecule	will	remain	in	the	same	place	(Juffmann	et	al.	2009,	
2).	Under	suitable	conditions,	we	can	infer	that	the	C60	molecule	will	emits	photons;	under	
different	conditions,	that	it	will	act	as	a	nucleation	core	for	molecular	growth	(Juffmann	et	al.	
2009,	3).	In	other	words,	the	inferences	licensed	by	the	non-quantum	magnitude	claim	support	
the	interpretation	that	the	meaning	of	the	claim	is	descriptive	rather	than	merely	prescriptive.
2
	
So	there	is	a	good	case	to	be	made,	I	think,	that	actual	use	supports	the	distinction	
between	prescriptive	quantum	claims	and	descriptive	non-quantum	magnitude	claims.	But	
there	is	a	further	strand	to	the	Healey-Friederich	interpretation,	namely	that	non-quantum	
magnitude	claims	are	only	licensed	after	decoherence.	This	claim,	I	think,	does	not	stand	up	so	
well	to	scrutiny.	
Consider	C60	interference	again.	After	the	molecule	has	adhered	to	the	silicon	surface,	
the	state	of	the	molecule	is	decoherent,	and	the	claim	that	the	molecule	has	a	particular	
																																																						
2
	There	is	a	sense	in	which	the	meaning	of	any	claim	is	prescriptive	according	to	the	
inferentialist	program:	the	claim	about	the	location	of	the	molecule	licenses	an	inference	to	a	
certain	degree	of	belief	that	the	electron	microscope	will	produce	an	image	of	it.	But	still,	there	
is	a	reasonable	distinction	here:	the	quantum	claim	licenses	inferences	only	via	the	Born	rule,	
whereas	the	non-quantum	magnitude	claim	licenses	inferences	via	a	huge	variety	of	schema	
typical	of	small	physical	objects.	The	latter	is	just	what	it	is	for	a	claim	to	be	descriptive.	
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location	is	licensed—that	is,	it	is	appropriate	to	associate	a	particular	degree	of	belief	with	the	
claim,	and	if	that	degree	of	belief	is	high	enough,	it	is	appropriate	to	assert	the	claim.	But	
before	the	molecule	has	adhered	to	the	silicon	surface,	the	state	of	the	molecule	is	coherent,	
and	no	claim	about	the	location	of	the	molecule	is	licensed—it	is	not	appropriate	to	associate	a	
degree	of	belief	with	such	a	claim,	or	to	assert	it.	Similar	considerations	apply	to	properties	
other	than	location.	
This	seems	to	fly	in	the	face	of	actual	use.	For	example,	in	the	description	of	the	C60	
interference	experiment,	Juffmann	et	al.	(2009,	2)	assert	that	“all	transmitted	particles	arrive	
with	the	same	speed,”	and	“about	110cm	behind	the	source,	the	molecules	encounter	the	first	
diffraction	grating,”	apparently	ascribing	both	speed	and	location	to	C60	molecules	prior	to	
decoherence.	This	doesn’t	seem	to	be	an	isolated	incident:	physicists	routinely	talk	of	
preparing,	selecting,	spraying,	shooting	and	trapping	particles,	ions	and	molecules,	and	this	talk	
typically	involves	making	claims	about	these	objects	prior	to	any	eventual	decoherence.	
It	is	possible,	of	course,	that	this	is	just	“loose	talk”,	or	an	indirect	way	of	making	claims	
about	the	quantum	state	of	the	systems	concerned.	But	given	the	frequency	of	such	claims,	and	
given	the	reliance	of	the	pragmatist	methodology	on	use,	this	seems	like	a	shaky	game	to	play.	
It	would	be	better,	all	things	considered,	if	such	claims	could	be	accommodated	within	the	
pragmatist	interpretation,	rather	than	explained	away	as	anomalies.	
But	there	are	obvious	barriers	to	licensing	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	prior	to	
decoherence.	As	Friederich	(2015,	79)	notes,	the	Born	rule	is	only	“reliable”	when	applied	to	
decoherent	states,	in	the	sense	that	only	for	such	states	are	the	numbers	it	produces	
guaranteed	to	closely	obey	the	probability	axioms.	Given	some	reasonable	assumptions	about	
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rationality,	it	is	plausible	that	numbers	that	do	not	closely	obey	the	probability	axioms	could	
not	be	rational	degrees	of	belief.		Furthermore,	Healey	argues	that	asserting	a	non-quantum	
magnitude	claim	prior	to	decoherence	is	likely	to	be	misleading.	For	example,	suppose	one	
asserts	(with	Juffmann	et	al.)	that	“about	110cm	behind	the	source,	the	molecules	encounter	
the	first	diffraction	grating.”	One	might	infer	from	this	that	each	molecule	passes	through	
exactly	one	slit	in	the	grating,	and	hence	that	the	presence	of	the	other	slits	is	irrelevant,	and	
hence	that	there	is	no	possibility	of	interference	(Healey	2012,	745).	
So	the	pragmatist	approach	seems	to	face	a	dilemma:	either	it	fails	to	accommodate	the	
actual	language	use	of	physicists,	or	it	licenses	misleading	assertions	and	irrational	degrees	of	
belief.	Isn’t	there	another	way?	I	think	there	is.	Consider	a	mundane	claim	like	“There	is	beer	in	
the	fridge.”	In	typical	contexts,	an	assertion	of	this	claim	licenses	the	inference	that	if	you	were	
to	go	to	the	fridge	and	open	the	door,	you	could	take	a	beer	and	drink	it.	Of	course,	you	might	
not	actually	do	this;	maybe	you	don’t	want	a	beer.	That	is,	the	inference	here	is	a	
counterfactual	one.	A	good	deal	of	the	inferential	content	of	our	assertions	has	this	
counterfactual	character.	
Now	return	to	the	quantum	context.	Consider	again	the	claim	that	“about	110cm	
behind	the	source,	the	molecules	encounter	the	first	diffraction	grating.”	What	content	could	
that	claim	have?	If	we	broaden	the	notion	of	inferential	content	to	include	counterfactual	
inferences,	then	the	content	seems	fairly	clear:	if	we	were	to	replace	the	first	diffraction	grating	
with	a	detector	taking	up	the	same	region	of	space,	then	the	Born	rule	would	ascribe	a	degree	
of	belief	close	to	1	to	detecting	the	molecules.	
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How	does	the	inclusion	of	counterfactual	content	avoid	the	barriers	to	licensing	non-
quantum	magnitude	claims	prior	to	decoherence?	Note	that	the	counterfactual	content	of	the	
claim	about	the	molecules	involves	a	counterfactual	intervention	on	the	system—a	
counterfactual	measurement.	The	counterfactual	measurement	induces	counterfactual	
decoherence.	The	Born	probabilities	are	conditional	on	this	intervention	and	the	associated	
decoherence,	so	the	Born	probabilities	for	various	position	claims	concerning	the	molecules	are	
not,	after	all,	unreliable,	in	the	sense	of	violating	the	probability	axioms.	
Neither	should	there	be	any	danger	of	being	misled	by	an	assertion	that	the	C60	
molecules	encounter	the	grating,	because	the	counterfactual	conditions	implicit	in	the	content	
of	that	assertion	are	distinct	from	the	conditions	that	actually	obtain	in	the	apparatus.	That	you	
could	detect	the	molecules	at	the	diffraction	grating,	given	a	different	experimental	
arrangement,	doesn’t	license	the	inference	that	there	is	no	interference,	given	the	actual	
experimental	arrangement.	Admittedly,	though,	this	amounts	to	a	weakening	of	the	content	of	
position	claims	from	the	classical	case,	as	spelled	out	in	the	next	section.	
	
5.	A	happy	convergence?	
I	have	argued	that	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	have	assertible	content	in	a	far	wider	range	
of	contexts	than	countenanced	by	Healey	or	Friederich.	If	there	is	some	counterfactual	
intervention	on	a	system	that	would	produce	decoherence	in	the	basis	defined	by	a	given	
observable,	then	claims	about	the	values	of	that	observable	have	content.	And	since	
counterfactual	interventions	only	have	to	be	realizable	in	principle,	this	means	that	claims	
about	the	value	of	an	observable	for	a	system	generally	have	content,	whether	or	not	the	
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system	actually	decoheres	in	the	basis	defined	by	that	observable.	This	has	the	welcome	
consequence	that	the	frequent	assertions	made	by	physicists	about	the	properties	of	systems	
prior	to	decoherence	are	contentful.	
	 A	potential	cost	of	such	permissiveness	about	content	is	that	the	structure	of	this	
content	is,	in	general,	non-Boolean.	Consider	again	a	C60	molecule	that	is	approaching	the	first	
diffraction	grating,	and	consider	an	assertion	of	“The	molecule	passes	through	the	leftmost	
slit”.	This	assertion	has	content,	on	the	proposed	view,	because	in	principle	there	is	an	
intervention	on	the	system	that	would	produce	decoherence	in	a	basis	defined	by	an	
observable	that	distinguishes	which	slit	the	molecule	passes	through.	Still,	assertion	of	the	
claim	would	not	be	appropriate,	simply	because	there	are	many	slits	in	the	grating,	so	the	Born	
rule	ascribes	it	a	low	probability.	The	same	goes	for	every	other	slit	in	the	grating.	Nevertheless,	
the	assertion	that	“The	molecule	passes	through	the	leftmost	slit,	or	the	second	to	the	left,	
or…”	is	assertible,	since	the	Born	rule	ascribes	it	a	probability	close	to	1.	The	disjunction	is	
assertible,	but	none	of	the	disjuncts	is	assertible.	Since	assertibility	is	a	surrogate	for	truth	in	
the	pragmatist	context,	this	is	equivalent	to	saying	that	the	disjunction	is	true,	but	none	of	the	
disjuncts	is	true.	
	 One	might	take	this	to	be	unacceptable	on	the	pragmatist	view—especially	if	you	
endorse	an	inferentialist	pragmatism,	as	Healey	does.	From	a	disjunctive	claim	you	can	
straightforwardly	infer	that	at	least	one	of	the	disjuncts	is	true.	If	the	content	of	a	claim	is	
identified	with	the	inferences	that	it	licenses,	then	part	of	the	meaning	of	the	disjunctive	claim	
about	the	C60	molecule	is	that	some	assertion	of	the	form	“The	molecule	went	through	slit	x”	is	
true.	Hence	my	proposal	about	content	threatens	to	violate	the	inferentialist	account	of	
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meaning.	The	pragmatist	interpretation	of	Healey	and	Friederich	avoids	this	problem	by	
insisting	that	claims	about	systems	have	meaning	only	after	suitable	decoherence.	
	 Of	course,	pragmatism	is	not	necessarily	tied	to	an	inferentialist	account	of	meaning.	
But	even	given	inferentialism,	there	is	arguably	no	real	problem	here.	Physicists	are	selective	in	
the	inferences	they	draw:	from	the	disjunctive	claim,	they	don’t	infer	that	the	C60	molecule	goes	
through	some	particular	slit,	so	they	don’t	infer	a	lack	of	interference.	But	they	do	infer	that	the	
molecule	will	arrive	at	the	silicon	surface,	that	it	might	radiate	a	photon	in	flight,	and	so	forth.	
That	is,	the	inferences	drawn	by	physicists	from	their	claims	about	pre-decoherent	systems	
suggest	that	the	non-Boolean	structure	of	those	claims	is	already	built	in	to	the	meanings	
associated	with	those	claims	and	revealed	in	inference.	
	 This	suggests	that	close	attention	to	the	way	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	are	
actually	used	leads	to	a	happy	convergence	between	pragmatism	and	the	quantum	logical	
approach.	Physicists	assert	claims	about	particles	even	when	the	state	does	not	decohere,	and	
such	claims	seem	to	be	meaningful.	But	physicists	are	not	inclined	on	that	basis	to	draw	all	the	
inferences	that	a	full	Boolean	structure	to	their	claims	would	license.	Quantum	mechanics	
apparently	weakens	the	meaning	of	many	claims	about	pre-decoherent	physical	systems,	but	
without	rendering	those	claims	meaningless.	
	 	
6.	The	normative	question	
As	a	methodology	for	addressing	the	descriptive	question	of	the	content	of	quantum	
mechanics,	the	pragmatist	approach	seems	entirely	appropriate:	look	to	the	use	of	physicists	to	
determine	what	the	various	claims	involved	in	the	theory	mean.	At	the	hands	of	Healey	and	
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Friederich,	this	approach	yields	the	important	insight	that	while	non-quantum	magnitude	
claims	are	used	to	describe	physical	system,	quantum	claims	are	used	to	prescribe	appropriate	
degrees	of	belief	in	non-quantum	magnitude	claims.	But	Healey	and	Friederich	go	further,	in	
limiting	the	assertibility	of	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	to	contexts	in	which	the	quantum	
state	is	decoherent	in	the	relevant	basis.	This,	I	have	argued,	cannot	be	squared	with	the	actual	
use	of	such	claims.	I	propose	instead	that	non-quantum	magnitude	claims	generally	have	well-
defined	content,	understood	in	terms	of	a	counterfactual	intervention	on	the	system.	This	
change	to	the	pragmatist	approach	means	that	it	ends	up	looking	a	lot	like	the	quantum	logical	
approach	that	preceded	it.	Indeed,	the	pragmatist	approach	might	be	regarded	as	a	justification	
for	quantum	logical	claims	concerning	the	content	of	quantum	mechanics.	
	 But	where	does	all	this	leave	the	normative	question	concerning	whether	quantum	
mechanics	is	fine	as	it	is,	or	whether	it	should	be	supplemented	or	replaced?	Healey	and	
Friederich	argue	that	quantum	mechanics	is	fine	as	it	is:	if	quantum	claims	do	not	describe	
physical	systems,	then	there	can	be	no	conflict	between	the	way	that	quantum	mechanics	
describes	systems	during	measurements	and	the	way	it	describes	them	during	non-
measurements.	If	there	is	no	measurement	problem,	then	there	is	no	motivation	to	replace	
such	a	successful	theory.	If,	as	Healey	(2017,	12)	maintains,	quantum	theory	“states	no	facts	
about	physical	objects	or	events,”	then	there	can	be	no	requirement	that	we	come	up	with	an	
explanation	of	quantum	facts	and	events.	
	 However,	I	have	suggested	that	quantum	theory	has	more	content	than	the	pragmatists	
countenance.	In	one	sense,	I	agree	that	quantum	theory	states	no	facts:	a	quantum	claim,	such	
as	the	attribution	of	a	quantum	state	to	a	system,	is	not	a	description.	But	in	another	sense,	
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there	are	distinctive	quantum	facts,	or	at	least	facts	with	a	distinctive	quantum	structure:	non-
quantum	magnitude	claims	about	pre-decoherent	systems	exhibit	the	non-Boolean	structure	
characteristic	of	quantum	mechanics.	This	is	the	sense	in	which	quantum	logic	gets	things	right.	
Notably,	though,	the	proponents	of	quantum	logic	also	often	take	the	view	that	
quantum	logic	dissolves	the	measurement	problem	(e.g.	Putnam	1975,	186).	But	this	
dissolution	is	widely	regarded	to	be	a	failure	(e.g.	Bacciagaluppi	2009,	65)	Once	one	has	
admitted	that	the	structure	of	true	(i.e.	assertible)	claims	for	a	quantum	system	is	non-Boolean,	
the	question	of	how	the	world	manages	to	instantiate	this	structure	becomes	legitimate	and	
pressing.	A	denial	that	any	explanation	is	required	looks	suspiciously	like	instrumentalism.	And	
since	any	answer	to	this	question	goes	beyond	quantum	mechanics	as	it	stands,	the	call	for	
explanation	involves	a	demand	to	supplement	quantum	mechanics,	or	to	replace	it	with	
something	more	fundamental.	
	 Of	course,	given	the	no-go	theorems,	the	path	to	an	explanation	of	the	structure	of	
quantum	facts	is	by	no	means	clear.	But	neither	do	the	no-go	theorems	show	that	an	
explanation	is	impossible	(Friederich	2015,	161).
3
	If	the	foregoing	is	correct,	then	pragmatism	is	
an	excellent	way	to	expose	the	foundational	problems	of	quantum	mechanics,	but	it	is	not	a	
means	to	dissolve	them.	
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Abstract ​. Mathematical formalisms that are constructed for inquiry in one 
disciplinary context are sometimes applied to another, a phenomenon that I call 
‘tool migration.’ Philosophers of science have addressed the advantages of using 
migrated tools. In this paper, I argue that tool migration can be epistemically 
risky. I then develop an analytic framework for better understanding the risks that 
are implicit in tool migration. My approach shows that viewing mathematical 
constructs as tools while also acknowledging their representational features 
allows for a balanced understanding of knowledge production that are aided by 
the research tools migrated across disciplinary boundaries. 
 
Keywords ​: Cross-disciplinarity, tool migration, epistemic risks 
 
1. Introduction 
Mathematical formalisms that are constructed for scientific inquiry in one disciplinary (or 
sub-disciplinary) context are applied to another.  Philosophers of science have started paying 
attention to this cross-disciplinary aspect of scientific practice.  For instance, the discussion of 
'model transfer' concerns a relatively small set of mathematical models that are applied in 
multiple disciplinary contexts. Humphreys (2004) proposes that models that are transferred to 
study phenomena of a different domain owe their versatility to the computational tractability 
they afford. In contrast, Knuuttila and Loettger (2014, 2016) suggest that in addition to 
tractability, versatile models also offer conceptual frameworks for theorization, which they label 
'model templates.' However, these analyses do not deal with the risks inherent in this aspect of 
scientific practice. Consider the use and development of game theory in evolutionary biology as 
an example. In importing game theory, which was originally conceived to describe strategic 
interaction between rational agents typically studied by social scientists, evolutionary biologists 
may need to modify the theory in order to generate knowledge about presumably non-rational 
agents, at least in many cases. One can then assume that any changes to the theory--between its 
established applications in social sciences and its novel uses in evolutionary biology--require 
special attention so as to avoid misinterpreting an analysis. 
Despite the advantages, there might be risks associated with using mathematical 
constructs across disciplines. In this paper, I ask: might there be patterns of transfer that may 
undermine the effectiveness of the imported mathematical formulation? What would these 
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patterns, if any, look like? This paper is an attempt to explore the conditions in which importing 
mathematical constructs may be epistemically risky. To begin, I develop a framework to 
systematically characterize the landscape of mathematical importations. The goal of such a 
framework is two-fold. Proximately, the framework captures characteristics of migration that the 
current terminology, such as 'model transfer' or 'importing/exporting,' fails to discern. Ultimately, 
with this additional discernibility, I suggest that one may start to explore and identify patterns of 
importation that may be subject to epistemic risks, such as misinterpretation of an outcome 
produced by using a imported mathematical construct. 
In Section 2, I argue that one can view mathematical constructs in science in terms of 
'research tools' and that transporting such tools across disciplines, which I call 'tool migration,' 
can in some cases be a disservice to science. Next, I classify tool migration based on two kinds 
of contextual details that bear significance to the effectiveness of the migrated research tool in a 
foreign context. ​In Section 3, I​ apply this approach to the use and development of game theory in 
evolutionary biology. Finally, in Section 4, I discuss in what ways this tool migration framework, 
which is essentially a typology of four types of tool migration, may help to characterize 
epistemically risky patterns of tool migration. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
Although the notion of epistemic risks associated with migration of mathematical constructs has 
not been explicitly addressed, the idea of viewing mathematical constructs as research tools 
follows from the discussion on the ontology of scientific models. Ever since the shift of attention 
to scientific practice (e.g., Hacking 1983), there has been a growing literature in which models in 
science are viewed as entities ​detachable​ from theory and data (e.g., Morrison 1999; Morgan and 
Morrison 1999). One recent predecessor to my tool migration account is a pragmatic approach to 
scientific models put forth by Boon and Knuuttila (2008). In their paper, which uses examples 
from engineering, they argue that scientific models are better understood as ʻepistemic toolsʼ 
instead of as representations of some target systems in the world. Boon and Knuuttila's argument 
draws heavily on the epistemological roles of scientific models in relation to the scientists who 
use them. According to them, scientific models allow their users “to understand, predict, or 
optimize the behavior of devices or the properties of diverse materials” (2008, 687). Thus, for an 
ontological account of scientific models to be productive and realistic, as they argue, it should be 
sensitive to the relation between the models and the modelers, i.e., the tools and their users. An 
adequate evaluation of Boon and Knuuttila's argument will take us far afield, but my work will 
show that both the representational and the pragmatic aspects are indispensable to a better 
understanding of the epistemic risks in tool migration.  
 
2.1 Viewing mathematical constructs as research tools 
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In general terms, any mathematical construct that is to be ​used or operated​ in an algorithmic 
manner, and the outcome of whose operation is to be ​interpreted​ in order to answer a research 
question, is an example of what I am calling a research tool. Let me first unpack the operational 
aspect of a research tool. 
Let's assume that the proper use of any mathematical constructs employed in scientific 
research is expected to produce consistent results. To achieve this consistency, then, a 
well-defined procedure needs to accompany such a construct so that anyone who follows the 
procedure expects, and is expected, to obtain the same outcome given the same input. For 
instance, when performing a game-theoretic analysis, one goes through a sequence of steps, such 
as: (i) identify the players and the acts available to them, (ii) identify the payouts in every set of 
acts, (iii) find the ‘Nash equilibria,’ which refers to a set of acts, one for each player, in which no 
player could improve his or her payoff by unilaterally changing act. A similar algorithmic 
procedure can be seen when applying, say, Newton's law of gravitation: 
.F grav = G r2m m1 2 (1.1) 
For example, the sequence of steps to obtain the magnitude of the gravitational force, ​F​grav​, 
between any two objects includes: (i) identify the mass of each object, (ii) identify the distance 
between them, (iii) complete the equation in which ​ʻm ​1​ʼ and ʻ ​m ​2​ʼ refer to the masses of the two 
objects, ʻ ​r ​ʼ the distance in between, and ʻGʼ the gravitational constant. In these two examples, 
when the first two steps produce consistent input, the third step is expected to generate the same 
output. 
Moreover, concerning the interpretational aspect of a research tool, the output of a series 
of symbol assignments and manipulations can be understood ​only through the lens of some 
interpretation​. The Nash-equilibrium of a game is a meaningful 'solution' in virtue of the usual 
understanding of the game-theoretic formulation of a problem. Similarly, the meaning of the 
value obtained through completing the equation in (1.1) is derived from the usual interpretation 
of the quantities appearing in the equation and the theoretical context in which those quantities 
are defined. 
Finally, assume that something can be viewed as a tool if it serves as a means to an end. 
In this case, then, mathematical constructs like game theory or mathematical formulas can be 
seen as research tools. In the case of applying a mathematical construct, the goal of performing a 
sequence of prescribed steps goes beyond merely completing the calculation and obtaining a 
result. Instead, the output is to be interpreted so that one may solve a problem, answer a research 
question, or gain knowledge about a subject-matter. Thus, a mathematical construct that 
prescribes algorithmic symbol manipulation can be seen as a research tool, assisting its users to 
meet an end. Manipulating symbols is a means to the end that was specified during the 
mathematical formulation of the research problem. 
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2.2 Epistemic risks of tool migration 
Another predecessor to my account is Morgan's discussion of the re-situating of knowledge 
(2014). According to her, knowledge production is necessarily 'situated,' and consequently, 
applying a piece of knowledge outside its initial context requires effort - different contextual 
situations require different 're-situating' strategies. The term 're-situation' thus captures what 
scientists do in practice to transport locally generated knowledge across contexts. As she argues, 
to make an instance of scientific knowledge accessible outside its production site, one needs to 
establish inferential links between the production site and the destination site. However, she 
suggests, whether a re-situation of knowledge contributes to scientific progress depends on 
whether the transport secures some sort of inferential safety. 
Building from Morgan's notion of the re-situation of knowledge, I argue that 
cross-disciplinary use of research tools is epistemically risky. Given the locality of scientific 
knowledge production, applying scientific knowledge outside its production site may come with 
epistemic risks. For example, between the production site and a destination site, there may be 
incongruent disciplinary characteristics (e.g., implicit theoretical assumptions) that fail to be 
captured by the inferential strategy, such that knowledge from the former cannot be transferred 
to the latter. Similarly, we can assume that the construction of a research tool is also ​situated ​in 
nature. Namely, a research tool is conceived to be operated and to extend our knowledge 
concerning a subject-matter ​given a particular disciplinary context​. It follows that 
cross-disciplinary use of research tools is as epistemically risky as re-situating knowledge. That 
is, the epistemic reliability (i.e., general ability or tendency to produce knowledge) of some 
research tool in one disciplinary context does not necessarily carry over to another. 
The concept of 'tool migration' captures both the 'situated-ness' of a research tool that was 
established in its native discipline and the effort it takes to 're-situate' the tool in a foreign 
discipline. Naturally, in the process of uprooting a research tool, significant contextual 
details—ranging from implicit expertise to important background assumptions—may be stripped 
away. Likewise, during re-situation, new features may be introduced to the tool so as to treat a 
different subject matter in a new disciplinary context. Together, due to the possibility of losing or 
gaining significant contextual details, or both, a cross-disciplinary tool migration risks 
undermining the effectiveness of the tool. These risks include, for example, misinterpretation of 
the research result or failure to produce genuine knowledge. Thus, it follows that tool migration 
can in some cases be a disservice to the production of knowledge. 
Acknowledging these challenges, some have argued against the cross-disciplinary effort 
to integrate disciplinary knowledge (e.g., van der Steen 1993). Alternatively, one might try to 
overcome these challenges so long as the risks are better understood and managed. To 
understand the risks, I suggest that we first look at the patterns of tool migration. Among these 
patterns, we might find that some of them could be epistemically risky. Having established the 
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notions of research tools and risks involved with tool migration, I turn to the contextual details 
that are closely related to a tool's epistemic performance. 
 
2.3 Contextual details of a research tool: the target profile and the usage profile 
The construction of a research tool is necessarily situated within a context. In order to compare 
and contrast between the native (or established) context and the foreign context of a migrated 
tool, I single out two major types of details. 
The first type concerns the assumptions about the entities that are studied by a 
subject-matter for which the tool is developed. For instance, game theory defines what it 
considers as a game, a player, or an act. For simplicity, I call ​all​ the assumptions that a tool 
makes about its target entities the tool’s 'target profile.'  
The second type considers ​the ways​ in which one interprets the output from applying a 
tool in his or her research. In a game-theoretic analysis, for example, by following an algorithmic 
procedure, one obtains a solution of a game in the form of a Nash equilibrium. Depending on the 
game that one was analyzing, the solution could be understood as an explanation of economic 
behavior, or a prediction about it, or it could be used to optimize an strategic interaction. For 
simplicity, I call ​all​ the ways in which a tool is intended to be used, e.g., describing, predicting, 
optimizing, or explaining its target phenomenon, the tool's 'usage profile.' 
Together, as I demonstrate in Section 4, the 'target profile' and 'usage profile' allow one to 
detect patterns of changes in the contextual details between the established use and the novel use 
of a research tool. They are able to do this because these two profiles offer a coarse resolution; 
looking through the lens of the target profile and usage profile, one zooms out from particular 
cases of tool migration so as to detect patterns of cross-disciplinary transport. Further analyses of 
these patterns will then shed lights on their associated epistemic risks. 
 
2.4 Four types of tool migration 
With the two profiles of a research tool and the two contexts in which the tool is used, i.e., a 
novel use and an established use, one can distinguish four types of tool migration.  
First, compared to its established use, when a novel use of a tool catalyzes changes in 
both target and usage profiles, the tool migration is transformative, and therefore I call it a 
tool-transformation​. Second, in contrast, when both target and usage profiles remain more or 
less intact after the migration, the tool's novel use is considerably similar to its previous 
applications. Thus, I call such a case ​tool-application​. Between these two extreme types, there 
are novel uses of a research tool that alter only one of the two profiles but not both. When a tool 
changes its target profile but not its usage profile, I call it a ​tool-transfer​, ​and when a tool 
changes its usage profile but not the target profile, I call it a ​tool-adaptation​. See ​Table 1​ for a 
summary. 
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Table 1 
A Typology of Tool Migration 
Between established 
and novel uses of a 
research tool 
Usage profile remains Usage profile deviates 
Target profile remains 'Tool-application' 'Tool-adaptation' 
Target profile deviates 'Tool-transfer' 'Tool-transformation' 
 
Among these four types of tool migration, tool-transfer is arguably the most familiar to 
the philosophers of science. Humphreys coins the term ʻcomputational templatesʼ to refer to a 
relatively small number of mathematical equations that are applied to investigate different 
domains of phenomena (2002, 2004). Bailer-Jones (2009) discusses such a scientific practice in 
terms of mathematical analogy. For one example, Newton's law of gravitation was intentionally 
sought after to model electrostatic force (see Bailer-Jones 2009 for a detailed account). The 
important parallel between the two formulas, shown in (1.2), is that both types of forces 
(gravitational and the electrostatic) are proportional to the inverse of the square of the distance, ​r ​, 
between two masses, ​m ​1​ and ​m ​2​, or two charges, ​q ​1​ and ​q​2​. The constants that appear in both 
formulas scale the quantities to match empirical phenomena. 
   ​andF grav = G r2m m1 2 F el = k r2q q1 2 (1.2) 
In contrast, the other three types of tool migration, despite prominent examples, are less 
explored in regard to their general features. One prominent example of tool-transformation is the 
development of game theory to be used in evolutionary biology. 
 
3.  The Migration of Game Theory From Social Sciences to Biology 
In this section, I show in what sense the novel use of game theory in evolutionary biology, which 
is now known as 'evolutionary game theory' ('EGT') can be considered as a tool-transformation. I 
should mention that my account of the migration of game theory in this paper is not meant to 
address all the limitations of both game theory and EGT in their respective disciplinary contexts. 
Instead, the purpose of this account is to show that one ​can​ detect patterns of migration that have 
epistemic implications by focusing on the target profile and usage profile of a research tool. 
 
3.1 Game theory in social sciences 
Game theory was initially formulated to mathematically model strategic interactions between 
intelligent, rational agents. In game theory, a game is defined as an interaction between two or 
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more players in which each player's payoff (e.g., profit) is affected by the decisions made by 
other players. Typically, such a game assumes both ​perfect information ​and ​common knowledge. 
Perfect information​ assumes that​ ​all players know the entire structure of the game (all moves and 
all payouts) as well as all previous moves made by all players in the game (if it is an iterated or 
multi-move game).​ Common ​ ​knowledge​ is the assumption that all players know that all players 
have perfect information, and that all players know that all players know that all players have 
perfect information, and so on. That is, ​common ​ knowledge concerns what players know about 
what other players know. Moreover, the players also recognize that all players are cognizant that 
all players are rational, i.e., there is common knowledge of the game and of the ​unbounded 
rationality​ of all players. As such, all players will act in the way that takes all other players' 
potential moves into account in order to maximize their odds of winning. In addition to these 
assumptions regarding the players of a game, the structure of a game, which refers to the 
combinations of each move and its payout, is usually summarized in a 'payoff matrix.' Typically, 
an analysis of a game aims to find out its 'solution,' a unique Nash equilibrium (or sometimes 
equilibria) of the game. 
Game theory has been used in economics, as well as other social sciences, to describe, 
predict, optimize, or explain a variety of human interactions, such as the economic behaviors of 
firms, markets, and consumers (e.g., Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1995; Casson 1994) military 
decisions (Haywood 1954) or international politics (e.g., Snidal 1985). 
 
3.2 Game theory in evolutionary biology 
Game theory was later used in evolutionary biology, where a game is understood as phenotypes 
(or heritable traits) in contest. In 1973, John Maynard Smith and George Price borrowed the 
formalism of a payoff matrix from game theory to mathematically model the evolution of 
phenotype frequencies in a population of organisms (see Grüne-Yanoff 2011). Their modeling 
method assumed that phenotypes are in contest with other phenotypes in a population of 
organisms. For instance, in a Hawk-Dove game, the contest is embodied by organisms with the 
phenotype of being aggressive and other organisms that are peaceful. In such a context, the 
payoff of a move is interpreted as the reproductive success of the phenotype (i.e., the number of 
copies it will leave to the next generation). Moreover, while the terminology such as 'game,' 
'payoffs' and the formalism of a payoff matrix can be seen in the novel use of game theory in 
biology, the solution to a game in evolutionary biology is decidedly different from the 
Nash-equilibrium. An evolutionary game theoretic analysis typically looks for an evolutionarily 
stable strategy (ESS), i.e., a distribution of phenotypes in a population that is stable. 
 
3.3 Epistemic implications of tool transformation 
It is clear that the target profile of game theory is no longer the same between its established use 
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in social sciences and its novel use in biology. First, none of the assumptions of ​perfect 
information​, ​ common knowledge​, and ​unbounded rationality ​in what is now known classical 
game theory (CGT) remain in the novel use of game theory in biology. Second, the moves in 
EGT are heritable phenotypes exhibited by a group of organisms instead of acts available to 
players. Third, the payoffs in EGT are the reproductive success of the heritable traits. In this 
sense, the three assumptions concerning the players were stripped away from the tool - as a result 
of uprooting game theory from social sciences, and the ​heritability​ assumption about the moves 
as well as Darwinian fitness interpretation of the payoff were introduced to the tool - as a result 
of re-situating it to evolutionary biology. 
Note that the change in the target profile forces a limitation to the usage profile of the 
migrated tool. For instance, nullifying the ​unbounded rationality​ assumption concerning the 
players, EGT can no longer be used to optimize a game, i.e., discovering the rationally optimal 
strategy, which is a common use of game theory in social sciences. For instance, in the prisoner's 
dilemma, the Nash-equilibrium is for both players to defect. This solution is often interpreted as 
a prescription for the game; the players are irrational not to defect. However, in a Hawk-Dove 
game, the ESS obviously has no such normative use. Because the 'moves' of being an aggressive 
type or a peaceful type are not 'chosen,' the idea of there being normatively better or worse 
choice of moves is therefore questionable. Moreover, the organisms are not assumed to be 
rational. Thus, while the players in the prisoner's dilemma could be said to be irrational for 
choosing to cooperate, this sense of normativity does not carry over to the evolutionary game 
theoretic analysis of the Hawk-Dove game. One would be mistaken to say that it is ‘irrational’ 
for the doves to be doves. Thus, the change in the target-profile of game theory, especially the 
stripping away of the ​unbounded rationality​ assumption, has resulted in how the migrated tool 
should or should not be used.  1
Moreover, applying EGT to study social phenomena (e.g., Axelrod 1984) or cultural 
evolution (e.g., Skyrms 2010) requires a careful re-defining of the terms (such as fitness) so as to 
avoid misinterpretation. Using EGT in social sciences, which can be considered as a 
ʻhomecomingʼ of the migrated tool, is not uncommon. However, the notion of payoffs in EGT 
refers to, roughly, the overall biological reproductive success of a group of organisms that 
exhibit a phenotype. Obviously in a social context, reproductive success of the members of some 
group is not, very often, the feature of interest. A careful reinterpretation of payoffs is thus 
needed in every analysis to prevent misleading conclusions.  
1 ​Of course, a more interesting prescriptive use of the ESS of a Hawk-Dove game might be, for 
example, to manage ecosystems for optimal predator-prey balance. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that a justification for this type of prescriptive use of EGT would require further analysis 
because it is apparently not be derived from CGT. 
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To generalize, this example suggests that at least in some cases, a change in the target 
profile requires a corresponding change in the usage profile, or failure of producing genuine 
knowledge may follow. So far, I have shown that a solution of an ESS analysis may not be 
interpreted as an optimization to a Hawk-Dove game. Applying EGT to study social phenomena 
also requires careful treatment to the notion of payoff. Now if, hypothetically, some researcher 
were to make either of these two mistakes, his or her novel use of the tool would have been 
classified as tool-transfer - the novel use changes only the target profile without also changing 
the usage profile. It suggests that in some cases, tool-transformation may not be as risky as 
tool-transfer. I will come back to the issue of tool-transfer after some remarks related to the 
migration of game theory. 
  
4. Contributions of the Tool Migration Analysis 
The tool migration typology and its focus on tracking both similarities and differences meets the 
needs to sharpen discussions concerning inter- or cross-disciplinary use of research tools. 
Current literature seems to lack a framework to capture important, relational characteristics of 
the research tools that appear in multiple disciplinary contexts. For instance, 'tool-transformation' 
captures significant differences in details between CGT and EGT without losing sight of the 
contextual relationship between the two. In contrast, other terms in the literature, such as 
'imports' or 'transfers,' fall short of doing so. 
'Imports' signals the importation of research tools from a foreign discipline. In contrast, 
'transfers' refers to the use of a scientific model, which was established to study phenomena of 
one domain, to study phenomena of a different domain. Neither term captures the migration of 
game theory to biology. As Grüne-Yanoff argues, 
[B]iologists constructed the more sophisticated formal [evolutionary game 
theoretic] concepts themselves. One could speak of the import of formal concepts 
only with respect to very basic notions such as strategies or pay-off matrices, and 
it may be more appropriate to refer to formal inspirations rather than imports or 
transfers in these contexts. (2011, 392) 
Moreover, I have suggested that a change in a tool's target profile without a 
corresponding change in the tool's usage profile ​may ​ lead to misinterpretation and hence misuse 
of the tool. If this observation is generalizable, which is debatable, then it follows that cases of 
tool-transfer are epistemically riskier than cases of tool-transformation. On the other hand, if this 
observation applies only to some cases, it nevertheless reveals at least two epistemic implications 
concerning tool migration: 1) when the target profile changes, one must be careful not to draw 
conclusions that might be natural in the old context but may not make sense within the new 
context, given the new target, and 2) sometimes a change in target profile can, force a change in 
usage profile. Potentially failing to recognize when these changes occurred in a migration leads 
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to risky uses of the migrated tool. 
Morgan (2011) has argued that while not all scientific knowledge travels far, those that 
travel with integrity (i.e., maintaining their content more or less intact during its travels) and 
travel fruitfully (i.e., finding new users or new functions) are considered to be traveling well. It is 
relatively easy to quantify the latter feature – one needs to look at just the number of a tool's 
novel applications. However, determining whether a tool has traveled with integrity is not 
straightforward. As a starting point, this proposed tool migration framework—especially its 
distinction between the target profile and the usage profile of a tool—provides a starting point 
that is crucial for assessing the integrity of a migrated research tool. With this framework, one 
may discover more patterns of tool migration that impact the epistemic integrity and, 
consequently, effectiveness of a migrated research tool in a foreign discipline. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that mathematical constructs used in science can be viewed as research tools and 
their cross-disciplinary novel use as tool migration. I have also argued that making novel use of 
established tools has its risks, but such an implication is not meant to deter cross-disciplinary 
sharing of tools. Indeed, certain important breakthroughs in the history of science are due to 
creative, unconventional, uses of research tools (e.g., the use of Fourier's mathematical treatment 
of heat to study electrostatics [Thomson 1842] or the use of Faraday's mechanical model of fluid 
motion to model the electromagnetic field [Maxwell 1861]). Versatile research tools are not rare 
in science. A framework of tool migration aims to offer not only a useful terminology to 
characterize the diverse landscape of their versatility but also a groundwork to investigate risky 
patterns of making novel use of established research tools. Finally, this tool migration approach 
shows that viewing these constructs as tools whilst acknowledging their representational features 
(i.e., as captured in their target profile) allows for a balanced understanding of knowledge 
production - especially those productions that are aided by research tools that have migrated 
across disciplinary boundaries.  
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Representations are Rate-Distortion Sweet Spots
Manolo Martínez (mail@manolomartinez.net)
Abstract
Information is widely perceived as essential to the study of communication
and representation; still, theorists working on these topics often take themselves
not to be centrally concerned with “Shannon information”, as it is often put, but
with some other, sometimes called “semantic” or “nonnatural”, kind of information.
This perception is wrong. Shannon’s theory of information is the only one we need.
I intend to make good on this last assertion by canvassing a fully (Shannon)
informational answer to the metasemantic question of what makes something
a representation, for a certain important family of cases. This answer and the
accompanying theory, which represents a significant departure from the broadly
Dretskean philosophical mainstream, will show how a number of threads in the
literature on naturalistic metasemantics, aimed at describing the purportedly non-
informational ingredients in representation, actually belong in the same coherent,
purely information-theoretic picture.
1 Information, Shannonian and Dretskean
In what follows I will use a random variable, S , to encode the state the world is in, and
another random variable, M, for signals. How should we characterize the information
that values of M (i.e., individual signals) carry about values of S (i.e., individual world
states)? The most basic quantity with which information theory records dependence
among two random variables is the mutual information between them. This quantity
being an expected value, Dretske (1981, p. 52f) claims, renders it unsuitable for an
analysis of representational status, and it should be substituted by notions that record
relations between individual states, S i, and individual signals, M j. The basic relation
which substitutes mutual information in contemporary Dretskean accounts is that of
making a probabilistic difference (Scarantino 2015): a signal M j makes a probabilistic
difference to the instantiation of a state S i iff the following basic inequality holds:
P(S i|M j) , P(S i)
Nearly all the accounts of information developed in the recent, and not so recent,
philosophical literature on this topic are variations on, and attempts to quantify, this
inequality. For illustration, in Skyrms (2010, p. 36) the “information in [M j] in favor
of [S i]” is defined as the pointwise mutual information (Also pmi henceforth) between
1
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state and signal. There is a direct relation between pmis and the basic inequality: the
former are nonzero iff the latter is true.
The running thread connecting most prominent contemporary accounts of information is
that all there is to Shannon’s information theory, at least for the purposes of investigating
the nature of representation, is two quantities: the unconditional probability of states and
the probability of states conditional on signals, perhaps rearranged as the logarithm of
their ratio, or in some other way. Unsurprisingly, from this it is routinely concluded that
there is much more to representation than information. This conclusion is premature:
informational content in the Dretskean tradition is not by a long shot all there is to
information theory. This should not be taken to imply that information is all there is to
representation—for one thing, I believe with teleosemanticists (Millikan 1984; Papineau
1987) that teleofunctions have a role to play in a complete theory of representation—but
it does mean that no Dretske-style “semanticized information” needs to be recognized,
over and above the quantities studied in information theory proper. I will argue that
it also means that some prominent proposals as to ways to bridge the information-
representation gap are, in fact, unwittingly appealing to informational structure.
In the following section I review two such proposals. My aim is not to argue against
them—they are built upon largely correct insights. I will instead aim at showing that
a better informed understanding of information provides a way to incorporating these
insights in a unified, purely information-theoretic picture.
2 Bridging Information and Representation
2.1 Many-to-One-to-Many Architectures
The first proposal is that it is not enough that representations carry information; on top of
that, they must sit in the right place in a certain cognitive architecture. Sterelny (2003),
for example, has argued that the emergence of representations is enabled by two prior
evolutionary transitions: from “detection” to “robust tracking”, on the one hand; from
“narrow-banded” to “broad-banded” behavioral responses, on the other. Robust tracking
is in essence a many-to-one relation between world state and signal: many sensory inputs
give rise to one and the same representation. Other theorists have advocated similar
architectural constraints on representational vehicles. Famously, Burge (2010) places
a great deal of weight on perceptual constancies in his characterization of perceptual
representation (Burge 2010, p. 413.) This is a variation on Sterelny’s idea and, as such,
a many-to-one architectural constraint on representational status.
As for broad-banded responses, in these systems a single representation will be flexibly
dealt with, resulting in different courses of action, depending on the context where
the representation is tokened. Response breadth is in essence a one-to-many relation
between representational vehicle and output: one representation, many agential outputs.
2
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2.2 Reference Magnetism
A second proposal has been to focus on the entities that should figure in the content
of simple representations. The suggestion, typically, is that represented entities should
be appropriately natural, or real. For example, Dan Ryder (2004, 2006) has argued
that neurons become attuned to sources of correlation. These entities are closely
related to Richard Boyd’s homeostatic property clusters (also HPC henceforth, Boyd
1989): HPC theory identifies natural kinds with clusters of properties which tend to be
instantiated together, and such that this frequent co-instantiation is not just a statistical
fluke. What Ryder calls sources of correlation are the grounds for these HPC-related
frequent co-instantiations—whatever it is that makes them not statistical flukes. Ryder
claims that many of the representations the brain trades in target sources of correlation.
Martínez (2013) and Artiga (forthcoming) have made more general cases that simple
representations preferably target HPCs (Martínez), or properties that best explain the
co-occurrence of other properties (Artiga).
A similar idea has been explored in an entirely independent line of enquiry starting with
Lewis (1983): “among the countless things and classes there are . . . [o]nly an elite
minority are carved at the joints, so that their boundaries are established by objetive
sameness and difference in nature. Only these elite things and classes are eligible to
serve as referents” (Lewis 1984, p. 227). This is what Sider (2014, p. 33) calls reference
magnetism.
As I show in section 4, these two ideas, although apparently disparate, are in fact closely
related, and the explanatory payback they bring to representation-involving talk depends
on their informational underpinnings.
3 Information Theory is a Source-Channel Theory
Philosophy has understood information theory as a mostly definitional effort: for all
philosophers have typically cared, the theory begins and ends with a presentation of what
it takes for one random variable (or the worldly feature it models) to carry information
about another. But information theory goes well beyond that. It is, well, a theory, and
as such it is chiefly composed of claims that are advanced in the hope that they be true
about the world.
In a nutshell, the most celebrated results in information theory have to do with specifying
how faithful the transmission of information from a source can be, when it happens
over a (typically noisy, typically narrow) channel. These results have played absolutely
no role in informational accounts of representation.1 Take, for starters, the idealized
depiction of an information-processing pipeline in fig. 1 (cf. Cover & Thomas 2006, fig.
7.1)
1Two recent philosophical treatments of information that try to redress this neglect are Mann (2018) and
Rathkopf (2017).
3
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Source Encoder
original message
Channel
signal
Decoder
signal
Final Consumer
decoded message
Figure 1: An information-processing pipeline
Here an encoder produces a signal as a response to information incoming from a source.
This signal goes through a channel and is subsequently decoded, producing a message
that is then utilized for whatever purposes downstream. The first thing to note is that
the broadly Dretskean ideas about the content of a signal introduced in section 1 only
have use for the first two links in this information-processing chain: how signals carry
information about a certain original message produced by a source, as depicted in fig. 2.
In fact, in information theory the main action happens immediately after that: a source
is producing stuff, and we want that stuff to go through a channel. Information theory
is mainly about providing theoretical guarantees of faithfulness in transmission, given
the rate of the channel. We can think of this rate as the number of bits it provides for
the encoder to use in the signal. If, say, the rate is 2 bits per use of the channel, this
means the encoder can use up to 2 bits to construct the signal and be sure that it can
pass unscathed through the channel and on to the decoder.
Source Encoder
original message signal
Figure 2: The information-processing pipeline in the Dretskean tradition
In typical cases of representation, channel rate is consistently smaller than ideal. Con-
sider animal alarm calls. Vervet monkeys, for example, are typically described as being
able to produce three different, discrete kinds of calls (Seyfarth, Cheney & Marler
1980a, 1980b) that are usually taken to be associated with the presence of leopards,
eagles and snakes respectively. Obviously, the entropy of the relevant aspects of the
environment that prompt the production of a call (think of all the possible patterns of
approach of these predators, for example) vastly outstrip the rate of a channel, which
consists in the production of just one out of three possible signals. This means that loss
in communication is inevitable. Alarm calls, and for analogous reasons representations
in general, are all about lossy transmission.
The way in which information theory deals with lossy transmission is by defining a
distortion measure (Cover & Thomas 2006, p. 304) that gives a score to a pair composed
of a certain original message M, and the decoded version thereof, Mˆ. In what follows I
4
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will be using the Hamming distortion which simply adds 1 to the distortion when the
bits in the original and decoded signals (which we can assume to be binary strings)
do not coincide, and 0 otherwise, then normalizes. So, for example, the Hamming
distortion between an original signal M = 010011 and a decoded signal Mˆ = 100010 is
3/6, because the first, second, and last (a total of 3) bits have been decoded incorrectly,
and there are 6 bits in total.
The central result in this so-called rate-distortion theory approach to lossy transmission
is that there is a rate-distortion function, R(D), which gives the minimum rate at which
any given distortion is achievable. The actual mathematical expression of the rate-
distortion function need not detain us here (see Cover & Thomas 2006, p. 307, theorem
10.2.1), but it is such that the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm (Blahut 1972; Arimoto 1972)
allows us to calculate it easily.
The main thesis of this paper is that representations belong in information-processing
pipelines whose rate-distortion function has sweet spots: by this I mean points in the rate-
distortion curve such that the usefulness of increasing the rate of the channel past those
points is much smaller than before reaching them. Moreover, the encoding-decoding
strategies that make use of these representations tend to live in the vicinity of those
sweet spots. I submit that it is these information-theoretic properties that the conditions
on representation discussed in section 2 try to get at.
To see how rate-distortion analyses work let’s start by looking into a source that models
a series of fair-coin tosses: this random variable would have two values, heads and tails,
with associated probabilities Pheads = Ptails = .5). Using the Hamming distortion as our
target distortion measure, if the coin lands heads (tails) and the decoded message is
tails (heads) the distortion is 1, otherwise 0. The Blahut-Arimoto algorithm allows us to
draw the rate-disortion curve, in fig. 3. Here the blue line is the rate-distortion curve. It
intersects the x-axis at 1.0 bits (the entropy of the source) and it intersects the y-axis at
0.5 (the lowest average distortion one can achieve when the channel is closed.) The red
line gives a measure of how steep the blue line is at any given point—in particular, the
absolute value of the slope of the blue line. The higher the red line, the steeper the blue
line.
The situation this setup is modeling is one in which a single cue is present or absent,
and a signal tries to keep track of whether it does. This is precisely the kind of
situation where many theorists (certainly Sterelny and Burge, for the reasons reviewed
in 2.1) would see the postulation of representations as entirely idle—see, e.g., Schulte’s
vasopressin example in his Schulte (2015). In agreement with the idea that postulating
representations here is idle, there is not much structure to the rate-distortion curve
corresponding to this setup: reading the chart from right to left, increasing the rate
makes the achievable expected distortion go smoothly down, until the rate hits the
entropy of the source, at which point the achievable distortion is zero.That’s about it.
Let’s now model one kind of situation in which there is a reasonably wide consensus
that representations make an explanatory contribution: vervet-monkey alarm calls, as
reviewed above. In the model, the source—the situation the information-processing
pipeline is dealing with—randomly makes members of two natural kinds (we can think
5
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Figure 3: The rate-distortion function for a coin toss
of them as two different predators) be or not present at any given time, independently
from one another. This intends to mimic the situation vervet monkeys face, where
snakes, leopards and eagles show up or not, more or less at random.
These natural kinds are modeled as homeostatic property clusters (see section 2.2 above).
In order to derive a explicit probability distribution for the source out of this qualitative
description, the two HPCs are in their turn represented by two Bayesian networks, each
with a parent node and four children (see fig. 4.) Each of the nodes stands for a property;
if the node is on it means the corresponding property is instantiated; if it is off it means
it is not. In the model, children nodes replicate noisily the state of their parent. Thus,
e.g., if the parent is on (if the corresponding property is instantiated) each child property
will have a .95 chance of being instantiated too; if the parent is off the probability for
each children of being instantiated is .05. The unconditional probability of instantiation
for the two parent nodes is .5.
In the model, the source produces a binary string, with each member of the string being
1 if the corresponding node is on, and 0 if it’s off. This signal is encoded, goes through
a channel, and is then decoded at the other side. The target distortion measure is the
Hamming distortion. Fig. 5 plots the rate-distortion curve for this model.
This curve is very different from the one in fig. 3: there is a clear “sweet spot”—a sudden
drop in the usefulness of extra rate, see the red curve—when the system hits a rate of 2
bit/use. I.e, there is, in a certain principled sense, an optimal level of lossy compression;
a way to set up an encoding-decoding strategy that recover most of what’s going on in
6
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Figure 5: A sweet spot in the rate-distortion function
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the world of relevance to the information-processing system, even through a very severe,
2 bit bottleneck. I claim that this is no coincidence. Our representation-attributing
practices gravitate towards this kind of situations.
To see how sweet spots in rate-distortion curves and representations are related, consider
now what an optimal encoding-decoding strategy would look like. That is, how should
the encoder encode the information coming from the source, and how should the decoder
decode the signal coming from the encoder, so that the resulting expected distortion
between original and decoded signal is the minimum achievable, at the sweet spot?
Optimal Encoding Strategy: First divide the incoming signal in two halves, one cor-
responding to properties P1 through P5; the other corresponding to properties P6
through P10.
If there is a majority of 1s in the first half of the original signal set the first bit
of the signal to 1. Otherwise set it to 0. Ditto for the second half of the original
signal and the second bit of the signal.
Optimal Decoding Strategy: If the first bit in the incoming signal is 1, set the first
half of the decoded signal to 11111. Otherwise, set it to 00000. Ditto for the
second bit and the second half of the decoded signal.
How should we interpret what encoder and decoder are doing here? A natural way
is this: they are using the presence or absence of properties in an HPC cluster as
diagnostic of the presence or absence of the underlying natural kind—this would be the
encoding part—and then taking the resulting signals as representing the presence of a
paradigmatic instance of the kind, one that has all the properties in the cluster—this
would be the decoding part. HPC kinds being what they are, frequently the first half of
the incoming signal will resemble the paradigmatic presence of the first kind (11111) or
its paradigmatic absence (00000), and the same will happen with the second half and
the second kind. That is why this encoding-decoding strategy works so well.
In describing this optimal strategy I have helped myself to representational vocabulary; it
has been useful in order to explain how the strategy works, and how come that behaving
in this particular way achieves low distortion at low rates: it is because each of the
two bits in the signal is caused by, and causes, behavior that is optimally attuned to the
probabilistic structure of each of the two natural kinds in the model world, respectively.
Nothing going on in this system falls outside the purview of Shannonian information
theory—of information theory tout court, so at least in this kind of cases representational
talk depends on no non-informational fact.
We can now understand better what’s lacking in the philosopher of mind’s information-
theoretic tookit: it is entirely possible, and computationally trivial, to calculate, e.g.,
Skyrms’s pmi between each of the possible signals (00, 01, 10 and 11) and each of the
possible world states (all 1024 of them, from 0000000000 to 1111111111). Doing so
would leave us with 4 vectors (one for each signal) with 1024 entries each (one for
each world state.) First, this is an unwieldy collection of numbers, which doesn’t bring
out the relevant structure. For example, if the probability of children nodes being on
conditional on their parent being on was .96 instead of .95 the rate-distortion curve
8
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would be qualitatively identical, with a sweet spot in exactly the same place, yet most
numbers in the Skyrmsian informational content vectors would change. Second, and
most important, nothing in those 4096 numbers allows us to infer the presence of a
sweet spot. The relevant information is simply not there, depending as it does on a
distortion measure which is not used in computing Skyrmsian informational contents.
If this is approximately right, the question about what makes representational talk
explanatory is readily answered: saying that a certain vehicle is a representation conveys
something quite specific about its informational context. It says that the vehicle is
part of an encoding-decoding strategy that exploits a sweet spot in a rate-distortion
curve—where the curve is in turn fixed by the probabilistic structure of the world, and
the target distortion measure. This, in less technical terms, translates to saying that the
vehicle is summarizing relevant (this is where the distortion measure comes in) aspects
of the current situation in an optimal, if lossy, manner, made possible by how the world
is (this is where the probabilistic structure of the world comes in.) This explication of
the explanatory contribution of representations can be turned into an explicit answer to
what makes something a representation—an answer, that is, to what Artiga (2016) calls
the metasemantic question.
The Rate-Distortion Approach: A signal, S , in a certain information-processing
pipeline, P, is a representation if the following two conditions are met:
Existence: There are sweet spots in the rate-distortion curve associated with P.
Optimality: S is produced as part of an encoder-decoder strategy that occupies
the vicinity of one of these sweet spots.
So, pace Dretske, the core information-theoretic notions of entropy, rate, distortion, etc.
can provide invaluable insight into the representational status of individual signals. If
the rate-distortion approach is on the right track, those information-theoretic notions,
through the existence condition, specify the kind of setup where representations live,
which then the optimality condition can use to provide a criterion for the representational
status of individual signals.
I offer the foregoing discussion as a preliminary case for the rate-distortion approach to
representation: it shows how postulating representations is explanatory, even if these
representations depend just on (Shannon) information. It illuminates the difference in
representational status between cue-driven examples, such as Schulte’s vasopressin; and
vervet alarm calls, and other similar examples. To complete my case I now show how
the ways to bridge the gap between natural and nonnatural information discussed in
section 2 can be seen as unwitting attempts to get at rate-distortion sweet spots.
4 There is no Gap to Bridge
What does it take for the existence condition to be met? That is to say, what circum-
stances result in sudden drops in the slope of the rate-distortion curve? We have seen
one such family of circumstances: if the pattern in which properties are instantiated
9
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in the source is noisily replicated in a cluster then sudden drops are to be expected:
distortion will decrease with rate up to the point where all the main sources of variation
in property instantiations are accounted for, and all that remains is the residual noise in
instantiations within each cluster. Take a look again at figs. 4 and 5: to describe this
source we basically need enough rate to account for the two main sources of variation:
P1 and P6. This is not all there is to the world, because it’s possible for the other
properties to (fail to) token independently of their parent, but the unlikeliness of these
departures makes the extra rate comparatively less useful.
Noisy replication of property instantiations is at the core of the HPC theory of natural
kinds, as we saw above. This means that, in general, the presence of HPC natural kinds
in a source will create sweet spots. This opens a line of argument in favor of reference
magnetism from information-theoretic premises: reference magneticsm should be seen
as making a point about the kind of probabilistic structure that an information-processing
pipeline must be attuned to, if signals are to effect the kind of optimal lossy compression
that underlies our representation-attributing practices. Reference magnetism is just a
way of meeting part of the existence condition.
Regarding the suggestion, by Sterelny, Burge and others, that representations inhere
preferably on signals sitting in a one-to-many-to-one pipeline, I submit that the many-to-
one aspect of this suggestion aims at meeting the optimality condition; the one-to-many
aspect, together with reference magnetism, aims at meeting the existence condition.
The first thing to note here is that the Optimal Encoding Strategy presented above
enforces what Sterelny calls robust tracking and Burge calls constancy: the strategy
consists in considering all properties coming from each of the two clusters and setting
the relevant bit to 1 only if a majority of those properties are instantiated. That is, the
encoder is taking a multiplicity of configurations (e.g., the first half of the incoming
signal being 00111, 01011, 10111, etc.) to a single output: the first bit of the signal
being 1. Furthermore, that part of the signal will be decoded as 11111: from there on,
the system downstream will treat whatever is out there in the world as a paradigmatic
member of the first kind. The system is recovering the presence of a natural kind out
of many different, noisy instantiation patterns. This is a clear instance of constancy.
Suppose that the encoder, insted of being many-to-one, depended on a single cue; say,
suppose it set the first bit to 1 if one of the children properties (say, P2) was instantiated,
and to 0 otherwise. In such a cue-driven setup, the best encoder-decoder arrangement
possible is marked by the blue circle in fig. 6. This has double the distortion than than
the optimal encoding (marked by the blue cross) which sits right on top of the optimal
rate-distortion curve. This cue-driven system would not meet the optimality condition,
which means that a many-to-one architecture is instrumental to meeting it.
Finally, the target distortion measure in the information-processing pipeline can be seen
as that which Sterelny’s one-to-many condition on representation is actually tracking.
Using, for example, the Hamming distance as a distortion measure is tantamount to
assuming that all of the properties of the natural kinds are relevant for downstream
processing. One natural way in which this may happen is when the agent is to respond
flexibly to the presence of the natural kind: in different contexts or states different
properties of the kind might be relevant and, for example, the presence of a tree might
10
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Figure 6: Cue-driven encoding
be sometimes relevant to behavior because it bears fruit (if the agent is hungry) and
some other times because it has a dense cover (if the agent is looking for shelter.)
Caring about all (or many) properties of the kind is what makes the rate-distortion
curve display a sweet spot. If, instead, the agent has a rigid, stereotyped response to
the presence of members of the kinds—that is, if it only cares about the presence of
one property, which is the property that makes that rigid behavioral response fitness-
conducive, then the curve is as presented in fig. 7. Rigid behavioral responses make the
probabilistic structure of the kinds largely irrelevant. As a result, the system behaves as
if a coin were tossed, where heads would mean that the target property is tokened, and
tails that it is not. This arrangement does not meet the existence condition. Sterelny’s
broad-banded responses are, again, a way of getting at rate-distortion sweet spots.
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The	Proportionality	of	Common	Sense	Causal	Claims	
Jennifer	McDonald	
	
This	paper	defends	strong	proportionality	against	what	I	take	to	be	its	principal	
objection	–	that	proportionality	fails	to	preserve	common	sense	causal	intuitions	
–	by	articulating	independently	plausible	constraints	on	representing	causal	
situations.	I	first	assume	the	interventionist	formulation	of	proportionality,	
following	Woodward.1	This	views	proportionality	as	a	relational	constraint	on	
variable	selection	in	causal	modeling	that	requires	that	changes	in	the	cause	
variable	line	up	with	those	in	the	effect	variable.	I	then	argue	that	the	principal	
objection	derives	from	a	failure	to	recognize	two	constraints	on	variable	
selection	presupposed	by	interventionism:	exhaustivity	and	exclusivity.		
	 	
																																																								
1	Woodward	2003		
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1.	Introduction	
	
Yablo’s	principle	of	proportionality	holds,	roughly,	that	something	counts	as	a	
cause	of	some	effect	just	in	case	it	includes	the	appropriate	degree	of	causal	
information.2	Proportionality	has	been	put	to	various	philosophical	uses,	such	as	
a	proposed	solution	for	the	causal	exclusion	argument,	and	as	a	justification	and	
explanation	of	the	dependence	on	high-level	causal	explanations	in	the	special	
sciences.	However,	the	precise	formulation	of	such	a	principle	has	proven	to	be	
controversial.		
	
I	take	the	most	promising	formulation	to	be	an	interventionist	one,	following	
Woodward.3	Such	a	formulation	defines	proportionality	as	a	relational	constraint	
on	variable	selection	in	causal	modeling.	In	this	paper,	I	argue	that	this	
formulation	works	well	as	it	is	–	contra	Franklin-Hall	(see	2016)	–	so	long	as	we	
recognize	two	independently	plausible	background	requirements	on	variable	
selection.	I	call	these	exhaustivity	and	exclusivity.	Exhaustivity	holds	that	a	
variable	must	take	at	least	one	of	its	values.	Exclusivity	holds	that	a	variable	can	
take	at	most	one	of	its	values.	Both	constraints	are	relative	to,	and	thereby	help	
to	make	explicit,	the	modal	assumptions	implicit	in	causal	inquiry.		
	
Finally,	with	these	requirements	in	place,	I	defend	proportionality	against	its	
principal	objection:	that	it	fails	to	preserve	fundamental	causal	intuitions.	I	
demonstrate	how	this	concern	derives	from	a	failure	to	recognize	and	integrate	
the	modal	assumptions	implicit	in	causal	inquiry,	in	tandem	with	an	
inappropriate	use	of	variables	to	represent	causal	situations.		
	
2.	Interventionism	
	
The	formulation	of	proportionality	that	I	endorse	comes	directly	from	
Woodward,	and	is	defined	in	terms	of	his	interventionist	account	of	causation.	
Interventionism	expands	on	the	intuition	that	causal	claims	provide	
																																																								
2	Yablo	1992	
3	Woodward	2003,	2008a,	2008b,	2010,	2016	
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manipulability	information.	If	X	causes	Y,	then	manipulating	or	changing	X	is	a	
way	of	manipulating	Y.	It	then	exploits	the	language	of	causal	models	to	identify	
and	articulate	different	causal	relations	of	interest.	A	causal	model	can	take	a	
variety	of	forms,	such	as	graphical,	potential-outcome,	and	structural-equations	
models.4	However,	I’ll	restrict	discussion	of	causal	models	in	this	paper	to	
graphical	models.	A	graphical	model	is,	essentially,	a	set	of	variables	–	
representing	the	causal	relata	–	and	a	directed	binary	relation	between	them	–	
representing	causal	influence.	
	
Interventionism	then	defines	the	notion	of	an	intervention	on	a	system.	An	
intervention,	I,	first	must	directly	change	the	value	of	some	variable,	X,	in	such	a	
way	that	it	breaks	the	dependence	that	X	may	have	had	on	other	variables	in	the	
system.	Second,	I	must	be	designed	in	such	a	way	that	any	change	in	the	effect	
variable,	Y,	will	be	the	direct	result	of	X	and	not	of	I	itself.	Finally,	I	must	be	
wholly	independent	of	other	possible	causes	of	Y,	whether	such	causes	are	
represented	by	the	given	model	or	not.	A	more	precise	formulation	than	this	
won’t	matter	for	the	purposes	of	this	paper.5		
	
With	this	in	place,	the	interventionist	then	defines	a	basic	notion	of	cause,	which	
corresponds	most	closely	with	the	intuitive	notion	of	causal	relevance:		
	
(Principle	M)	X	causes	Y	iff	there	are	background	circumstances	B	such	
that	if	some	(single)	intervention	that	changes	the	value	of	X	(and	no	
other	variable)	were	to	occur	in	B,	then	Y	would	change.	(Woodward	
2003,	222)	
	
That	is,	in	order	for	X	to	be	a	cause	of	Y,	the	change	in	X	from	one	value	to	
another	as	the	result	of	an	intervention	corresponds	to	the	change	in	Y	from	one	
value	to	another,	given	some	fixed	set	of	background	parameters.	Various	kinds	
of	causal	relations	are	then	captured	by	refinements	on	this	basic	notion.	Due	to	
																																																								
4	See	Greenland	and	Brumback	2002	and	Hitchcock	2009	for	overviews	of	causal	
models.	
5	See	Woodward	2003,	chapter	3,	especially	98	
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the	irrelevance	of	these	and	further	details	to	my	argument,	I’ll	leave	my	
overview	of	interventionism	here.6	
	
3.	Proportionality	as	Relational	Constraint	on	Variable	Selection	
	
Interventionism	places	variables	front	and	center	in	how	we	represent	and	
inquire	into	causation.	Thus,	more	needs	to	be	said	about	the	criteria	for	variable	
selection.	Although	the	variables	can	be	taken	to	represent	different	things,	I	will	
assume	throughout	that	the	set	of	values	of	a	particular	variable	represents	a	set	
of	properties	–	constrained	by	a	given	property	type	–	that	are	possibly	
instantiated	by	some	particular	thing.	The	assumed	causal	relata	of	this	paper	
will	therefore	be	property	instantiations.	
	
This	paper	addresses	two	questions	relevant	to	variable	selection:	(i)	What	
determines	the	range	of	values	that	a	variable	can	take?	(ii)	At	what	level	of	
description	should	the	values	of	the	variables	be?	Proportionality	has	been	
proposed	as	an	answer	to	(ii).	However,	after	laying	out	the	proposal,	I’ll	go	on	to	
argue	that	while	(ii)	can	be	answered	by	the	principle	of	proportionality,	it	can	
only	do	so	alongside	an	appropriate	answer	to	(i).	One	aspect	of	such	an	answer	
is	that	the	background	modal	context	determines	the	range	of	values	that	a	
variable	takes.	
	
Constraints	on	variable	selection	can	be	divided	into	two	kinds:	relational	
constraints	and	non-relational	constraints.	Relational	constraints	pertain	to	the	
extrinsic	nature	of	the	variables	in	a	causal	model,	to	how	“variables	relate	to	one	
another.”	(Woodward	2016,	1056)	One	example	of	such	a	constraint	is	stability.7	
Stability	is	the	persistence	of	the	causal	relation	between	a	cause	variable	and	an	
effect	variable,	despite	changes	in	the	background	conditions.	The	more	changes	
such	a	relation	can	survive,	the	more	stable	it	is.	
	
																																																								
6	See	Woodward	2003,	chapter	2,	especially	section	3	
7	See	Woodward	2010,	2016	
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Proportionality	is	just	such	a	relational	constraint.	It	holds	that	changes	in	a	
cause	variable	should	line	up	with	changes	in	an	effect	variable.	Intuitively,		
	
Proportionality	has	to	do	with	whether	changes	in	the	state	of	the	cause	
‘line	up’	in	the	right	way	with	changes	in	the	state	of	the	effect	and	with	
whether	the	cause	and	effect	are	characterized	in	a	way	that	contains	
irrelevant	detail.	(Woodward	2010,	287)	
	
Take	Yablo’s	pigeon	example.8	Sophie	the	pigeon	is	trained	to	peck	at	red	things	
and	only	at	red	things.	She	then	pecks	at	a	paint	chip,	which	is	a	particular	shade	
of	red	–	scarlet.	Which	of	the	following	is	causally	relevant	to	Sophie’s	pecking:	
the	chip’s	being	red	or	the	chip’s	being	scarlet?		
	
When	translated	into	interventionist	terms,	this	becomes	a	false	dichotomy.	Take	
the	variable,	P,	to	be	a	variable	representing	whether	the	pigeon	pecks	or	not.	It	
can	take	the	values:	{peck,	not-peck}.	Now	consider	two	alternative	variables	for	
representing	the	property-instantiations	of	the	paint	chip:	the	variable,	R,	which	
can	take	the	values	{red,	not-red},	and	the	variable,	T,	which	can	take	the	values	
{taupe,	scarlet,	cyan,	mauve,	crimson,	etc.},	where	‘etc.’	stands	for	all	other	
physically	possible	colors	at	the	same	grain	as	those	already	made	explicit.	
According	to	Principle	M,	the	causal	model	in	which	R	stands	as	causally	relevant	
to	P	is	just	as	accurate	as	one	in	which	T	so	stands.	In	the	R	model,	R	is	causally	
relevant	to	P	because	an	intervention	on	R	that	changes	its	value	from	not-red	to	
red	changes	P’s	value	from	not-peck	to	peck.	In	the	T	model,	T	is	causally	relevant	
to	P	because	an	intervention	on	T	that	changes	its	value	from	taupe	to	scarlet	
changes	P’s	value	from	not-peck	to	peck.	
	
Interventionism	therefore	doesn’t	ask	the	question,	which	variable	stands	in	a	
causal	relation	to	P?	For,	the	answer	is	‘both’.	R	and	T	are	each	causally	relevant	
to	P.	But,	this	doesn’t	mean	that	their	respective	relationship	to	P	is	the	same.	R	
is	proportional	to	P,	while	T	is	not.	All	of	the	changes	in	R	line	up	with	changes	in	
P	–	every	intervention	on	R	corresponds	to	a	change	in	P.	But	only	some	of	the	
																																																								
8	Yablo	1992	
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changes	in	T	line	up	with	those	in	P	–	only	certain	interventions	on	T	correspond	
to	changes	in	P.	The	intervention	that	changes	the	value	of	T	from	taupe	to	cyan,	
for	example,	will	not	change	the	value	of	P.		
	
Woodward	defines	proportionality	more	explicitly	as,	
	
(P)	There	is	a	pattern	of	systematic	counterfactual	dependence	(with	the	
dependence	understood	along	interventionist	lines)	between	different	
possible	states	of	the	cause	and	the	different	possible	states	of	the	effect,	
where	this	pattern	of	dependence	at	least	approximates	to	the	following	
ideal:	[it]	should	be	such	that	(a)	it	explicitly	or	implicitly	conveys	
accurate	information	about	the	conditions	under	which	alternative	states	
of	the	effect	will	be	realized	and	(b)	it	conveys	only	such	information	–	
that	is,	the	cause	is	not	characterized	in	such	a	way	that	alternative	states	
of	it	fail	to	be	associated	with	changes	in	the	effect.	(2010,	298)	
	
There	are	two	views	on	what	this	difference	between	variables	like	R	and	T	
means.	The	first	takes	proportional	variables	such	as	R	to	represent	genuine	
causes,	while	non-proportional	variables	such	as	T	represent	merely	causally	
relevant	factors.	Proportionality	is	thereby	considered	a	necessary	constraint	on	
causation.	Call	this	strong	proportionality.9	The	second	view	takes	
proportionality	to	be	a	merely	pragmatic	constraint	on	causal	explanation.10	Call	
this	weak	proportionality.	Throughout	this	paper,	I	assume	and	defend	strong	
proportionality.	
	
4.	Non-Relational	Constraints:	Exhaustivity	and	Exclusivity	
	
Non-relational	constraints,	on	the	other	hand,	pertain	to	the	intrinsic	nature	of	
the	variables	in	a	causal	model.	These	constraints	“can	be	applied	to	variables,	
individually,	independently	of	how	they	relate	to	other	variables.”	(Woodward	
																																																								
9	See	List	and	Menzies	2009;	Menzies	and	List	2010;	and	Papineau	2013	
10	See	Woodward	2015;	Shapiro	and	Sober	2012;	McDonnell	2017;	and	Weslake	
2013,	2017	
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2016,	1057)	One	example	is	metaphysical	naturalness,	which	requires	that	
variables	pick	out	only	natural	properties,	on	some	understanding	of	‘natural’.11	
	
What	I	propose	to	call	the	exhaustivity	and	the	exclusivity	constraint	are	
similarly	non-relational	constraints.	Take	exhaustivity	first.	The	exhaustivity	
constraint	requires	that	a	variable’s	values	capture	the	entire	range	of	relevant	
possibilities	for	whatever	type	of	thing	the	variable	represents.	An	exhaustive	
variable	is	one	that	must	take	one	of	its	values,	given	whatever	background	
modal	constraints	are	in	place.	
	
Since	I’ve	restricted	this	discussion	to	variables	whose	values	represent	the	
property	instantiation	of	some	target	object,	I	can	define	exhaustivity	in	more	
precise	terms.	Exhaustivity	is	the	constraint	on	a	variable	in	a	causal	model	that	
holds	that	its	values	must	jointly	represent	the	range	of	possibilities	of	property	
instantiation	by	the	given	object	for	the	given	property-type.	If	the	property-type	
is	a	color,	for	example,	then	the	values	must	somehow	exhaust	the	color	
spectrum.	This	can	be	done	quite	simply	with	a	binary	variable	that	can	take	the	
values:	{some	particular	color,	not-(that	particular	color)}.		
	
Next,	the	exclusivity	constraint	holds	that	the	values	of	a	given	variable	should	be	
such	that	any	one	excludes	all	the	others.	Woodward	references	exclusivity	when	
he	writes,		
	
When	considering	the	values	of	a	single	variable,	we	want	those	
values	to	be	logically	exclusive,	in	the	sense	that	variable	X’s	taking	
value	v	excludes	X’s	also	taking	value	v’,	where	v	≠	v’.	(2016,	1064)	
	
In	other	words,	if	two	things	are	not	exclusive	–	if	they	could	occur	together	–	
then	they	should	be	represented	by	distinct	variables.	While	exhaustivity	holds	
that	a	variable	should	take	at	least	one	of	its	values,	exclusivity	holds	that	a	
variable	should	take	at	most	one	of	its	values.		
	
																																																								
11	See	Lewis	1983;	Menzies	1996;	Paul	2000;	and	Franklin-Hall	2016	
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Importantly,	exhaustivity	and	exclusivity	are	each	relative	to	a	background	
modal	context.	In	possible	worlds	terminology,	the	modal	context	is	the	set	of	
possible	worlds	relevant	to	the	truth	of	the	counterfactual	that	captures	the	
causal	claim.	It	can	be	described	as	a	set	of	worlds,	or	perhaps	more	succinctly	as	
a	list	of	background	assumptions	that	define	such	a	set.	These	assumptions	can	
include	any	constraint	that	operates	in	a	law-like	fashion.	
	
For	example,	the	causal	claim,	“The	chip’s	being	scarlet	caused	the	pigeon	to	
peck,”	corresponds	to	the	counterfactual,	“Had	the	chip	not	been	scarlet,	the	
pigeon	wouldn’t	have	pecked.”	The	modal	context	of	this	claim	and	
corresponding	counterfactual	is	the	set	of	possible	worlds	that	determines	
whether	the	counterfactual	is	true.	So,	if	this	claim	and	counterfactual	are	meant	
to	represent	a	specific	causal	situation	near	a	local	paint	chip	factory	that	
specializes	in	just	the	colors	scarlet	and	cyan,	and	no	others,	then	the	relevant	set	
of	possible	worlds	will	be	constrained	to	those	in	which	the	paint	chip	takes	one	
of	the	two	factory	colors	–	cyan	or	scarlet.	In	this	context,	the	variable,	C,	that	can	
take	the	values	{cyan,	scarlet},	is	an	exhaustive	variable.	Further,	given	this	set	of	
worlds,	the	counterfactual	is	true.		
	
If	instead	these	are	meant	to	represent	any	general	causal	situation	involving	
paint	chips	and	a	red-pecking	pigeon,	then	the	relevant	set	of	possible	worlds	
will	be	more	inclusive,	including	all	worlds	in	which	the	paint	chip	takes	any	
color	within	the	color	spectrum.	C	is	not	exhaustive	relative	to	this	more	
inclusive	modal	context.	But	the	variable	T,	from	before,	is.	Given	this	more	
inclusive	set	of	worlds,	the	counterfactual	is	false,	since	the	pigeon	will	peck	in	
response	to	shades	of	red	other	than	scarlet.	
	
A	point	of	note	here	is	that	the	constraints	of	exhaustivity	and	exclusivity	are	
indeed	non-relational	constraints	in	the	sense	previously	defined.	Although	they	
are	relative	to	the	modal	context,	they	are	not	relative	to	other	variables	in	the	
model.	They	are	properties	of	a	variable	taken	independently	as	a	representation	
of	the	target	scenario.		
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I	hold	that	causal	models	successfully	represent	causal	situations	in	part	by	
requiring	exhaustive	and	exclusive	variables.	Proportionality,	defined	in	terms	of	
causal	models,	also	requires	exhaustive	and	exclusive	variables.	A	significant	
upshot	of	this	is	that	the	proportional	cause	is	not	only	relative	to	the	target	
effect	variable,	but	also	to	the	background	modal	context.		
	
5.	Interventionist	Proportionality	Does	the	Trick	
	
Franklin-Hall	contends	that	Woodward’s	formulation	of	proportionality	doesn’t	
successfully	prioritize	intuitively	proportional	causal	relata,	such	as	red	in	the	
pigeon	example.	However,	as	I’ll	argue,	presupposing	my	notion	of	exhaustivity	
corrects	for	this	objection.		
	
Franklin-Hall	argues	that	proportionality	as	laid	out	in	section	3	is	inadequate	
for	capturing	the	kind	of	causal	explanation	we’re	looking	for.	To	do	so,	she	calls	
upon	Sophie	and	her	paint	chip.	She	then	introduces	a	comparison	between	the	
causal	variable,	R,	that	can	take	the	values:	{red,	not-red},	(as	above),	and	a	
variable,	C,	that	can	instead	take	the	values:	{cyan,	scarlet}	(as	above).	R,	as	
before,	is	proportional	to,	and	therefore	a	genuine	cause	of,	Y.	But,	she	argues,	C,	
too,	is	proportional	to	Y,	since	every	possible	intervention	on	C	changes	the	value	
of	Y.	An	intervention	on	C	that	changes	its	value	from	cyan	to	scarlet	changes	Y	
from	not-peck	to	peck,	and	an	intervention	that	changes	C’s	value	from	scarlet	to	
cyan	changes	Y’s	value	from	peck	to	not-peck.	Thus,	the	changes	in	C	line	up	with	
the	changes	in	Y	just	as	well	as	the	changes	in	R	do.	The	problem,	then,	is	that	
proportionality,	as	formulated,	is	insufficient	to	its	intended	task.	It	fails	to	
privilege	a	variable	like	R	over	one	like	C,	and	so	fails	to	prioritize	a	causal	model	
that	uses	R	over	one	that	uses	C.	
	
In	response	to	this	problem,	a	natural	move	would	be	to	find	a	way	to	disqualify	
variables	like	C	from	the	arena.	Intuitively,	C	is	not	the	right	kind	of	variable.	But,	
why	not?	I	propose	that	our	aversion	to	variables	like	C	is	due	to	their	failure	to	
exhaustively	represent	the	implicit	modal	context	of	the	situation.	The	
background	possibilities	relative	to	the	paint	chip	include	the	full	color	spectrum.	
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Unless	the	possible	color	of	the	paint	chip	is	restricted	in	some	way	–	by	the	local	
factory,	for	example	–	then	the	target	object	can	fail	to	take	one	of	C’s	two	values.	
There	are	other	physically	possible	colors	that	the	paint	chip	could	have	–	such	
as	beige	or	olive	green	–	and	C’s	values	fail	to	represent	these	possibilities.		
	
Relative	to	the	implicit	modal	context,	then,	C	is	not	an	exhaustive	variable.	The	
variable,	R,	on	the	other	hand,	is	exhaustive,	since	the	object	must	take	one	of	R’s	
two	values.	By	requiring	exhaustive	variables,	C	is	discounted	as	a	candidate	
variable	relative	to	the	implicit	modal	context,	and	R	takes	privilege	as	the	
proportional	cause.	
	
In	general,	two	variables	are	in	proper	competition	with	each	other	over	which	is	
proportional	to	some	effect	variable	only	when	they	are	exhaustive	relative	to	
the	same	modal	context.	C	and	R	are	not	competitors	for	proportionality	relative	
to	Y,	since	only	one	of	them	can	contain	an	exhaustive	set	of	active	possibilities	
relative	to	any	given	modal	context.	
	
6.	Preserving	Causal	Intuitions	
	
The	strongest	objection	to	proportionality,	as	raised	by	Bontly,	Shapiro	and	
Sober,	McDonnell,	and	Weslake,	is	that	it	seems	to	render	many	common	sense	
causal	claims	false.12	Call	this	the	objection	from	common	sense.	It	objects	to	
strong	proportionality	by	attempting	to	demonstrate	that	if	proportionality	is	
required	of	something	to	be	a	cause,	then	many	things	that	we	would	naturally	
call	causes	don’t	actually	qualify.		
	
Take	as	an	example	the	situation	where	Socrates	drinks	hemlock	and	then	dies,	
and	the	corresponding	causal	claim,	‘Socrates’s	drinking	hemlock	caused	him	to	
die’.	The	objection	goes	that	drinking	hemlock	is	not	actually	proportional	to	
Socrates	dying.	For	example,	if	Socrates	had	not	drank	hemlock,	but	still	
consumed	it	–	by	eating	a	dozen	leaves,	for	example	–	then	he	still	would	have	
																																																								
12	See	Bontly	2005;	Shapiro	and	Sober	2012;	McDonnell	2017;	and	Weslake	
2013,	2017	
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died.	This	seems	to	show	that	the	changes	in	the	variable	that	represents	
Socrates	drinking	hemlock	don’t	line	up	with	the	changes	in	the	variable	that	
represents	Socrates	dying.	The	first	variable	could	change	values	from	Socrates-
drinks-hemlock	to	Socrates-eats-hemlock	and	the	second	variable	would	retain	
the	value	Socrates-dies.	This	common	sense	causal	claim	is	therefore	not	
proportional.	The	proportional	cause	should	be,	instead,	consuming	hemlock.	
	
However,	this	objection	is	mistaken.	It	fails	to	respect	the	exhaustivity	constraint	
on	variable	selection,	and	thereby	equivocates	between	different	background	
modal	contexts.	It	further	fails	to	respect	exclusivity,	and	thereby	runs	together	
what	should	be	different	variables.	Rectifying	this	illuminates	the	implicit	
proportionality	of	common	sense	causal	claims.	
	
First,	the	objection	ignores	the	fact	that	proportionality,	in	requiring	exhaustive	
and	exclusive	variables,	is	relative	to	modal	context.	Take	the	hemlock	example	
just	outlined.	Importantly,	this	example	and	corresponding	claim	are	under-
defined.13	Translated	into	interventionist	terms,	all	that	this	description	provides	
is	that	there	is	some	variable	that	takes	a	value	that	represents	Socrates	drinking	
hemlock,	and	an	intervention	on	this	variable	changes	the	value	of	some	other	
variable	to	one	that	represents	Socrates	dying.	But,	a	number	of	different	
variables	could	represent	the	purported	cause,	and	a	number	of	different	models	
could	represent	its	relationship	to	the	effect	of	Socrates’	dying.	Which	of	these	is	
accurate	depends	on	what	the	relevant	alternatives	to	drinking	hemlock	are.	
How	these	details	get	filled	in	will	determine	whether	or	not	the	variable	that	
represents	Socrates	drinking	hemlock	is	proportional.		
	
I	hold	that	the	common	sense	claim	that	drinking	hemlock	causes	Socrates’s	
death	implicitly	takes	the	relevant	alternative	to	be	Socrates’s	not	drinking	
hemlock.	The	default	context	is	taken	to	be	that	hemlock	was	the	only	possible	
poison,	and	drinking	it	the	only	possible	means	of	consumption.	Given	this	
context,	the	exhaustive	variable	would	take	the	values	{drinks-hemlock,	doesn’t-
																																																								
13	I	take	this	to	be	common	knowledge.	See	Franklin-Hall	2016;	McDonnell	2017;	
and	Weslake	2017	
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drink-hemlock}.	But,	such	a	variable	is	indeed	proportional	to	the	effect	variable.	
Thus,	the	common	sense	cause	is,	in	fact,	proportional.	
	
Such	a	defense	requires	that	common	sense	claims	be	implicitly	relative	to	a	
modal	context.	I’m	not	the	first	to	relativize	common	sense	claims	to	context.	
Philosophers	such	as	Mackie	and	Schaffer	make	such	a	move,	albeit	with	
different	ends	in	mind.14	However,	both	McDonnell	and	Weslake	explicitly	deny	
this	kind	of	relativity.15	They	claim	that	the	very	fact	that	we	have	strong	and	
convergent	intuitions	about	common	sense	examples,	despite	their	being	under-
determined,	demonstrates	that	the	intuitions	are	not	sensitive	to	filling	in	details.	
	
In	response,	I	argue	that	we	respond	to	common	sense	causal	examples	in	the	
same	way	that	we	respond	to	standard	conversations.	According	to	Grice,	
communication	is	governed	by	a	set	of	conversational	maxims.	16,	17	The	maxims	
most	relevant	to	how	an	audience	engages	with	these	under-defined	causal	
examples	are	the	maxims	of	quantity	and	relation.	Taken	together,	these	maxims	
enjoin	an	interlocutor	to,		
	
Make	your	contribution	as	informative	as	is	required	(for	the	current	
purposes	of	exchange)….[and	no]	more	informative	than	is	
required,….[and	b]e	relevant.	(1989,	26	–	27)	
	
Thus,	the	conversationally	natural	way	to	fill	in	the	modal	context	of	these	
examples	is	to	take	each	fact	as	informative	and	relevant,	and	to	assume	that	all	
informative	facts	have	been	provided.	
	
The	only	information	provided	by	the	hemlock	example	is	the	following:	(i)	
Socrates	drinks	hemlock.	(ii)	Socrates	dies.	The	Gricean	maxims	tell	us	that	this	
is	all	the	information	needed,	and	that	nothing	significant	has	been	left	out.	So,	
the	details	are	filled	in	as	continuous	with	everyday	life.	In	possible	world	speak,	
																																																								
14	See	Mackie	1974,	especially	chapter	2;	and	Schaffer	2005	
15	McDonnell	2017;	Weslake	2017	
16	See	Grice	1989	
17	Bontly	makes	a	similar	point	(see	2005)	
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we’re	looking	only	at	worlds	which	have	a	similar	environment,	a	biologically	
similar	Socrates,	etc.,	and	in	which	laws	of	metaphysical	necessity	hold.	
	
The	causal	focus	is	on	Socrates’s	drinking	hemlock.	This	means	that	in	evaluating	
the	causal	relationship,	everything	else	is	held	fixed	and	the	fact	of	the	drinking	
hemlock	is	varied.	Due	to	the	absence	of	any	other	details,	the	only	real	
alternative	to	Socrates’s	drinking	hemlock	is	his	not	drinking	hemlock.	Nothing	
suggests	that	there	are	alternative	means	of	consuming	the	hemlock.	Further,	it’s	
not	a	common	occurrence	in	everyday	life	to	have	alternative	means	of	
consuming	a	given	poison.	Treating	eating	hemlock	as	a	relevant	alternative	
would	be	to	arbitrarily	introduce	something	that	wasn’t	otherwise	specified,	and	
whose	presence	can’t	be	justified	by	everyday	experience.		
	
The	objection	from	common	sense	assumes	different	possible	alternatives	than	
what	I	take	to	be	implicit,	and	then	tries	to	say	that	relative	to	these	other	
alternatives,	the	common	sense	causal	claim	is	not	proportional.	I	have	argued	
that	the	common	sense	cause	is	simply	not	relative	to	these	other	alternatives.		
	
However,	even	given	other	possible	alternatives,	the	common	sense	cause	would	
still	be	proportional.	The	second	mistake	that	the	objection	makes	is	that	it	fails	
to	appreciate	the	constraint	of	exclusivity.		
	
The	objection	holds	that	there	is	some	relevant	alternative	to	Socrates’s	drinking	
hemlock	that	preserves	his	consuming	it.	Take	as	an	arbitrary	alternative	his	
eating	hemlock.	Socrates	could	both	drink	and	eat	the	hemlock	–	he	could	wash	
down	a	hemlock	salad	with	a	glass	of	hemlock	milk,	for	example.	Following	
exclusivity,	then,	these	possibilities	should	be	represented	by	distinct	variables	–	
one	that	can	take	the	value	drinks-hemlock,	call	this	D,	and	one	that	can	take	eats-
hemlock,	call	this	E.	
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But,	now	there	is	no	problem.	Following	Woodward’s	response	to	early	pre-
emption	cases,18	we	can	hold	E	fixed	at	the	value	that	represents	Socrates	not	
eating	the	hemlock,	and	see	if	the	changes	in	D	–	which	we	can	ensure	meets	
exhaustivity	by	giving	it	the	second	value	doesn’t-drink-hemlock	–	line	up	with	
the	changes	in	the	effect	variable.	They	do.	When	an	intervention	sets	the	value	
of	the	cause	variable	to	drinks-hemlock,	the	effect	variable	takes	the	value	dies.	
When	an	intervention	sets	the	value	of	the	cause	variable	instead	to	doesn’t-
drink-hemlock,	the	effect	variable	changes	value	to	doesn’t-die.	Once	again,	the	
common	sense	cause	is	proportional.	
	
If,	on	the	other	hand,	the	situation	is	such	that	Socrates’s	drinking	hemlock	is	
indeed	mutually	exclusive	with	his	eating	hemlock,	then	drinks-hemlock	and	eats-
hemlock	could	be	values	of	the	same	variable.	Imagine	that	Socrates’s	jailor	only	
has	enough	money	to	purchase	either	hemlock	leaves	or	hemlock	milk,	but	not	
both.	In	this	case,	neither	Socrates’s	drinking	nor	his	eating	will	be	proportional.	
The	proportional	cause	is	instead	his	consuming	hemlock.	The	proportional	
variable	will	therefore	be	one	that	takes	as	values	{consumes-hemlock,	doesn’t-
consume-hemlock}.		
	
But,	this	is	not	in	conflict	with	common	sense	–	so	long	as	we	abstract	away	from	
normal	everyday	circumstances,	and	instead	genuinely	fix	the	situation	as	one	in	
which	Socrates	is	forced	to	consume	hemlock,	arbitrarily	receiving	hemlock	
leaves	or	milk.	When,	given	this	background,	we’re	asked	what	causes	Socrates’s	
death,	it	is	natural	to	say	that	it	was	his	consuming	hemlock.	After	all,	it	isn’t	the	
drinking	nor	the	eating	that	makes	a	difference	to	whether	Socrates	dies,	since	
had	he	not	done	one	he	would	have	done	the	other.	It	is	his	consuming	hemlock	
rather	than	not.	
	
Finally,	I’d	like	to	point	out	that	the	intuition	that	Socrates’s	consuming	hemlock	
is	the	more	proportional	cause	is	actually	misguided.	The	naïve	intuition	holds	
that	an	exhaustive	and	exclusive	variable	with	the	value	consumes-hemlock	–	call	
this	H1	–	is	more	proportional	to	the	exhaustive	and	exclusive	variable	with	the	
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value	drinks-hemlock	–	call	this	H2.	But,	the	modal	context	to	which	H1	will	be	
exhaustive	is	different	than	that	to	which	H2	will	be.	They’re	therefore	not	even	
in	competition	for	proportionality.	Instead,	I	suggest	that	this	intuition	is	a	
response	to	the	fact	that	H1’s	modal	context	is	more	inclusive	than	that	of	H2.	H1	
can	accurately	(and	proportionally)	represent	the	cause	of	Socrates’s	death	in	a	
wider	range	of	situations	than	can	H2.	But,	this	is	about	stability	–	as	earlier	
defined	–	not	about	proportionality.	The	model	that	employs	H1	is	simply	more	
stable	than	that	which	employs	H2.	This	putative	proportionality	intuition	is	
actually	responding	to	the	property	of	stability.	
	
7.	Conclusion	
	
In	this	paper,	I	have	defended	the	interventionist	formulation	of	proportionality	
by	explicating	the	exhaustivity	and	exclusivity	constraints,	and	stipulating	that	
proportionality	requires	variables	that	meet	these	constraints.		
	
These	constraints	have	been	defined	on	the	assumption	that	a	variable	
represents	a	particular	object’s	instantiations	of	a	particular	type	of	property.	
But,	they	are	easily	generalized	to	cover	alternate	objects	of	representation.	Take	
events,	for	example.	If	variables	represent	particular	kinds	of	events	occurring	or	
failing	to	occur,	then	exhaustivity	would	require	that	the	values	of	a	variable	
cover	the	entire	range	of	possibilities	of	event	occurrence	for	whatever	type	of	
event	the	variable	represents.	Exclusivity	would	require	that	the	values	of	a	
variable	be	event	occurrences	such	that	no	two	could	occur	simultaneously.	
	
Finally,	I	have	articulated	how	the	interventionist	formulation	of	proportionality	
responds	to	the	objection	from	common	sense.	Such	an	objection	dissolves	once	
the	explicated	constraints	on	variable	selection	are	honored.	
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Species as Models
Abstract: This paper argues that biological species should be construed as abstract
models, rather than biological or even tangible entities. Various (phenetic, cladistic,
biological etc.) species concepts are defined as set-theoretic models of formal theories,
and their logical connections are illustrated. In this view organisms relate to a species
not as instantiations, members, or mereological parts, but rather as phenomena to be
represented by the model/species. This sheds new light on the long-standing problems of
species and suggests their connection to broader philosophical topics such as model
selection, scientific representation, and scientific realism.
1 Introduction
Biological species has arguably been one of the most controversial topics in the
philosophy of biology. Philosophers and biologists alike have long debated over “correct”
concepts of species and their ontological status. The traditional account took species as
a category, class, or type instantiated by individual organisms. After the advent of
evolutionary theory, the typological concept came under fire by those who identify
species with a part of biological lineage (Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1976). They forcefully
1
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argued that a species is not an abstract type but a concrete historical entity of which
individual organisms are mereological bits. Although this individualist thesis became a
de-facto standard in the philosophy of biology in the last century, some have complained
its lack of explanatory power and called for a revival of a type or natural-kind based
concept of biological species (Boyd 1999).
To this debate between individualists and typologists, this paper introduces yet
another thesis according to which species taxa are models of scientific theory. Model is a
notoriously equivocal concept, but in this paper it is understood as a set-theoretic entity
that makes sentences of a given theory true or false. This implies that biological species
are mathematical, rather than biological or even tangible, entities. To work out this
claim I begin Section 2 with a reconstruction of various (e.g., phenetic, cladistic,
biological etc.) species concepts in terms of formal models that licence characteristic sets
of inferences. The model-theoretic rendering illustrates logical connections among
different species concepts and provides a platform to evaluate them as a problem of
model selection. Section 3 then expounds on philosophical implications of the
model-theoretic interpretation. Identifying species with models entails that the
organism-species relationship is not instantial or mereological, but rather
representational; i.e., species as models represent individual organisms. This opens the
possibility of applying general philosophical discussions on scientific representation and
realism to vexed questions concerning the epistemic and ontological status of biological
species. Through these arguments this paper puts the species problem under broader
contexts of model selection, scientific representation, and scientific realism, depicting it
as a special case of the generic question as to how science investigates the world.
2
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2 Species as models
This section fleshes out the main claim of this paper by reconstructing various species
concepts as set-theoretic models. The central idea is that species concepts specify
theories that underpin biological inferences and descriptions, and species are models that
satisfy such theories.
2.1 Typological species concepts
The traditional typological view defines species by its essence, or necessary and sufficient
conditions or traits. This finds a straightforward expression as a biconditional form
∀x(Sx↔ T1x ∧ T2x ∧ · · · ). The extension of species S that satisfies this formula then is
the intersection
∩
i
Ti (see Figure 1(a)).
Though crude as it is, the biconditional formulation allows certain inferences from
traits to species and vice versa. It is this kind of logical reasoning that has enabled, for
example, the famous French zoologist George Cuvier to reconstruct the anatomy of a
whole organism from just a single piece of bone. As is well known, however, such
inferences have very restricted validity, because in most cases it is impossible to find a
definite set of phenotypic or genetic characteristics that exclusively defines a given
species. Evolution implies species boundaries to be necessarily “fuzzy,” which
undermines simple biconditional forms. The typological species concept has thus been
criticized for its lack of expression ability: a simple algebra of trait-sets cannot capture
the nuanced reality of biological species.
3
Seattle, WA; 1-4 November 2018 -481-
(a) Typological (b) Cluster (c) Cladistic (d) Relational
Sets Phenotypic space Posets Graphs
Figure 1: Illustrations of models of various species concepts, with corresponding formal
setups. In each model dots/nodes represent individuals. See text for explanation.
2.2 Cluster species concepts
The cluster species concepts avoid this difficulty by defining a species as a group or
cluster of similar organisms that do not necessarily share a common set of traits. The
question then is how to define similarity. Its earliest variant, the phenetic species
concept, represents organisms in a multi-dimensional space each axis of which defines a
recorded trait (Sokal and Sneath 1963). Phenotypic similarity is then measured by the
euclidean distance between two points/organisms, and a chunk or cluster of organisms in
this euclidean space is identified as a species (Figure 1(b)). The choice of euclidean
distance is not obligatory. One could, for example, measure similarity by the cosine
between two points in the normalized phenotypic space, in which case the similarity
amounts to correlation, with a species being identified as a correlated cluster or more
generally a probability distribution over the phenotypic space (Boyd 1999).
The phenotypic space with a certain metric or probability distribution is certainly a
much richer machinery than overlapping sets and allows for more nuanced expressions
and inferences. The sophisticated theoretical background (euclidean geometry or
4
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probability theory) enables one to measure the similarity among organisms and to make
a trait-species inference in the absence of necessarily or sufficient criteria. To what
extent such clustering and inference reflect objective species boundaries, however, was
disputed, for the similarity calculation depends much on which phenotypic characters are
taken into account. It should also be noted that, like the typological concept, the cluster
concepts are purely static and lack a means to express the evolutionary past, the point
often criticized by more historical approaches to species.
2.3 Cladistic species concepts
The cladistic species concepts focus on evolutionary history and define species solely in
terms of phylogenetic relationships, as a “branch” (monophyletic group) in the
evolutionary tree (Hennig 1966). Since ancestral relationship is antisymmetric and
transitive, phylogeny forms a (strict) partially ordered set or poset (Ω,≺), with Ω
corresponding to a set of organism and ≺ meaning “is an ancestor of.” A cladistic
species is then defined as descendants from some founder organism(s) ωf :
{ω ∈ Ω : ωf ≺ ω}. (1)
An obvious advantage of the cladistic concepts is that it is faithful to the fact of
evolution, and for this reason it has been most well received by biologists and
philosophers alike. It is not, however, without flaws. For one, although the requirement
of monophyly specifies a necessarily condition, it is silent as to how big a branch must be
to qualify as a species (for even a small family can satisfy (1)), and so far no satisfactory
sufficient condition was given (Velasco 2008). The monophyly requirement has also been
5
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criticized to be too strong, for it would count birds as reptiles because the smallest
monophylic group including lizards, snakes, and crocodiles also includes birds. That is,
the cladistic species concepts make paraphyletic groups like reptilia meaningless (Sensu
Narens 2007), which strikes some to be too high a price to pay.
2.4 Relational species concepts
Another popular approach is to define a species as a group of individuals in a certain
relationship to each other. The biological species concept, for instance, defines species as
“groups of interbreeding populations that are reproductively isolated form other such
groups (Mayr 1942)” so that the required relationship here is mutual crossability. Other
variants focus on reproductive competition (Ghiselin 1974) or organisms’ capacity to
recognize each other as a possible mate (Paterson 1985). All these proposals try to
reduce species into mutual relationships (interbreeding, competition, recognition, etc.)
between a pair of organisms. If we represent such relationships by an edge between
nodes/organisms, a relational species can be defined as an isolated complete subgraph or
clique in an undirected graph, that is, a group of nodes in which every two distinct nodes
are connected but none is connected to outside (Figure 1(d)). Relational species thus
find their model in graph theory, where edges represent the relation in question.
A common criticism of relational species concepts is that the focal relationship such
as crossability sometimes fails to induce isolated cliques because some organisms at a
species boundary can often mate with organisms that are thought to belong another
species (e.g. ring species). Moreover, the biological species concept has been criticized to
imply every asexually reproducing organism forms a distinct species (for any singleton
6
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node is complete). These criticisms suggest that the real biological network is so “messy”
that just a single relationship cannot divide it into distinct cliques in a non-trivial way.
2.5 “Combo” solutions
The model-theoretic rendering makes explicit what each species concept can and cannot
meaningfully say about the biological world. Given that most of the criticisms we have
seen concern the “cannot say” part, one way to deal with these difficulties is to combine
different theories to obtain more complex definitions of species.
For instance, one may combine the cluster and cladistic species concepts and define a
species as a lineage that shares the same or similar phenotypic distribution:
{ω ∈ Ω : ωf ≺ ω ∧ θ(ωf ) = θ(ω)} (2)
where θ : Ω→ Rn assigns distribution parameters to each organism ω ∈ Ω.1 On this
definition one may meaningfully define paraphyletic species and distinguish birds from
other reptiles on the basis of the difference in their phenotypic or genetic profiles. It can
also account for anagenesis (speciation without branching) and continuity of species
between a cladogenesis (splitting event).
If one replaces θ in (2) with a different function ν : Ω→ N that maps organisms
ω ∈ Ω to their niche ν(ω) ∈ N , it becomes the ecological species concept which defines a
species as “a lineage ... which occupies an adaptive zone minimally different from that of
1For non-parametric cases, we can set θ : Ω → R∞ and modify the definition as
{ω ∈ Ω : ωf ≺ ω ∧D(θ(ωf ), θ(ω)) < k} where D(•) is a divergence measure (such as the
Kullback-Leibler divergence) and k is a constant.
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any other lineage in its range (Van Valen 1976, 233).”
Yet another combination is that of the cladistic and biological species concepts,
which would define a species as a maximum monophylic lineage that can mutually
interbreed, so that
{ωx, ωy ∈ Ω : ωf ≺ ωx ∧ ωf ≺ ωy ∧ ωx ∼ ωy} (3)
where ∼ stands for crossability.2 This will make up for the lack of a sufficient condition
in the cladistic species concept, and accord well with the so-called evolutionary species
concept which emphasizes the unique “evolutionary tendencies and historical fate” of
each species (Wiley 1978, 17). It should be noted that this could also avoid the problem
of ring species because two crossable organisms may not necessary share the same
ancestor.
2.6 The scientific species problem as a problem of theory choice
The above discussion shows that (i) major species concepts can be defined as models of
formal theories, and that (ii) more complex concepts can be obtained by combining basic
ones. The model-theoretic approach characterizes each species concept with the formal
apparatus it assumes, which in turn determines its expressive power or what can
meaningfully be stated about organisms and/or their history (Narens 2007). In general,
a richer theoretical apparatus allows for more nuanced expressions, which makes it less
liable to counterexamples. This is illustrated in the progression from the typological to
2As in the case of the biological species concept, the crossability here must take into
account the existence of two sexes.
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cluster and then to cluster-cladistic concepts, where in each step the species concept
acquires the ability to deal with fuzzy boundaries and evolutionary history, respectively.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that a richer concept is always desirable,
because it tends to have a greater degree of freedom and requires more data in actual
application. While only phylogenetic information suffices to demarcate cladistic species,
the cluster-cladistic concept also requires phenotypic or ecological information, which in
many cases may not be available. A stronger semantic power thus comes with a higher
epistemic cost, as is often emphasized by pheneticists or cladists in their respective
advocacy of the phenotypic cluster and cladistic species concepts.
This suggests that the competition among various species concepts should be
understood as a problem of model selection, where different models are evaluated on the
basis of their explanatory or descriptive power versus parsimony or operationality (Sober
2008). Indeed, most disputes among advocates of different species concepts arise from
their differential emphasis on what aspects of the biological world a disable species
concept needs and needs not take into account (Ereshefsky 2001), but the difficulty is
that these emphases are often implicit and incommensurable. Although the
model-theoretic approach does not arbitrate these debates, it provides a common formal
framework that makes explicit the explanatory power and operationality of species
concepts and facilitates evaluation of their respective advantage.
9
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3 Philosophical implications
3.1 Species are models
Upon the model-theoretic reconstruction of various species concepts, we now turn to the
philosophical thesis that species taxa should be construed as models proposed above, i.e.,
as set-theoretic entities. To proceed, let me first begin with an analogy from classical
mechanics. Classical mechanics is a theory about Newtonian particles, which are
customary defined as volumeless points or vectors in a three-dimensional Euclidean
space. Newton’s celebrated laws like F = ma describe temporal evolution of a system
composed of such “particles.” This system is to be distinguished from any actual
physical systems, say the solar system, for one thing, no concrete bodies are volumeless,
nor do they indefinitely continue rectilinear motion as prescribed by Newton’s first law.
Newton’s theory, or any other physical theories for that matter, is a description of
idealized and abstracted models and not of actual phenomena (Cartwright 1983). That
is, models of classical mechanics — which make its laws and statements true — are not
concrete, physical entities, but rather abstract mathematical objects that can be
constructed within set theory (McKinsey et al. 1953).
The role of models in science has been emphasized by the so-called semantic or
model-based view of scientific theories (e.g. van Fraassen 1980; Suppe 1989).3 In the
traditional, logical-positivist view, a scientific theory was supposed to directly describe
3This label (“the semantic view”) has been used to describe different, and logically
independent, theses. In particular, while some philosophers (e.g. Suppes 2002) take a
scientific theory as a description of models, others identify it with a set of models (van
Fraassen 1980). In this paper I adopt the former thesis without committing to the latter.
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observed data. This has set for positivists the difficult task of reducing theoretical
concepts that seemingly lack direct empirical contents to observation vocabulary by way
of bridge laws or partial interpretations. To avoid this difficulty, proponents of the
model-based view take a model, rather than observation, as the primary descriptive
target of a scientific theory. In this view, a theory specifies an abstract model that
idealizes and extracts just salient factors, and only indirectly relates to actual
phenomena via such an model.
I submit that the species problem is a variant of the positivist conundrum. Species is
a highly theoretical concept, and various proposal of “species concepts” in the past can
be understood as attempts to build bridge laws for reducing it to a set of observational
or operational criteria. To date more than a dozen of different concepts have been
proposed4, with no general consensus — each has its own strength, but also weakness
and exceptions when applied to the rich and heterogeneous biological world. The
assumption has been that a species concept must be a faithful description of actual
biological features or phenomena. But what if this assumption is untenable, or at least
unreasonable? The model-based view has been quite popular among philosophers of
biology (e.g. Beatty 1981; Lloyd 1988). If we adopt this view and construe evolutionary
theory as describing models, then species too must be defined accordingly, i.e., as (a part
of) abstract models that satisfy descriptions and/or inferences of the corresponding
theory.
What, then, are theories about species? Without claiming to be exhaustive, this
paper adopts Suppes’s (2002) thesis that a scientific theory must be defined as a
set-theoretical predicate. The foremost advantage of this approach is that it enables one
4Mayden (1997), for example, counts at least 22 concepts of species.
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to easily harness a theory with mathematical apparatus necessary for sophisticated
reasoning. As discussed above, contemporary studies on species rely heavily on
quantitative methods to calculate similarity or reconstruct a phylogenetic tree from
phenotypic or genetic data. Given that such mathematical reasoning requires matching
formal models of calculus or probability theory, the straightforward way to define a
species is to build it upon these mathematical backgrounds as an extension of these
formal models. Section 2 is a preliminary sketch of applying this Suppesian program to
various species concepts. If this attempt turns out to be successful, biological species are
to be understood as parts of set-theoretic structures, just like Newtonian particles. That
is, they are mathematical and abstract constructs, rather than physical or biological
entities.5
The purpose of the set-theoretic exposition is not just to accommodate quantitative
reasoning. Even with less quantitative cases like the biological species concept, it makes
implicit assumptions explicit and suggests a way to deal with counterexamples. The
problem of ring species, for example, arises from a conflict between the presumption that
each biological species must be isolated and the fact that crossability is not necessarily
transitive and thus fails to induce equivalence classes. One possible response to this
charge then would be to weaken the former assumption and redefine a species just as a
(not necessarily isolated) clique in the reproductive network. Clarification of theoretical
assumptions helps us to assess other species concepts as well. For example, the phenetic
species concept is often claimed to be “theory-free” in that it does not depend on any
evolutionary hypothesis. But as we have seen in Sec. 2.2, the calculation of phenotypic
5Hence the present thesis should not be confused with the view that species are sets or
collections of organisms (Kitcher 1984), which, after all, are concrete biological entities.
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similarity presupposes a phenotypic space equipped with a particular (e.g., euclidean)
metric, which is a fairly strong theoretical assumption. Also, cladists often stress the
simplicity and purity of their monophylic species definition that only considers
phylogenetic relationships. But in order to make use of likelihood methods to infer such
relationships, as is common in practice, a simple poset is not enough: one also needs to
assume some genetic or phenotypic distribution, and then there is no in-principle reason
to exclude non-monophylic taxa from the definition of species (as (2) in Sec. 2.5).
The final but not least merit of the set-theoretic approach is its flexibility: it allows
for a construction of a new species concept by combining existing ones (Sec. 2.5) or
adding new theoretical assumptions. For instance, it is common in experimental biology
to characterize a species by shared developmental or causal mechanisms: developmental
biologists often talk about “the development of the chicken” and medical doctors rely on
causal extrapolation when they prescribe a clinically-tested drug for their patient. Such
a “causal species” may be defined by isomorphic causal models, which combine a
probabilistic distribution and a causal graph over variables. Hence the discussion in
Section 2 covers just a few samples that can be constructed within this general
framework. This does not of course mean that every possible species concept can and
must be formalized, but does suggest the potential of the set-theoretic approach to
accommodate the use of existing species concepts and to develop novel ones.
3.2 Philosophical implications
Identifying species with theoretical models sheds new light on some vexed philosophical
issues, one amongst which concerns how individual organisms are related to species taxa.
13
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Philosophers have long debated whether the organism-species relationship is instantial
(organisms are particular instances of a species qua class), membership (they are
members of a species qua set; Kitcher 1984), or mereological (they are parts of a species
qua genealogical entity; Ghiselin 1997). The model-theoretic approach suggests an
alternative account, according to which a species represents (a group of) individual
organisms. Just as the Rutherford-Bohr model represents the microscopic structure of
atoms, models proposed in Section 2 represent biological populations: for example, nodes
and edges consisting of the biological species model in Figure 1(d) respectively represent
organisms and crossability. Representation captures our intuitive notion that a model
and its target phenomenon share salient static or dynamic features up to a certain
precision. Given that said, it must be admitted that the criteria and nature of scientific
representation are diversified and still open questions (Frigg and Nguyen 2016). Hence
calling the species-organism relationship representational does not necessarily demystify
it, but at least implies that the problem is not endemic to evolutionary theory: it is
rather a version of a broader philosophical issue as to how the use of scientific models
help us understanding the world. This means that the arsenal of this rich philosophical
literature can and should be consulted to elucidate the nature of the species-organism
relationship. Another, more immediate implication is that the membership and
mereological accounts must be both abandoned, for whatever the relationship between a
model and phenomena turns out to be, the latter must certainly not be a member or
part of the former.
Neither is representation identity or instantiation. Ideal gas is not identical to any
actual gas, but only approximates thermodynamic characteristics of some. Hence strictly
speaking it has no instantiation, but this does not detract its epistemic validity. Likewise
14
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species concepts, as specifications of ideal models, need not directly apply to actual
populations. No wild population big enough to qualify as a species would strictly satisfy
the requirement of the biological species concept, because actual mating chance is often
hindered by physiological, geographical, and other contingencies. In the same vein, a
phenetic or genetic cluster is expected to have outliers when applied to a real population.
However, the presence of such exceptions should not immediately invalidate the
corresponding species concepts, because the value of a species concept consists less in its
universal validity than its epistemic serviceability for inferences and explanations of
evolutionary or biological phenomena. These two criteria often conflict: Cartwright
(1983) even argues that explanatory theories necessarily distort the reality by idealizing
the situation and extracting only relevant features, so that properly speaking they are
“lies” by design. Cartwright’s examples are physics and economics, but her idea also
applies to the present context. The primary function of a species concept is to explain
biological phenomena rather than to save them, so that a few discrepancies should not
be taken as a falsification.
The conflict between exceptionlessness versus explanatory power also underlies the
realism-nominalism debate over species. The proponents of the nominalistic thesis who
claim a species to be nothing but a totality of individual organisms have motivated their
view by criticizing the realist interpretation of species-as-class for its commitment to the
typological thinking and failure to deal with the evident heterogeneity of biological
phenomena (e.g. Ghiselin 1997). On the other hand, those who attach weight on the role
of species concept in induction and explanation have upheld a realist position and
treated species as natural kinds (Boyd 1999). The present thesis offers a third
alternative, recognizing the explanatory role of species concept without committing to
15
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the ontologically heavy assumption of natural kinds. As we have seen in Section 2,
species as models licence particular sets of inferences. The cluster and typological
species/models underpin an expectation that physiological or genetic features found in,
say, laboratory animals would also be shared by other individuals of the same species,
while the evolutionary species concept explains the reason of such intra-specific
similarities. These explanations are effectuated by the same model representing
numerically distinct individuals or phenomena to be explained. Note that this procedure
no more presupposes the existence of the model as an independent, real entity, than do
explanations based on, say, ideal gas. Indeed, explanations may be based on fictional
models, as is the case with the Ising model in statistical mechanics.
This does not of course mean that models must be fictions, or that species do not
exist. Recent advocates of scientific realism argue that successful scientific models
capture some, especially structural, aspect of reality (Ladyman 2016). Given its affinity
to the model-based view of scientific theories, species realists may well apply this line of
reasoning to the present context, taking the set-theoretic structures as discussed in
Section 2 as representing the reality or “essential feature” of biological species. Whether
and to what extent such an argument carry over, however, remain to be examined by a
further study.
4 Conclusion
The past debates over biological species have been based on the assumption that species
concepts must describe actual biological phenomena, the strict adherence to which tends
to rule out all but cladistic species as typological or inexact. The present paper
16
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challenged this assumption and argued that the primary referent of a species concept is a
(set-theoretic) model that licences a certain set of inferences specified by the concept.
The model-theoretic rendering articulates explanatory power and theoretical
assumptions of each species concept and illuminates logical relationships among them.
Once species are specified as models, the long-standing competition among different
species concepts reduces to a common problem of model selection. This suggests that
evaluation of relative merits and demerits of species concepts must be based more on
their explanatory power than on exceptionlessness.
On the philosophical side, the shift in the ontological status of species means that the
organism-species relationship is not that of instantiation, membership, or mereology, but
rather representation. The vexed issue that has troubled philosophers for decades,
therefore, boils down to the broader problem as to how and why scientific models can be
used to represent and explain the world. This suggests the possibility to apply the rich
literature on scientific representation and realism to elucidate the epistemological and
ontological nature of biological species.
In sum, the take home message of the present paper is that the species problem is not
endemic to biology or evolutionary theory, but rather is a variant of general scientific
and philosophical issues of model selection, scientific representation, and realism. The
purpose of this paper was just to establish such a parallelism: determining its
philosophical implications on specific debates such as realism or pluralism concerning
biological species will be a task for future studies.
17
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Abstract:	Historical	inductions,	viz.,	the	pessimistic	meta-induction	and	the	
problem	of	unconceived	alternatives,	are	critically	analyzed	via	John	D.	Norton’s	
material	theory	of	induction	and	subsequently	rejected	as	non-cogent	arguments.	It	
is	suggested	that	the	material	theory	is	amenable	to	a	local	version	of	the	pessimistic	
meta-induction,	e.g.,	in	the	context	of	some	medical	studies.	
	
1.	Introduction	
	
My	goal	is	to	contribute	to	a	growing	literature	that	is	critical	of	historical	inductions	
such	as	the	pessimistic	(meta-)induction	(PMI)	argument	(Poincaré	1952,	160;	
Putnam	1978,	25;	Laudan	1981)	and	the	problem	of	unconceived	alternatives	
(Stanford	2001,	2006)	against	scientific	realism,	concentrating	mostly	on	the	
former.		The	PMI	can	be	construed	in	different	ways	(Mizrahi	2015,	Wray	2015),	
viz.,	as	a	deductive	reductio	ad	absurdum	(e.g.,	Psillos	1996,	1999),	a	
counterexample	to	the	no	miracles	argument	and	inference	to	best	explanation	
argument	for	scientific	realism	(e.g.,	Saatsi	2005,	Laudan	1981),	or,	usually,	as	an	
inductive	argument	(e.g.,	Poincaré	1952,	Putnam	1978,	Laudan	1981,	Rescher	
1987).	In	the	following	I	will	argue	against	the	inductive	version	of	PMI—or	any	
construal	of	the	PMI	that	makes	use	of	historical	induction—using	John	D.	Norton’s	
material	theory	of	induction	(Norton	2003,	Manuscript).	The	upshot	is	that	one	
ought	to	be	critical	of	historical	inductions	that	seem	to	fit	the	general	form	or	
pattern	of	a	good	inductive	argument,	but	may	in	fact	lack	inductive	warrant	and	
force.	Various	critiques	have	been	put	against	the	PMI	(e.g.,	Lange	2002,	Lewis	2001,	
Mizrahi	2013),	along	with	some	defenses	(e.g.,	Saatsi	2005).	In	Section	2	I	will	
present	the	PMI	and	briefly	discuss	some	criticism	in	order	to	place	my	own	analysis	
in	broader	context.	Section	3	presents	the	material	theory	of	induction	and	argues	
that	it	dissolves	the	PMI,	while	Section	4	extends	such	claims	to	the	more	recent	
problem	of	unconceived	alternatives.	In	Section	5	I	note	that	the	material	theory	of	
induction	does	leave	room	for	a	local	version	of	the	PMI,	which	holds	in	some	
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limited	domain,	such	as	in	relation	to	certain	medical	studies	(Ruhmkorff	2014).	I	
end	in	Section	6	with	a	short	conclusion.	
	
2.	The	(Inductive)	Pessimistic	(Meta-)Induction		
	
The	modern	formulation	of	the	PMI	is	usually	attributed	to	Laudan	(1981)	who	
argued	that	having	genuinely	referential	theoretical	and	observational	terms,	or	
being	approximately	true,	is	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	for	a	theory	being	
explanatory	and	predictively	successful.	More	generally,	Anjan	Chakravartty	
characterizes	the	argument	as	follows:	
	
[PMI	can]	be	described	as	a	two-step	worry.	First,	there	is	an	assertion	to	the	
effect	that	the	history	of	science	contains	an	impressive	graveyard	of	theories	
that	were	previously	believed	[to	be	true],	but	subsequently	judged	to	be	
false	.	.	.	Second,	there	is	an	induction	on	the	basis	of	this	assertion,	whose	
conclusion	is	that	current	theories	are	likely	future	occupants	of	the	same	
graveyard.	(Chakravartty	2008,	152)1	
	
The	PMI	then	may	take	the	following	form:	
	
[Inductive	Generalization	PMI]	
	
P(i)	Past	theory	1	was	successful	but	not	genuinely	referential	or	
approximately	true.	
P(ii)	Past	theory	2	was	successful	but	not	genuinely	referential	or	
approximately	true.	
…	
C)	Therefore,	current	(and	perhaps	future)	theories	are	successful	but	(by	
induction)	probably	not	genuinely	referential	or	approximately	true.	
	
Laudan	(1981)	suggests	that	the	history	of	science	contains	a	graveyard	of	
theories	that	were	previously	believed	to	be	approximately	true	and	genuinely	
referential,	but	that	subsequently	were	judged	to	be	false	and	not	to	refer.	
Estimations	of	the	number	of	such	superseded	theories	have	been	debated	(e.g.,	
Lewis	2001,	Wray	2013)	and	recently	Mizrahi	(2016)	presents	evidence	that	
challenges	the	“history	of	science	as	a	graveyard	of	theories”	claim.	Others	voice	
concerns	regarding	the	period	of	history	of	science	used	in	order	to	extract	
historical	evidence	(e.g.,	Lange	2002,	Fahrbach	2011)	or	the	proper	unit	of	analysis,	
i.e.,	theories	vs.	theoretical	entity	(e.g.,	Lange	2002,	Magnus	and	Callender	2004).		
Similarly,	Park	(2011,	83)	and	Mizrahi	(2013,	3220-3222)	have	argued	that	the	PMI	
is	fallacious	due	to	cherry-picking	data,	biased	statistics,	and	non-random	sampling.	
My	own	criticism	of	the	inductive	PMI	comes	from	a	different	avenue.	I	will	
assume	that	the	anti-realist	does	have	randomly	sampled	historical	evidence	from	
the	correct	period	of	history	and	with	the	proper	unit	of	analysis	(whatever	those	
																																																								
1	cf.	Wray	(2015,	61).	
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may	be)	that	is	not	biased	or	cherry-picked.	Still,	on	the	material	theory	of	induction	
the	PMI	will	not	be	a	cogent	argument.	In	other	words,	I	aim	to	identify	what	I	take	
to	be	a	more	fundamental	(although	not	categorically	different)	problem	with	the	
PMI.	
	
3.	PMI	Meets	the	Material	Theory	
	
3.1	The	Material	Theory	of	Induction	in	a	Nutshell	
	
Consider	the	following	formally	identical	inductive	inferences	(Norton	2003,	649):	
	
P1)	Some	samples	of	the	element	bismuth	melt	at	271	degrees	C.	
C1)	Therefore,	all	samples	of	the	element	bismuth	melt	at	271	degrees	C.	
	
P2)	Some	samples	of	wax	melt	at	91	degrees	C.	
C2)	Therefore,	all	samples	of	wax	melt	at	91	degrees	C.	
	
What	makes	the	first	argument	an	inductively	strong	and	cogent	argument	while	the	
second	a	weak	and	non-cogent	inductive	argument?	Norton	(2003,	Manuscript)	has	
argued	that	formal	theories	of	induction,	which	provide	universal	schemas	that	are	
meant	to	identify	the	inductions	that	are	licit	and	those	that	are	not,	stand	against	an	
insurmountable	difficulty	when	facing	such	a	question.2	Instead,	he	offers	a	material	
account	of	induction:	
	
In	a	material	theory,	the	admissibility	of	an	induction	is	ultimately	traced	
back	to	a	matter	of	fact,	not	to	a	universal	schema.	We	are	licensed	to	infer	
from	the	melting	point	of	some	samples	of	an	element	to	the	melting	point	of	
all	samples	by	a	fact	about	elements:	their	samples	are	generally	uniform	in	
their	physical	properties.	…	All	inductions	ultimately	derive	their	licenses	
from	facts	pertinent	to	the	matter	of	the	induction.	(Norton	2003,	650;	original	
emphasis)	
	
Norton	calls	the	local	facts	that	power	inductive	inferences	“material	postulates.”	
Material	postulates	themselves	are	supported	by	other	instances	of	induction	that	
are	licensed	by	different	material	postulates.	
	
3.2	Material	Analysis	of	PMI	
	
Many	of	the	criticism	of	the	inductive	PMI	discussed	above	amount	to	the	claim	that	
the	universal	schema	used	by	the	likes	of	Laudan	(1981),	namely,	(P3)	Some	A’s	are	
B’s,	(C3)	Therefore,	all	A’s	are	B’s,	does	not	apply	in	the	case	of	the	PMI	because	
various	criteria	needed	to	implement	the	scheme,	e.g.,	random	sampling,	correct	
historical	period,	proper	unit	of	analysis,	have	not	been	met.	What	I	wish	to	do	here	
																																																								
2	I	will	not	defend	Norton’s	theory	or	claims	here.	He	dedicates	an	entire	book	to	the	
matter	in	Norton	(Manuscript).	
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is	conduct	a	material	analysis	of	the	PMI.	Considering	the	above	presentation	of	the	
PMI	in	its	[Inductive	Generalization	PMI]	form	we	may	ask,	what	powers	the	
inductive	inference,	i.e.,	what	material	postulate	licenses	the	pessimistic	conclusion?	
In	context	of	the	two	inductive	arguments	considered	in	Section	3.1,	we	note	
that	there	is	no	material	postulate	that	licenses	the	inductive	inference	in	the	case	of	
wax	(P2	too	C2)	but	there	is	one	in	the	case	of	bismuth	(P1	to	C1):	Generally,	
chemical	elements	are	uniform	in	their	physical	properties.	By	analogy,	the	
presumption	of	the	meta-induction	is	that	each	historical	case	study	looked	at	is	an	
instance	of	the	same	thing,	a	discovery	of	induction	in	science.	If	we	are	to	perform	
the	meta-induction	then	there	needs	to	be	something	in	the	background	facts	that	
unifies	all	such	inductions,	just	like	the	fact	chemical	elements	are	generally	uniform	
in	their	physical	properties	warrants	the	inductive	inference	regarding	the	melting	
point	of	bismuth.	Let	us	consider	several	options.	
First,	perhaps	the	material	fact	is	that	most	scientists	use	a	common	rule	or	
method	in	constructing	or	discovering	successful	theories,	something	along	the	lines	
of	Mill’s	methods	of	experimental	inquiry	in	his	System of Logic (1872, Book III, Ch. 
7).	If	so,	the	properties	of	the	rule	would	be	used	to	authorize	the	induction.	Is	there	
such	a	rule,	or	perhaps,	some	common	scientific	method?	A	glance	at	the	history	of	
science	suggests	that	this	is	unlikely.	Newton’s	deduction	from	the	phenomena,	is	
very	different	from	Darwin’s	inference	to	best	explanation,	which	in	turn	differs	
radically	from	Einstein’s	thought	experiments	with	lights	beams,	trains,	and	
elevators.3	More	generally,	there	seems	to	be	a	consensus	among	historians	and	
philosophers	of	science	that	something	like	“the	scientific	method”	is	really	more	of	
an	umbrella	term	for	very	different	methods	used	by	scientists	to	construct	and	
discover	theories.	After	all,	novel	problems	necessitate	novels	solutions,	and	the	
commonality	that	does	arise	in	different	cases,	say,	attempts	to	minimize	error	or	to	
be	objective,	is	not	the	kind	of	commonality	that	we	seek	in	powering	the	PMI	and	
drawing	the	pessimistic	conclusion.	For	instance,	in	his	book	Styles	of	Knowing:	A	
New	History	of	Science	from	Ancient	Times	to	the	Present,	Chungling	Kwa	(2011)	
argues	that	there	is	no	single,	fundamental	method	used	in	science:	“there	is	not	just	
one	form	of	Western	scientific	rationality;	there	are	at	least	six.”	The	framework	of	
six	“styles	of	knowing,”	includes	the	deductive,	the	experimental,	the	hypothetical-
analogical,	the	taxonomic,	the	statistical,	and	the	evolutionary	style,	and	is	based	on	
Alistair	Crombie’s	(1994)	three-volume	work	Styles	of	Scientific	Thinking.	Similar,	
Ian	Hacking	(also	taking	lead	from	Crombie’s	work)	has	argued	that	there	are	
distinct	“styles	of	reasoning”	used	in	science,	such	as	the	postulational	style,	the	
style	of	experimental	exploration,	the	style	of	hypothetical	construction	of	models	
by	analogy,	the	taxonomic	style,	the	statistical	style,	the	historical	derivation	of	
genetic	development,	and	the	laboratory	style	(Hacking	1992).	This	further	
																																																								
3	In	fact,	see	Norton	(Manuscript,	Ch.	8-9)	who	argues	that	even	in	historical	cases	
where	the	same	principle	is	applied	by	scientists,	viz.,	inference	to	best	explanation,	
“at	best	we	can	find	loose	similarities	that	the	canonical	examples	of	inference	to	
best	explanation	share,”	so	that	no	common	rule	of	the	kind	needed	to	power	the	
PMI	can	be	found	(Ch.	8,	p.	1).	
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corroborates	the	idea	that	scientific	methods	used	for	theory	construction	and	
discovery,	as	well	as	for	scientific	explanation,	are	very	diverse.	
More	generally,	scientific	theories	are	not	kind	of	things	that	portray	the	type	
of	uniformity	needed	to	license	inductive	inferences	on	Norton’s	material	theory.	
Albeit	in	a	different	context,	a	similar	point	is	nicely	made	by	Mizrahi	(2013,	3218):	
	
A	uniform—as	opposed	to	diverse—sample	might	be	a	sample	of,	say,	copper	
rods.	From	a	sample	of	just	a	few	copper	rods	that	are	tested	for	electrical	
conductivity,	it	is	reasonable	to	conclude	that	all	copper	rods	conduct	
electricity	because,	if	you	have	seen	one	or	two	copper	rods,	you	have	seen	
them	all	(given	their	uniform	atomic	structure).	Scientific	theories,	however,	
are	not	as	uniform	as	copper	rods.	The	point,	then,	is	that	any	sample	of	
theories	is	not	going	to	be	uniform	in	a	way	that	is	required	for	a	“seen	one,	
seen	them	all”	inductive	generalization.	
	
	 Similarly,	and	second,	perhaps	there	are	some	facts	about	investigating	
scientist	themselves,	how	they	work,	and/or	the	problems	situations	that	they	work	
in,	which	can	unify	the	historical	evidence	in	a	way	that	provides	us	with	the	
inductive	warrant	we	seek.	Maybe	such	facts	will	include	something	about	the	
psychology	of	scientists:	their	fastidiousness	and	fear	of	error,	their	facility	at	
jumping	to	conclusions,	or	perhaps	their	curiosity,	logic,	creativity,	skepticism,	etc.	
However,	in	a	similar	manner	to	the	search	for	a	common	rule	used	in	constructing	
successful	theories,	the	history	of	science	furnishes	us	with	scientists	that	are	
heterogeneous	enough	in	their	psychological	traits,	and	work	in	such	varied	
contexts,	so	as	not	to	provide	us	with	any	was	to	unify	the	various	historical	cases	in	
a	way	pertinent	to	licensing	the	pessimistic	inference	of	the	PMI.	
	 Third,	perhaps	we	can	circumvent	looking	to	a	common	rule	of	constructing	
or	discovering	theories,	or	searching	for	common	traits	among	scientists,	by	noting	
that	the	follow	candidate	material	postulate	would	power	the	PMI:		
	
MP-PMI:	Generally,	successful	theories	are	not	genuinely	referential	and/or	
approximately	true.		
	
But	how	would	we	establish	MP-PMI?	One	option	is	to	appeal	to	the	PMI	itself,	but	
this	would	either	be	circular	or	else	push	us	to	look	for	another	material	postulate.	
Another	option	is	just	to	grant	the	MP-PMI	as	a	reasonable	assumption.	Perhaps	
anti-realists	or	instrumentalists	would	think	that	this	is	a	sensible	starting	point,	but	
their	target	realist	opponent	would	surely	reject	such	an	assumption	as	question	
begging.	Last,	perchance	there	is	some	fact	about	explanatory	and/or	predictively	
successful	theories	that	renders	them,	generally,	not	genuinely	referential	and/or	
approximately	true?	Possibly	part	of	the	essence	of	successful	theories	is	to	
misrepresent	the	world?	To	me	this	seems	highly	unlikely	and	at	odds	with	any	
levelheaded	intuition	but,	in	any	case,	if	we	could	argue	that	successful	theories	are	
essentially	inaccurate	then	we	would	not	need	the	PMI	in	the	first	place!	
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	 Fourth,	we	may	want	to	construe	the	PMI	in	its	inductive	generalization	form	
as	a	kind	of	abductive	argument	with	the	following	type	of	material	postulate:4	
	
[Inductive	Generalization	PMI	–	Abductive	version]	
	
P(i):	The	success	of	past	theory	1	(constructed	using	method	m)	is	not	best	
explained	by	its	truth.		
P(ii):	The	success	of	past	theory	2	(constructed	using	method	m)	is	not	best	
explained	by	its	truth.		
…	
MP:	Scientific	theories	constructed	using	method	m	are	generally	uniform	
with	respect	to	what	best	explains	their	predictive	success.		
C:	The	success	of	our	best	current	(and	perhaps	futures)	theories	
(constructed	using	method	m)	are	not	best	explained	by	their	truth.	
	
Stating	the	PMI	as	above	has	the	merit	of	directly	engaging	with	the	“no	miracles	
argument”	for	scientific	realism,	namely:	
	
That	terms	in	mature	scientific	theories	typically	refer	[to	things	in	the	
world]	…,	that	theories	accepted	in	a	mature	science	are	typically	
approximately	true,	that	the	same	term	can	refer	to	the	same	thing	even	
when	it	occurs	in	different	theories―these	statements	are	viewed	by	the	
scientific	realist	not	as	necessary	truths	but	as	part	of	the	only	scientific	
explanation	of	the	success	of	science,	and	hence	as	part	of	any	adequate	
scientific	description	of	science	and	its	relations	to	its	objects.	(Putnam	1975,	
73)	
	
But	worries	abound.	First,	the	realist	may	very	well	deny	P(i),	P(ii),	etc.,	and	argue	
that	the	success	of	past	theories	is	best	explained	by	their	truth	but	that,	as	it	turns	
out,	either	the	best	explanation	did	not	hold	in	this	case	or	else	there	is	some	sense	
in	which	past	theories,	insofar	as	they	were	successful,	were	approximately	true	or	
on	the	road	to	truth.	Second,	construing	the	argument	as	an	abduction	opens	up	a	
Pandora’s	box	of	problems	associated	with	the	notion	of	explanation:	What	is	
explanation?	Are	there	accounts	of	explanation	where	success	is	best	explained	by	
truth	and	ones	in	which	it	isn’t	and,	if	so,	which	account	of	explanation	is	relevant	in	
this	context?	And	so	on.		
Third,	the	cogency	of	the	argument	depends	on	the	idea	that	all	theories	
appealed	to	were	constructed	with	some	method	m,	but	we	already	judged	that	
there	is	no	one	method	that	is	relevant	to	constructing	scientific	theories.	Perhaps	
phenomenological	models	are	good	candidates	for	the	type	of	things	that	can	
provide	empirical	success	but	are	not	generally	approximately	true.5	Thus,	at	best,	
the	above	argument	can	power	a	kind	of	local	PMI:	Successful	theories	constructed	
																																																								
4	Thanks	to	Tim	Sundell	for	suggest	this	line	of	thought.	
5	Phenomenological	models	are,	generally,	not	considered	explanatory.	
PSA 2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -504-
	 7	
by	method	m	are	not	approximately	true.	We’ll	consider	one	such	case	in	more	
detail	in	Section	5.	
In	short,	on	the	material	theory	of	induction	inductive	arguments	are	
powered	by	facts,	by	material	postulates,	but	in	the	context	of	the	PMI	it	seems	
unlikely	that	any	such	non-question	begging	postulates,	which	wouldn’t	render	the	
PMI	obsolete,	can	be	found.	This	is	so	even	if,	say,	the	historical	data	was	not	cherry-
picked,	and	the	right	unit	of	analysis	and	correct	period	of	history	were	used.	In	
other	words,	I’m	equally	skeptic	of	projects	that	attempt	to	block	the	pessimistic	
conclusion	by,	for	example,	taking	a	random	sample	of	past	scientific	theories,	e.g.,	
Mizrahi	(2016).	In	the	following	section	I’ll	attempt	to	extend	such	claims	to	the	
problem	of	unconceived	alternatives.	
	
4.	Extension	to	the	Problem	of	Unconceived	Alternatives	
	
Recently,	P.	Kyle	Stanford	(2001,	2006)	has	developed	what	may	be	characterized	as	
a	new	version	of	the	PMI:	
	
…	I	propose	the	following	New	Induction	over	the	History	of	Science:	that	we	
have,	throughout	the	history	of	scientific	inquiry	and	in	virtually	every	field,	
repeatedly	occupied	an	epistemic	position	in	which	we	could	conceive	of	only	
one	or	a	few	theories	that	were	well-confirmed	by	the	available	evidence,	
while	subsequent	history	of	inquiry	has	routinely	(if	not	invariably)	revealed	
further,	radically	distinct	alternatives	as	well-confirmed	by	the	previously	
available	evidence	as	those	we	were	inclined	to	accept	on	the	strength	of	that	
evidence.	(Stanford	2001,	S8-S9)	
	
The	problem	of	unconceinved	alternatives	as	an	argument	against	scientific	realism	
has	been	criticized	on	various	grounds	(e.g.,	Chakravartty	2008,	Devitt	2011,	
Mizrahi	2015),	but	my	goal	here	is	just	to	note	that	the	discussion	of	Section	3	can	
be	extended	to	this	new	version	of	the	PMI,	which	can	be	construed	as	follows:	
	
P(i)	In	the	past	time	of	theory	1,	theory	1	was	successful	but	there	were	
unconceived	alternative	theories	that	were	as	well	supported	by	available	
evidence	but	with	radically	different	ontology.	
P(ii)	In	the	past	time	of	theory	2,	theory	2	was	successful	but	there	were	
unconceived	alternative	theories	that	were	as	well	supported	by	available	
evidence	but	with	radically	different	ontology.	
…	
C)	Therefore,	in	present	times,	current	theories	are	successful	but	(by	
induction)	there	probably	are	unconceived	alternative	theories	that	are	as	
well	supported	by	available	evidence	but	with	radically	different	ontology.	
	
What	we	need	for	the	material	analysis	is	something	like:	Generally,	successful	
theories	are	underdetermined	by	data	due	to	possible	unconceived	alternative	
theories.	In	a	similar	fashion	to	the	MP-PMI,	we	could	look	to	some	common	rule	
used	by	scientists	to	conceive	theories,	or	some	common	psychological	traits	among	
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scientist,	that	may	ground	the	idea	that	successful	theories	are	such	that	empirically	
adequate	unconceived	alternatives	always	exists.	But	for	the	same	reasons	
discussed	above,	it	seems	unlikely	that	any	such	common	rule	or	traits	will	be	found.	
That	said,	perhaps	cognitive	facts	about	human	scientists	might	support	the	
inductive	inference	to	the	conclusion	that	we	always	miss	some	alternative	theories,	
which	in	turn	are	consistent	with	the	available	evidence.	What	is	attractive	about	
this	line	of	thought	is	that	it	does	seem	plausible	that	due	to	our	cognitive	
limitations	there	are	always	“unconceived	alternatives.”	However,	mere	cognitive	
limitations	do	not	support	the	further	conclusion	that	there	are	unconcieved	
alternative	theories	that	are	consistent	with	available	evidence.	
	 Alternatively,	one	may	think	that	Stanford’s	new	induction	circumvents	the	
material	objection:	modal	reflections	alone	convince	us	that	there	are	always	
unconceived	alternative	theories	that	can	explain	and	predict	empirical	phenomena	
just	as	well	or	better	than	conceived	theories.	But	how	can	we	come	to	such	a	
conclusion	based	on	modal	reflections	alone?	Isn’t	it	conceivable	if	not	possible	that	
there	would	be	a	point	in	history	with	no	unconceived	alternatives	and	isn’t	
conceivable	if	not	possible	that	we	are	at	such	point	in	time	in	history?	Moreover,	it	
is	unclear	what	to	make	of	theory-independent	modal	claims	(unless	one	has	logical	
modality	in	mind,	which	isn’t	the	case	here).	Certainly,	we	can	talk	about	different	
physically	possible	worlds	given	a	particular	physical	theory.	For	instance,	various	
solutions	to	the	Einstein	field	equations	are	taken	to	denote	different	possible	
universes	according	to	relativity	theory.	But	it	isn’t	clear	what	is	meant	by	different	
possible	or	alternative	conceivable	theories	given	no	meta-theory	as	a	constraint,	so	
to	speak.6	In	any	case,	if	we	know	that	unconceived	alternative	theories	always	exist	
based	on	modal	reflections	alone,	then	the	historical	induction	is	doing	no	work	for	
us	at	all.	
	
5.	Room	for	a	local,	material	pessimistic	induction?	
	
Although	the	material	analysis	given	here	may	prompt	us	to	be	skeptical	of	
historical	inductions	(insofar	as	one	is	moved	by	the	material	theory	of	induction),	it	
can	help	us	understand	why	local	pessimistic	inductions	may	be	tenable.	
Specifically,	I	want	to	look	at	a	recent	discussion	by	Rumkorf	(2014)	who	contends	
that	meta-analyses	in	medicine	such	as	Ioannidis’	(2005a,	2005b),	which	show	that	
a	disconcertingly	high	percentage	of	prominent	medical	research	findings	are	
refuted	by	subsequent	research,	can	be	developed	into	a	local	pessimistic	induction.	
Ioannidis	(2005a,	2005b)	is	concerned	with	studies,	denoted	“M-studies,”	that	
satisfy	the	following	criteria:	“being	highly	cited,	using	contemporary	research	and	
statistical	methods,	and	being	among	the	first	studies	to	investigate	a	question	at	
issue”	(Rumkorf	2014,	420).	Rumkorf’s	(2014,	421)	then	uses	the	various	
conclusions	of	Ioannidis	(2005a,	2005b)	to	generate	a	local	PMI	in	the	field	of	
medicine	(PMI-M):	
	
																																																								
6	What	would	count	as	a	(logically	possible	but	physically)	impossible	theory	in	such	
a	context?	
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E1	41%	of	the	associative	or	causal	claims	made	by	M-studies	in	the	sample	
were	inconsistent	with	the	results	of	subsequent	published	studies	either	(1)	
because	the	later	studies	provided	evidence	against	the	existence	of	the	
association	or	effect;	or	(2)	because	the	later	studies	provided	evidence	that	
the	magnitude	of	the	association	or	effect	was	significantly	different.	
	
E2	Therefore,	we	can	expect	approximately	41%	of	the	associative	and	causal	
claims	made	by	M-studies	to	be	inconsistent	with	subsequent	published	
studies.	
	
On	Norton’s	theory	we	need	to	appeal	to	a	material	postulate	to	license	the	
pessimistic	inductive	inference	in	the	transitions	from	E1	to	E2,	but	since	we	are	
now	working	in	a	limited	domain	without	many	heterogeneous	examples	as	in	the	
whole	history	of	science,	we	may	now	find	some	significant	commonality	between	
the	methods	used	in	different	M-studies	that	can	act	as	licensing	facts.	What	are	the	
background	facts	that	power	the	PMI-M?	Here	are	some	options	extracted	from	
Ioannidis’s	diagnosis	of	his	meta-analysis	and	quoted	in	Ruhmkorf	(2014,	219):	
	
Contributing	factors	include:	bias	in	research	(Ioannidis	2005b);	non-
randomized	trials	(Ioannidis	2005a);	smaller	rather	than	larger	sample	sizes	
in	refuted	studies	(Ioannidis	2005a,	224);	and	publication	and	time-lag	
biases	(whereby	studies	with	highly	significant	and	potentially	aberrational	
positive	results	are	overrepresented	among	published	articles	in	major	
journals	and	are	published	more	quickly	than	other	articles)	(Ioannidis	
2005a,	224).	Particularly	intriguing	is	the	idea	that	large-scale	features	of	the	
structure	of	medical	and	biological	inquiry	contribute	to	the	high	
contradiction	rate.	Having	a	number	of	distinct	working	groups	looking	at	the	
same	problem	increases	the	chances	that	at	least	one	of	them	will	find	
something	statistically	significant,	especially	if	they	are	looking	at	a	wide	
array	of	possible	relationships	(Ioannidis	2005b,	697–698).	The	
computational	power	and	richness	of	data	sets	available	to	researchers	
increases	the	chance	that	some	of	them	will	be	successful	in	achieving	
statistical	significance,	even	when	no	real	relationship	exists	(Ioannidis	
2005b,	701).7	
	
These	various	factors,	insofar	as	they	are	common	to	most	M-studies,	are	the	type	of	
background	facts	that	warrant	the	pessimistic	induction	from	a	material	point	of	
view.	One	may	worry	of	course	that	the	pessimism	associated	with	local	PMI	
generalizes	since,	presumably,	facts	about	biases	and	the	like	are	facts	about	
researchers	in	general,	not	just	researchers	in	medical	science	in	particular.	But,	
although	all	scientific	studies	have	to	deal	with	challenges	such	bias,	it	may	be	the	
case	that	a	particular	local	subfield,	due	to	its	specific	nature	and	whatever	social	
																																																								
7	It	should	be	noted	that	there	are	some	problems	with	Ioannidis’s	(2005a,	2005b)	
methodology,	as	identified	in	Ruhmkorff	(2014,	419-421),	but	they	do	not	seem	to	
be	problematic	enough	to	render	the	PMI-M	not	cogent.	
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norms	are	in	place	for	collecting	and	disseminative	evidence,	is	especially	
challenged	in	a	way	that	can	justify	the	pessimistic	induction.	The	above	suggests	
that	this	is	indeed	the	case	for	M-studies.	
To	end,	Ruhmkorff	(2014)	argues	against	global	PMI	on	independent	
grounds	(namely,	he	argues	that	the	PMI	commits	a	statistical	error	previously	
unmentioned	in	the	literature	and	is	self-undermining),	and	but	he	also	argues	for	
the	plausibility	of	a	local	PMI,	viz.,	M-PMI,	and	contends	that	there	are	clear	
advantages	of	PMI-M	over	PMI.	What	I	wish	to	note	here	is	that	an	additional	
advantage	of	PMI-M,	or	local	pessimistic	induction	generally	speaking,	is	that	
whereas	global	PMI	dissolves	upon	a	material	analysis,	a	material	account	of	PMI-M	
does	seem	viable.		
	
6.	Conclusion	
	
I	have	argued	that	historical	inductions	such	as	the	(global)	PMI	and	the	problem	of	
unconceived	alternatives	dissolve	if	we	work	with	the	material	theory	of	induction.	
The	reason	is	that	we	lack	the	material	postulates	needed	to	license	the	pessimistic	
inference:	the	great	heterogeneity	of	case	studies	from	the	history	of	science	of	
conceiving,	constructing,	and	discovering	(explanatory	and	predictively	successful)	
theories,	along	with	abundant	variety	of	context	that	scientists	find	themselves	in	
and	traits	that	they	exhibit,	make	it	unlikely	that	any	commonality	will	be	found	
strong	enough	to	authorize	the	induction.	One	may	of	course	object:	so	much	worse	
for	the	material	theory	of	induction!	This	is	a	fair	point,	but	there	is	a	more	general	
moral	to	consider.	In	various	situations	one	may	be	able	to	appeal	to	the	notion	of	
“induction”	without	much	being	at	stake,	but	in	the	context	of	historical	inductions	
like	the	PMI	and	problem	of	unconceived	alternatives	“induction”	is	doing	a	lot	of	
(philosophically)	heavy	lifting	and	so	the	situation	rightful	calls	for	scrutiny.	Such	
scrutiny	has	led	to	the	various	discussed	criticism	that	are	presented	in	the	context	
of	more	traditional,	non-material	theories	of	induction.	Accordingly,	it	seems	
appropriate	to	show	that—even	if	we	assume	randomly	sampled	historical	evidence	
from	the	correct	period	of	history	and	with	the	proper	unit	of	analysis	that	is	not	
biased	or	cherry-picked,	with	no	statistical	error,	etc.—historical	inductions	do	not	
fare	well	on	the	material	side	of	things.	I	leave	objections	to	the	effect	that	one	ought	
to	construe	the	PMI	as	a	deductive	argument,	or	through	a	different	framework	for	
induction,	e.g.,	via	hypothetical	or	probabilistic	induction,	for	future	work.	
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Can Quantum Thermodynamics Save Time?
Noel Swanson∗
Abstract
The thermal time hypothesis (TTH) is a proposed solution to the prob-
lem of time: every statistical state determines a thermal dynamics
according to which it is in equilibrium, and this dynamics is identified
as the flow of physical time in generally covariant quantum theories.
This paper raises a series of objections to the TTH as developed by
Connes and Rovelli (1994). Two technical challenges concern the im-
plementation of the TTH in the classical limit and the relationship
between thermal time and proper time. Two more conceptual prob-
lems focus on interpreting the flow of time in non-equilibrium states
and the lack of gauge invariance.
1 Introduction
In both classical and quantum theories defined on fixed background space-
times, the physical flow of time is represented in much the same way. Time
translations correspond to a continuous 1-parameter subgroup of spacetime
symmetries, and the dynamics are implemented either as a parametrized
flow on statespace (Scho¨dinger picture) or a parametrized group of auto-
morphisms of the algebra of observables (Heisenberg picture). In generally
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covariant theories, where diffeomorphisms of the underlying spacetime man-
ifold are treated as gauge symmetries, this picture breaks down. There is
no longer a canonical time-translation subgroup at the global level, nor is
there a gauge-invariant way to represent dynamics locally in terms of the
Schro¨dinger or Heisenberg pictures. Without a preferred flow on the space
of states representing time, the standard way to represent physical change
via functions on this space taking on different values at different times, also
fails. This is the infamous problem of time.
Connes and Rovelli (1994) propose a radical solution to the problem: the
flow of time (not just its direction) has a thermodynamic origin. Equilib-
rium states are usually defined with respect to a background time flow (e.g.,
dynamical stability and passivity constraints reference a group of time trans-
lations). Conversely, given an equilibrium state one can derive the dynamics
according to which it is in equilibrium. Rovelli (2011) exploits this con-
verse connection, arguing that in a generally covariant theory, any statistical
state defines a notion of time according to which it is an equilibrium state.
The thermal time hypothesis (TTH) identifies this state-dependent thermal
time with physical time. Drawing upon tools from Tomita-Takesaki modu-
lar theory, Connes and Rovelli demonstrate how the TTH can be rigorously
implemented in generally covariant quantum theories.
The idea is an intriguing one that, to date, has received little attention
from philosophers.1 This paper represents a modest initial attempt to sally
forth into rich philosophical territory. Its goal is to voice a number of techni-
cal and conceptual problems faced by the TTH and to highlight some tools
that the view has at its disposal to respond.
2 The Thermal Time Hypothesis
We usually think of theories of mechanics as describing the evolution of states
and observables through time. Rovelli (2011) advocates replacing this pic-
ture with a more general timeless one that conceives of mechanics as describ-
ing relative correlations between physical quantities divided into two classes,
partial and full observables. Partial observables are quantities that physical
measuring devices can be responsive to, but whose value cannot be predicted
1Earman (2002), Earman (2011), and Ruetsche (2014) are notable exceptions. Physi-
cists have been more willing to dive in. Paetz (2010) gives an excellent critical discussion
of the many technical challenges faced by the TTH.
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given the state alone (e.g., proper time along a worldline). A full observable
is understood as a coincidence or correlation of partial observables whose
value can be predicted given the state (e.g., proper time along a worldline
at the point where it intersects another worldline). Only measurements of
full observables can be directly compared to the predictions made by the
mechanical theory.
A timeless mechanical system is given by a triple (C,Γ, f). C is the
configuration space of partial observables, qa. Amotion of the system is given
by an unparametrized curve in C, representing a sequence of correlations
between partial observables. The space of motions, Γ is the statespace of the
system and is typically presymplectic. The evolution equation is given by
f = 0, where f is a map f : Γ×C → V , and V is a vector space. For systems
that can be modeled using Hamiltonian mechanics, Γ and f are completely
determined by a surface Σ in the cotangent bundle T ∗C (the space of partial
observables and their conjugate momenta pa). This surface is defined by the
vanishing of some Hamiltonian function H : T ∗C → R.
If the system has a preferred external time variable, the Hamiltonian can
be decomposed as
H = pt +H0(q
i, pi, t) (1)
where t is the partial observables in C that corresponds to time. Generally
covariant mechanical systems lack such a canonical decomposition. Although
these systems are fundamentally timeless, it is possible for a notion of time to
emerge thermodynamically. A closed system left to thermalize will eventually
settle into a time-independent equilibrium state. Viewed as part of a def-
inition of equilibrium, this thermalization principle requires an antecedent
notion of time. The TTH inverts this definition and use the notion of an
equilibrium state to select a partial observable in C as time.
Three hurdles present themselves. The first is providing a coherent math-
ematical characterization of equilibrium states. The second is finding a
method for extracting information about the associated time flow from a
specification of the state. Finally, in order to count as an emergent explana-
tion of time, one has to show that the partial observable selected behaves as
a traditional time variable in relevant limits.
For generally covariant quantum theories, Connes and Rovelli (1994) pro-
pose a concrete strategy to overcome these hurdles. Minimally, such a theory
can be thought as a non-commutative C∗-algebra of diffeomorphism-invariant
3
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observables, A, along with a set of physically possible states, {φ}.2 Via the
Gelfand-Nemark-Segal (GNS) construction, each state determines a concrete
Hilbert space representation (piφ(A),Hφ), and a corresponding von Neumann
algebra piφ(A)
′′, defined as the double commutant of piφ(A).
Connes and Rovelli first appeal to the well-knownKubo-Martin-Schwinger
(KMS) condition to characterize equilibrium states. A state, ρ, on a von
Neumann algebra, M, satisfies the KMS condition for inverse temperature
0 < β < ∞ with respect to a 1-parameter group of automorphisms, {αt}, if
for any A,B ∈ M there exists a complex function FA,B(z), analytic on the
strip {z ∈ C|0 < Imz < β} and continuous on the boundary of the strip,
such that
FA,B(t) = ρ(αt(A)B)
FA,B(t+ iβ) = ρ(Bαt(A)) (2)
for all t ∈ R. The KMS condition generalizes the idea of an equliibirum state
to quantum systems with infinitely many degrees of freedom. KMS states
are stable, passive, and invariant under the dynamics, {αt}. Moreover in the
finite limit, the KMS condition reduces to the standard Gibbs postulate.
Although the KMS condition is framed relative to a chosen background
dynamics, according to the main theorem of Tomita-Takesaki modular theory,
every faithful state determines a canonical 1-parameter group of automor-
phisms according to which it is a KMS state. Connes and Rovelli go on
to identify the flow of time with the flow of this state-dependent modular
automorphism group.
In the GNS representation (piφ(A),Hφ), the defining state, φ, is repre-
sented by a cyclic vector Φ ∈ Hφ. If φ is a faithful state (i.e., if φ(A
∗A) = 0
entails that A = 0) then the vector Φ is also separating. In this setting we
can apply the tools of Tomita-Takesaki modular theory. The main theorem
asserts the existence of two unique modular invariants, an antiunitary opera-
tor, J , and a positive operator, ∆. (Here we will only be concerned with the
latter.) The 1-parameter family, {∆is|s ∈ R}, forms a strongly continuous
unitary group,
σs(A) := ∆
isA∆−is (3)
for all A ∈ pi(A)′′, s ∈ R. The defining state is invariant under the flow of the
modular automorphism group, φ(σs(A)) = φ(A). Furthermore, φ(σs(A)B) =
2See Brunetti et al. (2003) for a formal development of this basic idea.
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φ(Bσs−i(A)). Thus φ satisfies the KMS condition relative to {σs} for inverse
temperature β = 1.
For any faithful state, this procedure identifies a partial observable, the
thermal time, tφ := s, parametrizing the flow of the (unbounded) ther-
mal hamiltonian Hφ := − ln∆, which has Φ as an eigenvector with eigen-
value zero. We can then go on to decompose the timeless Hamiltonian
H = ptφ + Hφ. Associated with any such state, there is a natural “flow
of time” according to which the system is in equilibrium. But in what sense
does this thermal time flow correspond to various notions of physical time?
In particular, how is thermal time related to the proper time measured by a
localized observer?
Although they do not establish a general theorem linking thermal time
to proper time, Connes and Rovelli do make substantial progress on the
third hurdle in one intriguing special case. For a uniformly accelerating,
immortal observer in Minkowski spacetime, the region causally connected to
her worldline is the Rindler wedge. In standard coordinates we can explicitly
write the observer’s trajectory as
x0(τ) = a−1 sinh(τ)
x1(τ) = a−1 cosh(τ)
x2(τ) = x3(τ) = 0 (4)
where τ is the observer’s proper time. The wedge region is defined by the con-
dition x1 > |x0|. The Bisognano-Wichmann theorem then tells us that in the
vacuum state, the modular automorphism group for the wedge implements
wedge-preserving Lorentz boosts — ∆is is given by the boost U(s) = e2piisK1
(where K1 is the representation of the generator of an x
1-boost). Since the
Lorentz boost λ(aτ) implements a proper time translation along the orbit
of an observer with acceleration a, U(τ) = eaiτK1 can be viewed as generat-
ing evolution in proper time. Comparing these two operators, we find that
proper time is directly proportional to thermal time,
s =
2pi
a
τ (5)
The Unruh temperature measured by the observer is T = a/2pikb (where
kb is Boltzmann’s constant), this leads Connes and Rovelli to propose that
the Unruh temperature can be interpreted as the ratio between thermal and
proper time. Not only does this relationship hold along the orbits of constant
5
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acceleration, but if an observer constructs global time coordinates for the
wedge via the process of Einstein synchronization, this global time continues
to coincide with the rescaled thermal time flow.
We can now summarize the main content of the TTH:
Thermal Time Hypothesis (Rovelli-Connes). In a generally covariant
quantum theory, the flow of time is defined by the state-dependent modular
automorphism group. The Unruh temperature measured by an accelerating
observer represents the ratio between this time and her proper time.
This is a bold idea with a numerous potential implications for quantum
physics and cosmology. Over the next three sections, we will consider a
series of technical and conceptual objections to the TTH.
3 Thermal Time and Proper Time
The Bisognano Wichmann theorem only applies to immortal, uniformly ac-
celerating observers in the vacuum state of a quantum field theory in flat
spacetime. How can we characterize the relationship between thermal and
proper time for a broader, more physically realistic class of observers and
theories?
A uniformly accelerating mortal observer has causal access to a different
region of Minkowski spacetime, the doublecone formed by the intersection
of her future lightcone at birth and her past lightcone at death. Because
wedges and doublecones can be related by a conformal transformation, in
conformally invariant theories, geometric results from wedge algebras can be
transferred onto the doubelcone algebras. In the vacuum state of a conformal
theory, the doublecone modular automorphism group acts as Hislop-Longo
transformations (Hislop and Longo, 1982). Martinetti and Rovelli (2003) use
this result to calculate the corresponding relationship between thermal time
and proper time for a uniformly accelerating mortal observer:
s =
2pi
La2
(
√
1 + a2L2 − cosh aτ) (6)
where L is the observer’s lifetime. (The relationship is more complicated in
this case due to the fact that proper time is bounded while modular time is
unbounded.) For most of the observer’s lifespan, s is an approximately con-
stant function of τ , allowing the Unruh temperature to again be interpreted
as the local ratio between thermal and proper time.
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This is the best we can hope for. Trebels (1997) proves that arbitrary
doublecone automorphisms act as local dynamics, only if they act as scaled
Hislop-Longo transformations.3 Of course, if nature is described by a non-
conformal theory, then there is no guarantee that the doublecone modular
automorphisms will have a suitable geometric interpretation. Saffary (2005)
goes further, arguing that they will not have geometric significance in any
theory with massive particles. The mathematical results backing this con-
jecture, however, are only partial.4
Attempting to generalize the TTH to cover non-uniform acceleration and
non-vacuum states generates further difficulties. Work on the Unruh effect for
non-uniformly accelerating observers (e.g., Jian-yang et al. 1995), indicates
that such observers feel an acceleration-dependent thermal bath, reflecting
the shifting ratio between constant thermal time and acceleration-dependent
proper time. The TTH must explain the phenomenological experience of
the observer who will presumably age according to her proper time, not the
background thermal time flow. On top of this, if the global state is not a
vacuum state, then it is not clear that the wedge modular automorphisms
will carry a dynamical interpretation at all. The Radon-Nikodym theorem
ensures that the action of the modular automorphism group uniquely deter-
mines the generating state. If φ, ψ are two (faithful, normal) states on a von
Neumann algebra M, then the associated modular automorphism groups σtφ,
σtψ differ by a non-trivial inner automorphism, σ
t
φ(A) = Uσ
t
ψ(A)U
∗, for all
A ∈ M, t ∈ R, so the general wedge dynamics will not be simple rescalings
of the vacuum case.
None of these are knockdown objections since so little is known about the
geometric action of modular operators apart from the Bisognano-Wichmann
theorem and its conformal generalization. But our current ignorance also
presents a major challenge. (The situation is even less clear in general curved
spacetime settings.) The defender of the TTH has at least four options on
3Formally, Trebels requires that local dynamics be continuous 1-parameter groups of
automorphisms of the doublecone algebra that preserve subalgebra localization as well
as spacelike and timelike relations between interior points. For a detailed discussion of
Trebels’s results, see Borchers (2000), §3.4.
4In the massless case, the modular generators are ordinary differential operators, δ0,
of order 1. In the massive case, it has been conjectured that the modular generators are
pseudo-differential operators δm = δ0+δr, where the leading term is given by the massless
generator δ0 and δr is a pseudo-differential operators of order < 1. This second term is
thought to give rise to non-local action without geometric interpretation.
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the table.
She can hold out hope for a suitably general dynamical interpretation of
modular automorphisms in a wide class of physically significant states. There
is some indication that states of compact energy (e.g., states satisfying the
Do¨plicher-Haag-Roberts and Buchholz-Fredenhagen selection criteria) give
rise to well-behaved modular structure on wedges. In this case the wedge
modular automorphisms can be related to those in the vacuum state by
the Radon-Nikodym derivative (Borchers, 2000). The analogous problem for
doublecones is still open.
Alternatively, she could reject the idea that the thermal time flow deter-
mines the temporal metric directly. Thermal time would only give rise to the
order, topological, and group theoretic properties of physical time. Metrical
properties would be determined by a completely different set of physical re-
lations. Some support for this idea comes from the justification of the clock
hypothesis in general relativity. Rather than stipulating the relationship be-
tween proper time, τ , and the length of a timelike curve ||γ||, Fletcher (2013)
shows that for any ǫ > 0, there is an idealized lightclock moving along the
curve which will measure ||γ|| within ǫ. This justifies the clock hypothesis
by linking the metrical properties of spacetime to the readings of tiny light-
clocks. If the metrical properties of time experienced by localized observers
arises via some physical mechanism akin to light clock synchronization. This
would explain why the duration of time felt by the observer matches her
proper time and not the geometrical flow of thermal time.
Perhaps motivated by the justification of the clock hypothesis, the de-
fender of the TTH could attempt to argue that the metrical properties of
time emerge from modular dynamics in the short distance limit of the theory.
If the theory has a well-defined ultraviolet limit, the renormalization group
flow should approach a conformal fixed point. Buchholz and Verch (1995)
prove that in this limit, the double-cone modular operators act geometrically
like wedge operators implementing proper time translations along the ob-
server’s worldline. It is unlikely that the physics at this scale would directly
impact phenomenology, but the asymptotic connection might turn out to be
important for explaining the metrical properties of spacetime (which bigger,
more realistic lightclocks measure) as emergent features of some underlying
theory of quantum gravity.
A final option would be to go back to the drawing board. Rovelli and
Connes briefly note that since the modular automorphisms associated with
each (faithful, normal) state of a von Neumann algebra are connected by
8
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inner automorphisms, they all project down onto the same 1-parameter group
of outer automorphisms the algebra. The TTH could be revised to claim
that this canonical state-independent flow represents the non-metrical flow of
physical time. It is not known, however, under what circumstances the outer
flow acts in suitably geometric fashion to be interpretable as local dynamics,
so it remains to be seen whether or not this is a viable option. The move
does have immediate consequences for the global dynamics, however. Since
the global algebra is expected to be type I, all modular automorphisms will
be inner. As a result the canonical group of outer automorphisms is trivial.
At a global level, there is no passage of time. At the local level, time emerges
as a consequence of our ignorance of the global state.
4 The Classical Limit
The classical limit presents a different kind of challenge. Conceptually, noth-
ing about the idea that a statistical state selects a preferred thermal time
requires that the theory be quantum mechanical. The proposed mechanism
for selecting a partial observable using modular theory, however, does ap-
pear to rely on the noncommutativity of quantum observables. If we model
classical systems using abelian von Neumann algebras, then every state is
tracial (i.e., φ(AB) = φ(BA)), and consequently every associated modular
automorphism group acts as the identity, trivializing the thermal time flow.
Does the TTH have a classical counterpart, or is quantum mechanics required
to save time in a generally covariant setting?
Arguing by analogy with standard quantization procedures, Connes and
Rovelli suggest that in the classical limit commutators need to be replaced by
Poisson brackets. We begin with an arbitrary statistical state, ρ, represented
by a probability distribution over a classical statespace Γ:
∫
Γ
dx ρ(x) = 1 (7)
where x ∈ Γ is a timeless microstate. By analogy with the Gibbs postulate,
we can introduce the “thermal Hamiltonian,”
Hρ = − ln ρ (8)
With respect to the corresponding Hamiltonian vector field, the evolution of
9
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an arbitrary classical observable, f ∈ C∞(Γ), is given by
d
ds
f = {− ln ρ, f} (9)
and ρ = exp(−Hρ). With respect to the Poisson bracket structure, the clas-
sical algebra of observables is non-abelian. Gallavotti and Pulvirenti (1976)
use this non-abelian structure to define an analogue of the KMS condition.
Is this connection strong enough to support a version of the TTH in ordi-
nary general relativity? Or does it only serve to aid us in understanding how
the thermal time variable behaves in the transition from quantum theory to
classical physics?
The difficulty lies in connecting the thermal time flow for an arbitrary
statistical state to our ordinary conception of time. In the quantum case
this link was provided by the Bisognano-Wichmann theorem, which does not
have a classical analogue. The problem is magnified by the lack of a full
understanding of statistical mechanics and thermodynamics in curved space-
time. Rovelli has done some preliminary work on developing a full theory
of generally covariant thermodynamics based on the foundation supplied by
the TTH, including an elegant derivation of the Tolman-Ehrenfest effect, but
the field is still young.5
Setting aside these broader interpretive challenges for now, an important
first step lies in obtaining a better understanding the classical selection pro-
cedure outlined above. As it turns out, the commutator-to-Poisson-bracket
ansatz is on firmer foundational footing than one might initially suspect.
As emphasized by Alfsen and Shultz (1998), non-abelian C∗-algebras have a
natural Lie-Jordan structure:
AB = A •B − i(A ⋆ B) , (10)
The non-associative Jordan product, •, encodes information about the spec-
tra of observables, while the associative Lie product, ⋆, encodes the gener-
ating relation between observables and symmetries. The significance of the
commutator, is that it defines the canonical Lie product, A⋆B := i/2[A,B].
Classical mechanical theories formulated on either a symplectic or Poisson
manifold have a natural Lie-Jordan structure as well. The standard product
of functions defines an associative Jordan product, encoding spectral infor-
mation, while the Poisson bracket determines the associative Lie product,
5See Rovelli and Smerlak (2011).
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describing how classical observables generate Hamiltonian vector fields on
statespace. Together, this structure is called a Poisson algebra. The primary
difference between the classical and quantum cases is the associativity/non-
associativity of the Jordan product.
These considerations point towards the idea that the appropriate classical
analogue of a noncommutative von Neumann algebra, is not a commutative
von Neumann algebra, but a Poisson algebra. In this setting, initial strides
towards a classical analogue of modular theory have been made by Wein-
stein (1997). Given any smooth density, µ, on a Possion manifold, Γ, Wein-
stein defines a corresponding modular vector field φµ given by the operator
φµ : f → divµHf where Hf is the Hamiltonian vector field associated with a
classical observable, f ∈ C∞(Γ). The antisymmetry of the Poisson bracket
entails that the operator φµ is a vector field on Γ. Weinstein proposes φµ
as the classical analogue of the modular automorphism group. It charac-
terizes the extent to which the Hamiltonian vector fields are divergence free
(with respect to the density µ), vanishing iff all Hamiltonian vector fields are
divergence free.
We can connect Weinstein’s classical modular theory to the TTH. If Γ is a
symplectic manifold and we let µ be the density associated with the canonical
Liouville volume form, then φµ(f) = 0 for all observables. This reflects
the conservation of energy by Hamiltonian flows in symplectic dynamical
systems. Given any statistical state, however, we can define an associated
density which leads to a nontrivial modular vector field. For any positive
function, h, we have
φhµ = φµ +H− lnh = H− lnh. (11)
Therefore any statistical state, ρ, defines a modular vector field equivalent
to the Hamiltonian vector field H− ln ρ associated with the density e
− ln ρµ.
We immediately recognize − ln ρ as the thermal Hamiltonian postulated by
Connes and Rovelli. Clearly, eis ln ρρe−is ln ρ = ρ, thus the state is invariant
with respect to the flow of H− ln ρ. Additionally, it can be shown that ρ
satisfies the KMS condition with respect to these dynamics, hence, from the
perspective of the associated time flow ρ resembles an invariant equilibrium
state just as in the quantum case.
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5 Conceptual Challenges
As we have seen in the previous two sections, the TTH faces a number of tech-
nical challenges (some of which look easier to overcome than others). There
are, however, several deeper conceptual problems looming in the background
which pose a more serious challenge to the viability of the hypothesis. Here,
we will discuss two of the most pressing.
The first, which we will call the generality problem, draws upon the pre-
ceding discussion of the classical limit. While mathematically speaking, We-
instein’s modular vector field gives us a method for selecting a canonical
thermal time flow in a classical theory, physical speaking, there is no reason
why we should view the corresponding thermal time as physical time. As
we have seen, any statistical state determines thermal dynamics according to
which it is a KMS state, however, if ρ is a non-equilibrium state, the resultant
thermal time flow does not align with our ordinary conception of time. By
the lights of thermal time, a cube of ice in a cup of hot coffee is an invariant
equilibrium state! The same problem arises in the quantum domain — only
for states which are true equilibrium states will the thermal time correspond
to physical time.
It appears inevitable that the TTH will have to be tempered. Rather than
letting any state determine a corresponding flow of thermal time, only certain
reference states should be permitted. Apart from the problem of providing
an intrinsic, non-dynamical characterization of such states, if a system is not
in one of these, it is hard to envision how a counterfactual state of affairs
can determine the actual flow of time.6 This might provide more reasons for
the defender of the TTH to explore the state independent, outer modular
flow. Alternatively, she could try to argue that local non-equilibrium be-
havior can be viewed as small fluctuations from some background state. On
this approach, the local flow of time in my office according to which the ice
6A closely related worry, what we might call the background-dependence problem, has
been voiced by Earman (2011) and Ruetsche (2014). Their concern is that we can only
identify modular automorphisms as dynamics because we already have a rich spatiotem-
poral geometry in the background. This casts doubt on whether the TTH can provide
a coherent definition of time in situations where such structure is absent (as required to
solve the full problem of time). This is exacerbated if the TTH is modified in response to
the generality problem. Unless the modular automorphism group can always be viewed
dynamically, the defender of the TTH will be hard pressed to find constraints capable of
separating the dynamical cases from the non-dynamical cases which are independent of
all background temporal structure.
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melts and the coffee cools is not defined by the thermal state of the ice/coffee
system, but the thermal state of some larger enveloping system (the entire
universe perhaps). Rovelli (1993) hints in this direction, calculating that
in a Friedman-Robertson-Walker universe, the thermal time induced by the
equilibrium state of the cosmic microwave background will be proportional
to the FRW time. While the connection is intriguing, it seems unlikely that
an explanation of this sort will be able to account for the flow of time experi-
enced by localized, mortal observers like us. It would be truly remarkable to
discover that our faculties of perception are sensitive to the thermal features
of the CMB.
The second problem is the gauge problem. The TTH does succeed in
providing a means to select a privileged 1-parameter flow on the space of
full, gauge invariant observables of a generally covariant theory. What makes
this flow interpretable as a dynamical flow, however, is its description as a
sequence of correlations between partial observables. The difficulty is that
these partial observables are not diffeomorphism invariant. Assuming that
we treat diffeomorphisms in generally covariant theories as standard gauge
symmetries (which is how we got into the problem of time in the first place),
then the partial observables are just descriptive fluff. They do not directly
represent physical features of our world.
The problem is not the resultant timelessness of fundamental physics.
The TTH adopts this dramatic conclusion willingly. The problem is that
the TTH is supposed to explain how the appearance of time and change
emerge from timeless foundations. But the explanation given is couched
in gauge-dependent language, and it is not apparent how we can extract
a gauge invariant story from it. We can introduce partial observables and
use correlations between them to calculate and predict emergent dynamical
behavior, but we cannot use these correlations to explain that behavior. We
lack a gauge invariant picture of generally covariant theories, and the TTH,
at least in its present form, does not provide one.
Can a revised TTH give us the explanatory tools needed to understand
the flow of time without reference to partial observables, or, does the entire
framework of timeless mechanics require us to revise our conception of how
ontology, explanation, and gauge symmetries are related?7 Whether or not
7Drifting in the latter direction, Rovelli (2014) suggests that gauge-dependent quanti-
ties are more than just mathematical redundancies, “they describe handles through which
systems couple: they represent real relational structures to which the experimentalist has
access in measurement by supplying one of the relata in the measurement procedure itself.”
13
Seattle, WA; 1-4 November 2018 -523-
quantum thermodynamics can save time may rest on the solutions to these
new incarnations of vexingly familiar philosophical problems.
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Neural redundancy and its relation to neural reuse 
 
Abstract 
 
Evidence of the pervasiveness of neural reuse in the human brain has forced a revision of the 
standard conception of modularity in the cognitive sciences. One persistent line of argument 
against such revision, however, draws from a large body of experimental literature attesting 
to the existence of cognitive dissociations. While numerous rejoinders to this argument have 
been offered over the years, few have grappled seriously with the phenomenon. This paper 
offers a fresh perspective. It takes the dissociations seriously, on the one hand, while 
affirming that traditional modularities of mind do not do justice to the evidence of neural 
reuse, on the other. The key to the puzzle is neural redundancy. The paper offers both a 
philosophical analysis of the relation between reuse and redundancy, as well as a plausible 
solution to the problem of dissociations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Cognitive science, linguistics and the philosophy of psychology have long been under the 
spell of “the modularity of mind” (Fodor 1983), or the idea of the mind as a modular system 
(see e.g. de Almeida and Gleitman 2018). In contemporary psychology, a modular system is 
generally understood to be “one consisting of functionally specialized subsystems responsible 
for processing different classes of input (e.g. for vision, hearing, human faces, etc.), or at any 
rate for handling specific cognitive tasks” (Zerilli 2017a, 231). According to this theory, 
“human cognition can be decomposed into a number of functionally independent processes, 
[where] each of these processes operates over a distinct domain of cognitive information” 
(Bergeron 2007, 176). What makes one process distinguishable from another is its 
“functional independence, the fact that one can be affected, in part or in totality, without 
the other being affected, and vice versa” (Bergeron 2007, 176). Furthermore, given that 
functional processes are realized in the brain, a functionally specialized process is one which 
presumably occupies a distinctive portion of neural tissue, though not necessarily a small, 
closely circumscribed and contiguous region. So fruitful and influential has this model been 
that it is safe to say that in many quarters of the cognitive sciences—and most especially in 
cognitive psychology, cognitive neuropsychology and evolutionary psychology—modularity is 
essentially the received view (McGeer 2007; Carruthers 2006; de Almeida and Gleitman 
2018). 
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Developments in cognitive neuroscience over the past thirty years, however, have 
discomfited the modular account. More evidence than ever before points to the 
pervasiveness of neural reuse in the human brain—the “redeployment” or “recycling” of 
neural circuits over widely disparate cognitive domains (Anderson, 2010, 2014; Dehaene, 
2005). As the terminology suggests, theories of “re-use” posit the “exaptation” of established 
and diachronically stable neural circuits over the course of evolution or normal development 
without loss of original function, so that the functional contribution of a circuit is preserved 
across multiple task domains.1 As Anderson (2010, 246) explains, “rather than posit a 
functional architecture for the brain whereby individual regions are dedicated to large-scale 
cognitive domains like vision, audition, language and the like, neural reuse theories suggest 
that low-level neural circuits are used and reused for various purposes in different cognitive 
and task domains.” According to the theory, just the same circuits exapted for one purpose 
can be exapted for another provided sufficient intercircuit pathways exist to allow alternative 
arrangements of them. Indeed, the same parts put together in different ways will yield 
different functional outcomes, just as “if one puts together the same parts in the same way 
one will get the same functional outcomes” (Anderson 2010, 247, my emphasis). The 
evidence here converges from heterogeneous sources and research paradigms, including 
neuroimaging (Anderson 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2008), computational (Eliasmith 2015), 
biobehavioral (Casasanto and Dijkstra 2010) and interference paradigms (Gauthier et al. 
                                                        
1 This usage of “exaptation” is somewhat misleading, since exaptation usually implies loss of 
original function (see Godfrey-Smith 2001). 
PSA 2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -528-
 - 4 - 
2003), and exempts practically no area of the brain (Leo et al. 2012, 2), including areas long 
regarded as specialized hubs for certain types of sensory processing, e.g. visual and auditory 
pathways (Striem-Amit and Amedi 2014). Among other things, this means that one of the 
hallmark features of a module—its domain specificity (Coltheart 1999)—looks too stringent a 
requirement to prove useful.2 For neural reuse demonstrates that any one module will 
typically be sensitive to more than one stimulus, including—most importantly—those 
channeled along intermodal pathways. Meanwhile efforts to salvage a computational or 
“software” theory of modularity, which carries no commitments regarding implementation, 
have met with scepticism (Anderson 2007c; 2010; Anderson & Finlay 2014) if not outright 
opposition (Zerilli 2017a).3 And while the brain could still be modular in some other sense, 
what is clear is that the strict domain-specific variety of modularity can no longer serve as an 
appropriate benchmark.4 
 
And yet there is a persistent line of argument against this conclusion which draws 
from a large body of experimental literature attesting to the existence of cognitive 
                                                        
2 The sense of domain specificity that is relevant here refers to a module’s sensitivity to a 
restricted class of inputs as defined by a domain of psychology—such as visual, auditory or 
linguistic information. For discussion of alternative senses, see Barrett and Kurzban (2006) 
and Prinz (2006). 
3 Though by no means universally (see e.g. Carruthers 2010; Junge ́ and Dennett 2010). 
4 Nor, for that matter, can its cognate property, informational encapsulation (see below). 
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dissociations, in which a cognitive ability (say language) is either selectively impaired 
(linguistic ability is compromised, but no other cognitive ability seems to be materially 
affected) or selectively spared (general intelligence is compromised, while linguistic abilities 
function more or less as they should). This literature, most vividly exemplified in lesion 
studies, is frequently cited in support of classical modularities of mind—be they inspired by 
the likes of Jerry Fodor (1983), evolutionary psychology (e.g. Cosmides and Tooby 1994; 
Barrett and Kurzban 2006; Carruthers 2006) or some variation thereof (e.g. ACT-R). While 
numerous rejoinders to this line of thinking have been offered over the years, few have 
grappled seriously with the phenomenon, either dismissing the dissociations as noisy, or 
reasoning from architectural considerations that even nonmodular systems can generate 
dissociations (Plaut 1995). The aim of this paper is to offer a fresh perspective on this vexed 
topic. I take the dissociation evidence seriously, on the one hand, while affirming that 
traditional modularities of mind do not do justice to the evidence of neural reuse, on the 
other. I do this by invoking neural redundancy, an important feature of cortical design that 
ensures we have various copies of the same elementary processing units that can be put to 
alternative (if computationally related) uses in enabling diverse cognitive functions. In the 
course of the discussion I offer a philosophical explication of the relationship between 
neural reuse and neural redundancy. 
 
2. What is the Problem? Cognitive Dissociations and Neural Reuse 
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Let us take an especially contentious question to underscore the nature of the problem we 
are dealing with and how redundancy might assist in its illumination. The question is this: 
Does language rely on specialized cognitive and neural machinery, or does it rely on the 
same machinery that allows us to get by in other domains of human endeavour? The 
question is bound up with many other questions of no less importance, questions 
concerning the uniqueness of the human mind, the course of biological evolution and the 
power of human culture. What is perhaps a little unusual about this question, however—
unusual for a question whose answer concerns both those working in the sciences and the 
humanities—is that it can be phrased as a polar interrogative, i.e. as a question which admits 
of a yes or no response. And indeed the question has divided psychologists, linguists and the 
cognitive science community generally for many decades now, more or less into two camps. I 
would like to sketch the beginnings of an answer to this question—and others like it—in a 
way that does not pretend it can receive a simple yes or no response. 
 
First of all, let me stress again that neural reuse is as well verified a phenomenon as 
one can expect in the cognitive sciences, and that it has left virtually no domain of 
psychology untouched. Neural reuse suggests that there is nothing so specialized in the 
cortex that it cannot be repurposed to meet new challenges while retaining its capacity for 
meeting old ones. In that regard, to be sure, what I am proposing is unapologetically on the 
side of those who maintain that language, as well as many other psychological capacities, are 
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not cognitively special—e.g. that there is no domain-specific “language organ” (cf. Chomsky 
1980,39, 44; 1988, 159; 2002, 84-86). 
 
And yet I would like to carefully distinguish this claim from the claim that there are 
no areas of the brain that subserve exclusively linguistic functions. The neuropsychological 
literature offers striking examples of what appear to be fairly clean dissociations between 
linguistic and nonlinguistic capacities, i.e. cases in which language processing capacities 
appear to be disrupted without impeding other cognitive abilities, and cases in which the 
reverse situation holds (Fedorenko et al. 2011; Hickok and Poeppel 2000; Poeppel 2001; 
Varley et al. 2005; Luria et al. 1965; Peretz and Coltheart 2003; Apperly et al. 2006). An 
example would be where the ability to hear words is disrupted, but the ability to recognize 
non-word sounds is spared (Hickok and Poeppel 2000; Poeppel 2001). Discussing such 
cases, Pinker and Jackendoff (2005, 207) add that “[c]ases of amusia and auditory agnosia, in 
which patients can understand speech yet fail to appreciate music or recognize 
environmental sounds...show that speech and non-speech perception in fact doubly 
dissociate.” Although dissociations are to some extent compatible with reuse—indeed there is 
work suggesting that focal lesions can produce specific cognitive impairments within a range 
of nonclassical architectures (Plaut 1995)—and it is equally true that often the dissociations 
reported are noisy (Cowie 2008), still their very ubiquity needs to be taken seriously and 
accounted for in a more systematic fashion than many defenders of reuse have been willing 
to do (see e.g. Anderson 2010, 248; 2014, 46-48). After all, a good deal of support for 
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theories of reuse comes from the neuroimaging literature, which is somewhat ambiguous 
taken by itself. As Fedorenko et al. (2011, 16428) explain: 
 
standard functional MRI group analysis methods can be deceptive: two different 
mental functions that activate neighbouring but non-overlapping cortical regions in 
every subject individually can produce overlapping activations in a group analysis, 
because the precise locations of these regions vary across subjects, smearing the group 
activations. Definitively addressing the question of neural overlap between linguistic 
and nonlinguistic functions requires examining overlap within individual subjects, a 
data analysis strategy that has almost never been applied in neuroimaging 
investigations of high-level linguistic processing. 
 
When Fedorenko and her colleagues applied this strategy themselves, they found that “most 
of the key cortical regions engaged in high-level linguistic processing are not engaged by 
mental arithmetic, general working memory, cognitive control or musical processing,” and 
they think that this indicates “a high degree of functional specificity in the brain regions that 
support language” (2011, 16431). While I do not believe that claims of this strength have the 
least warrant—as I shall explain, functional specificity cannot be established merely by 
demonstrating that a region is selectively engaged by a task—these results do at least 
substantiate the dissociation literature in an interesting way and make it more difficult for 
Seattle, WA; 1-4 November 2018 -533-
 - 9 - 
those who would prefer to dismiss the dissociations with a ready-made list of alternative 
explanations. Similar results were found by Fedorenko et al. (2012). 
 
3. How Might Redundancy Feature In a Solution? 
 
With rare exceptions (e.g. Friston and Price 2003; Barrett and Kurzban 2006; Junge ́ and 
Dennett 2010), redundancy has passed almost unnoticed in the philosophical and cognitive 
science literature. This is in stark contrast to the epigenetics literature, where redundancy 
and the related concept of degeneracy5 have been explored to some depth (e.g. see Edelman 
and Gally 2001; Mason 2010; Whiteacre 2010; Deacon 2010; Iriki and Taoka 2012; 
Maleszka et al. 2013). The idea behind neural redundancy is that, for good evolutionary 
reasons (see below), the brain incorporates a large measure of redundancy of function. Brain 
regions (such as cortical columns and similar structures) fall in an iterative, repetitive and 
almost lattice-like arrangement in the cortex. Neighbouring columns have similar response 
properties: laminar and columnar changes are for the most part smooth—not abrupt—as one 
moves across the cortex, and adjacent modules do not differ markedly from one another in 
their basic structure and computations (if they really differ at all when taken in such 
                                                        
5 Redundancy occurs when items have the same structure and function (i.e. are both 
isomorphic and isofunctional). Degeneracy occurs when items having different structures can 
perform the same function (i.e. are heteromorphic but isofunctional). Degeneracy implies 
genuine multiple realization (see Zerilli 2017b). 
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proximity). Regional solitarity is therefore not likely to be a characteristic of the brain 
(Anderson 2014, 141).6 That is to say, we do not possess just one module for X, and one 
module for Y, but in effect several copies of the module for X, and several copies of the 
module for Y, all densely stuffed into the same cortical zones. As Buxhoeveden and 
Casanova (2002, 943) explain of neurons generally: 
 
In the cortex, more cells do the job that fewer do in other regions....As brain 
evolution paralleled the increase in cell number, a reduction occurred in the 
sovereignty of individual neurones; fewer of them occupy critical positions. As a 
consequence, plasticity and redundancy have increased. In nervous systems 
containing only a few hundred thousand neurones, each cell plays a more essential 
role in the function of the organism than systems containing billions of neurones. 
 
The same principle very likely holds for functionally distinct groupings of neurons (i.e. 
cortical columns and like structures), as Junge ́ and Dennett (2010, 278) conjecture: 
 
It is possible that specialized brain areas contain a large amount of 
structural/computational redundancy (i.e., many neurons or collections of neurons 
                                                        
6 The term “solitarity” is Anderson’s, but while he concedes that solitarity will be “relatively 
rare,” he does not appear to believe that anything particularly significant follows from this. 
See also Anderson (2010, 296). 
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that can potentially perform the same class of functions). Rather than a single 
neuron or small neural tract playing roles in many high-level processes, it is possible 
that distinct subsets of neurons within a specialized area have similar competencies, 
and hence are redundant, but as a result are available to be assigned individually to 
specific uses....In a coarse enough grain, this neural model would look exactly like 
multi-use (or reuse). 
 
This is plausibly why capacities which are functionally very closely related, but which for 
whatever reason are forced to recruit different neural circuits, will often be localized in 
broadly the same regions of the brain. For instance, first and second languages acquired early 
in ontogeny settle down in nearly the same region of Broca’s area; and even when the second 
language is acquired in adulthood the second language is represented nearby within Broca’s 
area (while artificial languages are not) (Kandel & Hudspeth 2013). The neural coactivation 
graphs of such composite networks must look very similar. Indeed these results suggest—and 
a redundancy model would predict—that two very similar tasks which are forced to recruit 
different neural circuits should exhibit similar patterns of activation. And this is more or less 
what we find (see below). 
 
One might be tempted to think that redundancy and reuse pull in opposite 
directions. This is because whereas reuse posits that neural circuits get reused across 
different tasks and task categories, redundancy accommodates the likelihood of diverse 
PSA 2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -536-
 - 12 - 
cognitive functions being activated by structurally and computationally equivalent circuits 
running in parallel: instead of a single circuit being reused across domains, two, three or 
more copies of that same circuit may be recruited differentially across those domains, such 
that no single circuit gets literally “re-used.” But there is no substantive tension here. The 
redundancy account in truth supplements the reuse picture in a way that is consistent with the 
neuroimaging data, faithful to the core principle of reuse, and compatible with the apparent 
modularization and separate modifiability of technical and acquired skills in ontogeny. 
Evidence of the reuse of neural circuits to accomplish different tasks has, in fact, been 
adduced in aid of a theory which posits the reuse of the same neural tokens to accomplish 
these different tasks. Redundancy means we must accept that at least some of the time what 
we may actually be witnessing is reuse of the same types to accomplish these tasks. This does 
not diminish the standing of reuse. Let me explain.7 
 
To the extent that a particular composite reuses types, and is dissociable pro tanto—
residing in segregated brain tissue that is not active outside the domain in question—it is true 
that to that extent its constituents will appear to be domain-specific. But in this case looks 
will be deceiving. The classical understanding of domain specificity in effect assumes 
solitarity—that a module for X does something which no other module can do as well, or 
                                                        
7 For a developmental twist on the type/token distinction invoked in the context of modular 
theorizing about the mind, see Barrett (2006). 
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that even if another module can do X as well, taken together these X-ing modules do not 
perform outside the X-domain. Here is an example of the latter idea (Bergeron 2007, 176): 
 
a pocket calculator could have four different division modules, one for dividing 
numbers smaller than or equal to 99 by numbers smaller than or equal to 99, a 
second one for dividing numbers smaller than or equal to 99 by numbers greater 
than 99, a third one for dividing numbers greater than 99 by numbers greater than 
99, and a fourth one for dividing numbers greater than 99 by numbers smaller than 
or equal to 99. In such a calculator, these four capacities could all depend on (four 
versions of) the same algorithm. Yet, random damage to one or more of these 
modules in a number of such calculators could lead to observable (double) 
dissociations between any two of these functions. 
 
Here, each module performs fundamentally the same algorithm, but in distinct hardware, 
such that dissociations are observable between any two functions. Notice, however, that 
none of these modules performs outside the “division” domain. This is what allows such 
duplicate modules to be considered domain-specific—they perform functions which, for all 
that they might run in parallel on duplicate hardware, are unique to a specific domain of 
operation, in this case division. If such modules could do work outside the division domain, 
they would lose the status of domain specificity, and acquire the status of domain neutrality 
(i.e. they would be domain-general). This is why a module that appears dedicated to a 
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particular function may not be domain-specific in the classical sense. Dedication is not the 
same as domain specificity, and redundancy, whether of calculator algorithms or neural 
circuits, explains why. A composite of neural regions will be dedicated without being 
domain-specific if its functional resources are accessible to other domains through the 
deployment (reuse) of neural surrogates (i.e. redundant or “proxy” tokens). In this case its 
constituents will be multi-potential but single-use (Junge ́ & Dennett 2010, 278), and the 
domain specificity on display somewhat cosmetic. To take an example with more immediate 
relevance to the brain, a set of cortical columns that are structurally and computationally 
similar may be equally suited for face recognition tasks, abstract-object recognition tasks, the 
recognition of moving objects, and so on. One of these columns could be reserved for faces, 
another for abstract objects, another for moving objects, and so on. What is noteworthy is 
that while the functional activation may be indistinguishable in each case, and the same type 
of resource will be employed on each occasion, a different token module will be at work at 
any one time. To quote Junge ́ and Dennett (2010, 278) again: 
 
In an adult brain, a given neuron [or set of neurons] would be aligned with only a 
single high-level function, whereas each area of neurons would be aligned with very 
many different functions.  
 
Such modules (and composites) are for all intents and purposes qualitatively identical, 
though clearly not numerically identical, meaning that while they share their properties, they 
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are not one and the same (Parfit 1984). The evidence of reuse is virtually all one way when it 
comes to the pervasiveness of functional inheritance across cognitive domains. It may be that 
this inheritance owes to reuse of the same tokens (literal reuse) or to reuse of the same types 
(reuse by proxy), but the inheritance itself has been amply attested. This broader notion of 
reuse still offers a crucial insight into the operations of cognition, and I dare say represents a 
large part of the appeal of the original massive redeployment hypothesis (Anderson 2007c). 
 
It is interesting to note in this respect that although detractors have frequently 
pointed out the ambiguity of neuroimaging evidence on account of its allegedly coarse 
spatial resolution (e.g. Carruthers 2010), suggesting that the same area will be active across 
separate tasks and task categories even if distinct but spatially adjacent and/or interdigitated 
circuits are involved in each case, this complaint can have no bearing on reuse by proxy. 
Fedorenko et al. (2011, 16431) take their neuroimaging evidence to support “a high degree 
of functional specificity in the brain regions that support language,” but their results do not 
license this extreme claim. The regions they found to have been selectively engaged by 
linguistic tasks were all adjacent to the regions engaged in nonlinguistic tasks. Elementary 
considerations suggest that they have discovered a case of reuse by proxy involving language: 
the domains tested (mental arithmetic, general working memory, cognitive control and 
musical processing) make use of many of the same computations as high-level linguistic 
processing, even though they run them on duplicate hardware. Redundancy makes it is easy 
to see how fairly sharp dissociations could arise—knocking out one token module need 
PSA 2018: The 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association -540-
 - 16 - 
disrupt only one high-level operation: other high-level operations that draw on the same type 
of resource may well be spared. 
 
The consequences of this distinction between literal reuse and reuse by proxy for 
much speculation about the localization and specialization of function are potentially 
profound. In cognitive neuropsychology the discovery that a focal lesion selectively impairs a 
particular cognitive function is routinely taken as evidence of its functional specificity 
(Coltheart 2011; Sternberg 2011). Even cognitive scientists who take a developmental 
approach to modularity, i.e. who concede that parts of the mind may be modular but stress 
that modularization is a developmental process, concede too much when they imply, as they 
frequently do, that modularization results in domain-specific modules (Karmiloff-Smith 
1992; Prinz 2006; Barrett 2006; Cowie 2008; Guida et al. 2016). This is true in some sense, 
but not in anything like the standard sense, for redundancy envisages that developmental 
modules form a special class of neural networks, namely those which are qualitatively 
identical but numerically distinct. The appearance of modularization in development is thus 
fully compatible with deep domain interpenetration. In any event redundancy does not 
predict that all acquired skills will be modular. The evidence suggests that while some 
complex skills reside in at least partly dissociable circuitry, most complex skills are 
implemented in more typical neural networks, i.e. those consisting of literally shared parts.8 
 
                                                        
8 This seems to be true regardless of whether the complex skills are innate or acquired. 
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4. What Else Might Redundancy Explain? 
 
It is generally a good design feature of any system to have spare capacity. For instance, in 
engineered systems, “redundant parts can substitute for others that malfunction or fail, or 
augment output when demand for a particular output increases” (Whiteacre 2010, 14). The 
positive connection between robustness and redundancy in biological systems is also clear 
(Edelman and Gally 2001; Mason 2010; Whiteacre 2010; Iriki & Taoka 2012). So there are 
good reasons for evolution to have seen to it that our brains have spare capacity. But in the 
case of the brain and the cortex most especially, there are other reasons why redundancy 
would be an important design feature. It offers a solution to what Junge ́ and Dennett (2010, 
278) called the “time-sharing” problem. It may also offer a solution to what I call the 
“encapsulation” problem. 
 
The time-sharing problem arises when multiple simultaneous demands are made on 
the same cognitive resource. This is probably a regular occurrence. Here are just a few 
examples. 
 
• Driving a car and holding a conversation at the same time: if it is true that some of the 
selfsame motor operations underlying aspects of speech production and comprehension 
are also required for the execution of sequenced or complex motor functions 
(Pulvermu ̈ller and Fadiga 2010; Graziano et al. 2002; MacNeilage 1998; Glenberg et al. 
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2008; Glenberg and Kaschak 2002; Glenberg et al. 2007; Greenfield 1991), as perhaps 
exemplified by driving a manual vehicle or operating complex machinery (e.g. playing the 
organ), how do we manage to pull this off? 
• By reflecting the recursive structure of thought (Christiansen and Chater 2016, 51), the 
language circuits may redeploy a recursive operation simultaneously during sentence 
production. This might be the case during the formation of an embedded relative 
clause—the thought and its encoding may require parallel use of the same sequencing 
principle. Again, how do we manage this feat? 
• If metarepresentational operations are involved in the internalization of conventional 
sound-meaning pairs, and also in the pragmatics and mindreading that carry on 
simultaneously during conversation, as argued by Suddendorf (2013), could this not 
simply be another instance of time-sharing? The example is contentious, but it still raises 
the question: how does our brain manage to do things like this? 
• Christiansen and Chater’s (2016) “Chunk and Pass” model of language processing 
envisages multilevel and simultaneous chunking procedures. As they put it, “the challenge 
of language acquisition is to learn a dazzling sequence of rapid processing operations” 
(2016, 116). What must the brain be like to allow for this dazzling display? 
 
Explaining these phenomena is difficult. Indeed when dealing with clear (literal) instances of 
reuse, results from the interference paradigm show that processing bottlenecks are 
inevitable—true multi-tasking is impossible. Redundancy offers a natural explanation of how 
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the brain overcomes the time-sharing problem. It explains, in short, how we are able to walk 
and chew gum at the same time. 
 
Redundancy might also offer a solution to what I have called the encapsulation 
problem. The neural networks that implement cognitive functions are not likely to be 
characterized by informational encapsulation if they share their nodes with networks 
implementing other cognitive functions. This is because in sharing their nodes with these 
other systems they will prima facie have access to the information stored and manipulated by 
those other systems (Anderson 2010, 300). If, then, overlapping brain networks must share 
information (Pessoa 2016, 23), it would be reasonable to suppose that central and peripheral 
systems do not overlap. For peripheral systems, which are paradigmatically fast and 
automatic, would not be able to process inputs as efficiently if there were a serious risk of 
central system override—i.e. of beliefs and other central information getting in the way of 
automatic processing. But we know from the neuroimaging literature that quite often the 
brain networks implementing central and peripheral functions do overlap. This is puzzling in 
light of the degree of cognitive impenetrability that certain sensory systems still seem to 
exhibit—limited though it may be. If it is plausible to suppose that the phenomenon calls for 
segregated circuitry, redundancy could feature in a solution to the puzzle, since it naturally 
explains how the brain can make parallel use of the same resources. Neuroimaging maps 
might well display what appear to be overlapping brain regions between two tasks (one 
involving central information, the other involving classically peripheral operations), but the 
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overlap would not exist—there would be distinct albeit adjacent or interdigitated and nearly 
identical circuits recruited in each case. Of course there may be other ways around the 
encapsulation problem that do not require segregated circuitry: the nature and extent of the 
overlap is presumably important. But clearly redundancy opens up some fascinating 
explanatory possibilities. 
 
To the extent that acquired skills must overcome both the time-sharing problem as 
well as the encapsulation problem—for acquired competencies are often able to run 
autonomously of central processes—we might expect that their neural implementations 
incorporate redundant tissue. In concluding, let me illustrate this point by offering a gloss 
on a particular account of how skills and expertise are acquired during development 
elaborated by Guida et al. (2016) and Anderson (2014). The process involved is called 
“search” (Anderson 2014). Search is an exploratory synaptogenetic process, “the active 
testing of multiple neuronal combinations until finding the most appropriate one for a 
specific skill, i.e., the neural niche of that skill” (Guido et al. 2016, 13). The theory holds 
that in the early stages of skill acquisition, the brain must search for an appropriate mix of 
brain areas, and does so by recruiting relatively widely across the cortex. When expertise has 
finally developed, a much narrower and more specific network of brain areas has been 
settled upon, such that “[a]s a consequence of their extended practice, experts develop 
domain-specific knowledge structures” (Guido et al. 2016, 13). The gloss (and my hunch) is 
this: first, that repeated practice of a task that requires segregation (to get around time-
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sharing and encapsulation issues) will in effect force search into redundant neural territory 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1992; Barrett 2006; Barret and Kurzban 2006); second, that search will 
recruit idle or relatively underutilized circuits in preference to busy ones as a general default 
strategy. Guido et al. (2016) cite evidence that experts’ brains reuse areas for which novices’ 
brains make only limited use: “Whereas novices use episodic long-term memory areas (e.g., 
the mediotemporal lobe) for performing long-term memory tasks, experts are able to (re)use 
these areas also for performing working-memory tasks” (Guido et al. 2016, 14). Guido and 
colleagues, in agreement with Anderson (2014), seem to have literal reuse in mind. But the 
same evidence they cite is consistent with reuse by proxy. As Barrett and Kurzban (2006, 
639) suggest, echoing a similar suggestion by Karmiloff-Smith (1992), a developmental 
system 
 
could contain a procedure or mechanism that partitioned off certain tasks—shunting 
them into a dedicated developmental pathway—under certain conditions, for 
example, when the cue structure of repeated instances of the task clustered tightly 
together, and when it was encountered repeatedly, as when highly practiced….Under 
this scenario, reading could still be recruiting an evolved system for object 
recognition, and yet phenotypically there could be distinct modules for reading and for 
other types of object recognition. 
 
5. Conclusion 
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It is true that language and other cognitive skills frequently dissociate from other skills, but 
redundancy puts this sort of modularization in its proper context. Redundancy predicates 
functional inheritance across tasks and task categories even when the tasks are implemented 
in spatially segregated neural networks. Thus dissociation evidence alone does not always 
indicate true functional specificity. In particular, these dissociations provide no evidence 
that language is cognitively special vis-à-vis other cognitive domains. 
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